"Russia First" German strategy in ww1?

[David Flin]

Even in OTL with defender advantage, Entente had problems like the French mutinying. Not to mention that I have got the impression that morale in general was drown the drain by 1918, with the American reinforcements seeing Entente troops as some sleepwalkers - please correct me if I'm wrong.

The French mutinies weren't strictly a mutiny in the sense of "We don't want to fight this war anymore." They were more akin to: "We don't want to fight this war in this bloody silly way, and sort out the sodding organisation. Rations are rubbish, rotation is falling apart, and we aren't that keen on large-scale frontal assaults."

The troops weren't demanding an end to the war, they were demanding that it be fought more competently. They were happy enough to defend their lines, and even undertake small-scale offensives with clearly defined objectives that had a reasonable chance of success. The rotation system had fallen apart through lack of staff interest in making it work, and some troops were spending too long in the front lines while others got forgotten in the R&R areas. Rations were not getting through properly because of pilfering along the route.

To describe it as the French being on the verge of pulling out is to misunderstand what the mutinies were about. When Nivelle was sacked and Petain took his place, Petain promptly ended mass offensives, and switched to limited attacks with massed artillery. He also sorted out the rotation system. Problem over.

Amazingly, the German never even noticed there was an issue. German intelligence during the War was not exactly awe-inspiring.

As for the American reinforcements - it depends on the American. The Black American units that were put under French command (because Pershing didn't want them in the American Army) thought highly of the poillu. They also learned from the experience of those who had been fighting, as opposed to the rest of the American forces who had to learn the same old lessons all over again because they thought they knew better than the Europeans.

 

[balllightning]

No as guaranteed as if they invade Belgium, but see previous post's Britain has plenty of skin in the game

“The Cabinet was hopelessly divided—fully one third, if not one half, being opposed to our entry into the War. After the German ultimatum to Belgium the Cabinet was almost unanimous."

And no, the Americans would certainly not have joined the war with Falkenhayn’s continued ascendancy within the General Staff vetoing unlimited submarine warfare/proposed German-Mexican “alliance” to take back the 100 year-old lost lands from the War.

 

[Athelstane]

Only as pointed out people aren't stupid, this leaves Germany and AH the de-facto masters of Europe with only France really left,

Well, does it?

There are two questions to unpack here: 1) How will such a war really shape Germany's and Austria's position in Europe, and concomittantly, France's? 2) How will Asquith's Cabinet and parliamentary caucus view the possibility of such a outcome in that first week of August 1914?

1) On the first: We can reasonably agree that the CP cannot achieve a quick victory in an East-First strategy, right? It's going to take 2, probably 3, campaigning seasons before the Russians collapse. What cost will Germany and A-H bear from such a war? It won't be as severe as in OTL, obviously, but it will be massive. A couple million casualties for Germany alone, and a debt that will take 2 to 3 decades to pay off. It won't be able to claw much in the way of cash reparations from Russia, regardless of who is running it at that point (and "running" may be an elastic term here, as it was in 1918 OTL!). And it will have a bunch of unruly new Mitteleuropa nations to manage and help rebuild (and defend!) in order to be useful economic partners, all while postwar inflation ravages the Reich's economy and the SPD is feeling its oats. Austria meanwhile will be trying to figure out a way to get another lease on life for the Ausgleich with Budapest - and it might well fail - and trying to lasso what are sure to be even worse nationalist tensions elsewhere in the empire. A lot of prevailing sentiment in Germany and Austria-Hungary at the conclusion of peace is going to be more a sense of relief than exultation. 1871, it won't be.

Against all this, France is at least likely to be intact in a way it was not in OTL (though it is sure to have a different regime). Germany may well have more of a *hegemony* in Europe in this scenario, but it will have come at a terrible price, and a full plate for years to come.

2) All of this is in the future for the decision-makers of August 1914, of course, though some of it was predictable as probabilities. But it is reasonable to say that this kind of conflict is a considerably harder sell to wavering Liberal cabinet ministers as a Bonaparte Level Threat to the life of the British Empire, to say nothing of the British voting public. Especially given how Anglo-Russian relations had been chilling again in the last few years before 1914. (See see K. Neilson's Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917 on this point.) Seeing the Russian collosus knocked down to size is not a prospect that is going to be unhappily received in many parts of London.

what going to happen next does not take a crystal ball.

