I didn't say I thought the German companies made no profit, I'd suspect the profit would be not as high as it would be in the United States, though I don't know and hence am asking the question.
Sherman: mass produced cheap spam weapon OR average cost PoS
- Thread starter Equuleus
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I didn't say I thought the German companies made no profit, I'd suspect the profit would be not as high as it would be in the United States, though I don't know and hence am asking the question.
Probably, but I don't have anything like that compiled. Straight loss rates won't do, because LOTS of tanks were lost to AT guns, TD's, air attack, ATRL... you name it. Then, of course, lots of German tanks died to T-34's and such, or to the Brits.
I do have some construction figures handy if anyone wants to try to start from there:
German tanks of all types, all theaters, all years: ~30,000. That includes about 13,400 Pz IV (long 75mm variants) and Pz V. The US built some 44,000 Shermans of all types.
One more wrinkle: since the W. Allies were generally on the offensive, knocked-out tanks were often able to be recovered and rebuilt. The US also had dedicated ARV's in every tank company, and more higher up. In the case of Shermans, they almost always needed completely new crews. As the Germans were generally retreating, they had less of an ability to recover battle-damaged tanks for repair. They also didn't, as far as I've ever been able to tell, have dedicated ARV's, so another tank had to be used to pull a wreck.
Edit: by some quick adding up, the US fielded almost 200 medium tank battalions during WWII, split between armored divisions, independent battalions, USMC, etc. Such a battalion had 59 M-4 type tanks (including 6 with 105mm howitzers as their 'main gun'). So it would take 12,000 medium tanks to fully equip them. Aside from a handful of M-4's assigned to SP Field Artillery Battalions (to carry FO sections - that must have been fun), that's it. Leave a 100% margin for school units, depot-level reserves, etc. 24,000 tanks needed, and 44,000 built. I'm really hoping something is wrong with my numbers or assumptions, and the US didn't lose 20,000 tanks... anyone?
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I figured on that being a huge part of the problem, but surely someone somewhere parsed the numbers? There had to be US Army post-war studies on the issue, right?
Riain
Banned
Since nobody else has mentioned it I will, the US built the Sherman around doctrine which became outdated as it reached the field. Tanks weren't supposed to fight other tanks when the Sherman went into mass production, that was the job of tank destroyers. Tanks were supposed to shoot the crap out of everything else once the lines were breached, and the MV 75mm gun was perfect for that. But as the war progressed tank vs tank became the standard and the US was caught short, finally catching up with the E8. If the Sherman got the 76mm HV gun early on there wouldn't be any controversy because the Sherman would stand its ground against Panthers etc.
Um... the M10's couldn't take a Panther at any real range frontally either, and only with HVAP ammo could a US 76mm. The HVAP ammo nearly doubled the penetration, but it wasn't available at all until August/September '44, and NEVER replaced the standard AP ammo.
If the US had fielded the M36 as the standard TD in mid-1944 I'd say their doctrine was lousy, but their equipment was OK. As it was McNair just goes down in my book as an idiot. Bad doctrine and bad equipment even for your flawed doctrine? FAIL.
Riain
Banned
True, but the assumption was valid enough for the PzIII/IV.
75mm Shermans would lose 6:1 against Panthers, because they had to get ultra-close side and rear shots. 76mm guns would allow these shots to occur from much greater ranges, giving the Panther much less time to kill multiple Shermans before being killed itself, dropping the exchange rate to a far more manageable 3:1 or something.
75mm Shermans would lose 6:1 against Panthers, because they had to get ultra-close side and rear shots. 76mm guns would allow these shots to occur from much greater ranges, giving the Panther much less time to kill multiple Shermans before being killed itself, dropping the exchange rate to a far more manageable 3:1 or something.
You realize you're saying that killing 12-15 US tankers to kill 3-5 Nazi tankers should have been considered OK by the US at the time?
I'm not questioning that it would have WORKED, mind you - the US did win the war, after all. I'm just saying that if McNair had told FDR that FDR would have thrown him out a window.
Well according to an interview with a German tanker I read once, Americans when encountering a Panther would just sit well away from it in a safer position and call airplanes to take it out. At least that was the preferred American method apparently.
Riain
Banned
Yes, I am saying that, because it is a hell of a lot better than killing 24-30 US tankers which is what actually occured.
I'm not saying that the M26 shouldn't have been available earlier and in bigger numbers, just that the huge tank production year of 1943 should have pumped out 76mm gunned tanks instead of 75mm gunned tanks. This would have allowed the US to better in the 1944 campaigns, saved a lot of lives all around.
I'm not saying that the M26 shouldn't have been available earlier and in bigger numbers, just that the huge tank production year of 1943 should have pumped out 76mm gunned tanks instead of 75mm gunned tanks. This would have allowed the US to better in the 1944 campaigns, saved a lot of lives all around.
OK, that's fair, and I apologize. However, the M-26 was also ready for production during 1943. It was more buggy than the M-4, true, but if it had been made the prime tank those bugs could have been worked out in plenty of time for the 1944 campaign.
