Seven Civil War Topics

[TheDoofusUser]

These are ideas that have been floating in my head regarding the ACW that I think could be interesting if they happened IOTL. What are some thoughts and ideas that come from these?

1) The OTL Tullahoma Campaign was relatively bloodless and saw the Union General William Starke Rosecrans, who won Stones River/Murfreesboro earlier in 1863, fail to win a great major victory around the time that Grant and Meade had theirs (Vicksburg and Gettysburg), mainly because Bragg chose to retreat. However, what if Bragg chose to fight and Rosecrans and Bragg's Army clash outside Tullahoma, likely at Normandy/the Normandy Lake Area and wins a great battle for himself on July 3rd. With the Battle likely butterflying away Chickamauga, what happens to Rosecrans and Grant from that point on? How does the Civil War go?

2) In OTL, Lincoln refused to yield into public pressure and relieve Grant of Command. However, what if Lincoln relented and relieved Grant after Shiloh, sending him out west to fight the Indians or something like that. What happens to the operations against Corinth, Western Theatre, and whole war from there?

3) In OTL, Meade refused to engage Lee at Mine Run, avoiding a potentially bloody and disastrous Battle for the AotP that could've ended in Defeat. If that did happen, however, who is Lincoln likely to replace Meade with? My own personal money is on Winfield Scott Hancock but YMMV.

4) What if Ulysses S. Grant and Joseph Hooker swapped places, where Hooker had a major command out west and Grant was a Division/Corps Commander under McClellan/Pope/Burnside before the time of Chancellorsville arrived (I can't see how Grant being a Division/Corps Commander in the AotP or AoV changes how the overall Peninsula, Seven Days, Northern Virginia, Antietam, and Fredericksburg Campaigns go as the plans were pretty much set in stone by their generals)? How would both men handle their positions in the army and how different would the Civil War Campaigns and Military relationship in the Union have been if that didn't happen?

5) What if Henry Halleck had died before the War of Yellow Fever and instead another General, like maybe Samuel Ryan Curtis of Iowa, becomes Commanding General of the Army instead? What is Curtis' overall strategy and who does he put in his 'Clique"

6) IOTL, Joseph E. Johnston would lead the Confederate AoNV after the Battle of First Bull Run after Beauregard was sent West because the two men couldn't stand one another. However, what if Johnston died in the time between First Bull Run and the Peninsula Campaign? How would Beauregard do against General McClellan?

7) What if Albert Sidney Johnston had survived the war and Shiloh was a victory thanks to the Battle being a day or two prior to when it actually was OTL. What is the effect on the Army of Mississippi/Army of Tennessee and the War itself?

I'm genuinely curious for these conversation that could come from these questions, even if some are ASB.

 

[Arnold d.c]

One point at a time:

1) The OTL Tullahoma Campaign was relatively bloodless and saw the Union General William Starke Rosecrans, who won Stones River/Murfreesboro earlier in 1863, fail to win a great major victory around the time that Grant and Meade had theirs (Vicksburg and Gettysburg), mainly because Bragg chose to retreat. However, what if Bragg chose to fight and Rosecrans and Bragg's Army clash outside Tullahoma, likely at Normandy/the Normandy Lake Area and wins a great battle for himself on July 3rd. With the Battle likely butterflying away Chickamauga, what happens to Rosecrans and Grant from that point on? How does the Civil War go?

Are you asking if Bragg wins or Rosecrans wins? The wording is a tad confusing for me. Rosecrans had decisively outmaneuvered Bragg in the opening moves and was in position to deal a nasty blow had Bragg stayed to fight. A Tullahoma win for Rosecrans would be good for Rosecrans' career, but limited in some ways. Rosecrans' logistics were becoming frayed as the Federals needed time to fix the railroads from Murfreesboro while Rosecrans' personality really did not endear him to Stanton and Halleck. Still, until Rosecrans makes an error, it's unlikely he'll be leaving the Army of the Cumberland any time soon. On the other hand, Grant is in a bit of an awkward spot. After Vicksburg, it almost looked as though the Lincoln administration had no idea what to do with his army. Before Chickamauga, there were proposals for the use of Grant's army towards Arkansas while Grant kept firing away messages to launch an offensive to Mobile. It could be that the Georgia campaign will be a twin thrust from Rosecrans' army in Chattanooga and Grant's army in Mobile.

For a Bragg victory, we may see Rosecrans relieved while Bragg may be permitted to stay in command longer. Of course, by then, the relationship between Bragg and his corps commanders were already broken, with conspiratorial meetings between Hardee and Polk taking place during the campaign!

