Reagan : Falklands are British

What if Reagan had reacted differently to Argentinas attack on the Falklands? Meaning put alliance with the UK higher than the one with Argentina? And told Argentina that the US wouldn't allow an Argentinian attack on the Falklands? Could that have isolated the fascist government in Argentina ? Or send them in the arms of USSR? Regardless of the government being anti-communist?
 
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In the end, the US supported its ally through the Special Relationship. A stronger show of solidarity, one meant to preempt Argentine aggression, would have scared the junta into backing off and fuming silently. It would have lasted longer, slowly succumbing to inefficiency and corruption before eventually crumbling.

OTL American attitude was mostly because a) it didn't know if the British were willing to hold on to the Falklands, and b) didn't really expect Argentina to invade. Other than that, they were fully willing to support Britain on the matter.

As for Argentina allying with the USSR - the junta would effectively be slitting their own throats. Their entire rule, the brutality and the viciousness of the National Reorganization Process which carried out many atrocities, was all done to rid of the country of Communist guerrillas. To then turn around and ally with the USSR would have been as a betrayal of the highest order, and there would have undoubtedly been many younger officers willing to execute their own superiors for such treason. And just to put it in context in the period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the main South American nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru) were all rabidly anticommunist semi-fascist military regimes that carried out atrocities against their own people on a wide scale, and had cooperated on Operation: Condor, a massive continent-wide operation to abduct, assassinate or otherwise eliminate Communist agents, but mostly political opponents to the right-wing regimes. If Brazil, Peru, and Chile got wind that Argentina was selling out to the Kremlin? The Anglo-Argentine war would explode into a continent-wide conflict where Brazil, Chile, and Peru invade Argentina to remove the "traitorous communists" in Buenos Aires with full American support, with the RN and USN stomping any Argentine ships making it to sea.

And while the USSR would welcome fresh allies, it's clear that a) they don't have the reach to supply the Argentines properly for a war against the USN and RN and b) they'd want Buenos Aires as an obedient satellite, which means implementing Communism (see above paragraph on how well that would go).
 
An interesting scenario you put forward there. That could have changed S.A. completely and caused different 1990s for both Brazil, Chile and especially Argentina.

In the end, the US supported its ally through the Special Relationship. A stronger show of solidarity, one meant to preempt Argentine aggression, would have scared the junta into backing off and fuming silently. It would have lasted longer, slowly succumbing to inefficiency and corruption before eventually crumbling.

OTL American attitude was mostly because a) it didn't know if the British were willing to hold on to the Falklands, and b) didn't really expect Argentina to invade. Other than that, they were fully willing to support Britain on the matter.

As for Argentina allying with the USSR - the junta would effectively be slitting their own throats. Their entire rule, the brutality and the viciousness of the National Reorganization Process which carried out many atrocities, was all done to rid of the country of Communist guerrillas. To then turn around and ally with the USSR would have been as a betrayal of the highest order, and there would have undoubtedly been many younger officers willing to execute their own superiors for such treason. And just to put it in context in the period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the main South American nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru) were all rabidly anticommunist semi-fascist military regimes that carried out atrocities against their own people on a wide scale, and had cooperated on Operation: Condor, a massive continent-wide operation to abduct, assassinate or otherwise eliminate Communist agents, but mostly political opponents to the right-wing regimes. If Brazil, Peru, and Chile got wind that Argentina was selling out to the Kremlin? The Anglo-Argentine war would explode into a continent-wide conflict where Brazil, Chile, and Peru invade Argentina to remove the "traitorous communists" in Buenos Aires with full American support, with the RN and USN stomping any Argentine ships making it to sea.

And while the USSR would welcome fresh allies, it's clear that a) they don't have the reach to supply the Argentines properly for a war against the USN and RN and b) they'd want Buenos Aires as an obedient satellite, which means implementing Communism (see above paragraph on how well that would go).
 
How would the slower collapse of the junta affect their neighbors and the US as a whole? I get the feeling it would haunt American politics for a while too.
 
