Here's an idea that's been rattling around my skull. Worth continuing?
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Sho Sho Sweet – A look back at the M1917 “Chauchat”, the Doughboy’s Sweetheart.
Part 1. The Arsenal of Liberty.
As we approach the centenary of the entry of the U.S.A. into the Great European War, we are taking the time to examine some of the most iconic symbols of that war. Though US military involvement in the war only lasted some 628 days – April 6, 1917 to the Christmas Armistice in 1918 – it’s economic involvement began almost before Archduke Ferdinand corpse cooled. While it wasn’t the world’s biggest economic power in 1914, the agricultural and industrial might wielded by America was nonetheless impressive. From blankets to beans, shoes to shovels, trucks to tinned beef, the Entente soon beat a path to the “Emporium Americain”.
It was no surprise, then, when American gunmakers began to contract with the belligerents to supply rifles, handguns, and ammunition to supplement their increasingly strained domestic production. While America’s military arsenals only produced 25,000 rifles in 1914, Winchester alone churned out nearly 65,000 of their lever action rifles alone – not counting single shots, automatics, shotguns and smallbore rimfires. And they were not alone. New York and New England was full of arms companies - Remington, Marlin, Savage, Hopkins and Allen, Harrington and Richardson, Stevens, and scores of smaller manufacturers - many of whom were running at reduced capacity as a result of the Recession of 1913. In short, there was a demand for gun, and American industry was willing and more than capable of fulfilling it.
While a great deal has been written about America’s pre-war participation in the GEW, popularily referred to as the Arsenal of Liberty, we’re going to concentrate on the unlikely development and success of one of the most iconic weapons of the war, and it’s role in the following decade of turmoil in North America. By most accounts, the Remington-Chauchat M1917 should have been a complete failure. The original French Fusile Mitrallieur 1915 CSRG was at best problematic – the generally poor workmanship by non-gunmaking subcontractors and poor materials exacerbated some intrinsic design flaws. An open sided magazine allowed a direct path for mud, dirt, dust and debris to enter the weapons action – which was itself fairly complex. Heat treatment for many components was sub-standard, leading to premature wear and failure. Poor quality control in manufacturing led to a mass-produced gun that ironically required a great deal of skilled hand-fitting. Perhaps the most persistent design flaw was related directly to the gun’s long-recoil action.
Broadly speaking, automatic weapons can be broken down into three categories based on the method used to cycle the action. Blowback actions simply allow the weapon’s bolt to be pushed back by the same gas pressure that is pushing the bullet out – with some sort of delay to prevent the bolt from opening too quickly and exploding. Gas operated actions tap a small amount of the gas pushing the bullet out of the barrel to mechanically unlock and cycle the action. Recoil operated actions used the Newtonian reaction of the bullet being pushed out of the barrel – recoil – to mechanically unlock and cycle the action.
Recoil operated actions can be further broken down into short recoil mechanisms, where the recoiling parts only travel a short distance to unlock the action, the weapon relying on inertia of the working parts to complete the cycle. Long recoil actions, on the other hand, are fully locked for the entire first half of the firing cycle. Barrel and bolt travel together, locked, well over the length of the cartridge during extraction. At the fullest travel, the bolt is latched to the rear, and the barrel is pushed forward by a spring – exposing and ejecting the spent shell. Once it returns to it’s home position, the bolt is unlatched and is pushed forward by it’s own spring, stripping a fresh cartridge out of the magazine as it passes before locking.
The long recoil mechanism used in the Chauchat has some advantages, such as it’s relative insensitivity to ammunition quality and power. The long travel of the mechanical components absorbed a great deal of the recoil felt by the gunner, and the long travel also resulted in a very sedate rate of fire. This was a benefit, not only for control by the gunner, but because it mitigated the weapon’s horrendous tendency to overheat. The Achillies heel of the Chauchat was the bushing that supported the barrel at the front of the weapon. It needed to be fitted closely to the barrel to fully support it and assure some degree of accuracy. But during firing, the barrel would expand from heat and invariably sieze into the bushing, often in as few as 300 rounds. The Chauchat would be jammed solidly, until the barrel cooled enough to shrink to it’s original size. Early reports from French service describe soldiers urinating on the gun to hasten the cooling and get weapons back into action.