Well, for the foregoing reasons, maybe it *does*!

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The French mutinies weren't strictly a mutiny in the sense of "We don't want to fight this war anymore." They were more akin to: "We don't want to fight this war in this bloody silly way, and sort out the sodding organisation. Rations are rubbish, rotation is falling apart, and we aren't that keen on large-scale frontal assaults."

The troops weren't demanding an end to the war, they were demanding that it be fought more competently. They were happy enough to defend their lines, and even undertake small-scale offensives with clearly defined objectives that had a reasonable chance of success. The rotation system had fallen apart through lack of staff interest in making it work, and some troops were spending too long in the front lines while others got forgotten in the R&R areas. Rations were not getting through properly because of pilfering along the route.

To describe it as the French being on the verge of pulling out is to misunderstand what the mutinies were about. When Nivelle was sacked and Petain took his place, Petain promptly ended mass offensives, and switched to limited attacks with massed artillery. He also sorted out the rotation system. Problem over.

Amazingly, the German never even noticed there was an issue. German intelligence during the War was not exactly awe-inspiring.

As for the American reinforcements - it depends on the American. The Black American units that were put under French command (because Pershing didn't want them in the American Army) thought highly of the poillu. They also learned from the experience of those who had been fighting, as opposed to the rest of the American forces who had to learn the same old lessons all over again because they thought they knew better than the Europeans.

Ian does a good little video of this

 

[Aphrodite]

@Joku_
1) France won't invade Belgium until Britain declares war. After that, there's no reason not to do so.

If Britain doesn't declare war, than the French are done with them and will follow the military logic

2). How can French offensives not do better, a lot better? If Germany sends thirty divisions East, that's half the rifles, half the guns and half the men not shooting at the French. It's absurd to think the French won't do much better

3). Ludendorff thought the Ottomans added two years to the war. Russia isn't defeated in the field. Her army was preparing offensives for 1917. It was the anarchy in the rear brought about by the collapse of the rail system that ends Russia's war effort.

The Ottoman blockade is the major reason for the Revolution. The Ottomans also absorb about twenty Russian divisions which will make life a lot worse for the Germans and Austrians.

4). The Germans are going to be hard pressed to make it to 1916 with the loss of the Lorraine fields

5). The Germans should have been blunt with Franz Joseph- war against Britain and without Italy and Romania is suicide

 

[David Flin]

Ian does a good little video of this

Only trouble is, he starts off with a factual error. He claims that Verdun in 1916 saw the start of the rotation system of French units.

Poppycock. It started more or less as soon as the trench lines had become fixed towards the end of 1914.

Now, the collapse of the rotation system was a major factor in the 1917 mutinies, but to claim it started in 1916 is just, well, wrong.

 

[TDM]

Well, does it?

There are two questions to unpack here: 1) How will such a war really shape Germany's and Austria's position in Europe, and concomittantly, France's? 2) How will Asquith's Cabinet and parliamentary caucus view the possibility of such a outcome in that first week of August 1914?

1) On the first: We can reasonably agree that the CP cannot achieve a quick victory in an East-First strategy, right? It's going to take 2, probably 3, campaigning seasons before the Russians collapse. What cost will Germany and A-H bear from such a war? It won't be as severe as in OTL, obviously, but it will be massive. A couple million casualties for Germany alone, and a debt that will take 2 to 3 decades to pay off. It won't be able to claw much in the way of cash reparations from Russia, regardless of who is running it at that point (and "running" may be an elastic term here, as it was in 1918 OTL!). And it will have a bunch of unruly new Mitteleuropa nations to manage and help rebuild (and defend!) in order to be useful economic partners, all while postwar inflation ravages the Reich's economy and the SPD is feeling its oats. Austria meanwhile will be trying to figure out a way to get another lease on life for the Ausgleich with Budapest - and it might well fail - and trying to lasso what are sure to be even worse nationalist tensions elsewhere in the empire. A lot of prevailing sentiment in Germany and Austria-Hungary at the conclusion of peace is going to be more a sense of relief than exultation. 1871, it won't be.

Against all this, France is at least likely to be intact in a way it was not in OTL (though it is sure to have a different regime). Germany may well have more of a *hegemony* in Europe in this scenario, but it will have come at a terrible price, and a full plate for years to come.

