"Russia First" German strategy in ww1?

A few people have mentioned that Moltke's plan needed 'luck', for the French to make mistakes. What is meant by that?

With respect - as I understand the question - what is meant by that is that the operation of the German right wing was a) logistically unsustainable, and b) lacked sufficient troop density to achieve its objectives. It underestimated Belgian powers of resistance, let alone the possible impact of a British contingent. Even setting aside operational differences between the two plans, Schlieffen himself insisted that no less than 48.5 corps were needed to have a chance of attaining campaign objectives in France. His reaction to trying to do so with the 34 corps Moltke actually used would have been...volcanic.

Of course, using 48.5 corps requires an even more robust logistical organization . . .

So, you need utter imbecility on the part of the French Army, or you really need to fire up that luck machine.

The German Army was qualitatively superior to the French Army, the masses of indirect fire howitzers being one huge example but there are several others, so it's victories are no quirk of fate.

The irony here is that both Schlieffen and Moltke were adamant in insisting that their operational plans must not rely on assumptions of German qualitative supreriority. "What is this much higher quality supposd to consist of, in an age when the weapons, equipment, and training of all armies are more or less the same?" From Terence Holmes, "Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914," War in History, Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 2014), pp. 193-213:

Holmes Absolute Numbers The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914 198.png
Holmes Absolute Numbers The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914 199.png

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Another thing, grabbing the French territory taken in Aug-Nov 1914 was a far bigger blow to the Entente than the Russian Territory taken Apr-Sep 1915. Is there any doubt about that?

I might quibble with the word "far." But I agree that the French territory in question had more economic value than the Russian territory in question. I would not disagree that this is a sacrifice that a East First strategy has to accept, and take account of.
 
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Moving back to military moves etc, good, all that moralistic and British cabinet shit is irritating.

I'd point out that from December 1912 the German government assumed Britain would be a combatant, nothing was lost by invading Belgium which was Britain's cassus belli. Without Belgium in August 1914 there likely would be some other incident or 'mistake' that would bring Britain into the war, perhaps something like the Dogger Bank Incident in the Russo Japanese war where the Russian fleet attacked British fishing boats in the North Sea thinking they were Japanese for some unfathomable reason.


Which is another good reason to finish in the west quick and bring France to terms. Britain operating on the continent gets a lot harder without France as an ally


A few people have mentioned that Moltke's plan needed 'luck', for the French to make mistakes. What is meant by that? The German Army was qualitatively superior to the French Army, the masses of indirect fire howitzers being one huge example but there are several others, so it's victories are no quirk of fate.




Because we're talking about huge industrialized nations mobilizing and fighting with massive armies and lots of resources and strength in depth, even if one side has a slight edge in certain military areas it will take time for that edge to manifest enough to win out. It's also not like the French have no advantages here in this scenario.

The German army was better but it's not like it was overwhelmingly better, we're not talking guns vs. sticks here. I.e. were talking at most incremental advantages not revolutionary one.

The other point wasn't just as simple as the German army had some advantages, they also have plan that's going to require everything going right in terms of advancing to time tables, support, co-ordination etc

The problem is the German don't just need to beat them, they need to beat them quickly.

Also yeah luck plays a role in every conflict especially in same tier ones, even if we're using a broad definition that includes stuff like you opponent doing the wrong thing at the wrong time etc, etc

look at 1870-71 that's kind of what I mean, yes Prussia and Co. had some advantages but they were also helped by the French making bad or odd decisions.



Another thing, grabbing the French territory taken in Aug-Nov 1914 was a far bigger blow to the Entente than the Russian Territory taken Apr-Sep 1915. Is there any doubt about that?

Not in my mind
 
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The irony here is that both Schlieffen and Moltke were adamant in insisting that their operational plans must not rely on assumptions of German qualitative supreriority. "What is this much higher quality supposd to consist of, in an age when the weapons, equipment, and training of all armies are more or less the same?" From Terence Holmes, "Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914," War in History, Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 2014), pp. 193-213:

View attachment 698473View attachment 698474
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Exactly +1
 
Tsarist Russia would definitely have fallen by 1916, followed shortly afterwards by Italy. Kaiserschlacht 1917 without the US Army? Zabecki covers this offensive in great detail in his thesis, so perhaps Falkenhayn, unlike H + L, heeds to Hoffman’s intelligence warnings and properly concentrated the offensive strength on Amiens and Hazebrouck, which, as Zavecki points out, would have led to the cross-Channel evacuation of the BEF and the Germans now being able to concentrate on the French from the Somme to the Seine.
 
