Robert Falcon Scott survives returning from the South Pole

On my reading of Scott's journal, I think that was beyond their strength by that point.
But I believe Oates thought they could and advised Scott to push them one final time.

However, I believe if Scott and his party did make it to One Ton Depot they would have ended up stranded there because by that time their ability to keep marching was gone and not come back plus winter was relentlessly rolling towards them. Only a prompt rescue from Hut Point could save them but as the weather was by now deteriorating the chance of that quickly evaporated. I believe Atkinson tried to make another trip to One Ton after Cherry-Garrard's but had to turn back in the face of terrible conditions.
 
Frankly even Shackleton couldn't have gotten out of that mess and if Scott had made it back his story would be one of survival against incredible odds "dashing good show old chap, but the best man won."

I think the truth is closer to a middle ground on this.

Shackleton would have been more likely to get back alive at that point in his career because he would have planned the composition, logistics and equipping of his polar party better than Scott did: That is to say, he would not likely have been in quite so severe a mess in the first place!

On the other hand, I think Susan Solomon has made a compelling case that unusually adverse weather played a major role in Scott's disaster. Had it been even what Amundsen experienced on *his* journey back, I tend to think that Scott would have gotten out alive with at least most of his party, in spite of his shortcomings of planning and technique.

[And while Scott could be a grudge-bearing d*ck, I also tend to think that he would have conceded the loss to Amundsen with good grace had he made it back, too. That would have a bearing on the British public reaction as well.]
 
But I believe Oates thought they could and advised Scott to push them one final time.

However, I believe if Scott and his party did make it to One Ton Depot they would have ended up stranded there because by that time their ability to keep marching was gone and not come back plus winter was relentlessly rolling towards them. Only a prompt rescue from Hut Point could save them but as the weather was by now deteriorating the chance of that quickly evaporated. I believe Atkinson tried to make another trip to One Ton after Cherry-Garrard's but had to turn back in the face of terrible conditions.

There are uncertainties and error bars here, of course, and we can never be entirely certain. My gut sense is that Oates was probably too sanguine in his estimation of their capabilities at that point.

But...I might not disagree with you about the risk of being stranded at the depot. It could well be that it would only have prolonged their lives a little, rather than achieving their salvation.
 
the sacrifice IS the heroism. it is a very British story - we don't like losers but we do like a tragic failure with defeat snatched form the jaws of victory especially if those who take part do so correctly, behave like Englishmen and fall at the final hurdle. If you can be killed doing so then even better!
pointlessly dying while trying to win some vain glory is not sacrifice but suicide and there is nothing heroic about it, we dont call those who die to make a perfect selfie heroes after all

Well, at least he didnt send couple thousand men into machine gun fire to win some medal or promotion...
 
pointlessly dying while trying to win some vain glory is not sacrifice but suicide and there is nothing heroic about it, we dont call those who die to make a perfect selfie heroes after all

I think the point, though, is that neither Scott nor most Britons of that age thought he had died "pointlessly."
 
On the other hand, I think Susan Solomon has made a compelling case that unusually adverse weather played a major role in Scott's disaster.
Nobody is in disagreement that Scott and his party faced much worse weather than during Amundsen's or Shackleton's earlier effort. The thing is that when planning, margins for the unexpected must be worked in. There can never be any assurance that only benign weather will be experienced. Not enough food was cached and the error on how to preserve fuel played a big role but in the end it was the fact that Scott literally planned to manhaul for 1000miles at the period that summer in the Antarctic was waning was the determining factor. Maybe it could have been pulled off if everything went perfect but when does that happen? Never in my book so as soon as the party began to fall behind their fate became sealed. Perhaps if Scott had clearly ordered a relief party using the dogs met him returning from the pole at between 80deg and 82.5deg he would have lived but we know there was no clear order made for that relief party. This a great mystery as Scott mentions in his diary the disappointment not do be met by the dogs. Why didn't he very clearly say from the start they had to be there ready to meet the pole party at the bottom of the glacier? This of course, lays on Scott's lap as the organizer and the leader
 