2) All of this is in the future for the decision-makers of August 1914, of course, though some of it was predictable as probabilities. But it is reasonable to say that this kind of conflict is a considerably harder sell to wavering Liberal cabinet ministers as a Bonaparte Level Threat to the life of the British Empire, to say nothing of the British voting public. Especially given how Anglo-Russian relations had been chilling again in the last few years before 1914. (See see K. Neilson's Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917 on this point.) Seeing the Russian collosus knocked down to size is not a prospect that is going to be unhappily received in many parts of London.



Well, for the foregoing reasons, maybe it *does*!

OK I'd say that if France and Britain sit it out, Germany and AH will beat Russia in the field even if they don't conquer all the Russia's*. This will leave Germany in direct or defacto control over N.E Europe and maybe chunk of Western Russia. I think Italy will likely jump in with the CP as well

I also don't see how Germany not fighting in the west will suddenly lose more fighting Russia than they did OTL

OTL German loses eastern front :

1,500,000+:[2][3][4]
300,000 killed
1,151,153 wounded
143,818 captured

With Russia out of the way as European force pan-slavism is going to take a big knock AH will take direct control / influence up the Black sea


I agree Russian reparations in cash won't mean much but they will be made to pay reparations in land and people.

I also agree that all that wont suddenly and neatly integrate, but it will be a massive shift toward Mitteleuropa, plus France and Britain will be seen as just letting it happen


*as per my previous posts I dont think they can win quickly or conquer Russia.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Only trouble is, he starts off with a factual error. He claims that Verdun in 1916 saw the start of the rotation system of French units.

Poppycock. It started more or less as soon as the trench lines had become fixed towards the end of 1914.

Now, the collapse of the rotation system was a major factor in the 1917 mutinies, but to claim it started in 1916 is just, well, wrong.

I know that British did rotate units - meaning that a given soldier would only spend a few days in the very front line each month - so I am not surprised that the French did the same.

I was only surprised that the Germans did not also

 

[DougM]

I think a few of you have more then a few false assumptions. Contrary to some folks here i think it is more likly that.

1). The US will enter the war with out without unrestricted submarine warfair, This was a. convenient excuse but even today we are mot sure what the reason the US entered the war is it depends on what nook you read. But as long as the wealthy and powerful (and often pro England) folks have a say the US WILL enter the war if it looks like GB is in trouble. Got yo protect the money.

2). GB had treaties other then with Belgium, And wanted a seat at the table dictating terms. It will enter the war.

3). GB had already started dictating terms to Germany, odds are this will continue until a reason to enter the war is establiushed

4). 1/3 to 1/2 being opposed means 1/2 to 2/3 WANTED to go to war. Last i checked that is a majority

5). If Germany sends enough troops to make a difference East then they will get steam rolled in the west.

6). The East is not the area that Germany cares about or is worried about or is in danger. The WEST is the area Germany will win or lose. As in fact happend.

7). Germany was assisting AH in the East, it was fighting ALONE in the west.

8). Just defeating Russia does not. ernd the war favorably for Germany. (As happened)

9). it is Questionable if a victory in the East will see any assistance in the West from AH.

 

[Aphrodite]

@DougM

I agree with everything except American entry. That was extremely unpopular in OTL.

Even with the Zimmerman Telegram and unrestricted submarine warfare, 14 Senators and 50 representatives didn't vote for it.

After that, 12% of men refused to register for the draft and another 13% either never reported or deserted before completing basic training.

Given that 20% were physically unfit for service, that's an effective 30% refusal rate.

It's not going to take much for the Americans to stay out.

This is far afield from Germany going East and we're to the point of wild speculation.

 

[Athelstane]

I think a few of you have more then a few false assumptions. Contrary to some folks here i think it is more likly that.

1). The US will enter the war with out without unrestricted submarine warfair, This was a. convenient excuse but even today we are mot sure what the reason the US entered the war is it depends on what nook you read. But as long as the wealthy and powerful (and often pro England) folks have a say the US WILL enter the war if it looks like GB is in trouble. Got yo protect the money.

And yet, the United States managed to stay out of the war for three years!

How was Great Britain in any greater danger in spring 1917 than it had been at any previous point in those three years?

