Regarding India, I would be a bit surprised if the long period of war and near-total cutoff of European trade hadn't spurred a local expansion of some industries, at the very least war-related ones.
Previous Indian production for export probably fell by the wayside relatively quickly given the sudden and total absence of European and Japanese demand for such commodities, but compared to Africa, India (at least in places) has a much greater endowment of infrastructure and ports complimentary to its large population. Given near absolute domestic autonomy, the Indian government is unlikely to be at all hostile to domestic developments that in the past would have caused British producers to lobby for controls or protection, and the economic dislocation provides opportunities for Indian investors, entrepreneurs, or would-be industrialists.
The US economy is not a bottomless well of production, either, and India could well have a comparative advantage in producing Commonwealth material, at least of the less capital intensive sort. Unlike Britain, India is also entirely out of reach of German bombardment.
Politically, if the Japanese failed to penetrate Burma and Bengal given Anglo-American redeployment to the Pacific theater, the wartime famine in India may well have been entirely avoided. Stable trade in its rice staples and war industry demands could be leaving the average Indian's standard of living stable or rising through the entire war period. This, coupled with India's growing autonomy, probably lowers the temperature of political disputes quite a bit, even if underlying differences will come to the fore when the war actually ends.
On another topic: Since the US in OTL symbolically ended the prohibition of Chinese immigration, and the relative absence of unemployment, has there been any Chinese migration to the US since the surrender of Japan? The US might not have the same manpower concerns as the British, but it doesn't have an infinite workforce either.