I tried to put through this idea in Peter’s TL. It is not up to me to judge how successful but in that TL in 1930s France is still an empire ruled by Bernadotte dynasty. 😉
So Evident a Danger: The Consequences of War between Britain, Prussia and Russia in 1791
- Thread starter Gwrtheyrn Annwn
- Start date
Well, not exactly because in both books he ends up leaving for France. But French-Russian relations are seriously changing. In my TL Europe is noticeably different so it shakes or, if you prefer, trembles but within the reasonable limits. 😉
Honestly, for all this talk of Bonaparte or Bernadotte- with another year of breathing room for France, I desperately hope to see some sort of lasting Republic.
I don't think I've ever seen a surviving Republic under the Indulgents, actually- so far as France in this period goes it always seems to be Bourbons, Bonaparte or the ultramontagnards.
I don't think I've ever seen a surviving Republic under the Indulgents, actually- so far as France in this period goes it always seems to be Bourbons, Bonaparte or the ultramontagnards.
Chapter 2 - Part 1 - "The only reward for so many sacrifices is to see the destruction of royalty" Testament Politique de Louis XVI, p. i
Chapter 2 - A Better Crown Awaits Me
Part 1 - "The only reward for so many sacrifices is to see the destruction of royalty" Testament Politique de Louis XVI, p. i
Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, Louis XVI, King of France and Navarre and Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette
As every school pupil knows, the French Revolution pre-dated the Ochakov Crisis by over a year. The Bastille Prison, that notorious symbol of Bourbon tyranny containing a few forgers and a handful of 'deviant' noblemen sent there by their families, had fallen in 1789. In the intervening period, France had been steadily drifting to what appeared to be a British-style political system. There had been bumps along the way but it looked for all the world, at least those that cared about it beyond celebrating France making trouble for itself, as though there would soon be a constitutional monarchy and an elected assembly governing the Kingdom of France. A dramatic change from pre-1789 France certainly, but nothing too radical in the Era of the Enlightenment. In reality, that was a veil of convenient fiction drawn over escalating chaos. The National Assembly had been the product of fierce political conflict in the Estates-General, the King and his family had been marched to the Tuileries in Paris as though they were prisoners rather than royalty, order was barely maintained by a citizen militia with greater loyalty to the revolutionary cause than the King or their commanding officer, the Marquis de Lafayette, Paris itself wielded more power through its Commune and the mob than arguably any other authority in France and many in the nobility were fleeing the country either for safety or to plot the overthrow of the revolution, or both.
Louis XVI had repeatedly professed his support for reform and had even shown his approval for the political changes of the revolution in public, but in private he had many doubts about how far the revolution had gone and bridled against his status as a virtual prisoner in a gilded cage. And well might he be concerned, the revolution had been uncontrollable by anyone thus far and, though it was presently mostly 'peaceful' and broadly supported, there was no telling how long that might last. Around the prisoner-king, French internal politics had fractured from the ministerial order of the ancien regime into a number of fluid factions. The King himself, who tried to be figurehead steering politics. His immediate family, namely his wife and brothers, who generally hated the revolution, had assorted plans to fight back and were somewhat cooperating with each other. His ministers, greatly reduced from a near monopoly on internal political power but still relevant, were divided amongst themselves with Armand Marc, Comte de Montmorin, as the de jure Chief Minister but Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau, as the de facto hub of power. The National Assembly was further divided, over just about every aspect of national governance, except perhaps the consensus on the importance of the King. They were notionally protected, like the King, by the National (but in reality primarily drawn from Paris) Guard. The Guard were officially commanded by Lafayette, who had his own ambitions to be the Hero of Two Worlds, but the Parisian women's forceful march of the royal family to the Tuileries and the events of 18th April 1791 had demonstrated, despite Lafayette's reforms after the 18th April, that the National Guard were by no means reliable.