2) In OTL, Lincoln refused to yield into public pressure and relieve Grant of Command. However, what if Lincoln relented and relieved Grant after Shiloh, sending him out west to fight the Indians or something like that. What happens to the operations against Corinth, Western Theatre, and whole war from there?

Interestingly, this story has been challenged in recent years. Stanton actually gave permission to Halleck to fire Grant if he so pleased but Halleck shielded Grant from a presidential inquiry into Shiloh. The relationship between Halleck and Grant is a strange and mysterious one, with Halleck chiding Grant over and over again but Halleck did support Grant, especially against McClernand. That said, The siege of Corinth will be much the same, but everything else will be very different. Unlike most generals, Grant did grasp that he had to maintain good relations with his civilian superiors, something which Rosecrans and Meade did not grasp. As for the campaigns itself, Vicksburg is an interesting case. Grant's final approach to Vicksburg was vehemently objected by other generals (ironically save for McClernand) for its unconventional idea to live off the land. Sherman's career could also be stunted.

3) In OTL, Meade refused to engage Lee at Mine Run, avoiding a potentially bloody and disastrous Battle for the AotP that could've ended in Defeat. If that did happen, however, who is Lincoln likely to replace Meade with? My own personal money is on Winfield Scott Hancock but YMMV.

Now, this is a very interesting topic. Even when Meade avoided getting fired, there was a lot of talk on relieving him. The Radical Republicans wanted to reinstate Joe Hooker while Grant, based on a letter from Charles Dana, might have lobbied for Sherman or W.F. Smith for command of the Army of the Potomac. Of the AotP Corps Commanders, Sedgwick was not favored as Stanton was suspicious of Sedgwick's ties with the Democrats and McClellan, French and Newton are a hard no. Interestingly, at the start of the Overland Campaign, Grant remarked that at that point, if something had happened to Meade, he would have given the AotP to Warren. G. K. Warren's stock was really high in the army in early 1864, he had been one of the heroes at Gettysburg, and he had distinguished himself at Bristoe Station, and had made the right call at Mine Run.

4) What if Ulysses S. Grant and Joseph Hooker swapped places, where Hooker had a major command out west and Grant was a Division/Corps Commander under McClellan/Pope/Burnside before the time of Chancellorsville arrived (I can't see how Grant being a Division/Corps Commander in the AotP or AoV changes how the overall Peninsula, Seven Days, Northern Virginia, Antietam, and Fredericksburg Campaigns go as the plans were pretty much set in stone by their generals)? How would both men handle their positions in the army and how different would the Civil War Campaigns and Military relationship in the Union have been if that didn't happen?

Hooker would certainly benefit as it could help him build up his nerve, which he lost at Chancellorsville. Hooker was an excellent trainer of men and had sound ideas on operations. On the other hand, his ego would not have endeared him to Halleck and he would probably clash with Sherman as he did OTL in the Atlanta Campaign. Grant, on the other hand, would benefit less from his experience in the East, but Grant was, for the most part, good at establishing relationships. I think he would also keep his nerve unlike Hooker. Hooker really had a good chance as Longstreet's Corps was locked in the Suffolk campaign.

5) What if Henry Halleck had died before the War of Yellow Fever and instead another General, like maybe Samuel Ryan Curtis of Iowa, becomes Commanding General of the Army instead? What is Curtis' overall strategy and who does he put in his 'Clique"

I think Curtis is a competent general... but there are several factors against him. First, there was the matter of his age. Curtis was 56 at the start of the war, ten years Halleck's senior. Second, operating in the most isolated of the war's three major theaters also undoubtedly hindered popular and political recognition of Curtis's achievements. Lincoln and Grant were rather apathetic about Curtis, despite Curtis' achievements. I can't say what strategies he'll come up with, but I'd note that he was a hardliner against guerillas, especially when his son was killed by one.

6) IOTL, Joseph E. Johnston would lead the Confederate AoNV after the Battle of First Bull Run after Beauregard was sent West because the two men couldn't stand one another. However, what if Johnston died in the time between First Bull Run and the Peninsula Campaign? How would Beauregard do against General McClellan?

Now, this one is interesting. The Army of Northern Virginia was in no condition to attack prior to the Peninsula, so Beauregard's grand strategies likely translate to nothing. That said, Beauregard in the Peninsula Campaign is more interesting. Frankly speaking, I think that Johnston was a D-tier general at best, but his performance in the Peninsula warrants a C. A major make-or-break is that Beauregard is more inclined to counterattack, probably with his oft-proposed flank attacks. That said, he doesn't have the reinforcements that Lee gets until the period when OTL Seven Days begins and his army is still inexperienced in attacking so some cock up is possible.