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Even though this comes from Wikipedia, I cannot dispute it's validity and I am at a complete loss how others can?
Based on his experiences with McClintock and his love for naval traditions, Markham, future President of the Royal Geographical Society, became a fervent believer in the principle that manhauling was the purest form of polar travel. Markham became the driving force behind British Antarctic exploration endeavours in the early 20th century, and was the mentor of Robert Falcon Scott, to whom his thinking and drive were transferred. After his unhappy experiences with dogs in the Antarctic on the Discovery Expedition, 1901–04 Scott wrote, in his account of the expedition: "In my mind no journey ever made with dogs can approach the height of that fine conception which is realised when a party of men go forth to face hardships, dangers, and difficulties with their own unaided efforts […] Surely in this case the conquest is more nobly and splendidly won."
I don't find evidence anywhere that this is incorrect because Scott's attempts at adopting more efficient means to travel to the pole and back were anemic and the use of dogs, ponies and tractors never was intended to be south of the foot of the Beardmore Glacier which proves that he always planned dreadful manhauling for the majority of the attempt and which included the period of the approach of winter when manhauling became steadily more untenable. This was a known but nothing appears to have been done regarding it.
 
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Again forgive me for using Wikipedia as my source here but I believe it all rings true. The question of course is how many of the listed factors were known (actually known or would have become known with adequate pre-expedition research) and how much was actually fate? If the Norwegians knew then the British should also have known. There was nothing topsecret in any of this. The Journals from many expeditions to both south and north were right at hand to read and make inferences from. Only the worse than expected weather seems to be the one issue that can be laid at the doorstep of fate. All the rest could and should have been foreseen in some fashion and any of the risks mitigated before the start. That is the true essence of proper effective professional planning.

Historically, several factors have been discussed and many contributing factors claimed,[1] including:

  • Priority at the pole: Scott wrote that Amundsen's dogs seriously threatened his own polar aspirations, because dogs, being more cold-tolerant than ponies, would be able to start earlier in the season than Scott's mixed transport of dogs, ponies and motors.[2]
  • Cherry-Garrard in The Worst Journey in the World agreed but added that, in his experience, dogs would not have been able to ascend the Beardmore Glacier.[3]
  • With regards to the causes of the deaths of Scott and his companions, Cherry-Garrard devotes chapter 19 in his book to examine the causes. Among several other factors, he surmised that the rations of Scott's team were inadequate and did not provide enough energy for the men.[4]
  • Much of Scott's hauling was to be done by ponies, which are ill-suited to work on snow and ice without snow-shoes. Their relatively small hooves and large weight caused them to sink into anything other than very firm snow or ice. Oates was opposed to snow-shoes and had left most of them at base camp.
  • Ponies' coats easily became soaked with perspiration during exertion, thus necessitating constant attention with blankets to avoid hypothermia through evaporation. Dogs in contrast do not have sweat glands—they cool themselves via panting, making them less vulnerable to the cold. With ponies, Scott acknowledged he could not depart until 1 November 1911 when the weather would be warmer, leaving him less time to complete the journey.
  • The loss of ponies, several of which had drowned on disintegrating sea-ice, limited the supplies that could be hauled to the depots. Of 19 ponies brought south to aid in laying depots on the Ross Ice Shelf (traversed during the first and final quarters of the trek), nine were lost before the journey began. Further, unlike dogs which could eat the abundant seal and penguin meat found in Antarctica, the ponies' food had to be carried forward from the ship, vastly increasing the stores that had to be transported as Scott's expedition moved towards the pole.
  • Had the One-Ton depot been placed at latitude 80° S., as planned, Scott and his two surviving companions could have reached it on their return march. Instead, because Scott refused to drive the ponies to their deaths, despite Oates' urgent advice to do so, the depot was placed some 50 kilometres (31 mi) short of there. Scott's party died 18 km (11 mi) south of the depot.
  • The last-minute addition of Lieutenant Henry R. Bowers to the planned four-man pole party may have strained the rationing plan, although the death of Petty Officer Evans weeks later reduced the party to four again.
  • The rations were deficient in vitamins B and C.[5] The party became weaker a few weeks after reaching the pole, despite Scott's racing ambitions before the return march, writing "Now for a desperate struggle to get the news through first [before Amundsen reaches the cablehead in Australia]. I wonder if we can do it." Atkinson around 1918 would begin to gather up materials on his war-time findings, as well as his Terra Nova Expedition reports. He would later reveal to Cherry-Garrard the results of research he had conducted on the nutritional value of Scott's party's Barrier and Plateau rations. He found that the Barrier rations were generating only 51% of the calories required to support a typical Barrier workload, the corresponding Plateau figure being 57%.[6] These figures provided a substantial explanation (starvation) for the physical failure of the polar party.
  • The tins of cooking fuel cached along the return route were found to be partly empty, which forced the men to eat frozen food. Shortage of fuel to melt water likely caused the men to become dehydrated. Apparently the heat of the sun had vaporised part of the fuel, enabling it to escape past the cork stoppers. Amundsen knew about this "creep" and had had the fuel tins soldered shut on the voyage to Antarctica; see below.
  • The weather on the return march seems to have been unusually bad. In particular, when the party reached the Great Ice Barrier, the temperature was much lower than expected for the season, making the surface much less suitable for the sledge runners. Furthermore, the tailwind which they had expected to aid them home did not appear. Scott wrote, in his final "Message to the Public": "...our wreck is certainly due to this sudden advent of severe weather...."
  • The complexity of the transportation plan made it vulnerable. It depended in part on motor-sledges, ponies, dogs and southerly winds to assist the sledges (which were fitted with sails). Half of the distance was intended to be covered by man-hauling (and sails whenever conditions permitted). Scott's daily marches were limited to the endurance of the slowest team, the man-haulers who were instructed to advance 15 miles a day. The ponies marched by night and rested when the sun was warmer, Meares remained idle in camp with the much faster dogs for many hours, before catching up at the end of the day.[7]
Sullivan states that it was the last factor that probably was decisive.[1] He states:

Man is a poor beast of burden, as was shown in the terrible experience of Scott, Shackleton, and Wilson in their thrust to the south of 1902–3. However, Scott relied chiefly on man-hauling in 1911–12 because ponies could not ascend the glacier midway to the Pole. The Norwegians correctly guessed that dog teams could go all the way. Furthermore, they used a simple plan, based on their native skill with skis and on dog-driving methods that were tried and true. The moon will be reached by burning up a succession of rocket stages and casting them off. This, in effect, is what the Norwegians did with their dogs, the weaker animals being sacrificed to feed the other animals and the men themselves.
 
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Even though this comes from Wikipedia, I cannot dispute it's validity and I am at a complete loss how others can?

I don't find evidence anywhere that this is incorrect because Scott's attempts at adopting more efficient means to travel to the pole and back were anemic and the use of dogs, ponies and tractors never was intended to be south of the foot of the Beardmore Glacier which proves that he always planned dreadful manhauling for the majority of the attempt and which included the period of the approach of winter when manhauling became steadily more untenable. This was a known but nothing appears to have been done regarding it.

Markham deserves his reputation for being a largely toxic force in British polar exploration, I'm afraid.

And, unfortunately, his position was such that his patronage and approval was something that Scott felt he had to constantly cultivate.
Nobody is in disagreement that Scott and his party faced much worse weather than during Amundsen's or Shackleton's earlier effort. The thing is that when planning, margins for the unexpected must be worked in. There can never be any assurance that only benign weather will be experienced. Not enough food was cached and the error on how to preserve fuel played a big role but in the end it was the fact that Scott literally planned to manhaul for 1000miles at the period that summer in the Antarctic was waning was the determining factor. Maybe it could have been pulled off if everything went perfect but when does that happen? Never in my book so as soon as the party began to fall behind their fate became sealed. Perhaps if Scott had clearly ordered a relief party using the dogs met him returning from the pole at between 80deg and 82.5deg he would have lived but we know there was no clear order made for that relief party. This a great mystery as Scott mentions in his diary the disappointment not do be met by the dogs. Why didn't he very clearly say from the start they had to be there ready to meet the pole party at the bottom of the glacier? This of course, lays on Scott's lap as the organizer and the leader

I think there is not as much daylight between us as you may think!