The voice of the mob was supposed to be the Paris Commune, headed by the Mayor of Paris, Jean Sylain Bailly. Bailly himself was a Feuillant, a moderate constitutional monarchist, but had, like the Commune, at first been very popular. The institutions he and it operated through, however, were new and untested. The mob they sought to lead also often had their own ideas. A temperamental and fickle force, the mob could bay for blood one day, cheer 'vive le roi' the next and be entirely apathetic the day after that. They did not so much treat their social and political superiors as their voice as expect them to do what the mob wanted at any particular moment, usually revolving around the provision of bread. Already the power of the mob had been demonstrated on several occasions and, if they were roused by the tocsin, then the mob would have their way. There were some who tried to harness, or support, their force. Chief among their number were the Cordeliers Club, whose President was the lawyer Georges Danton, and the already notorious newspaper writer Jean-Paul Marat. Outside of Paris, the factions were harder to determine. The revolution and the Assembly were indeed national with wide support but, especially since the Assembly had been marched into Paris, Parisian dominance was resented in some quarters. Popular opinion outside the bourgeoisie tended to care more about bread prices than philosophic debates about the rights of man and many, as Louis XVI believed, still owned their loyalty to the King.
The church was also at war with itself. The aristocracy dominated the episcopal ranks, where believing in God or even living in the diocese were not required to be bishop. These bishops almost all tended to be strongly conservative but a handful, most famously Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Bishop of Autun, supported the revolutionary cause thus far. Another liberal minded clergyman, Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, had written the celebrate pamphlet, 'What is the Third Estate?', that, it wasn't too much of a stretch to argue, had helped start the whole thing. These men were far out of step with their fellows in the upper echelons of the church but right in with their juniors. The common parish clergymen were poor, overworked and denied access to high office. Almost to a man they had been some of the keenest and most effective supporters of the revolution and been instrumental in the Estates-General becoming the National Assembly. Since the introduction of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790, however, even these men had become riven with division. To top it all off, the French military was in a disastrous state. The army was hidebound with tradition and, as in the church, only an aristocrat could reach high rank. It was also beset with mutinies and only the artillery arm was up to date. The navy was marginally better in quality but significant numbers of its ships were laid up and the dock workers could not be paid to fix them. Both were functionally unusable for any major conflict, as neither crown nor assembly could bear the cost.
No wonder then that the other crowned heads of Europe, used to France's attempts at hegemony, relished the Bourbon monarchy's current difficulties. They also viewed them, despite Marie Antoinette's efforts to persuade her brother Leopold II, in particular, to intervene, as an internal matter. France could burn itself to the ground and no-one would have lifted a finger until the ashes were safe to sort through. In 1791, this certainly seemed possible. France was on a precipice and one wrong move could send it plummeting off into oblivion. That wrong move would be provided in June 1791 by Louis XVI.
Part 1 - "The only reward for so many sacrifices is to see the destruction of royalty" Testament Politique de Louis XVI, p. i
Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, Louis XVI, King of France and Navarre and Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette
As every school pupil knows, the French Revolution pre-dated the Ochakov Crisis by over a year. The Bastille Prison, that notorious symbol of Bourbon tyranny containing a few forgers and a handful of 'deviant' noblemen sent there by their families, had fallen in 1789. In the intervening period, France had been steadily drifting to what appeared to be a British-style political system. There had been bumps along the way but it looked for all the world, at least those that cared about it beyond celebrating France making trouble for itself, as though there would soon be a constitutional monarchy and an elected assembly governing the Kingdom of France. A dramatic change from pre-1789 France certainly, but nothing too radical in the Era of the Enlightenment. In reality, that was a veil of convenient fiction drawn over escalating chaos. The National Assembly had been the product of fierce political conflict in the Estates-General, the King and his family had been marched to the Tuileries in Paris as though they were prisoners rather than royalty, order was barely maintained by a citizen militia with greater loyalty to the revolutionary cause than the King or their commanding officer, the Marquis de Lafayette, Paris itself wielded more power through its Commune and the mob than arguably any other authority in France and many in the nobility were fleeing the country either for safety or to plot the overthrow of the revolution, or both.