Tsarist Russia would definitely have fallen by 1916, followed shortly afterwards by Italy. Kaiserschlacht 1917 without the US Army? Zabecki covers this offensive in great detail in his thesis, so perhaps Falkenhayn, unlike H + L, heeds to Hoffman’s intelligence warnings and properly concentrated the offensive strength on Amiens and Hazebrouck, which, as Zavecki points out, would have led to the cross-Channel evacuation of the BEF and the Germans now being able to concentrate on the French from the Somme to the Seine.
You mean Kaisersclacht in 1918?

Either way the US army wasn't really in the front line / support for that, the 100 days that comes later is different matter however
 
This is ATL, not IOTL.
Ah OK but there still wasn't massive amounts of the US army involve OTL so them not being there isn't the defining difference you make out.

Also not forgetting that if the Germans go East with greater numbers and don't do the Scliefflin plan in an ATL, not only will the western front not be where it was OTL prior to some potential German offensive after returning from beating the Russians, but the France & Britain will have been fighting less Germans in the interim.

Basically there will be a lot off differences other than just OTL Spring offensive going off in the same way but a year earlier

Edit: also didn't we just have a thread about Zabecki's claims regarding the Spring offensive? I'd say he gets mixed reviews here!
 
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Ah OK but there still was massive amounts of the US army involve OTL so them not being there isn't the defining difference you make out.

Also not forgetting that if the Germans go East with greater number and don't do the Scliefflin plan in a ATL, not only will the western front not be where it was OTL prior to some potential German offensive after returning from beating the Russians, but the France & Britain will have been fighting less Germans in the interim.

Basically there will be a lot off differences other than just OTL Spring offensive going off in the same way but a year earlier
Falkenhayn was opposed to unlimited submarine warfare from 1915-1916.
 
Falkenhayn was opposed to unlimited submarine warfare from 1915-1916.

Good for him, hope he can make that stick when the British Blockade is biting*, however it still doesn't increase the numbers of the US army during the OTL Spring offensive which your comparison is still built on.

And there's still the point I made about how a very different western front in this scenario makes saying "Kaiserschlacht 1917" a bit of a non- sequitur.


*although here we get into how much a changed western front will impact thing again
 
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Good for him, hope he can make that stick when the British Blockade is biting*, however it still doesn't increase the numbers of the US army during the OTL Spring offensive which your comparison is still built on.

Again, though, the whole strategic point of East First is to avoid British belligerency. If Britain is coming in anyway no matter what you do, well, you might as well grab as much of Artois and Compeigne as you can, hold on and hope the horse learns to sing at some point.

But if Britain is coming in anyway, the only prudent course of action for the Germans is not to go to war at all.
 

David Flin

Gone Fishin'
Tsarist Russia would definitely have fallen by 1916, followed shortly afterwards by Italy. Kaiserschlacht 1917 without the US Army? Zabecki covers this offensive in great detail in his thesis, so perhaps Falkenhayn, unlike H + L, heeds to Hoffman’s intelligence warnings and properly concentrated the offensive strength on Amiens and Hazebrouck, which, as Zavecki points out, would have led to the cross-Channel evacuation of the BEF and the Germans now being able to concentrate on the French from the Somme to the Seine.

Unfortunately, this falls into the old "Side A gets to make all sorts of changes, but Side B is rigidly fixed to doing what it did OTL, despite changing circumstances" issue.

Zabecki's thesis is, at best, debated as to its merits here.

In any case, if the Germans head East at the start of the war, the front lines in the West will not follow those of OTL. Which makes discussion of Zabecki's thesis moot, as the front will be very different. If nothing else, the Germans will have further to go, and that will impact their logistical ability to support the attack.
 
Good for him, hope he can make that stick when the British Blockade is biting*, however it still doesn't increase the numbers of the US army during the OTL Spring offensive which your comparison is still built on.

And there's still the point I made about how a very different western front in this scenario makes saying "Kaiserschlacht 1917" a bit of a non- sequitur.


*although here we get into how much a changed western front will impact thing again
Britain entering the war in the case of an East first/no Belgium scenario is not guaranteed at all.
 
Unfortunately, this falls into the old "Side A gets to make all sorts of changes, but Side B is rigidly fixed to doing what it did OTL, despite changing circumstances" issue.

Zabecki's thesis is, at best, debated as to its merits here.

In any case, if the Germans head East at the start of the war, the front lines in the West will not follow those of OTL. Which makes discussion of Zabecki's thesis moot, as the front will be very different. If nothing else, the Germans will have further to go, and that will impact their logistical ability to support the attack.
The Russians would have politically sued for peace before the Germans reached Petrograd, which they were in a position to do so in 1918, and would have been reached much earlier IATL due to a shorter Western Front without Belgium.