I do not say that Scott was not a bungler, but rather that Huntford overstated how much bungling he did, and that has become more evident with things we have learned in recent years (such as the discovery of Scott's written order to Meares). I do think that despite the bungling, Scott *could* have made it back if the weather had not been so bad, which at least attests to some level of competency. Which is what I think Susan Solomon was trying to argue, even if she went too far in the other direction.

The problem with Scott, I suspect, is not that he was an idiot, or even malicious (though he could certainly nurse a grudge, which he unfortunately did against Shackleton), but that he was in certain respects, not very well suited to be an exploration leader, or come to that, a front line naval captain. His gifts - and he did have real gifts - lay elsewhere. He actually did a very smart job of organizing the scientific side of the expedition, which certainly brought back far, far more useful science than Amundsen did. But he kind of got channeled into exploration as his means of advancement within the Royal Navy. As David Crane put it, “In any sensible society, a child of Scott’s type would have ended up as an engineer or scientist, but for a boy of his class in Victorian England the future was circumscribed by the deadening monopoly of the old professions.”

As to what you say about dealing with (and being prepared for) the unexpected, this is of course where Shackleton shines over Scott. Shackleton started out with all the same expectations and prejudices that Scott did, but he learned from their deficiencies, and he was eminently able to adapt. Both of his Antarctic expeditions ran into unexpected Bad Things and yet he managed against all odds to overcome them, and come back alive with all his men. And of course, he was simply better in leading men (and choosing ones who were leadable).
 
Regardless that Scott tried to play down the idea that the pole was the main goal of the expedition and that science was first he didn't say that when raising money. He didn't get money for the science he would bring back but for the fame and the press rights of being the first man to the pole so it was essential that he get there and get there first. That should have been overriding in any plans he made.

If that is clear, then the idea of not putting maximum resources into going to the pole seems very short-sighted. I've mentioned the northern party as not being available for Depot laying on the barrier and to be part of a relief party to meet him as he came off the glacier. Without any other means by that point in the expedition other than man-hauling and their handful of dogs, with enough men they could have been out there on the barrier to bring his pole party home. Here Scott failed by not prioritizing the pole as the most important goal of his expedition and science being second to that
 
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Since Scott's leadership and people skills have been mentioned, the subject of Cecil Meares needs to be discussed. My reading of the narrative is that before he departed on the glacier to return to Cape Evans, Meares had more or less washed his hands of Scott and had told him so much however history has not recorded any effort Scott made (if any) to keep Meares on the team and continue supporting the enterprise?

Certainly, if Scott believed the dogs were his only salvation for his return from the pole and that Meares was the man needed to effectively drive the dogs, then losing Meares basically meant giving up on that salvation. A man understanding this should have kept Meares aboard even if that meant cajoling if not outright begging. Scott could only offer Meares a carrot because he held no stick at all to use other than he would shittalk Meares after Scott returned to the UK which fell on the ears of a man who had long previously given up caring. Perhaps Meares already saw the polar party as dead already? Can we agree that Cecil Meares was savvy enough to see the situation clearly?

Most important is that an effective leader works hard to not be arrogant and alienate any man holding critical skills needed for success of the endeavor. My understanding is however, as Meares became more and more disaffected with Scott's methods and leadership, Scott became more and more intransigent with Meares. Scott's wanting to run the expedition as a naval one was not something which could hope to work with an independently minded man like Meares who chaffed against rigid protocol. Further did Scott try to provide to Meares any sense that he recognized Meares had knowledge, experience and ability which he nor anyone else on the expedition had and given him recognition of that plus a bit of freedom to act independently or to offer his advice to Scott? I do not believe Scott did any such thing to have Meares want to stay so when after Meares departed with the TERRA NOVA after returning from the glacier, Scott's chances of getting out alive might well have evaporated.
 