 

[TheDoofusUser]

Are you asking if Bragg wins or Rosecrans wins? The wording is a tad confusing for me. Rosecrans had decisively outmaneuvered Bragg in the opening moves and was in position to deal a nasty blow had Bragg stayed to fight. A Tullahoma win for Rosecrans would be good for Rosecrans' career, but limited in some ways. Rosecrans' logistics were becoming frayed as the Federals needed time to fix the railroads from Murfreesboro while Rosecrans' personality really did not endear him to Stanton and Halleck. Still, until Rosecrans makes an error, it's unlikely he'll be leaving the Army of the Cumberland any time soon. On the other hand, Grant is in a bit of an awkward spot. After Vicksburg, it almost looked as though the Lincoln administration had no idea what to do with his army. Before Chickamauga, there were proposals for the use of Grant's army towards Arkansas while Grant kept firing away messages to launch an offensive to Mobile. It could be that the Georgia campaign will be a twin thrust from Rosecrans' army in Chattanooga and Grant's army in Mobile.

For a Bragg victory, we may see Rosecrans relieved while Bragg may be permitted to stay in command longer. Of course, by then, the relationship between Bragg and his corps commanders were already broken, with conspiratorial meetings between Hardee and Polk taking place during the campaign!

I'm speaking of a Rosecrans victory here, as it would go in tandem with the other two big Union Victories in the Summer of 1863. I can actually see Rosecrans use his big victory as leverage, saying stuff like "I won but my men are exhausted. We need to be better on all levels against the Confederates, cavalry, logistics, strategy, until we can make our move!" as he was able to do after Stone's River/Murfreesboro despite how much Halleck and Stanton told him to move. You really can't remove a successful general without people demanding an actual reason as to why outside of "He ain't moving." I can see Grant grumble and stuff, but Rosecrans is likely to be far more prepared for a thrust towards Chattanooga and Georgia than he was OTL as Grant makes his move on Mobile. Hell, I can see this alt 1868 be between War Heroes William Starke Rosecrans and Ulysses S. Grant. Yes, Rosecrans being a catholic would work against him quite a bit, but he would definitely be a superior choice to Seymour who did not want the nomination.

Interestingly, this story has been challenged in recent years. Stanton actually gave permission to Halleck to fire Grant if he so pleased but Halleck shielded Grant from a presidential inquiry into Shiloh. The relationship between Halleck and Grant is a strange and mysterious one, with Halleck chiding Grant over and over again but Halleck did support Grant, especially against McClernand. That said, The siege of Corinth will be much the same, but everything else will be very different. Unlike most generals, Grant did grasp that he had to maintain good relations with his civilian superiors, something which Rosecrans and Meade did not grasp. As for the campaigns itself, Vicksburg is an interesting case. Grant's final approach to Vicksburg was vehemently objected by other generals (ironically save for McClernand) for its unconventional idea to live off the land. Sherman's career could also be stunted.

Huh, how curious and interesting. I can see Sherman leave the Army at some point as iirc, he did consider it until Grant convinced him otherwise (or was it the other way around?). Wonder who replaces both Sherman and Grant from there.

Now, this is a very interesting topic. Even when Meade avoided getting fired, there was a lot of talk on relieving him. The Radical Republicans wanted to reinstate Joe Hooker while Grant, based on a letter from Charles Dana, might have lobbied for Sherman or W.F. Smith for command of the Army of the Potomac. Of the AotP Corps Commanders, Sedgwick was not favored as Stanton was suspicious of Sedgwick's ties with the Democrats and McClellan, French and Newton are a hard no. Interestingly, at the start of the Overland Campaign, Grant remarked that at that point, if something had happened to Meade, he would have given the AotP to Warren. G. K. Warren's stock was really high in the army in early 1864, he had been one of the heroes at Gettysburg, and he had distinguished himself at Bristoe Station, and had made the right call at Mine Run.

Well it's interesting to note that at Gettysburg, several Corps Commanders were wounded and Reynolds was famously killed in battle. At Mine Run, this is likely to happen again due to how entrenched the AoNV likely is. Whether Warren and Smith is wounded is up in the air, but that really leaves Sherman and a few others. Lincoln was of the mindset "I'll take whoever is good at their job" and could supersede Stanton if he believed a certain general was better than another, though of course, it's unlikely to be a Democrat as if a Democrat scores enough wins, they could successfully run for President against him and what Republican wants that?