Louis XVI had repeatedly professed his support for reform and had even shown his approval for the political changes of the revolution in public, but in private he had many doubts about how far the revolution had gone and bridled against his status as a virtual prisoner in a gilded cage. And well might he be concerned, the revolution had been uncontrollable by anyone thus far and, though it was presently mostly 'peaceful' and broadly supported, there was no telling how long that might last. Around the prisoner-king, French internal politics had fractured from the ministerial order of the ancien regime into a number of fluid factions. The King himself, who tried to be figurehead steering politics. His immediate family, namely his wife and brothers, who generally hated the revolution, had assorted plans to fight back and were somewhat cooperating with each other. His ministers, greatly reduced from a near monopoly on internal political power but still relevant, were divided amongst themselves with Armand Marc, Comte de Montmorin, as the de jure Chief Minister but Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau, as the de facto hub of power. The National Assembly was further divided, over just about every aspect of national governance, except perhaps the consensus on the importance of the King. They were notionally protected, like the King, by the National (but in reality primarily drawn from Paris) Guard. The Guard were officially commanded by Lafayette, who had his own ambitions to be the Hero of Two Worlds, but the Parisian women's forceful march of the royal family to the Tuileries and the events of 18th April 1791 had demonstrated, despite Lafayette's reforms after the 18th April, that the National Guard were by no means reliable.
The voice of the mob was supposed to be the Paris Commune, headed by the Mayor of Paris, Jean Sylain Bailly. Bailly himself was a Feuillant, a moderate constitutional monarchist, but had, like the Commune, at first been very popular. The institutions he and it operated through, however, were new and untested. The mob they sought to lead also often had their own ideas. A temperamental and fickle force, the mob could bay for blood one day, cheer 'vive le roi' the next and be entirely apathetic the day after that. They did not so much treat their social and political superiors as their voice as expect them to do what the mob wanted at any particular moment, usually revolving around the provision of bread. Already the power of the mob had been demonstrated on several occasions and, if they were roused by the tocsin, then the mob would have their way. There were some who tried to harness, or support, their force. Chief among their number were the Cordeliers Club, whose President was the lawyer Georges Danton, and the already notorious newspaper writer Jean-Paul Marat. Outside of Paris, the factions were harder to determine. The revolution and the Assembly were indeed national with wide support but, especially since the Assembly had been marched into Paris, Parisian dominance was resented in some quarters. Popular opinion outside the bourgeoisie tended to care more about bread prices than philosophic debates about the rights of man and many, as Louis XVI believed, still owned their loyalty to the King.
The church was also at war with itself. The aristocracy dominated the episcopal ranks, where believing in God or even living in the diocese were not required to be bishop. These bishops almost all tended to be strongly conservative but a handful, most famously Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Bishop of Autun, supported the revolutionary cause thus far. Another liberal minded clergyman, Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, had written the celebrate pamphlet, 'What is the Third Estate?', that, it wasn't too much of a stretch to argue, had helped start the whole thing. These men were far out of step with their fellows in the upper echelons of the church but right in with their juniors. The common parish clergymen were poor, overworked and denied access to high office. Almost to a man they had been some of the keenest and most effective supporters of the revolution and been instrumental in the Estates-General becoming the National Assembly. Since the introduction of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790, however, even these men had become riven with division. To top it all off, the French military was in a disastrous state. The army was hidebound with tradition and, as in the church, only an aristocrat could reach high rank. It was also beset with mutinies and only the artillery arm was up to date. The navy was marginally better in quality but significant numbers of its ships were laid up and the dock workers could not be paid to fix them. Both were functionally unusable for any major conflict, as neither crown nor assembly could bear the cost.
No wonder then that the other crowned heads of Europe, used to France's attempts at hegemony, relished the Bourbon monarchy's current difficulties. They also viewed them, despite Marie Antoinette's efforts to persuade her brother Leopold II, in particular, to intervene, as an internal matter. France could burn itself to the ground and no-one would have lifted a finger until the ashes were safe to sort through. In 1791, this certainly seemed possible. France was on a precipice and one wrong move could send it plummeting off into oblivion. That wrong move would be provided in June 1791 by Louis XVI.