The Argentine junta was hitting a dead end either way. Galtieri thought a quick, victorious war would drum up support for the regime, as the regime had no real answers to stagnating economy and declining morale (the latter due to the NRP's own brutality, go figure). Eventually, the junta would have run out of steam and floundered until it was removed by the 1990s or late 1980s when Communism was no longer seen as a bogeyman and thus there'd be no need for the NRP. Afterwards, while there would be an attempt to cover them up, the atrocities would eventually leak, painting the full, dark image of the cruelties of the Argentine regimes.

As for effects on US policy... I don't see much changing from OTL. The USA supported such regimes, but always weaseled out by plausible deniability, and saying it just provided general support. The Gulf War would still happen unless the USA openly declared any attempt to invade Kuwait would result in retaliation - or made a declaration to that effect.

An Argentine realignment with the USSR, however extremely unlikely, would have shocking aftereffects throughout the continent the Western Hemisphere in general. In the short term, the Argentines would be crushed under a joint South American force, resulting in the legacy of the NRP being nothing but ruination and dismay, bringing about a disastrous war to a populace that didn't need or want it. Argentina would need a long time to recover from it, depending on how extensive the damage was, especially since the South American forces are renowned for their cruelty to perceived Communists or political opponents. Depending on how ready the USA is to rebuild Argentina, it could recover quickly, or it could descend into Afghanistan-like insanity, with Communist guerrillas ironically making a comeback after the Argentine forces and law enforcement were devastated in a large-scale conflict.

Long-term effects would be similarly harrowing. Initially, a second Condor might be in the works, given how the Argentine government seemingly abandoned its allies and turned Communist, or aligned with the USSR, on a dime, giving a booster shot to the desire to fight Communists and political opponents wherever they might be. However, the long-term effects would be chilling; the NRP turned traitor (to its anticommunist ideals) based on a calculated decision rather than idealistic reasons. The USA will never trust any of its South American allies again; what if any of them turned traitor? It would expand its operations to spy on its supposed allies, and demand more proof of loyalty (though always in plausible deniability fashion). The juntas themselves will no longer be safe from their own bloodhounds; it was fine when the ones in charge blamed 'subversives, riff-raff and Communists' for trouble, and sicced their goons on the people, but now people in charge are suspect of potentially doing a 180. The more radical elements in the army would always question if their own leaders will betray their cause like the Argentines did. We'd have a situation where superiors were scared of their own radical juniors, like what the IJN and IJA had during the 1930s and WW2. They'd demand constant proof of loyalty, and it could escalate to the point where several heads of states and generals be overthrown - by their own underlings, more radicalized and rabidly Anti-Communist than ever, creating a vicious feedback loop that would quickly run the economies of several states into the ground. By the time the 1990s come around, most of South America would be an economic wasteland, with crumbling regimes on the verge of collapse.

Of course, this scenario is extremely unlikely; the Argentines would not align with Moscow regardless of circumstances. If it did happen, however, it would be a massive shock to the region.
 
Of course, this scenario is extremely unlikely; the Argentines would not align with Moscow regardless of circumstances. If it did happen, however, it would be a massive shock to the region.

I can't imagine the Soviets wanting Argentina to align with them either. The Soviets got on with the Junta pretty well (they liked them better than they liked Castro, ironically) but the value of Argentina to the Soviets was as a trading partner. If the Junta is busy painting a "kick me" sign on their backs and then either getting invaded or shunned and heavily sanctioned, they aren't going to make a very good trade partner any more.

If Argentina is being invaded by a coalition of its neighbours, I wonder how bad things get for the Soviets? Argentina was a major source of wool and grain imports. I wonder if the Soviets might collapse a couple years early in this scenario?

fasquardon
 
In the end, the US supported its ally through the Special Relationship.
Apparently UK didn’t feel very “supported”:

https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/29/...ed-rare-friction-for-thatcher-and-reagan.html
Papers Show Rare Friction for Thatcher and Reagan

By JOHN F. BURNS DEC. 28, 2012

LONDON — The bond between Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan, both in office in the 1980s, has become a kind of gold standard, showing what the “special relationship” between Britain and the United States can be when their leaders share a political creed.