The reasons for US entry just aren't hard to seek, whatever Gerald Nye and conspiracy theorists claim to the contrary: the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany, coming rapidly on the heels of the revelation of the Zimmerman Telegram. That's what featured in Wilson's address to Congress, and it's what filled all the congressional speeches on the vote. What motivations individuals had can't be read into how the war was sold - and bought. Personally, I think US entry into the war was a terrible, awful mistake; but it's impossible to deny that USW seems to have been sufficient to turn the trick.

2). GB had treaties other then with Belgium, And wanted a seat at the table dictating terms. It will enter the war.

If it has other treaties, surely you can list them?

 

[kham_coc]

If it has other treaties, surely you can list them?

Well theoretically Luxembourg was covered by the same treaty as Belgium.
And again, a substantial minority in the government wanted war, that with the Conservatives that did want war, meant that the UK was entering as soon as a useful CB could be manufactured. There were several attempts prior to Belgium.

 

[David Flin]

I think a few of you have more then a few false assumptions. Contrary to some folks here i think it is more likly that.

I can't speak for others, but I at least have a bit of a problem parsing this phrase of yours:

No one buys Belgium and Bosnia were defending themselves and those two had chosen sides but wanted to pretend they hadn’t.

This seems to be you saying that Belgium wasn't simply defending itself from the German invasion, but had, in some Machiavellian fashion, lured Germany into invading it so that it could be on the side it had already chosen.

I mean, the German Confederation had signed the 1839 Treaty of London guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.

Of course, by 1914, the German Chancellor described the treaty as a "mere scrap of paper", which doesn't speak highly of its attitude to treaties.

I, for one, would appreciate clarification of you phrase that "no-one buys that Belgium (was) ... defending itself and had chosen sides. In the light of Germany kind of invading Belgium.

 

[Aghasverov]

I can't speak for others, but I at least have a bit of a problem parsing this phrase of yours:



This seems to be you saying that Belgium wasn't simply defending itself from the German invasion, but had, in some Machiavellian fashion, lured Germany into invading it so that it could be on the side it had already chosen.

I mean, the German Confederation had signed the 1839 Treaty of London guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.

Of course, by 1914, the German Chancellor described the treaty as a "mere scrap of paper", which doesn't speak highly of its attitude to treaties.

I, for one, would appreciate clarification of you phrase that "no-one buys that Belgium (was) ... defending itself and had chosen sides. In the light of Germany kind of invading Belgium.

I believe Chancellor B-H stated later that the "scrap of paper" comment was taken out-of-context for propaganda value, and that the "gist" he was trying to get across was that the 1839 treaty was a mere scrap of paper in comparison to what the consequences of a war between Germany and the UK would mean...
Of course, there are no recordings of the conversation, so we'll never know whether his recollection can be taken at face value or not...

 

[David Flin]

I believe Chancellor B-H stated later that the "scrap of paper" comment was taken out-of-context for propaganda value, and that the "gist" he was trying to get across was that the 1839 treaty was a mere scrap of paper in comparison to what the consequences of a war between Germany and the UK would mean...

Even if we grant the best possible interpretation, that still comes down to: "We're going invade Belgium and break our obligations under the treaty and you had better not do anything about it because that would be War."

Naturally, German diplomacy of the period was about as bad as it was possible to be.

Brief summary for those who have just tuned in.

Germany and France are not good friends. Given this, and given the inexorable nature of geography, the one thing Germany doesn't want is for France to ally with Russia, posing the prospect of a two front war. The obvious solution is to be friendly with Russia. Invest in it, so it has a vested interest in keeping you sweet to continue this. It's want France did, to good effect. Germany failed to do so, instead choosing to back Russia's competitor in the Balkans. And whoops, France and Russia have an agreement.

OK, that can be lived with, provided Britain is kept on good terms. France and Russia and Britain would be a big problem. So lets - lets piss off Britain by supplying arms to disrupt the problematic situation in Ireland and support the Boers and challenge Britain's sensibilities by building a stonking big Navy that is big enough to scare Britain but not big enough to beat it and, just to make sure, ensure that no-one is under any illusions that this Navy might be useful anywhere other than in the North Sea (and Baltic).