Hooker would certainly benefit as it could help him build up his nerve, which he lost at Chancellorsville. Hooker was an excellent trainer of men and had sound ideas on operations. On the other hand, his ego would not have endeared him to Halleck and he would probably clash with Sherman as he did OTL in the Atlanta Campaign. Grant, on the other hand, would benefit less from his experience in the East, but Grant was, for the most part, good at establishing relationships. I think he would also keep his nerve unlike Hooker. Hooker really had a good chance as Longstreet's Corps was locked in the Suffolk campaign.

What's interesting is Sherman would've been Hooker's subordinate as Sherman did not want an Army Command and its unlikely that Hooker runs into a Shiloh situation, since he was more observant and recognized present issues (Chancellorsville seems to be an exception and it seems to be common agreement that had Hooker not been wounded, he likely won Chancellorsville or at least, that's what Sean Chick has stated). I could also see Sherman being a subordinate to Grant in the East and Grant also pushing for aggressive, borderline Kearny-like tactics on Joe Johnston/Lee during Peninsula and Seven Days and how he handles Second Bull Run, Antietam, and Fredericksburg likely sees a lot of his men get chewed up with little support behind him. Chancellorsville is really a roll of the dice but judging on how Grant basically almost crumbled otl against Lee in the Wilderness and Chancellorsville is in the Wilderness, as well as how Grant wouldn't have the experience of Shiloh OTL to prepare him for a potential attack from Jackson and even dismiss the ideas, it's likely Chancellorsville be might even worse than OTL.

I think Curtis is a competent general... but there are several factors against him. First, there was the matter of his age. Curtis was 56 at the start of the war, ten years Halleck's senior. Second, operating in the most isolated of the war's three major theaters also undoubtedly hindered popular and political recognition of Curtis's achievements. Lincoln and Grant were rather apathetic about Curtis, despite Curtis' achievements. I can't say what strategies he'll come up with, but I'd note that he was a hardliner against guerillas, especially when his son was killed by one.

This is what ChatGPT had given me when I asked for an examination of his tactics :

Samuel Ryan Curtis was a Union general during the American Civil War. In terms of his command style, Curtis was known for being disciplined and methodical. He was a careful planner who believed in a systematic approach to military strategy. He was also known for being detail-oriented and meticulous in his preparations. Curtis was a stickler for discipline and order, and he was known for enforcing strict rules and regulations among his troops. He believed that maintaining a high level of discipline was essential for maintaining order on the battlefield and ensuring that his troops could execute their plans effectively. Overall, Curtis was a competent and reliable leader who was respected by his troops and fellow officers. While he was not known for taking bold risks or making audacious moves on the battlefield, his careful and methodical approach to military strategy helped him achieve success in a number of important battles during the Civil War.

so however that would look like when he becomes Commanding General of the Army would be interesting to see. Who are some other candidates you can see coming?

Now, this one is interesting. The Army of Northern Virginia was in no condition to attack prior to the Peninsula, so Beauregard's grand strategies likely translate to nothing. That said, Beauregard in the Peninsula Campaign is more interesting. Frankly speaking, I think that Johnston was a D-tier general at best, but his performance in the Peninsula warrants a C. A major make-or-break is that Beauregard is more inclined to counterattack, probably with his oft-proposed flank attacks. That said, he doesn't have the reinforcements that Lee gets until the period when OTL Seven Days begins and his army is still inexperienced in attacking so some cock up is possible.

I do think Beauregard would be careful and not order anything too extreme when he sees the condition of the AoNV in Early 1862 (and he wouldn't even be in any condition to do such a thing, given he just had throat surgery otl shortly before Shiloh). However, he would be able to take Little Mac's number as an overly cautious and uneasy commander and attempt to lure him into a trap near Richmond and then once there, with Jackson and Longstreet supporting him, try and direct McClellan away from the Peninsula and into the Wilderness of Virginia to destroy the AotP in detail. Beauregard was good as a general and against a general out of his depth in field command like McClellan, he would have an easy time. What comes next though shrugs

What of my seventh question that I gave?

 

[Arnold d.c]

Hell, I can see this alt 1868 be between War Heroes William Starke Rosecrans and Ulysses S. Grant. Yes, Rosecrans being a catholic would work against him quite a bit, but he would definitely be a superior choice to Seymour who did not want the nomination.

It would be narrow. IIRC Grant actually lost the white vote and was carried by (unsurprisingly) the votes by freedman.

I can see Sherman leave the Army at some point as iirc, he did consider it until Grant convinced him otherwise (or was it the other way around?)