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Bernadotte is certainly one of the better options, given he is already high (-ish) rank in 1790. Gives him a better chance then many of avoiding the butterflies interfering with his career.
Also something I have considered, there is a lot to consider in Revolutionary France and so much sadly, despite some very good recent TLs, often gets ignored.
And is a “political animal” and capable administrator unlike most of the republican generals. The additional bonuses are that he is much more flexible in his relations with others, may decide to preserve more of the republican trappings and would not necessarily to insist on being #1 military on the top of everything else, as Nappy did.
IMO the main problem with the continuation along the “revolutionary” line is that the Republic and then the Directorate had been pretty much stuck with the wars that did not have any clear purpose and which it was continuing to a noticeable degree out of fear of its own army. IIRC, either Barras or one of his colleagues said something to the effect that if the government would not keep its armies fighting, they’ll turn against it. So, objectively, we have the same expansionist mindset as under the Empire, just less successful.
As a “subjective” factor we have the military being unhappy because the government was routinely screwing up the supply side of the equation and the troops had been suffering from the shortage of everything they needed.
Combination of these two factors is not too conductive for the republican government having a long happy future ahead of it and it does not look like any of its members had any talents allowing to fix the situation. Which leds to a growingly good chance for a “strong man” from outside the government to take over in one form or another. And there were not too many potential candidates to that role. But precise form of a resulting regime does not have to be exactly the same as in OTL even if we assume that the “strong man” will decide to secure his position. The same goes for the policies of such a regime.
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Absolutely, he is a very interesting figure with some great potential for the TL. Who knows, maybe there will be a Napoleon vs. Bernadotte show down?
This is also entirely true, if France gets into a pan-continental war then radicalisation and a military emphasise is inevitable. But there is always the chance that France won't get stuck in that cycle, however unlikely.
Nothing bad whatsoever, they will definitely have a lovely time.
Personally (just my opinion), the open confrontation is unlikely because Bernadotte was very cautious in his political activities and preferred to act only if there were good odds (which he could create). Look at his “election campaign” in Sweden: he started as a clear underdog both in Sweden and France (the Danish candidate was #1 in both cases) and ended up, before making the decisive step, being the by far most popular candidate in Sweden, getting blessing from Nappy and, equally important, from Alexander (at least in theory Sweden was within his sphere of influence).
In OTL circa 1799 Bernadotte was not in a politically winning situation. He was a prominent figure, quite popular among the ‘republican’ officers in the army but not among the political elite and among the army republicans Moreau was more popular. The Bonaparte, not without the help of his clan, had a much stronger position in the political establishment and Bernadotte could not change this: he still had “Jacobine” stamp on his forehead 😉. Speaking of which, the open political confrontation is even less likely due to the fact that two most important political figures in the clan, Joseph and Lucien, happened to be Bernadotte’s (which most probably influenced his neutral position in Brumaire) close friends and he was considered something of a family member: while leaving upon his second Italian campaign Napoleon expected that in the case of some problems in Paris, Bernadotte with his army will come to save his family. Military confrontation is, IMO, out of the question.
Of course, there already were the signs of exhaustion on both French and Austrian side and, probably, more of a stalemate war would result in a mutually acceptable peace, instead of OTL humiliating one. However, it is not clear how long would it take and if the Directorate would be able to rule a peaceful France. There was a huge army which had to be paid and no OTL vassal territories to loot. And you can’t just disband most of it because majority of these people on all levels have no useful skills.
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Chapter 2 - Part 2 - "But the greatest sacrifice was reserved for His Majesty's heart." Testament Politique de Louis XVI, p. ii
Part 2 - "But the greatest sacrifice was reserved for His Majesty's heart." Testament Politique de Louis XVI, p. ii
François Claude Amour, Marquis de Bouillé and Axel von Fersen
[1] Primarily, the Day of Daggers on 28th February 1791.
[2] One of the Marquis de Bouillé's officers.
[3] Louise-Élisabeth de Croÿ, Marquise of Tourzel.
