The Fall of the Republic, Part 11
In AUC 760, Rome was approaching a crossroads in its political evolution. Macedonia had been defeated, its empire dismantled. The lands east and north of Illyricum were in the process of being pacified and reorganized. Piracy in the Mediterranean had been virtually eliminated, and where merchants followed in the wake of Roman armies, the economic benefits eventually trickled down to all social classes. In Africa, the fruits of peace and security, albeit harvested under foreign dominion, were starting to provide dividends for the local population as well as for Roman businessmen and administrators.
With the reduction of Gallia, the Roman imperium was no longer a purely Mediterranean entity. With the conquest of North Africa, the Roman mind was opened to and broadened by an inflow of exotic ideas and sophisticated tastes. With the absorption of Hellas, Romanitas ceased to be a promotion of narrow-minded parochial values, and was beginning to metamorphose into a more cosmopolitan ideal.
Yet the very success of the Republic had put intolerable strains on its institutions and traditions. The empire was simply too vast, too heterogeneous and too complex to be ruled by institutions and traditions evolved to govern a city-state, or by an aristocratic elite that protected its self-interest by stifling initiative and enterprise. Most ominously, the conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries had given rise to a new breed of political and military leadership refusing to be bound within the restrictive confines of the mos maiorum and the cursus honorum.
The irony was that the Republic was destroyed by the very competitive forces which shaped it. Men strove for pre-eminence in a system which was by its very nature paradoxical. Because no man was king, every man desired to be king; and because no man was king, every man had the opportunity to make himself king. None of the Romans of the late Republic exemplified this more than Tiberius Claudius Nero Germanicus.
It was just one of the paradoxes which Germanicus embodied that his conquests were justified by the need to secure stable frontiers in Gallia, the lands conquered by his grandfather. For this policy of defensive aggression produced its own momentum. As the Roman territories expanded, so did the frontiers needing to be protected. Such is the way of empires. However, Germanicus was driven by more than just the desire to consolidate a legacy.
In the first half of the eighth century, the political and personal rivalry between the Claudii Neroni and the Caecilii Metelli, and their partisans, dominated Roman politics - in the Senate where the Metelli and the conservatores prevailed, and in the assembly, where the Claudii and the populares held sway. The Gallic campaign of Ti. Claudius Nero Africanus in AUC 722 had pacified the Gallic and Germanic peoples west and south of the Rhenus. However, this achievement was overshadowed by the success of L. Caecilius Metellus Creticus in the eastern Mediterranean. Given three centuries of hostility with Macedonia, for most Romans this was where the greatest threat was to be found, and where the greater glory was to be won.
Yet to the vexation of Metellus, it was Gaius Claudius Nero, son of Africanus, who in 748 was acclaimed Imperator and given the nomen Macedonicus. It was he who was in at the kill at Mylae while Lucius Caecilius Metellus Nepos occupied Pella.
Tiberius Claudius Nero, son of Macedonicus, was elected to the consulship in 762. His relative youth - at age 35 - should have disqualified him, but it was now routine practice for both populares and conservatores to ignore the constitution when it suited their purposes.
In contrast to the dour Africanus, Gaius had been a popular, charismatic, innovative commander. He harboured a strong sense of personal destiny, but he was also a man of integrity. As provincial governor, he won the admiration of the local population but did not endear himself to the equestrian class with his measures to stamp out dishonest and exploitative dealings. His son inherited these qualities, but in addition a more finely honed political acumen and a ruthless streak. As a consul, he used his legislative and veto powers to pay off debts and buy political allegiance; and he was not averse to using his family’s clientele - including army veterans - to intimidate his opponents. As proconsul, he flouted the lex Sulpicia which forbade a governor taking his army outside his province without the consent of the Senate.
Like his father and grandfather - and not so different from the Metelli - Tiberius earned the respect and loyalty of his troops by sharing their hardships and by providing decent pay and consistent victory. A strict disciplinarian, he was hard on his men but also on himself. He was conspicuous in battle, facing the same dangers as the troops, whom he addressed as commilitones, comrades. His regimen of intensive training and retraining and rigorous drill created a hardened, disciplined and all-conquering army.