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I feel like I'm at risk here for turning into a Scott apologist, which I really am not, but...

Regardless that Scott tried to play down the idea that the pole was the main goal of the expedition and that science was first he didn't raising money for the science he would bring back but for the fame and the press rights of being the first man to the pole so it was essential that he get there and get there first. That should have been overriding in any plans he made.

If that is clear then the idea of not putting maximum resources into going to the pole seems very short-sighted. I've mentioned the northern party as not being available for Depot laying on the barrier and to be part of a relief party to meet him as he came off the glacier. Without any other means by that point in the expedition other than man-hauling and their handful of dogs, with enough men they could have been out there on the barrier to bring his pole party home. Here Scott failed by not prioritizing the pole as the most important goal of his expedition and science being second to that

Again, I think the reality is more nuanced here. There are, without question, good grounds on which to criticize Scott's running of the Terra Nova Expedition! But bear in mind:

1) Yes, Scott flogged getting to the Pole, front and center, in much of his fundraising for the expedition. "The main objective of this expedition is to reach the South Pole, and to secure for the British Empire the honour of this achievement." But unlike Amundsen and Shackleton, Scott had what was really a public-private expedition. The British government provided over half the funding! Regardless of what he told some of his financial backers, science was therefore built in as an important part of the portfolio. He could not ignore it or minimize it. That, unfortunately, scattered his focus. Amundsen did not need to worry about any of that: he could focus on just the Pole, and the Pole alone. That was not Amundsen's only advantage, but it was an important one.

2) Scott did not even learn of Amundsen's expedition until he was already in Australia - and what was more, Amundsen's telegram was enigmatic about just what he was going to be doing in Antarctica. And by that point, the planning and equipping was already in place, the pieces were in motion. This handcuffed Scott to some degree.

That said, I think that cannot excuse some of the decisions Scott made after that point, and they go beyond the reluctance to fully embrace the use of sledge dogs. And his luck was just bad enough that some of those decisions ended up making for a fatal result.

The irony is...to get back to the OP's question...Scott, like Franklin before him, ended up being more famous, more admired in his generation, for dying in his attempt than he would have had he completed his mission.
 
The thing is, should Scott win the pole, the government will be so thrilled with the great prize as to overlook that he didn't bring back much in the way of new science. I am honestly not sure what scientific discoveries the Northern parties were expected to make except for filling in blank areas on the map? As it was six men ended up spending the entire expedition away from the primary effort and in their second winter suffered abominably and only barely returned alive. What could those six men have contributed if they had not been separately from the main party in first place? Yes, the Northern Party was supposed to be reunited with the main party during the summer season of 1912 but there was always a risk they wouldn't be (for any reason) which it appears Scott also did not mitigate? Should those 6 been kept close and available to support bringing the polar party home they might have survived.
 
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The thing is, should Scott win the pole, the government will be so thrilled with the great prize as to overlook that he didn't bring back much in the way of new science.
The Terra Nova Expedition actually brought back quite a bit of science!


But I agree that the government would be thrilled if Scott reached the Pole first. (Though this does not seem to be the scenario the OP is asking about.) Asquith's government was chest deep in domestic reform issues and the Irish question, and a Scott triumph would have been a welcome distraction and reflected bit of glory for all concerned.
 
The Terra Nova Expedition actually brought back quite a bit of science!
Of that I am well aware but did Scott hamper the effort to attaining the pole but placing too many men in positions where the polar party could not be successfully supported? With six more men available to be bringing supplies out onto the barrier and to escort his party home they just might have made it but manpower fit enough for the journey out onto the barrier was in very short supply at Hut point in March 1912.
 
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Well, at least he didnt send couple thousand men into machine gun fire to win some medal or promotion...
Which bears discussion because what would the value of 5 men become in just a couple of years...especially at the Somme where tens of thousands perished pointless deaths in an afternoon?

It's very hard to mythologize that kind of slaughter and thus we still talk and debate Scott now more than a full century later
 
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Even though this comes from Wikipedia, I cannot dispute it's validity and I am at a complete loss how others can?