François Claude Amour, Marquis de Bouillé and Axel von Fersen
It would become a momentous episode in French, European and indeed world history, but the Flight to Montmedy first appeared to be an entirely internal affair. One more act in the ever-lengthening play of the French Revolution. Indeed, it passed almost without wider notice in the immediate aftermath, as the might of the great powers of Europe were focussed elsewhere. Only in Stockholm, where King Gustav III had used part of his substantial subsidy from Britain and Prussia to assist his French counterpart, and in Vienna, where Leopold II had at last been persuaded in early June to provide military support to Louis XVI if he could act independently, did the news attract more than a comment of mild interest. Gustav III, sympathetic to the plight of a King restrained having staged his own autocratic coup in 1772, had not helped out of his own initiative but in response to an appeal from his Minister to the King of France, Axel von Fersen. The Swedish Count was a favourite of Marie Antoinette and had been charged by her with orchestrating the escape plot that became the Flight to Montmedy. He had done remarkably well.
Marie Antoinette was also responsible for the apparent cooperation of her brother. She had worn him down relentlessly into agreeing, despite Florimond Claude, Comte de Mercy-Argenteau's dire assessment of the royal situation. Leopold II might never have expected to be called to honour his promise, the careful emphasis on Louis XVI's freedom of action recalls the similarly careful wording of his defence pact with Prussia, which itself was also motivated by events in France. Nonetheless, his sister had every intention of forcing him to do so and thus acted accordingly when it came to the escape plan. Louis XVI himself chaffed against his bonds after the humiliations of early 1791 [1] writing, "I owe it to myself, I owe it to my children, I owe it to my entire family to ensure that royal authority confirmed in my dynastic line through the test of time shall not be diminished in any respect." But Marie Antoinette was in full rebellion and restrained only by the secrecy necessary for the plot to succeed. And so, from April 1791, the royal family simultaneously redoubled their apparent support for the revolution in public, whilst Louis XVI increasingly relied on his wife, as he had since the death of Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, in 1787, to get them all out of this mess. He retained the final say, but the planning was otherwise left entirely in Marie Antoinette's hands.
She had displayed little aptitude for much else but balls and the generation of scandal since arriving in France in 1770 but here, at last, she found an unlikely talent. Whether by luck or skill, Axel von Fersen was an inspired choice. Their co-conspirator in the military, François Claude Amour, Marquis de Bouillé who commanded the frontier with the Austrian Netherlands and had recently gained notoriety for crushing a mutiny at Nancy, was also astute, if more obvious. From there, Marie Antoinette's role was primarily in letters to Leopold II as she left all the details to her favourite. Or rather, almost all of them. She and Louis XVI both would still make several decisions that managed to nearly scupper the whole scheme.
What von Fersen and Bouillé produced was, for everything else that happened subsequently, justifiably remembered afterwards by Jean Jacques Joseph Klinglin, Baron de Hattsatt, [2] as "our sublime conspiracy." The key aspects alone were remarkable, the royal family were to felee the Tulieres at night, as 'Madame de Korff', played by the royal governess [3], her two daughters the Dauphin and Madame Royal, her two serving women, Marie Antoinette and Louis XVI's sister Elizabeth, and her financial agent Monsieur Durand, Louis XVI himself. Madame de Korff was a reall Russian noblewoman who von Fersen had persuaded to 'lose' her papers and request new ones from the Parisian authourities for the royal family to use. They were to be accompanied by three bodyguards, chosen by Jean Antoine d'Agoult, the King's Bodyguard, and chosen well. von Fersen himself also companied them in the first escape from Paris as the coachmen. d'Agoult was also originally intended to come as well but was replaced by the Marquise of Tourzel. As the King and the Queen prioritised the welfare of their children, two nursemaids would join the party, which was travelling in a single ostentatious berline that had been specially built for 'Madame de Korff', outside Paris. von Fersen and Bouillé had both counselled for the royal family to travel in two smaller and faster carriages but were, nearly disastrously, overruled by the royal couple who wished to remained with their children.
