Ranking the Confederate Corps Commanders

[Arnold d.c]

On the point of Western Theater Confederate Corps commanders, it's notable to there are less competent corps commanders. The Army of Tennessee had 11 infantry corps commanders throughout its life: William J. Hardee, Leonidas Polk, E. Kirby Smith, Simon Buckner, D.H. Hill, W.H.T. Walker, John B. Hood, John C. Breckenridge, Benjamin F. Cheatham, A.P. Stewart and S.D. Lee.

The first two were the army's original corps commanders. While I think of Hardee as one of the most capable corps commanders in the Army of Tennessee, I must note that Hardee's record has some low moments-he certainly had brilliant and competent moments like his assault of Rosecrans' right on the 1st day of Stones' River, his delaying action at Averasboro, and the desperate cavalry charge at Bentonville; however, that glosses over Hardee's less than finer moments, such as his very lackluster performance in the Atlanta Campaign, and his negligence during the Tullahoma Campaign (this nearly cost Bragg the Army of Tennessee). Erza Warner's Generals in Gray called him one of the best corps commanders in Confederate service, but it feels like a superficial description when you study his career in detail. Another issue I have with Hardee is his responsibility in creating a toxic command structure in the Army of Tennessee (although this is shared with Polk) and his passive-aggressive relationship with army commanders.

Leonidas Polk, on the other hand, is just a subpar corps commander. At Perryville, Polk messed up the deployment of his battle lines and only the incompetence of Buell and McCook allowed Polk to achieve tactical success. At Stones River, his performance was passable. At Tullahoma, Polk ignored Bragg's attack order (although in retrospect, Polk unwittingly saved Bragg's army because Hardee had failed to inform Bragg that Rosecrans had broken through the gaps he was protecting). At Chickamauga, his attacks were delivered late and often piecemeal. During the Atlanta Campaign, Polk did not play a significant role in the events, save his agreement with Hood to call off the attack at Cassville, which has been argued to be an excellent opportunity for the Rebels to strike back at Sherman.

E. Kirby Smith, Simon Buckner, D.H. Hill, W.H.T. Walker and John C. Breckenridge were only corps commanders for a brief period. In the Kentucky Campaign, E.K. Smith won the Battle of Richmond in KY, which was one of the more smashing victories won by a Confederate army in the war. However, he cheerfully ignored Bragg during the Kentucky campaign and his tactical record is marred by the butchery at Jenkins' Ferry.

Simon Buckner has very little experience as a corps commander for people to judge. He did well at Perryville as a division commander but left the Bragg's army to command the Department of East Tennessee. When Rosecrans advanced for Chattanooga, Buckner's command was added as a corps to Bragg's army. Buckner was assigned to support Thomas Hindman in destroying the XIV Corps at McLemore's Cove. However, Hindman and Buckner seemed more concerned of what their opponents could do to them than attacking. A greater share of blame falls on Hindman, but Buckner doesn't do himself any favors. In the lead up to Chickamauga, both W.H.T. Walker and Buckner seemed to be slow-moving, showing no initiative when crossing the creek. Buckner had not much of a role during the fighting. On September 19, his corps was split up by Bragg to reinforce Cheatham's battered division and so he spent the battle micromanaging Preston's Division. He was very passive and did nothing on his own initiative. Had he committed Preston's Division and his 7 artillery batteries, Buckner could have struck a powerful blow on the Union force in front of him. But he did nothing. The same could be said on September 20. Buckner may have also attempted to convince the other corps commanders to depose Bragg and Buckner's Corps was later disbanded.

W. H. T. Walker was the commander of Bragg's "Reserve Corps". The force was rather small, summing up to 6 brigades by the end of the battle. Walker was aggressive and argumentative. He spent September 18 capturing Alexander Bridge but failed to comply with Bragg's orders to get all his troops across the creek. September 19 saw Walker performing rather well. When Forrest called on him for help, he complied with his request but was surprised when the "skirmish" turned out to be an all-out battle. Walker was furious when he found out Forrest had used his old division without permission and that his old division had suffered heavy losses. Nevertheless, Walker acted smartly, moving Liddell's Division into position to sweep Thomas' XIV Corps off the field. While initially successful, the XIV Corps eventually rallied and put a stop to Walker's attack. Walker's corps was done for the day. On the 20th, he got into a fight with D.H. Hill and Polk. D.H. Hill and Polk wanted to feed Walker's Corps into the fight one brigade at a time but Walker wanted to attack en masse. Walker was almost certainly right as his corps was practically decimated by the end of the morning.

D.H. Hill was just bad. Here's a post from the expert on the battle of Chickamauga: https://chickamaugablog.wordpress.com/2012/05/16/up-came-hill/

John Breckenridge did rather badly at Chattanooga. His corps lost Lookout Mountain and the "invulnerable" Missionary Ridge. He did perform well at New Market though.