In 763, Tiberius went to his allocated province. Many Romans were surprised when he engineered his appointment to the minor Gallia Alpina. He had his reasons, which soon became apparent.
In the wake of his 722 campaign, Tiberius Africanus had made no substantial changes to the existing tribal structures in central and northern Gallia. Instead, he followed the course of ad hoc expediency, negotiating alliances and imposing treaties, supporting friendly clans and chiefs and aiding in the suppression of their rivals. The policy was designed to keep the peace with a minimum of expenditure; but it required vigilance. Having no great interest in the administrative details, and perhaps being overly optimistic, he left the supervision of the treaties and alliances in the hands of the Senate. Within a few years there were distractions both overseas and domestic. The Senate’s neglect of Gallic affairs - which Tiberius saw as sheer negligence - guaranteed that the peace would not last.
With his arrangements in Gallia and Dacia already beginning to unravel, Africanus retired to private life an embittered man. So there is no doubt that the younger Tiberius was motivated at least partly by the wish to vindicate his grandfather.
One of the responsibilities of the governor of Gallia Alpina was to maintain the vital alliance with the Helvetii. Ironically, it had been to protect Rome’s allies against these people that the Gallic War of 690 had been launched. Seven decades on, the situation was reversed. Now the Helvetii played a crucial role in guarding the northern approaches to Italia through the Alpine passes. This concord was a typical demonstration of the Romans’ diplomatic genius at turning implacable enemies into faithful allies, even if they did not always follow through on their commitments.
Nevertheless, the safety of the Helvetii was nothing more than a pretext, and they were not involved directly in the subsequent campaign.
The trouble in Gallia in the 760s was a legacy of that earlier conflict. The extinction of the Suebi, annihilated by L. Aurelius Cotta in 690, had created something of a vacuum in the territory along the upper reaches of the River Rhenus. The Aedui who occupied the adjacent Gallic lands had been weakened and their neighbours the Averni decimated in their own struggle with Rome. Both had been reduced to the status of subject allies, dependant on Roman financial and military support.
In the late 750s, two warlike peoples, the Marcomanni and Quadi, began a movement across the Rhenus, threatening Rome’s allies. Why these peoples were on the move is not well understood, since their homeland directly north of the Alpes does not appear to have been under any recognizable threat. Certainly not all of the clans joined in the westward migration. Since they are believed to have been related to the Suebi, it is possible that they were claiming the patrimony of their kin.
The Marcomanni were also spreading northwards. At this time the Germanic Ubians and, to their south, the Vangiones also crossed the Rhenus, in the vicinity of the River Mosella, taking advantage of the decline of the Treveri (who had been defeated by Tiberius Africanus). It can be assumed that these tribes had been displaced by the migration of the Marcomanni, although this explanation does not take into account why the Nemetes, neighbours of the Ubians, remained on the east bank of the Rhenus. The affairs of Germania at this time are confusing, and so therefore are the extant historical accounts.
Farther north, the Chatti - a tribe of the Hermiones related to the Suebi - remained for the time being east of the river, inhabiting the upper reaches of the Visurgis. However, the west bank in their vicinity had been largely depopulated by the Roman conquest of 722, and it was only a matter of time before they took advantage of the situation. Roman policy in central and northern Gallia was now bearing the cost of two bitter wars which had destroyed the power and security of the indigenous Gallic peoples without putting in place a viable long-term alternative.
From his base in Gallia Alpina, Tiberius the younger was maneuvering to acquire an army. His allies in the assembly, led by the Tribune Lucius Octavius, had him assigned two legions to support the Helvetii. The wide-ranging lex Octavia also granted him the authority to levy troops in his and neighbouring provinces, to appoint his own officers, to negotiate treaties without prior approval of the Senate (although they would still have to be ratified in Rome) and to establish colonies. Such extraordinary powers were not without precedent, but in 763 Tiberius Claudius Nero was young and untested. He immediately began recruiting in Gallia, both in the provinces and among the allies. Protests in the Senate counted for little.