In spite of the faults, the CSRG 1915 did have two redeeming qualities. It was cheap, and it was easy to produce. As the saying goes, “Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien.” And while far, far from perfect, cheap and plentiful firepower certainly looked good in 1915.
This probably would have been the Chauchat’s legacy – good enough, but never good. However, in late 1915, France sent a contingent to America to secure production of their Mle 1907/15 Berthier rifle. A simpler and more modern design than the Mle 1886 Lebel rifle, the Berthier rifle was in full production at French arsenals. Even so, attrition on the Western Front meant continual shortages of rifles – so much so that the French had purchased some 100,000 single-shot Rolling Block rifles from Remington to arm second-line troops and free up serviceable rifles for combat. Impressed by the quality and price of the Remington rifles, the French sought to have the Berthier rifles manufactured once the Rolling Block contract was filled.
The French contingent was made up of purchasing agents and government officials, along with armorers familiar with the Berthier design. Their job was to assess the capability of the American gun factories – fearful, perhaps, that making guns for combat was too much for makers of guns for cowboys. And so, in 1915, Colonel Charles Sutter – the “S” in CSRG – found himself touring Remington’s plant in Illion, New York. A last minute substitution, Sutter was never part of the Berthier commision. But he was a well-regarded senior armorer, and when the original armorer selected to travel to America was incapacitated by gout, Sutter was sent in his stead. In hindsight, it was serendipity.
During the tour of Remington’s plant, Sutter saw gunsmiths manufacturing hundreds of the Model 8 rifles and Model 11 shotguns. Designed by American gun designer John Browning, the Model 8 and Model 11 were the first truly practical semi-automatic sporting arms manufactured en masse – and they were the long-recoil operated. Indeed, Louis Chauchat had borrowed features from both during development of the CSRG 1915. Sutter immediately realized the implications – here was a firearms maker, fully familiar with automatic arms, mass producing them with exceptional quality. Immediately, he began to push back against having Remington contract to built Berthiers. “What will more quickly win this war?” he wrote, “200,000 rifles for 200,000 soldiers, or 200,000 machine rifles that equal 2,000,000 soldiers?” It was perhaps hyperbole, but the point was undeniable.
Despite resistance from some parts of the French ordinance department, Sutter returned to Remington in February of 1916 with blueprints and samples of the Chauchat. Initially, Remington’s engineers were lukewarm to the idea. As it stood, the Chauchat was actually below Remington’s ability to produce. It made extensive use of stamped parts and commercial tubing, neither of which Remington had much experience in. However, the allure of a lucrative military contract was enough for Remington to commit it’s best designer to the project: John Pedersen.
Immediately, Pedersen began to work with Sutter (through a translator) to “Americanize” the Chauchat. In a reversal of the normal scenario, forged parts were designed to replace stamped, and frame pieces were milled from solid steel instead of welded and brazed tubing. Metric dimensions were translated to English, and by April, Pedersen and Sutter had 50 pre-production samples ready for testing.
The prototypes overheated and jammed. The magazines were easily bent and damaged. Dirt constantly found it’s way into the gun, requiring frequent stops for cleaning. In short, it performed like a Chauchat, though they proved more durable and required much less hand fitting. Sutter was delighted. Pedersen was less so. The two argued about whether to improve the design, and delay it’s introduction to service, or start churning them out and fix the problems on the fly. In the end, good enough won out. By June, 12,000 CSRG 1915/R machine guns had been shipped to France, and hundred rolled out of Remington’s plant each day. They were well received by the French Army, being significantly more durable and reliable than the domestically produced Chauchats. As time went on, the influx of Remington Chauchats allowed the French to slow domestic production and improve the quality of the home-grown products. But these were always regarded as less desirable by line units, and the feeling was shared by the High Command. Evidence of this is borne out by the fact that, after the war, the when the French Army was discarding large numbers of surplus weapons, it kept the CSRG 1915/R for regular issue, and sold off the French built models entirely. By the end of the war, 300,000 Chauchats had been delivered – 210,000 of the Remington 1915/R, and the balance by various French manufacturers.