John B. Hood is a very mediocre corps commander at best. I won't hold his wounding at Chickamauga against him, but I find his chaffing at Johnston's preference to remain on the defensive to be incredibly ironic when he called off the attack at Cassville and got his corps butchered at Kolb's Farm.

Benjamin F. Cheatham was a fairly capable corps commander. His first fight at Bald Hill (July 22) saw him take the initiative and transform his corps' mission of demonstration to full-on attack when the XV Corps' line was at its weakness. His assault ultimately failed due to Hood's failure to coordinate Hardee and Cheatham as well as Logan's ability to rally the XV Corps to counter-charge. However, he did fail in a major way at Spring Hill but I can't really fault him too much for the butchery at Franklin or the rout of his corps at Nashville.

In my book, A.P. Stewart is one of the best corps commanders of the Army of Tennessee. He displayed excellent control over his corps at Peachtree Creek and did very fine work handling his troops at Bentonville. He did, however, commit several errors at Ezra Church, but I will note that he made these mistakes at the advice of S.D. Lee who supposedly had most knowledge of the field. His corps was butchered at Franklin, which probably contributed to its poor performance at Nashville along with Hood's poor placements.

My perception of S.D. Lee is perhaps very negatively tainted by his first battles as a corps commander- Tulepo and Ezra Church. In the former, he got Forrest's troops butchered in a frontal assault. In the latter, Hood sent S.D. Lee and A.P. Stewart to attack the Army of the Tennessee. S.D. Lee had orders to fix the Union troops in place while Stewart launched a flank attack. However, S.D. Lee chose to launch piecemeal frontal assaults. The first had the most justification, but the rest of the attacks were just stupid butchery. After the battle, he blamed his troops for the failure. At Franklin, S.D. Lee was surprised to find out there was even a battle and when ordered to help out, he hastily ordered a night time assault even after the fighting had died down. Not surprisingly, the battle ended with another butchery. The only positive thing I have to say is that he did perform a capable rearguard action at Nashville.

 

[Lothar]

In my opinion, John Gordon really was a brilliant brigade and division commander. As a corps commander, I think Gordon had potential but his tenure is a bit too short to tell how good he was. At Fort Stedman, Gordon did a good job of creating a detailed assault plan. However, Gordon's analysis of his opponent's defensive line was faulty. The "three forts" in the Union second line required for breaking the Union line were actually non-existent according to Andrew A. Humphreys, II Corps commander and Meade's former Chief of Staff. Furthermore, Gordon's assault was too narrow. By failing to seize Fort Haskell and Battery No. 9 on their flanks, Gordon's troops and any reinforcements to the captured Fort Stedman were raked by heavy artillery fire.

During the retreat to Appomattox, Gordon's Corps acted as the rearguard. The biggest fight of the Appomattox Campaign was Sailor's Creek, which was very nearly the fatal blow for Lee's army. Gordon's Corps succeeded in repulsing two attacks by Humphrey's II Corps before it collapsed from pressure from three sides. The majority of the losses, however, were due to Ewell's and Anderson's failure to notify either Longstreet or Gordon that they had stopped to let the wagon train go pass ahead them. In short, I think Gordon showed some promise with his handling of his corps, but I also think that it isn't enough to determine whether he would have been a top tier corps commander or not. Gordon's attack at Fort Stedman, while brilliantly planned, had the advantage of knowing the ground before them for 9 months. Would Gordon have planned an attack as well as Fort Stedman with less intelligence on enemy dispositions?

I totally agree on your assessment of Fort Stedman and Sayler's Creek. To answer your final question is a bit difficult because I believe one of Gordon's major asset was great planning and gathering of intelligence in cases where he attacked.

Take Cedar Creek, where he viewed the Federal dispositions from the top of the Massanutten. He immediately saw the potential for an assault, even though his three divisions and the army as such were numberswise in a really bad shape. He argued successfull with Early, got his will and moved his men around the mountain through the darkest night without being detected although being screened only by a 300-strong cavalry brigade. I believe this flank march was more difficult than Jackson's at Chancellorsville and the following attack routed not one but two whole corps. Gordon also did not mess up his divisions and would have been able to press on, if Early had allowed it. In my eyes, this assault was planned and executed masterfully.

At Third Winchester Gordon was de-facto in control of the 2nd Corps because Early directed the whole army. He held with less than 7,000 effectives against the VI and XIX Corps and later parts of Crook's AoWV from 11:30 to 5:30, temporarily forcing Upton and Wright to retreat and almost breaching the whole front line up until the numerical equivalent to Early's entire army additionally crashed into his left flank.

Besides the aftermath of the Fort Stedman assault I do not believe there were any noteworthy failures and this instance was also not really his fault, because the whole endeavour was viewed as an all-or-nothing final gamble by Lee and himself.

 

[Arnold d.c]

At Third Winchester Gordon was de-facto in control of the 2nd Corps because Early directed the whole army. He held with less than 7,000 effectives against the VI and XIX Corps and later parts of Crook's AoWV from 11:30 to 5:30, temporarily forcing Upton and Wright to retreat and almost breaching the whole front line up until the numerical equivalent to Early's entire army additionally crashed into his left flank.