You are falling into the same fallacy yourself by assuming that Britain will join the war no matter what, which was by jo means an inevitability without Schlieffen.
 
Moving back to military moves etc, good, all that moralistic and British cabinet shit is irritating.

I'd point out that from December 1912 the German government assumed Britain would be a combatant, nothing was lost by invading Belgium which was Britain's cassus belli. Without Belgium in August 1914 there likely would be some other incident or 'mistake' that would bring Britain into the war, perhaps something like the Dogger Bank Incident in the Russo Japanese war where the Russian fleet attacked British fishing boats in the North Sea thinking they were Japanese for some unfathomable reason.

A few people have mentioned that Moltke's plan needed 'luck', for the French to make mistakes. What is meant by that? The German Army was qualitatively superior to the French Army, the masses of indirect fire howitzers being one huge example but there are several others, so it's victories are no quirk of fate.

Another thing, grabbing the French territory taken in Aug-Nov 1914 was a far bigger blow to the Entente than the Russian Territory taken Apr-Sep 1915. Is there any doubt about that?

Germans apparently assumed so, but in hindsight it was not guaranteed. I'd call it 50/50, if Britain would have joined the war.

But even if they do, how much enthusiasm they got for the endeavour is still meaningful. Germany overrunning France and ending their great power status is a massive threat to Britain, but Russia being carved up to a bunch of nations that are more or less sympathetic towards Germany is much less so. The latter would make a diplomatic solution in Western front much more achievable. I mean, as @kham_oc said, even in OTL the Brits demanded Germany leaving France and Belgium.

I mean, Germany is unlikely to win a war where everybody is willing to slug it off to the bitter end, so maybe it's better to not go all-in and try to be a little bit more subtle?

The lines were established when the retreating Germans stopped. Naturally, they stopped at the most defensible spots. The line along the Aisne River is as good as it gets - a hundred feet wide and fifteen feet deep.

Why would the French attack into the Vosges? Like the Germans they will go through the Ardennes because it's the only route available. The only fortifications the Germans have there are Metz Thionville which is designed to cover the German assembly. The complex is easily bypassed through Belgium and Luxembourg.

The best line would be the Saar which is what Moltke the elder picked

I'm sorry, but this is contrary to almost everything I have heard before about WW1. As far as I know, the French didn't want to risk going through Belgium for political reasons (that would basically guarantee Britain staying out). Also, almost everywhere it has been said, that the OTL French offensives failed miserably in 1914. Why would they do better in this scenario?


The Germans never defeated Russia. The Ottomans did with their blockade. The Germans don't know if the Ottomans will join on August 1st when the decision has to be made.

The Germans go East in 1915. All they do is chase the Russians around Poland while Britain and France build up their strength. It accomplished nothing. Brusilov proves that in 1916 with his offensive that shatters what remained of Austria.

Nor is there any reason to think the Germans are holding the West with five let alone four armies. They never tried it.

I haven't heard of this either - do you have a source? Russia could have still been supplied through Murmansk.

Also, obviously the Germans never tried to hold West with five armies, as they went with the Schlieffen plan! This doesn't prove anything!


If Germany wins in the east, it's likely to come out of that the de-facto or actual ruler of Eastern Europe / chunks of western Russia. On top of that AH will likely be pretty much dominant to the Black sea (we've not mentioned AH much).

Britain does not want that. Britain might at times like to give the impression it's above what goes on on the continent but it knows it it can't ignore it (e,g. Napoleon's continental system etc). Certainly it doesn't want the nation that's challenging it in the 'biggest naval dick measuring contest' doing that.


France also doesn't want it because it knows if it happens best case scenario is it will be dominated on the continent (and France is a continental power), worse case scenario it will be next.

And once the fighting has started and blood and resources committed it's hard to withdraw with nothing to show for it except a stronger opponent and the threat of round two with them to come.

I'm sure Britain would not like it, but it's another matter to sell the war to their public with this when they are experiencing extremely heavy casualties. Germany overrunning France and Belgium while ending up at the Channel is a massive threat to Britain, and an easy way to motivate their population and army. Russia being carved up into numerous small states is much less of a problem, and if the Germans can present this as a fait accompli to Britain in 1916 while not having territorial ambitions in the West, a compromise peace would be much more likely than in OTL.

As has been said, OTL British demands to Germany were to evacuate France and Belgium - what do they demand from them if Germany never occupied them to begin with?

I grant that this is still a gamble, but IMO a much better one than the Schlieffen plan.
 
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David Flin

Gone Fishin'
You are falling into the same fallacy yourself by assuming that Britain will join the war no matter what, which was by jo means an inevitability without Schlieffen.

Um, I said nothing about Britain. Perhaps you're confusing me with someone else.