Other way around, pal. Grant was planning to take leave for a while after basically being shoved aside when Sherman, who thought that Grant was leaving for good, visited him.

its unlikely that Hooker runs into a Shiloh situation, since he was more observant and recognized present issues

Is it though? The thing is that cavalry scouts and spy networks were very rudimentary at this time, Hooker or no Hooker.

Chancellorsville seems to be an exception and it seems to be common agreement that had Hooker not been wounded, he likely won Chancellorsville or at least, that's what Sean Chick has stated

I strongly disagree with Sean Chick's assessment. I've noticed that some historians like Sears and Sean Chick have tried to rehabilitate Hooker, but I'll point out that 90% of Hooker's mistakes were made before the concussion. The fault for Hooker's defeat lies with Hooker. He was so taken aback by the fact that Lee didn't retreat that he didn't push his advantage and force his way out of the Wilderness while he had the chance, he surrendered the initiative, and made a massive tactical error on the third day in giving up Hazel Grove and not exploiting the division of the Confederate army. Charles Wainwright, the commander of the I Corps artillery, also had a conversation with Hooker and noted that he was mostly lucid after the third day, so the fact that Hooker withdrew is not the product of a concussion of any sort. Hooker's subordinates noted that Hooker was acting like a "whipped man" even during the first day.

d Grant also pushing for aggressive, borderline Kearny-like tactics on Joe Johnston/Lee during Peninsula and Seven Days and how he handles Second Bull Run, Antietam, and Fredericksburg likely sees a lot of his men get chewed up with little support behind him. Chancellorsville is really a roll of the dice but judging on how Grant basically almost crumbled otl against Lee in the Wilderness and Chancellorsville is in the Wilderness, as well as how Grant wouldn't have the experience of Shiloh OTL to prepare him for a potential attack from Jackson and even dismiss the ideas, it's likely Chancellorsville be might even worse than OTL.

I also strongly disagree with this. While it ought to be acknowledged that Grant did push on the offensive too hard, this image only really looks at a caricature of Grant in 1864. As Gordon Rhea points out, Grant showed restraint and flexibility throughout the Overland Campaign and other historians can do the same. I really, really must discourage this image of Grant as a Kearny. He did not blunder into a charge at Fort Donelson, rolled up Pemberton's flank at Champion Hill and was flexible at Chattanooga. While the Wilderness was hardly a success, don't forget that Lee almost crumbled on May 6 when Hancock routed AP Hill before Longstreet managed to turn the situation around while Burnside, Hancock's reinforcements, fumbled. I honestly don't see Grant's replacement of Hooker as detrimental, given that Hooker's own performance was not decisive.

Also...

even dismiss the ideas, it's likely Chancellorsville be might even worse than OTL.

so what? Hooker also dismissed it, even when Sickles produced prisoners to show Jackson's withdrawal for the flank march.

This is what ChatGPT had given me when I asked for an examination of his tactics :

One thing I'd note about Curtis is that he was an early pioneer for living off the land. That said, it's really hard to say given that Curtis had such a relatively small responsibility. Peters Principle is a thing.

so however that would look like when he becomes Commanding General of the Army would be interesting to see. Who are some other candidates you can see coming?

The problem is that early war is genuinely very random with who can rise up the ranks, especially with Halleck dead early. For example, who even takes command of Halleck's Department? Nathaniel Lyon, Charles F. Smith? Ethan A. Hitchcock?

However, he would be able to take Little Mac's number as an overly cautious and uneasy commander and attempt to lure him into a trap near Richmond and then once there, with Jackson and Longstreet supporting him, try and direct McClellan away from the Peninsula and into the Wilderness of Virginia to destroy the AotP in detail. Beauregard was good as a general and against a general out of his depth in field command like McClellan, he would have an easy time.

My guy, look at a map of Virginia. McClellan would have to literally walk around Richmond to get to the Wilderness. But I do think that you're underestimating how hard it is to teach an army how to attack. Beauregard's division commanders aren't exactly the best lot and even commanders like Longstreet had a long way to go before they mastered how to attack. Longstreet in one case even wasted his command in piecemeal assaults during the Seven Days.

What of my seventh question that I gave?

Oh right. Grant is probably out, but I do see a dead end after Shiloh for the rebs. After all, I don't Johnston brought any bridging material with him, so crossing the Tennessee is a no go. There could be a brief stalemate while both sides plot an offensive.

 

[TheDoofusUser]

It would be narrow. IIRC Grant actually lost the white vote and was carried by (unsurprisingly) the votes by freedman.