OK, Britain has joined up with France and Russia. Still, at least Italy signed up to be our friend. So we can let AH piss it off so much it leaves and has talks with France about joining their team.

OK. We've done all this, and we've decided to invade Belgium. Let's make sure our troops are on their best behaviour so as not to give any opportunity for our enemies to make propaganda about war crimes against Belgium civilians.

Icing on the cake - Zimmerman telegram and USW - let's make sure USA comes in on the other side.

Rough summary - If Germany had been trying to get everyone in the world on the other side, they couldn't have done a better job. Still, at least they learned that lesson and definitely weren't going to repeat it in the late 1930s/first half of the 1940s.

 

[Vabasion]

My small timeline in terms of events -

Germany shifts majority of its troops during mobilization East leaving two armies in the west.

Initial Russian push is somewhat successful in taking Galician oil fields and surrounding areas surrounding and sometimes destroying Austrian Hungarian units caught in the advance. The attack is quickly checked by German forces advancing in Prussia.

The Russian armies tasked with attacking into Prussia are met by Germans in equivalent force and defeated forcing a retreat to more defensible areas. Some Russian units shift from Galicia to Prussia to shore up defenses giving Austria Hungary breathing room.

Push into Serbia is still slow and a disaster but with German presence in the East pressure is relieved somewhat from ending in quickly.

French push into Germany is checked. Metz and Strasbourg fortresses aid in the counter attack but due to lack of sufficient forces Germany is unable to completely capitalize on these events and crush the French armies. Loses are heavy on French side but not as heavy as they could have been with greater presence in the west. German military leadership and civilians are somewhat disgruntled by what they perceive as a chance to quickly end the war being wasted in Russian wastes.

Britain reaffirms its protection of Belgium and denotes a zone of naval interest from Kent to Belgium and from Scotland to Norway. Military vessels are forbidden from approaching said areas and British coast This benefits France indirectly by bottling in German fleet in the North Sea and allowing them to shift to Mediterranean.

Austria Hungary prepares to push into the lost areas of Galicia and retake them. The advance is slow and disappointing with cassualties on both sides being somewhat equivalent.

Germans hold on East Prussian border while pushing into Poland. German units shift south to Silesia in preparation for a pincer.

Britain approves a loan to France and Russia. Trade increases towards Russia both trough North Atlantic and Black Sea. Sale of war material begins as Entence stocks start running short.

Germans push into Poland. France launched a counter-offensive to relieve the pressure. Loses are heavy but not decisive once again. Little progress is made in terms of advance. German troops start rotating on the front line due to short front and plenty of men to cover it improving morale.

German push into Poland allows Austria Hungary to recover its lost territories. First advanced are made into Ukraine but are quickly checked by reformed Russian troops. In Poland Russians dig in into the cities and fortresses while majority of troops are moved to a tenable frontline. Counter-offensive is prepared.

By October fighting slows down and turns into a slog, but Poland is taken by December.

Several German ships try to leave past the British zone of interest. Media and politicians in Britain goes into overdrive presenting this as aggressive moves and preparation for war on part of Germany.

Winter of 1914/15 passes mostly uneventfully due to poor weather, mud and cold preventing major offensives. Polish legion enters Warsaw and organizes a new government. Recruitment starts.

All participants prepare spring offensives. Germans create two fronts, one for advance from north of Belarusian marches towards Baltic and other one for advance south of marshland.

Germans would breach the demilitarized naval zone several times again to strike French leading to British entry into the war.

After that Germans would make steady progress while Austrians advance into Ukraine. Serbia falls by autumn of 1915, British entry into the war forces several corps to be redeployed west, Losses of men and land create discontent in Russia. British and French offensive fails. Plans are made to bypass the German lines. Invasion of lowland is seriously proposed but shelved for the time being. Overtures are made to Italy for their entry into the war. Ottomans are still neutral due to delivery of their ships from Britain.

Italy enters in 1915, stopping the Austrian advance into Ukraine and forcing a diversion west. As a result Germans move troops south to help deal with Serbia and close one of the fronts freeing up Austrian units.

Germant starts their submarine warfare, US protests, aside from Italian entry and slow advance into Russia things are unchanged. Entry of Italy and pressure it relieves raises hopes in Russia.

