Second Sino-Japanese War ends in December 1937

Around December 1st 1937, Chiang Kai-shek must have been rather unhappy. The Nine Power Conference had broken up without promising any intervention and the USSR was also not promising any direct intervention against Japan. Chinese forces had been heavily defeated both around Beijing and Shanghai and Japan was now threatening his capital at Nanking. Lastly Germany was pressing for a peace between China and Japan rather than offering Chiang strong support. It seems likely that he would have quickly accepted a Japanese peace offer on the basis of status quo ante except for a provision for the stationing of extra Japanese troops around Beijing and Shanghai. There are reports that he was willing to accept a less generous settlement on December 2nd.

Is it possible that Japan would have offered such a peace settlement at that time? There were certainly important voices calling for peace with China including Tada Hayao, who was the Army's Vice-Chief of Staff, and Ishiwara Kanji, who had, however, been removed as head of the General Staff's Operations Bureau in September 1937 following his opposition to hostilities. The peace faction in the Army was a minority, associated especially with those who were concerned with Japan's economic development. There were many others opposing peace, such as the War Minister Sugiyama Gen and many of the generals involved in operations in China.

The position of the Navy is much less clear. Navy Minister Yonai had been very concerned by the dangers of the Navy's position at Shanghai and thus strongly in favour of the landing of the Army forces around Shanghai. However, it is less clear what he or the Navy's Chief of Staff Prince Fushimi believed should be Japan's objectives in China. There were certainly officers in the Navy who considered that China was a stepping stone towards the resources of South East Asia. However, these only became influential later, leading to the decision to capture Hainan Island.

The positions of the Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoe, or the Foreign Minister Hirota are equally unclear. However, Konoe was a politician and was probably both directing and swept along by the wave of popular support for the war.

Actually, Japan did not offer China a generous peace. As this is a what if, we have to make changes. A possible change would be to make Konoe a close associate of the "Total War" faction in the Army such as Ishiwara Kanji. That would fit his early statements about the world being divided into Have and Have Not Powers and would not have prevented him becoming Prime Minister before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Let us imagine that he has reluctantly gone along with the war because he could not allow attacks on Japanese civilians in China but that he is seeking peace because he fears the economic consequences of the war. To bring the Navy onto the side of peace, we could assume that he or someone else has questioned whether the Navy's Circle 3 building programme can be carried out if the China Incident continues. Let us also assume that Tada persuades the Army's Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in and that the Princes then bring the Emperor in to directly order generals such as Sugiyama to accept the peace (the Emperor's own view can be determined after reading Bix and Large by tossing a coin). Thus peace is agreed and the IJA stops as the outskirts of Nanking come within artillery range.

What are the consequences for China, Japan and the World?
 

Hendryk

Banned
There's a serious chance that Jiang would be deposed by a Nationalist junta, and the peace deal turned down. By that point there was a groundswell of patriotic fervor in China, and ending the war with a negotiated surrender would have been politically suicidal. Already the year before Jiang had been abducted by his own generals and forced to agree to a united front with the Communists in order to focus against Japanese aggression.

Not that Jiang being deposed would be a bad thing for China. Someone more competent might step in, like Li Zongren or Sun Liren.
 
There's a serious chance that Jiang would be deposed by a Nationalist junta, and the peace deal turned down. By that point there was a groundswell of patriotic fervor in China, and ending the war with a negotiated surrender would have been politically suicidal. Already the year before Jiang had been abducted by his own generals and forced to agree to a united front with the Communists in order to focus against Japanese aggression.

Not that Jiang being deposed would be a bad thing for China. Someone more competent might step in, like Li Zongren or Sun Liren.
I agree that it would have been suicidal to surrender to all of Japan's demands but Chiang might have tried to represent an agreement as a temporary truce until the KMT armies had recovered from their loses. I mentioned that it was reported that Chiang offered to accept an earlier Japanese offer on 2nd December, presumably via German negotiators, but I was not sure if he was sincere. In later negotiations he was obviously just playing for time. However, Chiang's position must have looked bleaker in early December 1937 than it looked two months later. Until Liu Xiang died (was poisoned?) on 20th January 1938, Chiang cannot have been confident that he would be able to withdraw into Sichuan (Szechwan). Thus it is possible that he might have been tempted.

Had there been a plot against Chiang either before such a truce or after a peace, it is very difficult to guess what would have happened. Perhaps Sun was too junior in 1938 and he had been wounded at Shanghai, so I am not sure if he was fit. As well as Li Zongren, there were some less heroic figures such as Han Fuju and also Wang Ching-wei to consider. After a peace, it is possible that no single figure would have quickly emerged on top, especially as the central KMT armies had suffered much heavier loses than those of the various warlords. If the plot had actually prevented the truce being agreed, it would have certainly cost China some international support. It might also leave the rest of the World uncertain of who was the legitimate Chinese government, especially as they would shortly afterwards lose their capital.

Assuming a peace which holds until 1st September 1939 (and no serious war between Japan and the USSR over the same period), I would expect that the KMT would become very cautious after September 1939, because they would know that no other countries would consider intervention against Japan.
 
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