I do believe that Grant would win the White Vote due to Anti-Catholic Sentiment at the time, as much as I am loathe to say that to my own admitted anti-Grant bias (I'm not a Lost Causer but nor am I a Just Causer. I subscribe to the idea by Sherman that it was going to be a long war, Rosecrans idea of preparation for anything, and McClellan's idea to go up the Peninsula and after Richmond, but at the same time, I detest Lincoln's constant meddling in military affairs, having the bitter Stanton be SoW instead of a less bitter War Democrat or Non-Partisan General on the verge of retirement, and the creation of the Halleck Clique that gave us such wonderful generals like John Pope for Second Manassas)

Other way around, pal. Grant was planning to take leave for a while after basically being shoved aside when Sherman, who thought that Grant was leaving for good, visited him.

Ah, thanks for the clarification.

Is it though? The thing is that cavalry scouts and spy networks were very rudimentary at this time, Hooker or no Hooker.

Reason why I'm saying that is that Shiloh is unlikely to happen as Grant moved farther than he really should've and I doubt that Hooker would've taken the unnecessary risk that Grant did, waiting for Buell to catch up before advancing. Had Shiloh been a day or two earlier, Grant could've very likely lost. Buell saved him and I don't think anyone can deny that.

I strongly disagree with Sean Chick's assessment. I've noticed that some historians like Sears and Sean Chick have tried to rehabilitate Hooker, but I'll point out that 90% of Hooker's mistakes were made before the concussion. The fault for Hooker's defeat lies with Hooker. He was so taken aback by the fact that Lee didn't retreat that he didn't push his advantage and force his way out of the Wilderness while he had the chance, he surrendered the initiative, and made a massive tactical error on the third day in giving up Hazel Grove and not exploiting the division of the Confederate army. Charles Wainwright, the commander of the I Corps artillery, also had a conversation with Hooker and noted that he was mostly lucid after the third day, so the fact that Hooker withdrew is not the product of a concussion of any sort. Hooker's subordinates noted that Hooker was acting like a "whipped man" even during the first day.

If I recall correctly, Chancellorsville was a massive battle stretched out a large area from Fredericksburg to Wilderness, which is difficult for any one general to manage, especially in mid 19th century warfare. Much like how Chickamauga was a cluster for both sides, Chancellorsville was a confused mess of a battle thanks to the terrain and looking at it from Joe's perspective, as Lee didn't retreat, he could be anywhere in the trees, having reformed and redeployed his line in another position, which would give any general pause, less they wanna suffer a major ambush and have more casualties than necessary.

I also strongly disagree with this. While it ought to be acknowledged that Grant did push on the offensive too hard, this image only really looks at a caricature of Grant in 1864. As Gordon Rhea points out, Grant showed restraint and flexibility throughout the Overland Campaign and other historians can do the same. I really, really must discourage this image of Grant as a Kearny. He did not blunder into a charge at Fort Donelson, rolled up Pemberton's flank at Champion Hill and was flexible at Chattanooga. While the Wilderness was hardly a success, don't forget that Lee almost crumbled on May 6 when Hancock routed AP Hill before Longstreet managed to turn the situation around while Burnside, Hancock's reinforcements, fumbled. I honestly don't see Grant's replacement of Hooker as detrimental, given that Hooker's own performance was not decisive.

from what I've read, Fort Donelson and Fort Henry (would you consider SBB or Pemberton to be great Southern Generals?) were easier to conduct battles given the Confederate Commanders and how both forts were really low on everything. As for the Wilderness, iirc, 1) Grant's plan was overall not very good but great sub-ordinates, like WSH, could make a terrible plan work (for example, the attack on Hooker's flank on Chancellorsville and the German charge through the Ardennes were risky and/or stupid plans but due to who was in command of them, they succeeded in spite of how bad the plan seemed on paper) and 2) IIRC, Grant wanted to counterattack on the second day w or w/o Buell (disputed though this may be) and had he counterattacked w/o Buell, he would've been met with disaster. As you can tell, I'm not a huge fan of Grant and his meat grinder aggressiveness that you see of him in some of his campaigns (he does well in Vicksburg and Corinth but then fumbles the ball in Shiloh and is saved by luck, fumbles the ball in the Overland and stumbles to Petersburg with a depleted, exhausted, and low morale army, and fumbles the ball in the Crater and listens to Confederate propaganda saying that they're sacrificing black lives by using them instead of going "These men are far braver than you cowards because they will honorably die if it means they are free!" and ordering the colored soldiers in anyway, which likely could've meant a successful attack on the crater rather than the Turkey shoot we got OTL).

so what? Hooker also dismissed it, even when Sickles produced prisoners to show Jackson's withdrawal for the flank march.