But even though the two shared a belief in the virtues of the free market and the need to face down the Soviet Union over Afghanistan and other cold war issues, the Thatcher-Reagan embrace had its thorny passages — perhaps never more so than during the 1982 Falklands war in the South Atlantic.

Just how thorny was revealed on Friday by the publication of British government papers covering the period, under a rule that mandates the release of hitherto secret documents after 30 years. The papers, including records of the Thatcher cabinet and her occasional prickliness toward Reagan, have added spice to what was previously known about rocky patches in their relationship.

A memo written by one Thatcher aide chronicled a midnight telephone call Reagan made to Mrs. Thatcher on May 31, 1982, when British troops were closing in on Port Stanley, capital of the British-ruled Falkland Islands, off the coast of Argentina, and the site of the last undefeated Argentine garrison.

Reagan, yielding to advisers who regarded Britain’s insistence on retaining sovereignty over the sparsely populated islands as a colonial anachronism, urged the prime minister to show magnanimity rather than force the invading Argentine troops to surrender, and to reach a cease-fire deal providing for a shared Argentine-British role in the islands’ future and a joint American-Brazilian peacekeeping force.

“The best chance for peace was before complete Argentine humiliation,” the memo recorded Reagan as saying. “As the U.K. now had the upper hand, it should strike a deal now,” rather than act in a way that further hardened Argentine feelings.

But the memo said Mrs. Thatcher rejected the president’s appeal for talks three times, becoming more emphatic each time. “Britain had not lost precious lives in battle and sent an enormous task force to hand over the queen’s islands to a contact group,” Mrs. Thatcher told him, adding a brusque reminder that Britain had been forced to “act alone, with no outside help,” in recovering the islands, an oblique reference to the American refusal to be drawn directly into the conflict on the British side.

Speaking before the final toll had been tallied — 255 British and 649 Argentine military personnel dead — the prime minister “asked the president to put himself in her position,” the memo said. “She was sure the president would act in the same way if Alaska had similarly been threatened.” The memo said the call ended with Mrs. Thatcher saying that the only acceptable outcome was for the Argentines to agree to withdraw without negotiation, which happened a few weeks later.

British newspapers highlighted the Thatcher-Reagan exchanges in their Friday editions, with interest heightened by the fact that Mrs. Thatcher, 87, spent the Christmas holiday in a London hospital after having an operation to remove what her family described as a growth on her bladder. Though she has been increasingly frail in recent years and suffering from dementia, the family said she was recovering well.

The documents also offered new insights into Britain’s fractious relationship with France, centering on Mrs. Thatcher’s dyspeptic exchanges with President François Mitterrand over French-made Exocet missiles that Argentina used to sink several British naval ships during the Falklands war. At the time, British military leaders were warning that a successful Exocet strike on one of Britain’s aircraft carriers could lead to defeat.

But the hardest-edged document was a diplomatic cable from Britain’s ambassador in Washington at the time, Sir Nicholas Henderson, fulminating against Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Reagan’s United Nations ambassador, who supported Argentina’s claim to the Falklands. The cable described Ms. Kirkpatrick, a former Georgetown University professor, as “more fool than fascist” for her support of Argentina’s military dictatorship, and added, “She appears to be one of America’s most reliable own-goal scorers: tactless, wrong-headed, ineffective and a dubious tribute to the academic profession.”
 

GeographyDude

Gone Fishin'
Apparently UK didn’t feel very “supported”:
But if . . . U.S. and UK had closer relationship in ‘81,

then 1983 might hurt more. This is when Thatcher felt Reagan had personally let her down and embarrassed her during question period in Parliament, by not honestly giving her a heads up of U.S. plans to invade Grenada (former British colony).

And regarding Able Archer Nov. ‘83, Thatcher’s government played a pretty key role — Are Soviets really scared or are they just huffing and puffing? — well, in letting U.S. know that it looked they were really scared. New U.S. Nat’l Security Advisor Robert “Bud” McFarlane also played a key role.

