Road Less Traveled: WW1 negotiated peace in 1916/17

[Hörnla]

I see Alsace-Lorraine actually as one of the toughest nuts to crack. For the German side, losing it defines a lost war. For France not winning it means admitting the impossibility to win against Germany and to accept that Alsace-Lorraine will have to be forever given up (which the repulic mostly wasn't ready to).

The only realistic idea would be some sort of plebiscite under conditions which give both Paris and Berlin not the impression that the result is a risky toss-up (or bound to lose)... but which gives both sides the illusion that it will grant resp. confirm possession of Alsace-Lorraine.

A somewhat smaller chance might be that both sides accept a limited plebiscite which is more or less designed to split off the definitely French-speaking areas mostly in Lorraine. This would result in the French Government being able to show some gains in the matter, whereas Berlin could sell this agreement as a principal acceptance of the German character of the remaining Elsaß-Lothringen while the Reich only got rid of the untrustworthy Wackes which would never be reliable Waffenbrüder anyways.

 

[ferdi254]

TDM the quotes have been brought up in all the other threads

You are short any quote either contemporary or by historians that the Entente could have fought until Oct 1918 without US supplies.

You are short any answer what kind of assets did the UK have available to fund the 2.7 billion it would have needed for OTL supplies until June 17.

 

[ferdi254]

Oh and btw there is a very fine line between arguing that the banks were steering the USA into a war and a lot worse arguments.

But in the end it does not matter. I have seen the argument that the US politicians were willing to further support the UK even with uncollaterized loans because stopping it would hurt the USA economically.

This argument does not fly due to 2 simple reasons.

1) I am yet to see any quote that backs up that claim. What I see as historical fact is that even until March 17 all what the politicians did was saying that there won’t be any uncollaterized loans. So making the am claim one would really be in need of actual quotes because

2) the US politicians were collectively not stupid. They knew that a stop now would lead to an economical downtime. But that was not a major one, it would happen at a time chosen by the USA and faaar from any elections. They knew that inevitably the deliveries would stop some day and the longer it lasted the economy would be more and more hit at worst one or two months before elections.
They also feared that the US giving uncollaterized loans might get them to either see the UK default on them (which would mean they were to get the blame on it) or they wold have to join the Entente (not a very popular thing).

How do we know that the second line of thinking is correct? Because the US politicians acted totally in accordance with it until ZT. How do we know the first one is incorrect? Because until March 18 they acted completely the opposite.
Or somebody bring up some quotes of politicians in the USA to back up the first line of thinking.

 

[TDM]

TDM the quotes have been brought up in all the other threads

Then you will have no issue presenting them here, thing is I've read those other threads and the cites are pretty much how I described them here

You are short any quote either contemporary or by historians that the Entente could have fought until Oct 1918 without US supplies.

Is the US now refusing to sell to the entente? Again you are asking for evidence against a threat that didn't seriously exist, so no I have no evidence for what the UK intended to do if the US stopped selling to them entirely.

You are short any answer what kind of assets did the UK have available to fund the 2.7 billion it would have needed for OTL supplies until June 17.

See the link I gave, see how US markets seemed happy to lend money, again J P Morgan was working on the next round of loans to the tune of $1.5bn just in spring 1917 alone.

You are the one who hasn't addressed points.

 

[ferdi254]

I looked it up you were in those threads so what good would it do to quote them again.

Summary from my side. Once again „somehow“is the answer.

 

[TDM]

I looked it up you were in those threads so what good would it do to quote them again.

I agree probably not much, what wasn't proved then is unlikely to be proved now certainly not by posting the same stuff again

Summary from my side. Once again „somehow“is the answer.

No read my post, you haven't addressed the points made. You just double down on your initial claim and frankly all your points stem from the a-priori assumption that your initial claim is 100% right i.e. you are presenting a pretty circular argument.

did you read the linked article I gave?

Also if you want to reply to me a favour and quote me eh.

 

[ferdi254]

Oh and of course those mutinies were so unimportant that the French changed their CIC and hid it completely from the UK.

That does sound to me that the French government (those people who I assume knew much better what was going on than anybody on this board) thought it was an important thing.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Oh and of course those mutinies were so unimportant that the French changed their CIC and hid it completely from the UK.