Even so, I would say Grant was far more worse at Shiloh. There were numerous reports from deserters, prisoners, and patrols that said ASJ was nearby and he was still caught off guard. For Hooker, there was a number of things he could assume from the prisoners information :
1) They're lying about Jackson and he's actually still where he originally is
2) He's doing a flanking Manuever like the prisoners are saying
3) Lee is ordering for him to fall back to Richmond to prepare it for a defense
4) Lee has ordered Jackson away from the Battlefield to try and lure away a large enough detachment of Hooker's men so that the AoNV has an easier time
5) try and swing around Hooker's rear and attack his line of retreat/supply route.

All five of these things and maybe more would have to be considered by Hooker, meanwhile when three things all at once are telling Grant that ASJ is nearby and that an attack is imminent, then that means ASJ is nearby and an attack is imminent. Grant chose to ignore that, however, and so did Sherman.

One thing I'd note about Curtis is that he was an early pioneer for living off the land. That said, it's really hard to say given that Curtis had such a relatively small responsibility. Peters Principle is a thing.

Yes, I know all about Peter and his principle. Alexander McCook is the best example of it. He was ok on the Brigade and Division level but as a Corps Commander...I think Sean said it best "Well, you already said what happened he (Bragg or Cleburne) was attacking Alexander McCook [at Perryville]..."

The problem is that early war is genuinely very random with who can rise up the ranks, especially with Halleck dead early. For example, who even takes command of Halleck's Department? Nathaniel Lyon, Charles F. Smith? Ethan A. Hitchcock?

Lyon is unlikely, guy was despised by the soldiers (reading some of the letters written about him show that it seems only Sherman really thought highly of him as far as I know) but Smith and Hitchcock are likely as well as Curtis.

My guy, look at a map of Virginia. McClellan would have to literally walk around Richmond to get to the Wilderness. But I do think that you're underestimating how hard it is to teach an army how to attack. Beauregard's division commanders aren't exactly the best lot and even commanders like Longstreet had a long way to go before they mastered how to attack. Longstreet in one case even wasted his command in piecemeal assaults during the Seven Days.

I did say try and direct McClellan away from the Peninsula with flanking attacks, not saying they would succeed, since plans often do not survive contact with the enemy and Beauregard's complicated most definitely would not have, though I'm unsure if wouldn't have any of the same blunders Lee did during the Seven Days if it happens or would still have made them while making Richmond into a literal fortress. I also don't see Beauregard going for Malvern Hill. As an artillery man, he'd immediately recognize the danger attacking that position would've been and would've let it be, unlike Lee, who wasted his army needlessly in the battle. This would keep the AoNV's strength up for when/if Pope arrived.

Oh right. Grant is probably out, but I do see a dead end after Shiloh for the rebs. After all, I don't Johnston brought any bridging material with him, so crossing the Tennessee is a no go. There could be a brief stalemate while both sides plot an offensive.

I don't think ASJ's overall plan was for an offensive push immediately after Shiloh but more pushing the Union from the Battlefield and using the victory for some respite before making their own offensive movements later. After all, the whole reason for Shiloh seemed less to do with striking the Union and more to do with getting the Confederacy needed morale.

Bu at least we can agree that Kearny and Joe Johnston are overrated generals (that one TL that made Kearny seem like an unbeatable god when he likely would've been an utter disaster at Army Command, compared to another much better man like Frederick West Lander or Winfield Scott Hancock and how Atun-Shei put Joe Johnston over Richard Taylor, who did amazingly with what he had, and Beauregard), right?

 

[Arnold d.c]

I am loathe to say that to my own admitted anti-Grant bias (I'm not a Lost Causer but nor am I a Just Causer. I subscribe to the idea by Sherman that it was going to be a long war, Rosecrans idea of preparation for anything, and McClellan's idea to go up the Peninsula and after Richmond, but at the same time, I detest Lincoln's constant meddling in military affairs, having the bitter Stanton be SoW instead of a less bitter War Democrat or Non-Partisan General on the verge of retirement, and the creation of the Halleck Clique that gave us such wonderful generals like John Pope for Second Manassas)

With all due respect, I think we do have opposite views here. I generally view this sort of historiography view (and those of Peter Cozzens and Sean Chick) to be tied to a renewed Cumberland Army school of history*. While I do think that the pendulum has shift slightly too far in Grant's favor, I also think that this view is an overreaction.

* is my nickname for the historical divide (dating back to the war itself and especially veterans writing afterwards) who hold up Grant and the Army of Tennessee, and those who extol Rosecrans/Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland, with the latter school particularly believing the ascendency of Grant and Sherman led to their accomplishments being overlooked.