The German War began with an offensive against the Ubians and Vangiones. On the pretext of shielding the Helvetii, Tiberius took his small army out of his province, proceeding north of Gallia Maritima and setting up headquarters at Vesontio. From here, he despatched envoys to renew the partnership with the Andecavi, on the Liger, and to forge an alliance with the Mediomatrici, a Gallic people living east of the River Mosella who felt threatened by the migrating Germans. He manufactured a casus belli by sending a deputation which was roughly treated by the Ubians who received them. Marching north with just his four trained legions, plus auxiliary cavalry, he attacked without further warning, driving both tribes back to the Rhenus. A truce was arranged and the Germans were permitted to return to their side of the river. Tiberius then sent an expedition towards the coast, to ensure that the Gallic tribes there, pacified by his grandfather, were not preparing to rise against him.
As it was now late summer, Tiberius withdrew to establish winter quarters within the territory of the friendly Andecavi and Lingones. To ease his supply problems, he dispersed his legions. This scattering of his forces might have encouraged the other German tribes, but they were too disunited to take advantage. The following summer, 764, now with six legions at his disposal and having secured enough provisions for a long campaign, he advanced once more to the Rhenus.
Back in Rome, moves had been made in the Senate to relieve Tiberius of his proconsular imperium, for exceeding his legal authority and breaching the lex Sulpicia. Portraying himself, disingenuously, as a professional soldier with no interest in self-promotion, Tiberius expressed dismay that partisan politics should interfere with his military responsibilities. It was a clear signal that he intended to defy the Senate. Even so, the conservatores might have been successful, except that the Metellans overplayed their hand. Instead of the army being recalled, the command was to be handed over to none other than Metellus Nepos.
The proposal was vetoed by a popularis tribune, A. Terentius Varro. Rioting ensued, and Varro was forced to flee the city. However, one of the consuls in 764 was the patrician L. Cornelius Lentulus, no agent of Tiberius but disdainful of Metellan pretensions. His threat to call in legions from the provinces to quell the disorders had its desired effect. The senatorial faction responsible for the worst of the mob violence had no desire to see an army marching on Rome, lest the precedent not be lost on ambitious generals.
Due to Lentulus’s intervention, Tiberius was secure in his command, as he prepared his army for a pre-emptive strike against the Germans across the great river.
In AUC 760, Rome was approaching a crossroads in its political evolution. Macedonia had been defeated, its empire dismantled. The lands east and north of Illyricum were in the process of being pacified and reorganized. Piracy in the Mediterranean had been virtually eliminated, and where merchants followed in the wake of Roman armies, the economic benefits eventually trickled down to all social classes. In Africa, the fruits of peace and security, albeit harvested under foreign dominion, were starting to provide dividends for the local population as well as for Roman businessmen and administrators.
With the reduction of Gallia, the Roman imperium was no longer a purely Mediterranean entity. With the conquest of North Africa, the Roman mind was opened to and broadened by an inflow of exotic ideas and sophisticated tastes. With the absorption of Hellas, Romanitas ceased to be a promotion of narrow-minded parochial values, and was beginning to metamorphose into a more cosmopolitan ideal.
Yet the very success of the Republic had put intolerable strains on its institutions and traditions. The empire was simply too vast, too heterogeneous and too complex to be ruled by institutions and traditions evolved to govern a city-state, or by an aristocratic elite that protected its self-interest by stifling initiative and enterprise. Most ominously, the conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries had given rise to a new breed of political and military leadership refusing to be bound within the restrictive confines of the mos maiorum and the cursus honorum.
The irony was that the Republic was destroyed by the very competitive forces which shaped it. Men strove for pre-eminence in a system which was by its very nature paradoxical. Because no man was king, every man desired to be king; and because no man was king, every man had the opportunity to make himself king. None of the Romans of the late Republic exemplified this more than Tiberius Claudius Nero Germanicus.
It was just one of the paradoxes which Germanicus embodied that his conquests were justified by the need to secure stable frontiers in Gallia, the lands conquered by his grandfather. For this policy of defensive aggression produced its own momentum. As the Roman territories expanded, so did the frontiers needing to be protected. Such is the way of empires. However, Germanicus was driven by more than just the desire to consolidate a legacy.