Undaunted, von Fersen honed the Parisian escape. The berline was driven regularly through the streets of Paris to become a familiar sight and a loyal courtier, with a passing resemblance to the King, was dressed in royal finery for regular evening walks for the same purpose. von Fersen also timed his part of the route on multiple occasions to produce an exact timetable, whilst Bouillé's officers did the same elsewhere on the route. A second of Louis XVI's nearly disastrous decisions was to insist to leave the main route to Montmedy to instead go via Varennes, under the belief that it would make him less likely to be recognised. This route was fully timed and then a complete version of the timetable given to Louis XVI. On it was also marked where the royal family would be met by Bouillé's German and Swiss mercenary cavalry at the Somme-Vesle relay post near Chalons, and then by further detachments along the route until they joined Bouillé himself at Dun, 15 miles south of Montmedy, where he would be waiting with a large escort to go the rest of the way.
The plans were ready in May, but Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette would, in addition to the changes they had already made, continue to be indecisive. Louis XVI pushed the scheme back through the month and the pair were only finally convinced to act, and act immediately, when apparent confirmation of Leopold II's willingness to provide military aid arrived in early June. The date was at last set for 12th June and so Bouillé's cavalrymen were sent out on their false mission to escort a strongbox full of pay whilst von Fersen prepared the carriage for the vital first stage.
Marie Antoinette was also responsible for the apparent cooperation of her brother. She had worn him down relentlessly into agreeing, despite Florimond Claude, Comte de Mercy-Argenteau's dire assessment of the royal situation. Leopold II might never have expected to be called to honour his promise, the careful emphasis on Louis XVI's freedom of action recalls the similarly careful wording of his defence pact with Prussia, which itself was also motivated by events in France. Nonetheless, his sister had every intention of forcing him to do so and thus acted accordingly when it came to the escape plan. Louis XVI himself chaffed against his bonds after the humiliations of early 1791 [1] writing, "I owe it to myself, I owe it to my children, I owe it to my entire family to ensure that royal authority confirmed in my dynastic line through the test of time shall not be diminished in any respect." But Marie Antoinette was in full rebellion and restrained only by the secrecy necessary for the plot to succeed. And so, from April 1791, the royal family simultaneously redoubled their apparent support for the revolution in public, whilst Louis XVI increasingly relied on his wife, as he had since the death of Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, in 1787, to get them all out of this mess. He retained the final say, but the planning was otherwise left entirely in Marie Antoinette's hands.
She had displayed little aptitude for much else but balls and the generation of scandal since arriving in France in 1770 but here, at last, she found an unlikely talent. Whether by luck or skill, Axel von Fersen was an inspired choice. Their co-conspirator in the military, François Claude Amour, Marquis de Bouillé who commanded the frontier with the Austrian Netherlands and had recently gained notoriety for crushing a mutiny at Nancy, was also astute, if more obvious. From there, Marie Antoinette's role was primarily in letters to Leopold II as she left all the details to her favourite. Or rather, almost all of them. She and Louis XVI both would still make several decisions that managed to nearly scupper the whole scheme.
What von Fersen and Bouillé produced was, for everything else that happened subsequently, justifiably remembered afterwards by Jean Jacques Joseph Klinglin, Baron de Hattsatt, [2] as "our sublime conspiracy." The key aspects alone were remarkable, the royal family were to felee the Tulieres at night, as 'Madame de Korff', played by the royal governess [3], her two daughters the Dauphin and Madame Royal, her two serving women, Marie Antoinette and Louis XVI's sister Elizabeth, and her financial agent Monsieur Durand, Louis XVI himself. Madame de Korff was a reall Russian noblewoman who von Fersen had persuaded to 'lose' her papers and request new ones from the Parisian authourities for the royal family to use. They were to be accompanied by three bodyguards, chosen by Jean Antoine d'Agoult, the King's Bodyguard, and chosen well. von Fersen himself also companied them in the first escape from Paris as the coachmen. d'Agoult was also originally intended to come as well but was replaced by the Marquise of Tourzel. As the King and the Queen prioritised the welfare of their children, two nursemaids would join the party, which was travelling in a single ostentatious berline that had been specially built for 'Madame de Korff', outside Paris. von Fersen and Bouillé had both counselled for the royal family to travel in two smaller and faster carriages but were, nearly disastrously, overruled by the royal couple who wished to remained with their children.