This could have been the end of the story, had it not been for some nosy Russian officers who was also in Illion purchasing rifles. Faced by worse shortages than the French, the Imperial Army was already contracting with Remington to manufacture the Mosin Nagant Model 1891 rifle – along with similar contracts with New England Westinghouse for the same rifles, and contracts with Winchester for their Model 1895 lever-action rifle, chambered in the Russian 7.62mm cartridge. At some point during early May of 1916, the Russians expressed interest in having Remington produce the Chauchat for them. At first, they were willing to simply have a portion of the French production diverted to them, but Pedersen saw an opportunity to improve the design. The Russians were skeptical at first, but when they saw Pedersen’s proposed improvements they enthusiastically agreed. By mid-June, the Russian prototypes were ready.
The most recognizable improvement was to the magazine. The open ports on the side were eliminated, thicker steel was introduced, and stiffening ribs stamped into the steel. The distinctive half-moon shape of the magazine was retained, because of the similar shape of the Russian 7.62mm cartridge to the French round. However, the slightly smaller diameter of the Russian shell allowed the magazine capacity to increase to 22 rounds, up from the original 20. 7.62mm barrels were chambered in the Russian cartridge, and the barrels were made slightly heavier with had longitudinal flutes to better dissapate heat.
Pedersen’s best improvement was hidden out of sight, but made all the difference. The problematic barrel bushing was redesigned, and the jams from overheating were almost eliminated. Pedersens new bushing still supported the barrel fully, but instead of being a basic cylinder in shape, it had two semi-spherical knobs in it’s inside bore, oriented to the top of the gun. A a third knob was located in the bottom of the bushing, centered between the upper knobs. The bottom knob was spring loaded, and put constant pressure on the barrel upwards. This centered the barrel consistently between two fixed points, yet was able to accommodate the swelling of the barrel when heated. The semi-spherical bushings reduced friction in the mechanism, and similar relief cuts elsewhere reduced drag throughout.
The design improvements worked beyond anyone’s expectations. The reduced friction resulted in a slight increase in rate of fire – 270 rounds a minute for the Russian Model, compared to 250 rounds a minute for the standard CSRG. The closed magazine kept dirt out, and a spring-loaded dust cover kept the action covered when not in action. The new bushing actually improved accuracy, though extended firing would still see a change in point of impact because of heat distortion. The combination of the bushing and the fluted barrel that resulted in an elimination of heat seizures. The low rate of fire, small magazine capacity, and reloading time meant that heat buildup was less overall than similar weapons like the Lewis. It still wasn’t perfect, but it was a lot closer than before.
The Russians enthusiastically embraced to improved gun, and adopted it as the автомат Педерсен1916 (Automatic Rifle Pedersen 1916) or AP16, completely ignoring the French origin of the weapon. While it cost three times more than a Mosin Nagant and took three times longer to produce, the Imperial Army immediately ordered 50,000, and quickly increased the order to 200,000. Only a fraction of the Russian contract, perhaps 20,000, actually made it to Russia. By all accounts, the AP16 performed well on the Eastern Front. In spite of it’s complexity, it performed well in freezing temperatures. It was easy to operate, easy to transport and gave the Russian soldiers a much needed edge over their German and Austrian enemies. However, Russia was a mess by 1917, and the February Revolution dragged the country into chaos. Shipment of the remaining AP16’s, along with hundreds of thousands of Mosin Nagant rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition, was halted because of non-payment.