So, sweet dreams.
 
The administration was split

You had Kirkpatrick who drank all the Kool aid and never found a fascist South American junta she didn't like. She was also by her actions openly an Anglophobe.

The you had Casper Weinberger the Secretary of Defence who was shipping intel and supplies to the British under the table even before Reagan made the decision to support them openly. There were outright rows in the Oval Office between him and Kirkpatrick.


He was an Anglophile - his mother's parents came from England; as part of the American melting pot, his paternal grandfather was from a Jewish family in Bohemia - and during the Falklands war in 1982, he immediately and effectively sided with the UK.

He provided key weapons systems and supplies, notably the Sidewinder missile, to the British task force.

Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher later said that without the Sidewinder "supplied to us by US Defence Minister Caspar Weinberger, we could never have got back the Falklands."

He disapproved of the efforts of the US Secretary of State Alexander Haig who in the early stages shuttled between London and Buenos Aires seeking a diplomatic solution. In 1988 he was awarded an honorary knighthood for an "outstanding and invaluable" contribution to military cooperation between the UK and the US.

Now Haig I think was relatively neutral while leaning towards the Argentinian position, he formed an uneasy alliance of sorts with Kirkpatrick in trying to keep Reagan at best neutral and at worst pro Argentine. Luckily that failed
 

GeographyDude

Gone Fishin'

page 467:

“The cold shoulder treatment was something new,”

The Grenada invasion rift between Thatcher and Reagan came at a very bad time (late Oct. ‘83). But did not prevent communication regarding Able Archer.
 
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The USSR interest was in seeing Argentina destroy as much as the Royal Navy as possible, they wouldn't care about the Junta becoming communist and signing Argentina into the Warsaw Pact. It would even be counterproductive for trade, because it would risk an American led coalition invading Argentina.
Had the war developed at a slower pace, the Soviets would have gladly delivered weapons. But as things happened, even if the Junta and the USSR arranged something to that effect, there was no time to train Argentine soldiers with new weapon systems.
 
U.S. plans to invade Grenada (former British colony

Grenada was a dominion, not a colony in 1983. The US invasion was undertaken against a British self-governing Dominion - exactly as the Argentine invasion two years earlier had been against a British self-governining territory, the Falkland Islands. This event so upset the Queen that Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister was made to stand during her regular Tuesday Afternoon "chat" with the Monarch. That had not happened to any other Prime Minister and she received a well deserved "dressing down" from the Monarch.
 

GeographyDude

Gone Fishin'
Or better yet, if Mrs. Thatcher had said, “Your Majesty, the Americans did not level with us. They made it sound like it was a plan they were merely considering, when it in fact was already in the works. Now, I can’t go public with the fact that we were basically snookered. But out of respect, I amletting you know.”

Of course, interrupting the Queen may be almost unthinkable, but this might constitute one of the very rare exceptions!

* about Grenada, 1983
 
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I've been creating a Time line on this very question. 1983 election becomes very interesting, SDP/Lib alliance might get upward of 100 seats.
 
I've been creating a Time line on this very question. 1983 election becomes very interesting, SDP/Lib alliance might get upward of 100 seats.
It could be even worse. Depending on the polling Thatcher might decide to delay the election until spring 1984, in which she'll be damaged by the US invasion of Grenada and also dealing witht he aftermath of the Libyan Embassy Siege.
 
It could be even worse. Depending on the polling Thatcher might decide to delay the election until spring 1984, in which she'll be damaged by the US invasion of Grenada and also dealing witht he aftermath of the Libyan Embassy Siege.

Will find you my wiki infobox, but it may have to wait because I currently can't find it.
 
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Ooh, that's na-a-a-asty. I can't see the SDP agreeing to support a Conservative government and I can't see them supporting a Labour government led by Foot. It sounds insane, but I wonder if they'd try to leverage their winning the popular vote to get Jenkins in to No. 10. 😵
 
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