That does sound to me that the French government (those people who I assume knew much better what was going on than anybody on this board) thought it was an important thing.

Nivelle was sacked because of the defeat of his offensive, which caused the mutinies, rather than the actual mutinies themselves.

The French did not suddenly go pacifist. The main complaints of the soldiers was improvement in conditions (especially leave) but more to cease what appeared to be suicidal offensive.

That doesn't mean the French didn't attack at all for the rest of 1917. Look at the limited offensives - very much "bite-&-hold" - that took place at Verdun, pushing the front line pretty much back to where it was in early 1916. The army was willing to attack in certain conditions - not exactly a perfect situation, but one that allowed the French to hang on in the War.

 

[ferdi254]

Yep knowing that the US soldiers were coming, having received the promise that no large scale offensive would take place until then….
I am not overstating this but morale was a serious problem in the Entente armies.

So we can only speculate how this would have turned out in an ATL but claiming it would eactly pan out like OTL or have zero influence on the fighting ability of the French and UK armies is imo more than a bit far fetched.

 

[NoMommsen]

Nivelle was sacked because of the defeat of his offensive, which caused the mutinies, rather than the actual mutinies themselves.
...

Instead he was sacked for ... ?

 

[TDM]

Yep knowing that the US soldiers were coming, having received the promise that no large scale offensive would take place until then….
I am not overstating this but morale was a serious problem in the Entente armies.

So we can only speculate how this would have turned out in an ATL but claiming it would eactly pan out like OTL or have zero influence on the fighting ability of the French and UK armies is imo more than a bit far fetched.

Has anyone done this though?

 

[kham_coc]

The French morale issue is overblown or misunderstood. the mutinies weren't about "we don't want to fight the Germans any more" it was about "we don't like the kind attacks you sending us out for".

Yes, but How are the germans to be dislodged without attacking?
That's it.

Less manpower during the spring offensive without the US troops. The US troops didn't start hitting the front in big numbers until after the spring offensive (US numbers are far more in effect in the following 100 days offensive).

Yeah my point is, how are the germans to be dislodged from their positions gained by the spring offensives?

With no direct US involvement the 100 days certainly couldn't go off like it did OTL, but you have to remember what state Germany was in during and after the spring offensive and Brest-Litovsk isn't going to save them.

Yeah, but German morale was what it was because of their position being untenable.
In a scenario where the spring offensives goes better (Quite possibly Much better) and then no reversals, due to no US involvement, German morale will be a lot better.

 

[TDM]

Yes, but How are the germans to be dislodged without attacking?
That's it.

You assuming the France will never attack again, it not really like that. The thing is the US declaring war is a POD earlier than the mutinies anyway so teh butterflies will already be in effect i.e. France was doing ting sin 1917 with the US declaration in mind

Yeah my point is, how are the germans to be dislodged from their positions gained by the spring offensives?

The ground they took left them in pretty untenable over extend lines because their attack failed.

Yeah, but German morale was what it was because of their position being untenable

In a scenario where the spring offensives goes better (Quite possibly Much better) and then no reversals, due to no US involvement, German morale will be a lot better.

German moral was low for several reason but a lot of them ultimately are due to of the effects of the blockade, the whole spring offensive was launched in an attempt to bring the war to a close before the blockade made continuing untenable (as well as before the US getting fully stuck in).

Germany was increasingly finding it hard to continue to supply and maintain it forces in the field because of the effects of the blockade. The issues at home (some of which cause the issues at the front of course) were also increasing at home because of the blockade.

So the Spring offensive is basically Germany running a big offensive to try and win knowing that if it doesn't do it then the continuing deteriorating situation will make it harder and harder for them to do so in the future. Of course since it failed it functionally sacrificed the resources expended mounting it making that increasingly bad situation worse. (and ultimately made the 100 day offensive that followed easier of course).


It's the same driving factor for the German going unrestricted with their subs in 1917. They don't it to knock Britain out because the entente were about break though German line and march on Berlin, or because their own lines was about to collapse, or the like. They do it because the blockade was strangling them and they tried to strangle Britain back.