Several failed offensives and lack of progress in the west as well as beating Russia is receiving lead to western Entente approving the advance trough lowlands in summer of 1916. The plan calls for advance into both Belgium and Netherlands since Belgium alone doesn’t offer a wide enough increase of frontage towards Germany to give hope for successful breakthrough, as well as to neutralize the Dutch trade with Germany and threaten Wihlelmshaven and Emden naval bases hopefully bottling the Germans up in the Baltic.

Summer advance into Russia enters Baltic states and advances into Estonia. Little progress is made in Ukraine without German aid.

Belgium and Netherlands prompted with requests to allow troops trough willingly or they will enter anyway. Refusal leads to war. Civilians in France, Britain and US are outraged by blatant aggression. Leaders justify it by presenting a case of Belgians and Dutch trading with Germans, the need to rescue Russia and absolute threat Germany would present if they win in the east. Aggression leads Scandinavians to come together to deter aggression. All of them are trading with Germany and would be under pressure to stop trade or even military threats.

Interventionism in US dealt a mortal blow trough Invasions of Belgium and Netherlands. Isolationists denounce European wars as imperialist in nature with both sides being the same.

Anglo French push unbalances Germany. While Belgium and Netherlands offer resistance they are unable to stand up to well equipped and numerous entente forces. German troops in the west redeploy north while awaiting reinforcements from the East thinning the line. French conduct spoiling attacks along the Franco German border to disrupt redeployments. Belgium falls aside from Antwerp. Maastricht offers resistance but is bypassed. Entente forces enter Germany and swing Northward into Netherlands taking most of it save the coastal cities.

Grand fleet moves in close as demonstration of force. Ultimatum is given to surrender or fleet would level Dutch and Belgian cities to the ground. Shelling never happens due to their surrender. Germans are on the back foot due to quick emergency redeployment. Fleet evacuated Emden and plans are put in motion to leave Wilhelmshaven if need be.

The Anglo French advance bolsters Russian morale. Entry into Germany itself as well as quick fall of lowland states leads many in Russia to hope for reverse of fortunes. Russia prepared offensive west to act in accord with Allied advance trough lowlands. Weakened German forces are pushed back from Estonia. Ukraine front remains unmoving.

Reversal of fortunes also leads Romania to consider entry into the war. Loss of Dutch and Belgian ports as neutral importers for German war needs impacts Germans heavily as industry and civilians suffer from the blockade.

And I’m stuck here a bit. I feel Wilson may easily lose the elections, he won California by just a few thousand votes, but I also feel his opponent who was for more preparedness for war may lose even harder since war is delegitimized in eyes of the public.

 

[Aghasverov]

Even if we grant the best possible interpretation, that still comes down to: "We're going invade Belgium and break our obligations under the treaty and you had better not do anything about it because that would be War."

Naturally, German diplomacy of the period was about as bad as it was possible to be.

Brief summary for those who have just tuned in.

Germany and France are not good friends. Given this, and given the inexorable nature of geography, the one thing Germany doesn't want is for France to ally with Russia, posing the prospect of a two front war. The obvious solution is to be friendly with Russia. Invest in it, so it has a vested interest in keeping you sweet to continue this. It's want France did, to good effect. Germany failed to do so, instead choosing to back Russia's competitor in the Balkans. And whoops, France and Russia have an agreement.

OK, that can be lived with, provided Britain is kept on good terms. France and Russia and Britain would be a big problem. So lets - lets piss off Britain by supplying arms to disrupt the problematic situation in Ireland and support the Boers and challenge Britain's sensibilities by building a stonking big Navy that is big enough to scare Britain but not big enough to beat it and, just to make sure, ensure that no-one is under any illusions that this Navy might be useful anywhere other than in the North Sea (and Baltic).

OK, Britain has joined up with France and Russia. Still, at least Italy signed up to be our friend. So we can let AH piss it off so much it leaves and has talks with France about joining their team.

OK. We've done all this, and we've decided to invade Belgium. Let's make sure our troops are on their best behaviour so as not to give any opportunity for our enemies to make propaganda about war crimes against Belgium civilians.

Icing on the cake - Zimmerman telegram and USW - let's make sure USA comes in on the other side.

Rough summary - If Germany had been trying to get everyone in the world on the other side, they couldn't have done a better job. Still, at least they learned that lesson and definitely weren't going to repeat it in the late 1930s/first half of the 1940s.