Riain
Banned
But initial production would have been low, it would have taken considerable time to produce them in good numbers, establish the support tail, train units and then transport the units to Europe. I could see them in action from late 44 but probably not in large numbers for D-Day, the Shermans built in big numbers in 1943 were the ones which fought in Normandy.
That's the sort of thing I've got from all my reading too.
After contact and if at all possible, the Shermans - which as several far more knowledgeable posters than I have pointed out weren't "supposed" to be fighting other tanks - would maneuver to keep the panzers in sight while either calling in air strikes, calling in artillery, or allowing other Shermans to flank the panzers in question.
Even when the Shermans had to engage the panzers, it was more a case of the Shermans engaging the panzers with an eye towards pinning them for flankers to take out than a case of confronting them directly.
Naturally none of these tactics could be achieved all the time and the Shermans would find themselves doing exactly what they hadn't been designed to do: fighting other tanks.
That's why I was interested in the actual tank vs. tank loss ratios.
Cook
Banned
From 1940 onwards the Allies knew their tanks would be encountering 88mm dual use Flak guns in an anti-tank role and were aware of how deadly they would be against thin skinned tanks after seeing how easily they dealt with the BEF’s Matilda tanks with 78mm front armour. The Sherman was then produced with 76mm front armour.
For comparison the Churchill tank had 152mm front armour.
Comparing the Sherman with German tanks isn’t a valid argument, the German’s only had to worry about Allied anti-tank and tank guns, the Sherman faced the 88mm Flak gun and should have had the armour increased to deal with it. Right from the start the Sherman tank’s armour was inadequate for the battlefield environment it was required to operate in.
Another fault that was discovered early but wasn’t rectified until the war was nearly over was the width of the tracks; while good for the desert and firm terrain, in mud and snow the Sherman’s 16.56in (42.06cm) wide tracks struggled, sinking in mud and giving poor traction in snow. 23in (58cm) wide treads were not introduced until far too late.
Considering the necessity of good mobility this is a major failing and given that with would not have required major retooling of the factory to achieve this is inexplicable.
For some reason Allied tank designers in WW2 lagged badly behind the battlefield environment with were providing tanks for. Allied aircraft designs evolved rapidly, allied tank designs did not.
For comparison the Churchill tank had 152mm front armour.
Comparing the Sherman with German tanks isn’t a valid argument, the German’s only had to worry about Allied anti-tank and tank guns, the Sherman faced the 88mm Flak gun and should have had the armour increased to deal with it. Right from the start the Sherman tank’s armour was inadequate for the battlefield environment it was required to operate in.
Another fault that was discovered early but wasn’t rectified until the war was nearly over was the width of the tracks; while good for the desert and firm terrain, in mud and snow the Sherman’s 16.56in (42.06cm) wide tracks struggled, sinking in mud and giving poor traction in snow. 23in (58cm) wide treads were not introduced until far too late.
Considering the necessity of good mobility this is a major failing and given that with would not have required major retooling of the factory to achieve this is inexplicable.
For some reason Allied tank designers in WW2 lagged badly behind the battlefield environment with were providing tanks for. Allied aircraft designs evolved rapidly, allied tank designs did not.
My vote is for good-enough spam weapon
The trouble with the Sherman is that it was good enough in 1941 to beat the Japanese throughout the war and the German tanks we thought we'd face.
American strategic doctrine emphasized naval and aerial supremacy as the war-winning strategy, not so much tanks and infantry weaponry so guess which got the R&D emphasis on new versions and production?
It didn't exactly help that the US Army learned the wrong lessons from North Africa where we whipped an exhausted army running on fumes in open country because we had total naval and air supremacy, reserves and plenty of ammo and fuel.
The folks who pointed out the deficiencies of the Sherman and American tank doctrine as well as the "green troops" whitewash for the losses suffered got ignored or reassigned to counting pencils in Greenland so when Operation Overlord went into motion, nobody really considered changing the central tank of Allied forces or how we used them.
By the time we got to see what the Wehrmacht really could do it was too late and we and the rest of the Allies had to fight with what we had in France and Italy.
A lot of improvised changes, wet ammo storage, using HVAP rounds, and tactics made the Sherman-equipped units in 1945 a lot more effective than the first-generation Shermans, but thousands of Allied tank crews paid the cost for working with a mediocre tank with crappy tactics in '43/'44.
Others upthread have mentioned it was the devil we knew how to deal with and pack in the LST's vs an unproven design it'd take units weeks to months to learn how to use effectively as well as handle the teething pains of any new system. By the time say we decided to go with the M26, it would've been 1945 before we had all of our armored units equipped and semi-effective at using/maintaining them. So we went with the Sherman and took our lumps.
The trouble with the Sherman is that it was good enough in 1941 to beat the Japanese throughout the war and the German tanks we thought we'd face.
American strategic doctrine emphasized naval and aerial supremacy as the war-winning strategy, not so much tanks and infantry weaponry so guess which got the R&D emphasis on new versions and production?