 

[Veiovis]

That does sound to me that the French government (those people who I assume knew much better what was going on than anybody on this board)

Assuming that people on the ground, with patchy information, no time to think about it and heavy emotional investments, have a more accurate view then people with a century of sholarship to mule over something is not something you should make a habit of. Not necessariy here, but more generally.

Hindsight is everything and all that.

 

[ferdi254]

Veiovis, in general you are right the pont is that all() scholarly work that has been cited so far in all those threads points in one and only one direction.
I am yet to see quotes from any reliable historian that without the deliveries of the USA the Entente could have won.

I am also yet to see any work from a reliable historian that the USA would have continued deliveries with uncollaterizrd loans

I am yet to hear any idea how to quell the mutinies without the USA being in.

I am yet to see…. long list by now.

„somehow“ simply does not cut it.

 

[ferdi254]

And of curse in one point TDM is completely right the UK had enough assets to finance the war more or less indefinitely.

Singapur and Hongkong would have gone a long way, all Carribeam assets not that much but still and them you have the big prizes.

But in the end if the UK gets the possibility to make a status quo ante peace in the West or piece by piece sell its colonial empire to thr USA which course would they take?

That is why I have asked him again and again to come up with concrete figures to add up to OTL purchased but the answe so far is „somehow“.

 

[Mikestone8]

the whole spring offensive was launched in an attempt to bring the war to a close before the blockade made continuing untenable (as well as before the US getting fully stuck in).

Certainly the latter, but not particularly the former.

Ludendorff's concern was to get a decisive blow in before Americans could arrive in force. His other reason was that because (in his view) the troops were "weary of endless defensive battles." In his war memoirs he doesn't even mention the blockade as a reason, though it would have provided him with a good reason for launching the attacks.

And Prince Max of Baden, in his memoirs for October 1918, also barely mentions the matter, save for a passing comment that things were very bad in the poorer parts of Berlin. The reasons the military men gave him for low morale were tanks (though they had coped well enough with these at Cambrai) and the unceasing flow of Americans. The blockade (though making life unpleasant for man y)was the least of their concerns.

 

[TDM]

Certainly the latter, but not particularly the former.

Ludendorff's concern was to get a decisive blow in before Americans could arrive in force. His other reason was that because (in his view) the troops were "weary of endless defensive battles." In his war memoirs he doesn't even mention the blockade as a reason, though it would have provided him with a good reason for launching the attacks.

And Prince Max of Baden, in his memoirs for October 1918, also barely mentions the matter, save for a passing comment that things were very bad in the poorer parts of Berlin. The reasons the military men gave him for low morale were tanks (though they had coped well enough with these at Cambrai) and the unceasing flow of Americans. The blockade (though making life unpleasant for man y)was the least of their concerns.

They had food riots and were beginning to lose large numbers to malnutrition and malnutrition related diseases. Even the army who they did they best to insulate form this ended up easting ersatz food

Ludendorff also blamed his defeat on his innumerable foes and their lack of will power. so I'm not sure I rely to heavily on his memoirs

Finally what was the trigger event for the US declaring war? German unrestricted sub warfare. Why did the Germans have to go with unrestricted sub warfare, was it because the British were about to break through German line and march to berlin? No it was because the British blockade was beginning to bite and the Germans knew they couldn't win war of attrition in that situation

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Instead he was sacked for ... ?

His offensive being a bloody failure, and not calling it off when he had advised the French Govt. that if unsuccessful he would close it down. His sacking predated the Govt. being made aware of the mutinies. Cos if the French ministers knew, the Germans would too!

 

[Knightmare]

His offensive being a bloody failure, and not calling it off when he had advised the French Govt. that if unsuccessful he would close it down. His sacking predated the Govt. being made aware of the mutinies. Cos if the French ministers knew, the Germans would too!

Also overpromising on the offensive. Apparently the French troops had great elan, all fired up, thinking "this is it, we're gonna win the war" but then the Germans pulled back to the Hindenburg Line, which didn't stop plans to attack, and worse, the Germans got ahold of the plan, which was not a fun combo for the French when it finally kicked off.

Basically, he gambled on a war winning offensive, like, somehow smashing all the German armies there within 24-48 hours of it kicking off. He then failed to deliver. Which kicked off a major drop in morale among the French troops, leading to his firing, and shortly thereafter, the Mutinies.