If I recall correctly, Chancellorsville was a massive battle stretched out a large area from Fredericksburg to Wilderness, which is difficult for any one general to manage, especially in mid 19th century warfare. Much like how Chickamauga was a cluster for both sides, Chancellorsville was a confused mess of a battle thanks to the terrain and looking at it from Joe's perspective, as Lee didn't retreat, he could be anywhere in the trees, having reformed and redeployed his line in another position, which would give any general pause, less they wanna suffer a major ambush and have more casualties than necessary.

Even so, I would say Grant was far more worse at Shiloh. There were numerous reports from deserters, prisoners, and patrols that said ASJ was nearby and he was still caught off guard. For Hooker, there was a number of things he could assume from the prisoners information :
1) They're lying about Jackson and he's actually still where he originally is
2) He's doing a flanking Manuever like the prisoners are saying
3) Lee is ordering for him to fall back to Richmond to prepare it for a defense
4) Lee has ordered Jackson away from the Battlefield to try and lure away a large enough detachment of Hooker's men so that the AoNV has an easier time
5) try and swing around Hooker's rear and attack his line of retreat/supply route.

All five of these things and maybe more would have to be considered by Hooker, meanwhile when three things all at once are telling Grant that ASJ is nearby and that an attack is imminent, then that means ASJ is nearby and an attack is imminent. Grant chose to ignore that, however, and so did Sherman.

I don't think you appreciate how hard it was to determine intelligence. During 1861-1862, there were countless false alarms of an impending Confederate offensive north. Grant noted that Paducah kept receiving "the enemy's coming" over and over again, with clashes between pickets and cavalrymen. Furthermore, I think you're going too hard on Hooker apologia. Hooker's strategy after he stopped attacking was that Sedgwick's corps at Fredericksburg was going to save him, all the while making little effort to at least keep Lee pinned in place. And what excuses Hooker's decision to withdraw on May 6?

rom what I've read, Fort Donelson and Fort Henry (would you consider SBB or Pemberton to be great Southern Generals?) were easier to conduct battles given the Confederate Commanders and how both forts were really low on everything.

I don't, but I actually think that Pemberton isn't as incompetent as people make him out to be. That said, you seriously discount that the opposition Grant faced. He was initially outnumbered at Fort Donelson and kept his nerve during the attempted breakout while at Vicksburg, Grant understood that he was at risk of being outnumbered if Johnston could concentrate rapidly enough.

As for the Wilderness, iirc, 1) Grant's plan was overall not very good but great sub-ordinates, like WSH, could make a terrible plan work (for example, the attack on Hooker's flank on Chancellorsville and the German charge through the Ardennes were risky and/or stupid plans but due to who was in command of them, they succeeded in spite of how bad the plan seemed on paper)

Hard disagree. Grant's plan for May 6 was perfectly sound - the rebel forces were divided on two roads and A.P. Hill was visibly vulnerable. Instead of launching a broad-front attack, Grant opted to hold Ewell in place while concentrating the blow against A.P. Hill.

and 2) IIRC, Grant wanted to counterattack on the second day w or w/o Buell (disputed though this may be) and had he counterattacked w/o Buell, he would've been met with disaster.

While I'd say that the counterattack would not have been as impactful, Wallace's relatively fresh 3rd Division, I'd argue, was more decisive than Buell.

As you can tell, I'm not a huge fan of Grant and his meat grinder aggressiveness that you see of him in some of his campaigns (he does well in Vicksburg and Corinth but then fumbles the ball in Shiloh and is saved by luck, fumbles the ball in the Overland and stumbles to Petersburg with a depleted, exhausted, and low morale army, and fumbles the ball in the Crater and listens to Confederate propaganda saying that they're sacrificing black lives by using them instead of going "These men are far braver than you cowards because they will honorably die if it means they are free!" and ordering the colored soldiers in anyway, which likely could've meant a successful attack on the crater rather than the Turkey shoot we got OTL).

I think we'll just have to agree to disagree here. I just think that this view is absolutely inaccurate and I will leave it at that.

that one TL that made Kearny seem like an unbeatable god

Oi, don't slander that timeline. That TL's the main reason I'm on this board or even spent years of my life reading the ACW.

 

[TheDoofusUser]

@Arnold d.c alright, I agree to disagree with you on all the points but

Oi, don't slander that timeline. That TL's the main reason I'm on this board or even spent years of my life reading the ACW.

You have to admit that Kearny was a bit overrated from that TL, even if it was amazingly well written.