My point was and is that if you change Germany's strategic direction in 1914, you simply can't apply Zabecki's thesis in anyway, because the thesis is predicated upon the situation that applied in OTL, and the circumstances that will apply simply make that nonsensical.
 
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I'm sure Britain would not like it, but it's another matter to sell the war to their public with this when they are experiencing extremely heavy casualties.


Only as I said earlier if they are already facing heavy causalities then they are already at war, and a different set psychology comes into play.

Also I hate this point in general because it only ever get applied to countries the arguer wants to remove from the scenario, both Germany and AH suffered very heavy causalities but apparently that's OK they will always keep fighting no matter what.


Germany overrunning France and Belgium while ending up at the Channel is a massive threat to Britain, and an easy way to motivate their population and army. Russia being carved up into numerous small states is much less of a problem, and if the Germans can present this as a fait accompli to Britain in 1916 while not having territorial ambitions in the West, a compromise peace would be much more likely than in OTL.

Only as pointed out people aren't stupid, this leaves Germany and AH the de-facto masters of Europe with only France really left, what going to happen next does not take a crystal ball.


As has been said, OTL British demands to Germany were to evacuate France and Belgium - what do they demand from them if Germany never occupied them to begin with?

something else I mean you a right in an ATL scenario it's likely there will be different demand than OTL?

Take WW2, do you really think the British declared war in 1939 because Poland was the the key to all of Britain's international policies, or because the invasion of Poland happened in a broader context of actions and foreign policies that included stuff like the balance of Power in Europe etc?

I grant that this is still a gamble, but IMO a much better one than the Schlieffen plan.
I get the theory, but it ignores the reality of the alliance system and the things I mentioned above. And the fact that once it kick's off it's harder and harder for other interested to justify not getting involved. Simply because doing so allow them three things

1). to help end teh conflict in way that is most advantageous to them

2). be at the winner's table

3). give them the best opportunity to end threats because it's always going to easier for Russia, France and Britain to beat Germany & AH, fighting together than to do it in a series of conflicts where Germany&AH get to consolidate previous victories over them.
 
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I haven't heard of this either - do you have a source? Russia could have still been supplied through Murmansk.

I think the obvious advantage of Russia's Black Sea ports is that they're ice-free year round. Also, they can handle more tonnage than Murmansk and Archangel. (Note that Archangel, for example, depended entirely on its 635-kilometre railway link to the rest of the network at Vologda, and had merely a low-speed single narrow-gauge track that had been built in the 1890s with only local commercial needs in mind.) Russia’s ports on the Black Sea and Sea of Azov together had handled over half of the empire’s European maritime trade by weight in 1913...

That said, I agree with you that Aphrodite is over-reading the importance of the closure of the Straits to the Russian war effort.
 
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Only as i said earlier if they are already facing heavy causalities then they are already at war, and a different set psychology come into play.

Also I hate this point in general because it only ever get applied to countries the arguer want to remove from the scenario, both Germany and AH suffered very heavy causalities but apparently that's OK they will always keep fighting no matter what.

Hmm, does such a war psychology come into play in an offensive war with extremely heavy casualties, at least to the same degree as for the defender?

My guess is that Germany and A-H got away with it to the degree they did because they were not democracies to the same degree as Britain or France - and they still got big issues on the home front, plus a revolution after the war. Germany also had the advantage of having success on the Eastern front they could present to their population.

Even in OTL with defender advantage, Entente had problems like the French mutinying. Not to mention that I have got the impression that morale in general was drown the drain by 1918, with the American reinforcements seeing Entente troops as some sleepwalkers - please correct me if I'm wrong.


Only as pointed out people aren't stupid, this leaves Germany and AH the de-facto masters of Europe with only France really left, what going to happen next does not take a crystal ball.

It depends a lot on the circumstances. With a far more nasty war than predicted, they very well might be too exhausted to push their luck after leaving Britain and France intact.

something else I mean you a right in an ATL scenario it's likely there will be different demand than OTL?

Take WW2, do you really think the British declared war in 1939 because Poland was the the key to all of Britain's international policies, or because the invasion of Poland happened in a broader context of actions and foreign policies that included stuff like the balance of Power in Europe etc?

Sure, but it's going to be a lot harder to sell the war to their population - unlike the Central Powers, they are democracies, and people will be much less willing to die for ending Great Power status of Germany and A-H than for defending their homes or for a clear and imminent danger, such as Germany at the Channel.

The British and French governments might hate it, but they might have to settle for less than they would like due to army morale. But I have to admit that as this is a much less straightforward strategy than going all in with the Schlieffen plan, and trying to overrun the French, so I could be wrong.
 
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