It didn't exactly help that the US Army learned the wrong lessons from North Africa where we whipped an exhausted army running on fumes in open country because we had total naval and air supremacy, reserves and plenty of ammo and fuel.
The folks who pointed out the deficiencies of the Sherman and American tank doctrine as well as the "green troops" whitewash for the losses suffered got ignored or reassigned to counting pencils in Greenland so when Operation Overlord went into motion, nobody really considered changing the central tank of Allied forces or how we used them.
By the time we got to see what the Wehrmacht really could do it was too late and we and the rest of the Allies had to fight with what we had in France and Italy.
A lot of improvised changes, wet ammo storage, using HVAP rounds, and tactics made the Sherman-equipped units in 1945 a lot more effective than the first-generation Shermans, but thousands of Allied tank crews paid the cost for working with a mediocre tank with crappy tactics in '43/'44.
Others upthread have mentioned it was the devil we knew how to deal with and pack in the LST's vs an unproven design it'd take units weeks to months to learn how to use effectively as well as handle the teething pains of any new system. By the time say we decided to go with the M26, it would've been 1945 before we had all of our armored units equipped and semi-effective at using/maintaining them. So we went with the Sherman and took our lumps.
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Eh, I'd replace Allied in that sentence with American. From what little I know, British and Russian tanks were typically between decent and pretty good. Well, maybe not the earlier models but the early German tanks were also pretty bad all things considered.
German recovery vehicles
The German army had the Famo half track,Bergpather and the Bergtiger to recover disable tanks.
The German army had the Famo half track,Bergpather and the Bergtiger to recover disable tanks.
Cook
Banned
British tanks were in many cases appalling.
When I use the term ‘Allied’ I am referring to the western Allies; I always refer to the Soviets or Red Army specifically and in those terms. Sorry for the confusion.
It isn’t the condition of the early German tanks that is an issue; the Germans improved their tank designs and anyway, as of 1940 the battlefield environment included 88mm anti-tank guns that could cut through a Sherman tank like butter. Tank vs Tank was a rarity in World War Two.
On average, one crewman was killed when a Sherman was knocked out.*
In 1954, the US Army's Ballistics Research Laboratory conducted a study of tank vs tank engagements fought by the 3rd and 4th Armored Divisions from August to December 1944.
98 engagements were identified, including 33 from the Ardennes fighting. The typical engagement involved 9 US Shermans against 4 German AFVs. Only 1/3 of the total involved more then 3 German AFVs. The average range Shermans inflicted kills on the panzers was 893yds, and the panzers averaged kills at 946yds.
The study concluded that the most important factor was spotting and shooting first. Defenders fired first 84% of all engagement, inflicting 4.3 times more casualties on the attackers then suffered. When the attackers fired first, they inflicted 3.6 times as many casualties on the defenders compared to own losses.
29 engagements involved Panthers and Shermans. The Shermans had an average numerical advantage of 1.2:1. The data showed the Panther had a 10% advantage over the attacking Sherman when the Panther defended, but the Sherman was a whopping 8.4 times more effective then attacking Panthers when the Sherman defended. Overall, the Sherman was 3.6 times as effective as the Panther in all engagements. German A/T guns however, were by far the most effective anti-Sherman weapon they had.
From the study itself:
Data on World War II
Tank Engagements
Involving the U.S.
Third and Fourth Armored Divisions
According to Table II, the most common type of engagement was Shermans defending against Panthers, and the Shermans fired first. In 19 engagements, involving 104 Shermans and 93 Panthers, 5 Shermans were destroyed compared to 57 Panthers.
The second most common engagement was US Tank destroyers defending against Panthers, with the TDs firing first. In 11 engagements, involving 61 TDs and 19 Panthers, 1 TD was lost compared to all 19 Panthers.
The most successful enemy weapon was antitank guns defending. In 9 engagements (3rd most common), 19 a/t guns inflicted 25 casualties on 104 total attacking Shermans, losing 3 guns in exchange.
The 4th most common engagement was Shermans attacking Panthers, and the Shermans fired first. In 5 actions a total of 41 Shermans fought 17 Panthers, losing 2 and taking 12 Panthers in return.
In 40 actions in which the US forces were attacking, they had 437 weapons and lost 100 (23%). The Germans had 135 and lost 45 (33%). In 37 actions in which the Germans were attacking, the US had 205 weapons, losing 14 (7%), and the Germans lost 83 of 138 (60%).
* For comparison, when a T-34 was knocked out, on average, one crewman survived.
So basically, the Sherman pwned the Panther.
That ought to freak out the Nazi fanboys.
Again, the fact appear to demonstrate the advantages to reasonably sophisticated but reliable weapon.
Surprising to some, it also suggest the United States armored forces were not bad as commonly assumed.
That ought to freak out the Nazi fanboys.
Again, the fact appear to demonstrate the advantages to reasonably sophisticated but reliable weapon.
Surprising to some, it also suggest the United States armored forces were not bad as commonly assumed.
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