SIGH..... You may change the ground campaign, but this will not change the air campaign. Even if the French do much better on the ground, by early June their air force is still practically non existent. The British without the advantages they enjoyed during the BoB will also do a lot worse than OTL, and they will still not commit all of their air forces to the continent out of fear that France might still fall.
The French Air Force collapsed in the context of its bases being overrun, confusion and chaos of a fast moving war it was not capable of undertaking, and its industrial base and infrastructure being captured. In the case that the French are not defeated on the ground, this disappears, and conversely it becomes a case of improving French and British forces and declining German fores.
The British were also establishing a radar network on the continent, although this would not be as effective as the UK one in any case. The present of a major ally however, is well worth the loss of a radar chain, and the lack of disruption to UK air production is also a major boon.
As for the claim that the LW runs out of steam by July - after just 2 months of fighting: A complete ridiculous claim proven wrong bei the BoB and most other air campagins coonducted by the LW during WW2.
The Germans constantly had time between campaigns to refit, repair, and re-adjust. Once they were thrown into constant high intensity combat against peer enemies, starting from 1943-1944 onward, their back was broken - and that was with much more time to prepare and build up. The Luftwaffe is a much more fragile tool in 1940, and its constant high intensity combat will put a strain on it which will ultimately lead to diminishing effectiveness. Becoming a non-entity will take longer, probably until 1941, but ultimately the path for the German air force is clear: being out-produced and swamped under the far larger aerial resources of Britain and France.
Also by July the LW is practically unopposed, so even if they have problems they can scale back their involvement and still be very effective.
Unopposed in the context of the original 1940 battle, in the event of the front lines holding then the air battle will be much more even and gradually creep into the Anglo-French favor.
Also if the campaign should take until 1941, then its the French collapsing, not the Germans.
Yes, the Germans who are outmatched in almost all industrial categories, cut off from the world markets, and with a much more populous, richer, and powerful enemy, are the ones who will win the war of attrition....
Also colonial troops are a poor replacement for American/Allied troops, and in terms of numbers didnt even represent 10% of Allied armies. Also - colonial troops will no die for their colonial overlords indefinitly.
I would again recommend for you to read The Breaking Point and To Lose a Battle: both will point out that some of the most effective, motivated, and courageous units that the French fielded in 1940 were colonial troops, as can be testified by the heroic actions of French Spahi forces, colonial machine gun brigades, and various African units. The idea of colonial units being useless cannon fodder is a historical fallacy of the highest degree.
@All
As written in my introduction. The determinism regarding this topic borders on Allied Wanking. While one of the greatest military victories in human history can apparently be turned around quite easily, German defeat seems to be inevitable. Even if they just fight 2/3 of what they were faced with historically. Or half, or 1/3. Little Britain prevails no matter what - it didnt really need the US and the 20 million+ tons of shipping space built by the US or the 3 million US soldiers and all the other stuff. It doesnt matter that OTL they very scrapping the barrel both in terms of manpower and finance by 1944 - another 6 years of war is a cakewalk for Britain...... And dont mind Germany. Its economy cant take a long war- just look at OTL where their economy collapsed by September 1944 - after just 5 years of fighting. The results will be same even without the 1 million tons of bombs released by the Americans. This doesnt help Germany industry/economy at all.....
The Battle of France swung on critical and key decision points which do not require much altering to change. Decisive results do not mean that something is guaranteed to succeed and inevitable. Both sides took heavy risks, and if the German risk didn't pay off, then their ability to defeat France in 1940 is nil.
Isn't it interesting that you can turn around the war ever so easily by killing off Churchill, Stalin, or FDR in petty accidents or assassinations, but the minute I suggest that the French choose a different deployment plan in 1940 or even just pump out more artillery fire during the Sedan operation instead of husbanding their shells, I am engaged in artificially vaunting the Allied powers?