Undaunted, von Fersen honed the Parisian escape. The berline was driven regularly through the streets of Paris to become a familiar sight and a loyal courtier, with a passing resemblance to the King, was dressed in royal finery for regular evening walks for the same purpose. von Fersen also timed his part of the route on multiple occasions to produce an exact timetable, whilst Bouillé's officers did the same elsewhere on the route. A second of Louis XVI's nearly disastrous decisions was to insist to leave the main route to Montmedy to instead go via Varennes, under the belief that it would make him less likely to be recognised. This route was fully timed and then a complete version of the timetable given to Louis XVI. On it was also marked where the royal family would be met by Bouillé's German and Swiss mercenary cavalry at the Somme-Vesle relay post near Chalons, and then by further detachments along the route until they joined Bouillé himself at Dun, 15 miles south of Montmedy, where he would be waiting with a large escort to go the rest of the way.
The plans were ready in May, but Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette would, in addition to the changes they had already made, continue to be indecisive. Louis XVI pushed the scheme back through the month and the pair were only finally convinced to act, and act immediately, when apparent confirmation of Leopold II's willingness to provide military aid arrived in early June. The date was at last set for 12th June and so Bouillé's cavalrymen were sent out on their false mission to escort a strongbox full of pay whilst von Fersen prepared the carriage for the vital first stage.
[1] Primarily, the Day of Daggers on 28th February 1791.
[2] One of the Marquis de Bouillé's officers.
[3] Louise-Élisabeth de Croÿ, Marquise of Tourzel.
The pieces are falling into place and it remains to be seen if the royal family also falls
Ah! ça ira, ça ira, ça ira
les aristocrates à la lanterne!
Ah! ça ira, ça ira, ça ira
les aristocrates on les pendra!
les aristocrates à la lanterne!
Ah! ça ira, ça ira, ça ira
les aristocrates on les pendra!
It does indeed remain to be seen...but whatever happens France will not be the same. And Europe probably won't be the same either.
And so the revolution begins!
I do hope to see where this, or perhaps something similar, could go. Lots of potential with a different revolution and the shifting power dynamics, both in France and aboard that would result. But no spoilers yet!
There are definitely interesting possibilities for the scenario in which Louis escapes. This, as I understand, implies that revolution did happen but reactions of the outside world could be quite different. Would it be safe to say that for the monarchist cause (in a broader sense) the dead Louis was much more helpful than Louis exiled?
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Both yes and no I would say, executing the king and queen in a Europe full of absolute monarchies was that made France a pariah. With Louis and Marie in exile foreign states will be less interested in intervening and likely wait to see. But on the other hand with a legitimate king in exile instead of a uncrowned pretender (no matter how legitimate his claim is) the monarchists will have more legitimacy and not being guilt of having executed the king, reestablish the monarchy will have far less personal consequences for the different revolutionary factions. If Robespierre still go down the deep end, inviting the king home under a constitutional monarchy will always be a option for his enemies.
Ramontxo
Donor
Yes, good thinking. In this TL the 1795 constitution could very well bring back an Constitutional Monarch. Or it may have to wait for the equivalent of Napoleon's coup
Constitution of the Year III - Wikipedia
Quite a few negotiations will have to occur, including bringing back the normal years instead of just making it year one of the revolution, I would think.Yes, good thinking. In this TL the 1795 constitution could very well bring back an Constitutional Monarch. Or it may have to wait for the equivalent of Napoleon's coup
Constitution of the Year III - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
Of course Charles I loss his head anyway, so it won't be a direct comparison, but I wonder if some will liken this more to the English civil war, Cromwell version. With the crowned heads basically agreeing that it's okay to have something like a Glorious Revolution where William and Mary eventually ended up reigning together in England.