In the first half of the eighth century, the political and personal rivalry between the Claudii Neroni and the Caecilii Metelli, and their partisans, dominated Roman politics - in the Senate where the Metelli and the conservatores prevailed, and in the assembly, where the Claudii and the populares held sway. The Gallic campaign of Ti. Claudius Nero Africanus in AUC 722 had pacified the Gallic and Germanic peoples west and south of the Rhenus. However, this achievement was overshadowed by the success of L. Caecilius Metellus Creticus in the eastern Mediterranean. Given three centuries of hostility with Macedonia, for most Romans this was where the greatest threat was to be found, and where the greater glory was to be won.
Yet to the vexation of Metellus, it was Gaius Claudius Nero, son of Africanus, who in 748 was acclaimed Imperator and given the nomen Macedonicus. It was he who was in at the kill at Mylae while Lucius Caecilius Metellus Nepos occupied Pella.
Tiberius Claudius Nero, son of Macedonicus, was elected to the consulship in 762. His relative youth - at age 35 - should have disqualified him, but it was now routine practice for both populares and conservatores to ignore the constitution when it suited their purposes.
In contrast to the dour Africanus, Gaius had been a popular, charismatic, innovative commander. He harboured a strong sense of personal destiny, but he was also a man of integrity. As provincial governor, he won the admiration of the local population but did not endear himself to the equestrian class with his measures to stamp out dishonest and exploitative dealings. His son inherited these qualities, but in addition a more finely honed political acumen and a ruthless streak. As a consul, he used his legislative and veto powers to pay off debts and buy political allegiance; and he was not averse to using his family’s clientele - including army veterans - to intimidate his opponents. As proconsul, he flouted the lex Sulpicia which forbade a governor taking his army outside his province without the consent of the Senate.
Like his father and grandfather - and not so different from the Metelli - Tiberius earned the respect and loyalty of his troops by sharing their hardships and by providing decent pay and consistent victory. A strict disciplinarian, he was hard on his men but also on himself. He was conspicuous in battle, facing the same dangers as the troops, whom he addressed as commilitones, comrades. His regimen of intensive training and retraining and rigorous drill created a hardened, disciplined and all-conquering army.
In 763, Tiberius went to his allocated province. Many Romans were surprised when he engineered his appointment to the minor Gallia Alpina. He had his reasons, which soon became apparent.
In the wake of his 722 campaign, Tiberius Africanus had made no substantial changes to the existing tribal structures in central and northern Gallia. Instead, he followed the course of ad hoc expediency, negotiating alliances and imposing treaties, supporting friendly clans and chiefs and aiding in the suppression of their rivals. The policy was designed to keep the peace with a minimum of expenditure; but it required vigilance. Having no great interest in the administrative details, and perhaps being overly optimistic, he left the supervision of the treaties and alliances in the hands of the Senate. Within a few years there were distractions both overseas and domestic. The Senate’s neglect of Gallic affairs - which Tiberius saw as sheer negligence - guaranteed that the peace would not last.
With his arrangements in Gallia and Dacia already beginning to unravel, Africanus retired to private life an embittered man. So there is no doubt that the younger Tiberius was motivated at least partly by the wish to vindicate his grandfather.
One of the responsibilities of the governor of Gallia Alpina was to maintain the vital alliance with the Helvetii. Ironically, it had been to protect Rome’s allies against these people that the Gallic War of 690 had been launched. Seven decades on, the situation was reversed. Now the Helvetii played a crucial role in guarding the northern approaches to Italia through the Alpine passes. This concord was a typical demonstration of the Romans’ diplomatic genius at turning implacable enemies into faithful allies, even if they did not always follow through on their commitments.
Nevertheless, the safety of the Helvetii was nothing more than a pretext, and they were not involved directly in the subsequent campaign.
The trouble in Gallia in the 760s was a legacy of that earlier conflict. The extinction of the Suebi, annihilated by L. Aurelius Cotta in 690, had created something of a vacuum in the territory along the upper reaches of the River Rhenus. The Aedui who occupied the adjacent Gallic lands had been weakened and their neighbours the Averni decimated in their own struggle with Rome. Both had been reduced to the status of subject allies, dependant on Roman financial and military support.