Oh, I agree on most points... German foreign policy was downright bone-headed in the wake of the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty (though, given the players on both sides and Russia's Balkan interests, I'm not sure it was really salvageable), German diplomacy was about as ham-fisted as could be imagined. There were many missed opportunities when it came to relations with the UK....

 

[Riain]

With respect - as I understand the question - what is meant by that is that the operation of the German right wing was a) logistically unsustainable, and b) lacked sufficient troop density to achieve its objectives. It underestimated Belgian powers of resistance, let alone the possible impact of a British contingent. Even setting aside operational differences between the two plans, Schlieffen himself insisted that no less than 48.5 corps were needed to have a chance of attaining campaign objectives in France. His reaction to trying to do so with the 34 corps Moltke actually used would have been...volcanic.

Of course, using 48.5 corps requires an even more robust logistical organization . . .

So, you need utter imbecility on the part of the French Army, or you really need to fire up that luck machine.



The irony here is that both Schlieffen and Moltke were adamant in insisting that their operational plans must not rely on assumptions of German qualitative supreriority. "What is this much higher quality supposd to consist of, in an age when the weapons, equipment, and training of all armies are more or less the same?" From Terence Holmes, "Absolute Numbers: The Schlieffen Plan as a Critique of German Strategy in 1914," War in History, Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 2014), pp. 193-213:

View attachment 698473View attachment 698474
[Link]



I might quibble with the word "far." But I agree that the French territory in question had more economic value than the Russian territory in question. I would not disagree that this is a sacrifice that a East First strategy has to accept, and take account of.

Schlieffen required so many Corps because he needed a bunch to mask the Dutch army after violating Dutch territory and allocated a lot of Corps to mask Antwerp, Moltke removed the need for those Corps masking the Dutch by not violating their territory and masked Antwerp with maybe half what Schlieffan considered. necessary. I'n any case there was no room for the troops Schlieffen said were needed, and the German army never got those 300,000 extra troop anyway, only 135,000. The idea was to transfer troops from the left to the right wing, this should have gone some way to addressing the troop density issues, however Moltke didn't do this indeed he did the opposite.

I think that any moves Joffre might have made have to be weighed against moves that Moltke might have made, my current interest being the fighting on the left wing being examples of what Moltke might have done. Maybe Joffre's moves might work great or maybe not, similarly Moltkes moves might work or not so I think tend to cancel each other out and we're left with detail qualitative and numerical differences.

 

[Riain]

Because we're talking about huge industrialized nations mobilizing and fighting with massive armies and lots of resources and strength in depth, even if one side has a slight edge in certain military areas it will take time for that edge to manifest enough to win out. It's also not like the French have no advantages here in this scenario.

The German army was better but it's not like it was overwhelmingly better, we're not talking guns vs. sticks here. I.e. were talking at most incremental advantages not revolutionary one.

The other point wasn't just as simple as the German army had some advantages, they also have plan that's going to require everything going right in terms of advancing to time tables, support, co-ordination etc

In key areas, in particular the high angle artillery, Germany was vastly superior to the French and had 7 Armies with 34 Corps compared to 5 armies with 21 Corps. This meant that Germany often could create local numerical superiority and had a great superiority with the most important weapon class, thus making their own luck.

The French could move troops around all they like but nothing will make up for the fact that they had 102 155mm howitzers to Germany's 1260 105mm howitzers, ~500 150mm howitzers and 216 210mm howitzers in the Divisions, Corps and Armies.

 

[TDM]

In key areas, in particular the high angle artillery, Germany was vastly superior to the French and had 7 Armies with 34 Corps compared to 5 armies with 21 Corps. This meant that Germany often could create local numerical superiority and had a great superiority with the most important weapon class, thus making their own luck.

The French could move troops around all they like but nothing will make up for the fact that they had 102 155mm howitzers to Germany's 1260 105mm howitzers, ~500 150mm howitzers and 216 210mm howitzers in the Divisions, Corps and Armies.

If that early advantage was so overwhelming why didn't they win then?

The reality is that while that is an advantage it's not the entire game, other factors mattered. Fixating on one thing to the exclusion of all others doesn't win wars unless that one thing can by itself win wars in abstract before getting into how it is applied in real time.