This proved a godsend. By April, America - whose entire army had only 600,000 rifles and 600 machine guns - was at war.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Sho Sho Sweet – A look back at the M1917 “Chauchat”, the Doughboy’s Sweetheart.
Part 1. The Arsenal of Liberty.
As we approach the centenary of the entry of the U.S.A. into the Great European War, we are taking the time to examine some of the most iconic symbols of that war. Though US military involvement in the war only lasted some 628 days – April 6, 1917 to the Christmas Armistice in 1918 – it’s economic involvement began almost before Archduke Ferdinand corpse cooled. While it wasn’t the world’s biggest economic power in 1914, the agricultural and industrial might wielded by America was nonetheless impressive. From blankets to beans, shoes to shovels, trucks to tinned beef, the Entente soon beat a path to the “Emporium Americain”.
It was no surprise, then, when American gunmakers began to contract with the belligerents to supply rifles, handguns, and ammunition to supplement their increasingly strained domestic production. While America’s military arsenals only produced 25,000 rifles in 1914, Winchester alone churned out nearly 65,000 of their lever action rifles alone – not counting single shots, automatics, shotguns and smallbore rimfires. And they were not alone. New York and New England was full of arms companies - Remington, Marlin, Savage, Hopkins and Allen, Harrington and Richardson, Stevens, and scores of smaller manufacturers - many of whom were running at reduced capacity as a result of the Recession of 1913. In short, there was a demand for gun, and American industry was willing and more than capable of fulfilling it.
While a great deal has been written about America’s pre-war participation in the GEW, popularily referred to as the Arsenal of Liberty, we’re going to concentrate on the unlikely development and success of one of the most iconic weapons of the war, and it’s role in the following decade of turmoil in North America. By most accounts, the Remington-Chauchat M1917 should have been a complete failure. The original French Fusile Mitrallieur 1915 CSRG was at best problematic – the generally poor workmanship by non-gunmaking subcontractors and poor materials exacerbated some intrinsic design flaws. An open sided magazine allowed a direct path for mud, dirt, dust and debris to enter the weapons action – which was itself fairly complex. Heat treatment for many components was sub-standard, leading to premature wear and failure. Poor quality control in manufacturing led to a mass-produced gun that ironically required a great deal of skilled hand-fitting. Perhaps the most persistent design flaw was related directly to the gun’s long-recoil action.
Broadly speaking, automatic weapons can be broken down into three categories based on the method used to cycle the action. Blowback actions simply allow the weapon’s bolt to be pushed back by the same gas pressure that is pushing the bullet out – with some sort of delay to prevent the bolt from opening too quickly and exploding. Gas operated actions tap a small amount of the gas pushing the bullet out of the barrel to mechanically unlock and cycle the action. Recoil operated actions used the Newtonian reaction of the bullet being pushed out of the barrel – recoil – to mechanically unlock and cycle the action.
Recoil operated actions can be further broken down into short recoil mechanisms, where the recoiling parts only travel a short distance to unlock the action, the weapon relying on inertia of the working parts to complete the cycle. Long recoil actions, on the other hand, are fully locked for the entire first half of the firing cycle. Barrel and bolt travel together, locked, well over the length of the cartridge during extraction. At the fullest travel, the bolt is latched to the rear, and the barrel is pushed forward by a spring – exposing and ejecting the spent shell. Once it returns to it’s home position, the bolt is unlatched and is pushed forward by it’s own spring, stripping a fresh cartridge out of the magazine as it passes before locking.
The long recoil mechanism used in the Chauchat has some advantages, such as it’s relative insensitivity to ammunition quality and power. The long travel of the mechanical components absorbed a great deal of the recoil felt by the gunner, and the long travel also resulted in a very sedate rate of fire. This was a benefit, not only for control by the gunner, but because it mitigated the weapon’s horrendous tendency to overheat. The Achillies heel of the Chauchat was the bushing that supported the barrel at the front of the weapon. It needed to be fitted closely to the barrel to fully support it and assure some degree of accuracy. But during firing, the barrel would expand from heat and invariably sieze into the bushing, often in as few as 300 rounds. The Chauchat would be jammed solidly, until the barrel cooled enough to shrink to it’s original size. Early reports from French service describe soldiers urinating on the gun to hasten the cooling and get weapons back into action.