In the late 750s, two warlike peoples, the Marcomanni and Quadi, began a movement across the Rhenus, threatening Rome’s allies. Why these peoples were on the move is not well understood, since their homeland directly north of the Alpes does not appear to have been under any recognizable threat. Certainly not all of the clans joined in the westward migration. Since they are believed to have been related to the Suebi, it is possible that they were claiming the patrimony of their kin.
The Marcomanni were also spreading northwards. At this time the Germanic Ubians and, to their south, the Vangiones also crossed the Rhenus, in the vicinity of the River Mosella, taking advantage of the decline of the Treveri (who had been defeated by Tiberius Africanus). It can be assumed that these tribes had been displaced by the migration of the Marcomanni, although this explanation does not take into account why the Nemetes, neighbours of the Ubians, remained on the east bank of the Rhenus. The affairs of Germania at this time are confusing, and so therefore are the extant historical accounts.
Farther north, the Chatti - a tribe of the Hermiones related to the Suebi - remained for the time being east of the river, inhabiting the upper reaches of the Visurgis. However, the west bank in their vicinity had been largely depopulated by the Roman conquest of 722, and it was only a matter of time before they took advantage of the situation. Roman policy in central and northern Gallia was now bearing the cost of two bitter wars which had destroyed the power and security of the indigenous Gallic peoples without putting in place a viable long-term alternative.
From his base in Gallia Alpina, Tiberius the younger was maneuvering to acquire an army. His allies in the assembly, led by the Tribune Lucius Octavius, had him assigned two legions to support the Helvetii. The wide-ranging lex Octavia also granted him the authority to levy troops in his and neighbouring provinces, to appoint his own officers, to negotiate treaties without prior approval of the Senate (although they would still have to be ratified in Rome) and to establish colonies. Such extraordinary powers were not without precedent, but in 763 Tiberius Claudius Nero was young and untested. He immediately began recruiting in Gallia, both in the provinces and among the allies. Protests in the Senate counted for little.
The German War began with an offensive against the Ubians and Vangiones. On the pretext of shielding the Helvetii, Tiberius took his small army out of his province, proceeding north of Gallia Maritima and setting up headquarters at Vesontio. From here, he despatched envoys to renew the partnership with the Andecavi, on the Liger, and to forge an alliance with the Mediomatrici, a Gallic people living east of the River Mosella who felt threatened by the migrating Germans. He manufactured a casus belli by sending a deputation which was roughly treated by the Ubians who received them. Marching north with just his four trained legions, plus auxiliary cavalry, he attacked without further warning, driving both tribes back to the Rhenus. A truce was arranged and the Germans were permitted to return to their side of the river. Tiberius then sent an expedition towards the coast, to ensure that the Gallic tribes there, pacified by his grandfather, were not preparing to rise against him.
As it was now late summer, Tiberius withdrew to establish winter quarters within the territory of the friendly Andecavi and Lingones. To ease his supply problems, he dispersed his legions. This scattering of his forces might have encouraged the other German tribes, but they were too disunited to take advantage. The following summer, 764, now with six legions at his disposal and having secured enough provisions for a long campaign, he advanced once more to the Rhenus.
Back in Rome, moves had been made in the Senate to relieve Tiberius of his proconsular imperium, for exceeding his legal authority and breaching the lex Sulpicia. Portraying himself, disingenuously, as a professional soldier with no interest in self-promotion, Tiberius expressed dismay that partisan politics should interfere with his military responsibilities. It was a clear signal that he intended to defy the Senate. Even so, the conservatores might have been successful, except that the Metellans overplayed their hand. Instead of the army being recalled, the command was to be handed over to none other than Metellus Nepos.
The proposal was vetoed by a popularis tribune, A. Terentius Varro. Rioting ensued, and Varro was forced to flee the city. However, one of the consuls in 764 was the patrician L. Cornelius Lentulus, no agent of Tiberius but disdainful of Metellan pretensions. His threat to call in legions from the provinces to quell the disorders had its desired effect. The senatorial faction responsible for the worst of the mob violence had no desire to see an army marching on Rome, lest the precedent not be lost on ambitious generals.
Due to Lentulus’s intervention, Tiberius was secure in his command, as he prepared his army for a pre-emptive strike against the Germans across the great river.