... once and again I'm astonished of the rigidity into the belief of unchangebility of for us historical events and their involved persons actions ...
Stalin offering France and Czechoslovakia military support against germany during the Sudeten-crisis for being involved into the Munich conference was rejected by France at least. Likely one reason Stalin still didn't turn down the negotiations that eventually lead to the MR-pact (
economical talks were already taking place for some time then).
Stalin - not being the most unemotional human - could have felt even more ... "pissed" than IOTL ...
The occupation of Czechia after Slovakia had seceeded and declared its independence on 14th March (
thereby removing the 'object' of the Munich agreement -Czechoslovakia- making it superfluous, esp. after its sovereignity had already been more or less destroyed by the First Vianna Award in november 1938) rather led to an increase of diplomatic activity between Germany and the USSR.
The silent impotence of the western powers when Hitler Germany occupied the Memelland (Klaipeda Region) on 22nd March also didn't much to strengthen Stalins 'confidence' into them instead making a possible deal – however (
inofficially) timely ‚limited‘ - with Hitler becomming even more attractive with one ruthless dictator looking at another one.
What these events IMHO also show:
Hitler – despite his since early 1938 repeatedly and with increasing urge uttered wishes for going to WAR (
for whatever reason available) – was well able to withdraw this urge and cashier in some ‚victories‘ without even a shot fired.
Sudeten on Munich in September 1938, the Protectorate mid-March 1939, Klaipeda end-March 1939. Three opportunities he loudly cried first for war but then went with the ‚diplomatic‘ not the militaristic solution.
Why not also a forth time given the opportunity?
Serious talks between german and soviet diplomacy abaout some agreement began in early August after the economical talks had reached their home straight accompanied by in soviet perception rather dilatory military talks with France and Britain.
At that time the
Battles of Khalkin Gol had reached some ‚stalemate‘ phase with Tokyos repeatedly stated desire to not escalate this conflict further (
what Zhukov used to strongly reinforce his troops). Therefore this front could be - the one way or the other – considered ‚safe‘ by Stalin. And with the successfull offensive of Zhukov starting on 20th August and continuing all thriugh the rest of the month this ‚safety of the East‘ can only increase.
I'm confident a/the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact will occur very likely almost as IOTL.
------------ now for some "alternate history" ---------
When Hitler gets Mussolinis message of his non-readiness for war on evening 25th he might not only withdraw as IOTL the already given order for the attack on Poland for 04:30 of the 26th August. But also during the now following ranting fit (
as they were all the time every time possible on getting unwanted info) about Musso ‚stabbing him into the back‘ by lying (
at least as such perceived) on Italys war readiness he decides – at least for the time being – to return to his original time table about war readiness in 1940 (
remember 4-Year-Plan statements of 1936).
And: No
Hitler never seriously thought about economics not even the one necessary for war and would therefore not have seen or even cared about – would he have seen it - the ‚brokeness‘ (
glory to his lordship Saint Tooze) of germany. But … some others might have and might have contemplated some changes to the
German-Soviet Credit Agreement of 19th August esp. regarding possible increases of soviet deliverances.
The polish crisis at hands might be prolongated ITTL with Hitler allowing for a polish emissary to show up in Berlin, with some deliberate delays by the Poles producing an ‚empowered‘ emissary (
as IOTL), probably on 2nd or 3rd September with the british diplomacy strongly arguing/pressuring the Poles for (
as IOTL).
Maybe then at first polish-german only negotiations around the
16-Points-Plan may begin rather quickly augmented by british, french, italian diplomacy this time giving ample time for all involed and asked to comment upon these 16 points contarry to OTL.
USSR may once again ask for being involved what at such a point of time (after the MR-Pact) esp. the Poles wont be very fond of. Whatever might be decided upon this point the german diplomats keep – as a measure of good will – the soviets well informed about what’s going on.
First to second week of September:
Negotiations with the japanese go well, as well as the requested re-negotiation of German-Soviet Credit agreement. Stalin might already thsi time demand some changes to the ‚zones of interests’ of the secret protocol of the MR-Pact.
With the western powers once again showing their commitment ot appeasement as well as the afforementioned change in Stalins perception of them (as even more impotent while being pissed by them) he might even add – esp. Regarding Poland – some phrase hinting at a desire to strike against Poland ASAP.
Hitler also with the western allies once again negotiating in favor for him – their approval of something along the lines of said 16 point as a matter of buying time for their own rearmament becomming more and more obvious – began to further disregard them they becoming for the time being his MAYOR opponent to fight before turning for Lebensraum.
Therefore:
On 15th September not only the ceasefire for Khalkin Gol is signed but also a/the „
Berlin Agreement“ on some modified 16 points plan including Danzig becomming part of the Reich, a plebiscite of the corridor secured by international observers and securities with the guarantee of extraterritorial access to Baltic ports for whoever ‚looses‘ this plebiscite. In order to await the foreign asecurities (british, italian, french) german and polish troops are to withdraw from the borders.
Hitler begins to place these troops now to quite some degree on the western border (though not all, keeping ‚local troops‘ at their garrisons (in somewhat rather … cramped conditions). Polish troops might begin to be partially (still Germany is seen as more immediatly threatening esp. As the foreign securities are not in place yet) re-deployed to their eastern front, as slowly the russians have built up quite some troop concentrations there. …
However, with Hitler still posing as the more threatening threat on the western borders thereby offsetting fears of their possible interference ion Poland on about 20th September – after some border-incidents of polish troops only in the East – Stalin invades Poland.
tadaah