In spite of the faults, the CSRG 1915 did have two redeeming qualities. It was cheap, and it was easy to produce. As the saying goes, “Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien.” And while far, far from perfect, cheap and plentiful firepower certainly looked good in 1915.
This probably would have been the Chauchat’s legacy – good enough, but never good. However, in late 1915, France sent a contingent to America to secure production of their Mle 1907/15 Berthier rifle. A simpler and more modern design than the Mle 1886 Lebel rifle, the Berthier rifle was in full production at French arsenals. Even so, attrition on the Western Front meant continual shortages of rifles – so much so that the French had purchased some 100,000 single-shot Rolling Block rifles from Remington to arm second-line troops and free up serviceable rifles for combat. Impressed by the quality and price of the Remington rifles, the French sought to have the Berthier rifles manufactured once the Rolling Block contract was filled.
The French contingent was made up of purchasing agents and government officials, along with armorers familiar with the Berthier design. Their job was to assess the capability of the American gun factories – fearful, perhaps, that making guns for combat was too much for makers of guns for cowboys. And so, in 1915, Colonel Charles Sutter – the “S” in CSRG – found himself touring Remington’s plant in Illion, New York. A last minute substitution, Sutter was never part of the Berthier commision. But he was a well-regarded senior armorer, and when the original armorer selected to travel to America was incapacitated by gout, Sutter was sent in his stead. In hindsight, it was serendipity.
During the tour of Remington’s plant, Sutter saw gunsmiths manufacturing hundreds of the Model 8 rifles and Model 11 shotguns. Designed by American gun designer John Browning, the Model 8 and Model 11 were the first truly practical semi-automatic sporting arms manufactured en masse – and they were the long-recoil operated. Indeed, Louis Chauchat had borrowed features from both during development of the CSRG 1915. Sutter immediately realized the implications – here was a firearms maker, fully familiar with automatic arms, mass producing them with exceptional quality. Immediately, he began to push back against having Remington contract to built Berthiers. “What will more quickly win this war?” he wrote, “200,000 rifles for 200,000 soldiers, or 200,000 machine rifles that equal 2,000,000 soldiers?” It was perhaps hyperbole, but the point was undeniable.
Despite resistance from some parts of the French ordinance department, Sutter returned to Remington in February of 1916 with blueprints and samples of the Chauchat. Initially, Remington’s engineers were lukewarm to the idea. As it stood, the Chauchat was actually below Remington’s ability to produce. It made extensive use of stamped parts and commercial tubing, neither of which Remington had much experience in. However, the allure of a lucrative military contract was enough for Remington to commit it’s best designer to the project: John Pedersen.
Immediately, Pedersen began to work with Sutter (through a translator) to “Americanize” the Chauchat. In a reversal of the normal scenario, forged parts were designed to replace stamped, and frame pieces were milled from solid steel instead of welded and brazed tubing. Metric dimensions were translated to English, and by April, Pedersen and Sutter had 50 pre-production samples ready for testing.
The prototypes overheated and jammed. The magazines were easily bent and damaged. Dirt constantly found it’s way into the gun, requiring frequent stops for cleaning. In short, it performed like a Chauchat, though they proved more durable and required much less hand fitting. Sutter was delighted. Pedersen was less so. The two argued about whether to improve the design, and delay it’s introduction to service, or start churning them out and fix the problems on the fly. In the end, good enough won out. By June, 12,000 CSRG 1915/R machine guns had been shipped to France, and hundred rolled out of Remington’s plant each day. They were well received by the French Army, being significantly more durable and reliable than the domestically produced Chauchats. As time went on, the influx of Remington Chauchats allowed the French to slow domestic production and improve the quality of the home-grown products. But these were always regarded as less desirable by line units, and the feeling was shared by the High Command. Evidence of this is borne out by the fact that, after the war, the when the French Army was discarding large numbers of surplus weapons, it kept the CSRG 1915/R for regular issue, and sold off the French built models entirely. By the end of the war, 300,000 Chauchats had been delivered – 210,000 of the Remington 1915/R, and the balance by various French manufacturers.