I don't find evidence anywhere that this is incorrect because Scott's attempts at adopting more efficient means to travel to the pole and back were anemic and the use of dogs, ponies and tractors never was intended to be south of the foot of the Beardmore Glacier which proves that he always planned dreadful manhauling for the majority of the attempt and which included the period of the approach of winter when manhauling became steadily more untenable. This was a known but nothing appears to have been done regarding it.

Bevause AS THE MAIN SOURCE YOU RELY ON (ie Huntford) SAYS , Scott changed his mind. The prospectus Scott wrote indicates he changed his mind. His own diary says he changed his mind. The diaries of the men in the expedition say he changed his mind.

You have been given references and quotes from well-researched publications such as the Cambridge University Press' work on polar studies that show that your claims are simply untrue. Scott wrote several times that he would take dogs to the pole. It is not honest to ignore that just so that you can feel superior or vent your hate.

It is silly to clain that introducing motor sledges, using ponies and about 32 dogs is "anaemic".

It is dishonest, untrue and utterly against evidence to say that Scott "always planned dreaded manhauling" for the last part. His diary says he did not plan manhauling. Accounts of the other members of the party say he did not plan manhauling,
 
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clam yourself down fella - I am not, rather obviously , expressing MY view!

I am expressing a view I think might be prevalent in the circumstances described at the time these actions took place. it might not be the position of the RGS but it is certainly possible ( if not probable) that such a view would be held by other establishment figures, communicated by thier friends in the print media and taken up by normal people in the UK.

This is, after all, the time of (almost) peak empire. Britannia rules the waves, the sun never sets on the greatest empire the world has ever known and the British "race" is the finest and most outstanding "race" in the world. The lowest Britain is superior in every way to the highest foreigner. They are absolutely going to claim that Scott won even when he didn't. How could he not? He is British!

Take a look at the imperial jingoism in the media of the time ( and by extension we must assume in the populace) . It is awful. The language used to describe different people ( especially but not only those of colour) and the views expressed about the standing and probity of other nations is appalling. Coupled with that is the creation of imperial heroes and the championing of heroic actions in a manner that we would find distasteful and unacceptable today.

The reporting of the titanic sinking features quite a bit about people behaving in a proper British manner even when drowning or freezing to death!

It sounded as if your view was that they were racist, which is insulting them. Saying it's merely "my view" is not a get out of jail card.

Yes, the Brits of the time (which is an era I've looked at a lot for research for other purposes) could be jingoistic, but they could also be balanced and realistic. Just using sweeping statements to insult them en masse doesn't create an actual reasoned and evidenced claim that can support sweeping insults. By coincidence, yesterday I was going through copies of The Field for about the time of Scott's death and there were many discussions about international sport, of course. There was NO tendency to state that the Brits were the best - in one case, for example, there was basically a sigh of relief that a US entry had not knocked off the cream of the Brits. In another (a report on the Olympics) there was the statement that the Brit had done well but that the Swede who won gold was a level or two above in all departments. That's only a microcosm but it is an example where apocryphal statements of bias run counter to those you presented.

In other areas I study, like naval history, the British who were actually involved at the top level were not as jingoistic as claimed and were often quite realistic about the virtues of other nations. And to some extent, at the time the UK was on top of the world in many respects.

We do not have to assume that the jingoism of the popular media is reflected in those who would have come to any conclusion about the polar "race". Surely we can only come to such an insulting conclusion based on proper research into, for example, the reception in the relevant circles of Nansen, Amundsen (regarding his earlier expedition), the US claims to the North Pole, etc. Proper research into such an area shows that the RGS, the Royal Society and other relevant bodies did not rewrite the world to the extent you claim.

If you can find actual evidence of an example where the RGS and other relevant opinion makers decried a similar claim of exploration then please provide it. Otherwise we will just be throwing apocryphal tales at each other.

PS - I'm not a Brit.

Yes, the "tuppenny press" may have thrown some lurid and biased headlines around, but they seem to have done the same thing in every country.
 
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