Speaking of england, having just lost a war, it might be advantageous for the Americans to try to negotiate Jay's Treaty and get a little more out of Britain than they did in our timeline. It was roundly criticized in our timeline but perhaps wouldn't be as much if they could get a better deal from the British.
Then again, if they just go back to a constitutional monarchy by 1796, you're going to have Federalists saying to the Democrat-Republicans, "so what was all this fuss about again?"
Although with this also make the party rift less apparent and the French more acceptable to the Federalists?
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The revolution has already begun, yes, its onwards path will be quite different however.
its hard to say whether a living or dead Louis is more 'helpful' to the cause, as others have discussed, there are good arguments for both and depend on the character of the revolution. A living Louis is arguably better for seeking help but equally makes the revolution less hated, especially if they were try and find an alternative monarch to Louis for example.
A fair assessment I think. The lack of a royal execution would definitely shift attitudes around the monarchy, but to what extent definitely depends on what Louis actually ends up doing. If he ends up leading a civil war against the Assembly then that could be just as disastrous for the French monarchy as OTL.
A good suggestion! There's a long way to go until 1795 though, so whether that possibility arises will have to depend on what Louis gets up to in the meantime.Yes, good thinking. In this TL the 1795 constitution could very well bring back an Constitutional Monarch. Or it may have to wait for the equivalent of Napoleon's coup
Constitution of the Year III - Wikipedia
A good idea for a potential butterfly, I really should get around to looking beyond the main players here. Spain was already mentioned by a poster earlier in the thread and another idea about the USA as well so there is definitely some potential there. I would probably have to get a bit more familiar with internal American politics of the era first though!
Of course, the issue can be argued in more than one way. My point is that often it is more convenient for the cause to have a martyr than a living person. Especially when such a person is quite unimpressive as a leader. 😂
Now, if Louis just fled, well, the whole thing is more or less an internal affair. Yes, Louis was inconvenienced but he was not overthrown and who said that he would be or that his life was in danger? Yes, after he fled the republic is declared but what his subjects were supposed to do? They need some kind of a government and their choice, while bad, is not an international crime.
But his flight causes obvious problems to other monarchs because he is not just a claimant to the throne and his social position requires much better accommodations than one of the Count of Provence. He is entitled to a palace and a court and most probably the Hapsburgs are ending up with a questionable pleasure to host and keep in state him and his family. Louis himself may be not (optimistically) a major issue: AFAIK, he was, at worse, stubborn. But MA was an energetic idiot (probably there is a consensus on this account 😂) and she would be pestering her brothers about the military help. Regardless the results, the royal presence in Austria may, at least to some degree, deprive the Austrian diplomacy of a freedom of maneuver making settlement with France less likely unless restoration of the Bourbons is a part of a peace deal.
But, besides cutting off the heads, Revolution also confiscated and distributed a lot of the land and other properties belonging to the aristocrats so the happy return of the Bourbons in the 1790s would not be a welcomed perspective for the French peasantry (or at least a politically active part of it) and the people who were buying the estates, etc.
Then comes an army. While in 1815 the oath of a loyalty to Louis XVI. became pretty much an abstract notion and majority of the French military never made it, in the 1790s situation is quite different and a big part of the French military are traitors. OK, an amnesty can be a part of the deal but how about the ranks to which these upstarts rose? In 1815 France was thoroughly defeated with a massive foreign military presence, etc. and, anyway, the army was anything but “republican” in its spirit and the command cadres formed a new aristocracy, which could be accommodated with a relative ease. But in the 1790s this is not the case and how are you going to reconcile the existing situation with the Old Regime’s traditions? Would Moreau get back to studying the law, Massena became a warrant officer, Bernadotte became a sergeant, Hoche a corporal, etc.? I’d suggest that a more likely option is them overthrowing any republican government trying to negotiate that type of a deal but it is also rather hard to imagine that the returning “fresh” emigrants would meekly agree to accommodate such a fundamental change.