This could have been the end of the story, had it not been for some nosy Russian officers who was also in Illion purchasing rifles. Faced by worse shortages than the French, the Imperial Army was already contracting with Remington to manufacture the Mosin Nagant Model 1891 rifle – along with similar contracts with New England Westinghouse for the same rifles, and contracts with Winchester for their Model 1895 lever-action rifle, chambered in the Russian 7.62mm cartridge. At some point during early May of 1916, the Russians expressed interest in having Remington produce the Chauchat for them. At first, they were willing to simply have a portion of the French production diverted to them, but Pedersen saw an opportunity to improve the design. The Russians were skeptical at first, but when they saw Pedersen’s proposed improvements they enthusiastically agreed. By mid-June, the Russian prototypes were ready.
The most recognizable improvement was to the magazine. The open ports on the side were eliminated, thicker steel was introduced, and stiffening ribs stamped into the steel. The distinctive half-moon shape of the magazine was retained, because of the similar shape of the Russian 7.62mm cartridge to the French round. However, the slightly smaller diameter of the Russian shell allowed the magazine capacity to increase to 22 rounds, up from the original 20. 7.62mm barrels were chambered in the Russian cartridge, and the barrels were made slightly heavier with had longitudinal flutes to better dissapate heat.
Pedersen’s best improvement was hidden out of sight, but made all the difference. The problematic barrel bushing was redesigned, and the jams from overheating were almost eliminated. Pedersens new bushing still supported the barrel fully, but instead of being a basic cylinder in shape, it had two semi-spherical knobs in it’s inside bore, oriented to the top of the gun. A a third knob was located in the bottom of the bushing, centered between the upper knobs. The bottom knob was spring loaded, and put constant pressure on the barrel upwards. This centered the barrel consistently between two fixed points, yet was able to accommodate the swelling of the barrel when heated. The semi-spherical bushings reduced friction in the mechanism, and similar relief cuts elsewhere reduced drag throughout.
The design improvements worked beyond anyone’s expectations. The reduced friction resulted in a slight increase in rate of fire – 270 rounds a minute for the Russian Model, compared to 250 rounds a minute for the standard CSRG. The closed magazine kept dirt out, and a spring-loaded dust cover kept the action covered when not in action. The new bushing actually improved accuracy, though extended firing would still see a change in point of impact because of heat distortion. The combination of the bushing and the fluted barrel that resulted in an elimination of heat seizures. The low rate of fire, small magazine capacity, and reloading time meant that heat buildup was less overall than similar weapons like the Lewis. It still wasn’t perfect, but it was a lot closer than before.
The Russians enthusiastically embraced to improved gun, and adopted it as the автомат Педерсен1916 (Automatic Rifle Pedersen 1916) or AP16, completely ignoring the French origin of the weapon. While it cost three times more than a Mosin Nagant and took three times longer to produce, the Imperial Army immediately ordered 50,000, and quickly increased the order to 200,000. Only a fraction of the Russian contract, perhaps 20,000, actually made it to Russia. By all accounts, the AP16 performed well on the Eastern Front. In spite of it’s complexity, it performed well in freezing temperatures. It was easy to operate, easy to transport and gave the Russian soldiers a much needed edge over their German and Austrian enemies. However, Russia was a mess by 1917, and the February Revolution dragged the country into chaos. Shipment of the remaining AP16’s, along with hundreds of thousands of Mosin Nagant rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition, was halted because of non-payment.
This proved a godsend. By April, America - whose entire army had only 600,000 rifles and 600 machine guns - was at war.
