Stronger Russia in WWI

Grey Wolf said:
Oh I thought this said STRANGER Russia

Grey Wolf

I think having a larger Russian army and a smaller German one would make some differences in 1915. Germany might be forced to send some troops east.
 
Russian officers are trained that it is far more appropriate at times to kneel, squat or get down on their stomachs in order to avoid enemy fire. This is one problem I've heard the Russians had, their officers were determined to remain standing during combat.
 
David S Poepoe said:
Russian officers are trained that it is far more appropriate at times to kneel, squat or get down on their stomachs in order to avoid enemy fire. This is one problem I've heard the Russians had, their officers were determined to remain standing during combat.

That could do it, but what are the results?
 
David S Poepoe said:
Russian officers are trained that it is far more appropriate at times to kneel, squat or get down on their stomachs in order to avoid enemy fire. This is one problem I've heard the Russians had, their officers were determined to remain standing during combat.

Italian officers too took horrible losses on the Alpine front b/c of this brave but suicide attitude. they had to receive explicit orders not to expose themselves, and NCOs were "produced" at an accelerated pace to fill the gaps in the chain of command.
 
Brilliantlight said:
What if the Russian army was better trained and thus takes 20% less casualties and inflicting 20% in 1914?

I don't think that training was really the issue. When competently lead, Russian troops fought very well in World War I. But there was a severe lack of competent leadership. If most Russian generals had been of the caliber of Alexi Brusilov...especially at the highest levels, where incompetence was especially rampant...Russia would have done much, much better.
 
robertp6165 said:
I don't think that training was really the issue. When competently lead, Russian troops fought very well in World War I. But there was a severe lack of competent leadership. If most Russian generals had been of the caliber of Alexi Brusilov...especially at the highest levels, where incompetence was especially rampant...Russia would have done much, much better.

Better training includes better training of officers.
 
Brilliantlight said:
Better training includes better training of officers.

But at the level I am talking about, training is not what makes a good officer. Russian officers went to a military academy but still ended up incompetant. There has to be some natural military ability...aggressiveness, willingness to take risks, yet seasoned by the ability to judge when those risks are justified. This is not something that can be taught...the officer just has to have it.
 
robertp6165 said:
But at the level I am talking about, training is not what makes a good officer. Russian officers went to a military academy but still ended up incompetant. There has to be some natural military ability...aggressiveness, willingness to take risks, yet seasoned by the ability to judge when those risks are justified. This is not something that can be taught...the officer just has to have it.

Somehow I find it hard to believe that Russians are incapable of learning when to be aggresive and when not.
 
Aggression--something that can be taught? Methinks not...

Brilliantlight said:
Somehow I find it hard to believe that Russians are incapable of learning when to be aggresive and when not.

Aggression is not something that is taught. It is a quality one has. George McClellan was no doubt taught in West Point that aggression was a good quality in commanders. He would have studied the campaigns of Napoleon, Alexander, Caesar, all the great captains. But he had no natural aggressiveness, and even though he without a doubt INTELLECTUALLY knew that he should be aggressive, it was not in his makeup to be so. The problem with the Russian General Staff in the First World War was that it was populated by McClellans and not by Lees or Grants, with the nearly sole exception of Alexi Brusilov.
 
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The basic problem with the Russian army's upper leadership was that generals were also courtiers, and their standing depended on thei success, they were thus very reluctant to take risks (especially after the traumatic defeats of 1915), except with their mens lives, which were seen as worthless, this contempt for the infantry also hindered co-operation with the artillery, with gunners far more concerned with saving their weapons when threatened than with supporting the "cattle" at the front, largely counterbalancing the basically good level of professional competence in the Tsarist artillery.


If the tsar had left his uncle Nicholas in command of the army in 1915 court politics might have been less influential, and the commander in chief would have had sufficient social prestiege to actually issue orders to teh front commanders 9nicholas was reluctatn to intervene directly when he took over as CinC, and Alexeev was too timid).

To get improved loss ratios in 1914 you could simply have the two armies invading East Prussia cooperate properly, preventing the Germans from focusing their outnumbered forces against each in turn. Alternatively the Russians could have abandoined the idea of invading East Prussia and concentrated all their efforts on the Habsburgs, turning OTL's successes into a decisive victory. Either of these would have a major impact on 1915, the first might leave a portion of german soil in foreign hands whilst the second would certainly force the gemans to provide massive support to their Habsburg allies months earlier than in OTL.
 
Russian mobilisation 1914 not so disorganised

WI also the initial Russian mobilisation in Aug 1914 hadn't been so haphazard, and the massive nos. of Russian soldiers in the steamroller had been better equipped and organised instead of many being sent into combat without rifles ? Of course, this presupposes that STAVKA possesses a better more competent and organised planning staff.

BTW, I recall that Dale Cozort wrote an article on his website focussing on a stronger Russia in 1916 as a result of a successful Dardanelles campaign.
 
Matthew Craw said:
Alternatively the Russians could have abandoined the idea of invading East Prussia and concentrated all their efforts on the Habsburgs, turning OTL's successes into a decisive victory. Either of these would have a major impact on 1915, the first might leave a portion of german soil in foreign hands whilst the second would certainly force the gemans to provide massive support to their Habsburg allies months earlier than in OTL.

That one sounds better to me. What would have happened if they slammed into Austria-Hungry full strength?
 
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