I am not as sanguine about Third Winchester. To my knowledge, Gordon was not the de-facto commander of the II Corps. He was in charge of his division and Rodes' division after Rodes was mortally wounded. His counterattack was well-executed but Gordon's counterattack ultimately failed when General David Russell of VI Corps led Emory Upton's brigade struck Gordon's flank. Ultimately, I think this is a good example of Gordon's tactical acumen but I'm not sure if this is a good example of Gordon being a good corps commander.

Take Cedar Creek, where he viewed the Federal dispositions from the top of the Massanutten. He immediately saw the potential for an assault, even though his three divisions and the army as such were numberswise in a really bad shape. He argued successfull with Early, got his will and moved his men around the mountain through the darkest night without being detected although being screened only by a 300-strong cavalry brigade. I believe this flank march was more difficult than Jackson's at Chancellorsville and the following attack routed not one but two whole corps. Gordon also did not mess up his divisions and would have been able to press on, if Early had allowed it. In my eyes, this assault was planned and executed masterfully.

I do see your point in the importance of Gordon in the planning of the devastating assault at Cedar Creek. However, I must disagree with the idea that Early could have pressed on. The "fatal halt", as Gordon called it, was absolutely necessary. The temptation of looting the captured camps was too much for the under-supplied and ragged Confederates and there was a real danger of Federal cavalry on both flanks. Gordon was notably and understandably unable to halt the plundering, which left his already depleted ranks greatly diminished. Jubal Early had no infantry reserves so an all or nothing attack on the two VI Corps divisions on the hill before them was absolutely risky, especially in the presence of the two Federal cavalry divisions. Furthermore, you make it seem that Gordon was in charge of the three divisions, which I have not read before.

 

[Lothar]

I am not as sanguine about Third Winchester. To my knowledge, Gordon was not the de-facto commander of the II Corps. He was in charge of his division and Rodes' division after Rodes was mortally wounded. His counterattack was well-executed but Gordon's counterattack ultimately failed when General David Russell of VI Corps led Emory Upton's brigade struck Gordon's flank. Ultimately, I think this is a good example of Gordon's tactical acumen but I'm not sure if this is a good example of Gordon being a good corps commander.


I do see your point in the importance of Gordon in the planning of the devastating assault at Cedar Creek. However, I must disagree with the idea that Early could have pressed on. The "fatal halt", as Gordon called it, was absolutely necessary. The temptation of looting the captured camps was too much for the under-supplied and ragged Confederates and there was a real danger of Federal cavalry on both flanks. Gordon was notably and understandably unable to halt the plundering, which left his already depleted ranks greatly diminished. Jubal Early had no infantry reserves so an all or nothing attack on the two VI Corps divisions on the hill before them was absolutely risky, especially in the presence of the two Federal cavalry divisions. Furthermore, you make it seem that Gordon was in charge of the three divisions, which I have not read before.

At Third Winchester you might be correct concerning the command structurr, but at Cedar Creek he definitely led the 2nd Corps divisions while his own was under the command of Clement Evans.

Concerning the counterattack at Third Winchester you are also right but I dont believe there was more to gain when comparing the numbers. I visited the battlefield two years ago and was amazed how open the terrain infront of Gordon and Ramseur was (Rodes was partly obbscurrd by woods), especially in the vicinity where Zebulon York's brigade met Sharpe in the open pasture.

On the topic of the fatal halt, I am conflicted. Although there was some looting, the extent is argued within several accounts and at least keeping up the pressure would have been possible. I however have to say that when Early denied the follow-up, he should have taken the captured guns, prisoners and camp equipment and retreat to the other side of the creek. The terrain on the northern bank was not defensible at all and Sheridan had more cavalry at that point than remained in Early's infantry. After virtually overrunning two corps I sincerely doubt a fallback to higher ground or behind the safety of a river would have damaged morale.

 

[Arnold d.c]

At Third Winchester you might be correct concerning the command structurr, but at Cedar Creek he definitely led the 2nd Corps divisions while his own was under the command of Clement Evans.

Interesting. Can I know what your source is?

On the topic of the fatal halt, I am conflicted. Although there was some looting, the extent is argued within several accounts and at least keeping up the pressure would have been possible.

Fair enough on the number of looters. However, that doesn't really address the very real concerns about Custer's and Merritt's Cavalry Divisions. By the time Early stopped, VI Corps had formed a strong line with both Custer and Merritt on the flanks. Just as Sheridan arrived, Wright had already rallied XIX and VIII Corps for a counterattack. Sheridan simply arrived in time to show himself to the men and take credit.

I however have to say that when Early denied the follow-up, he should have taken the captured guns, prisoners and camp equipment and retreat to the other side of the creek. The terrain on the northern bank was not defensible at all and Sheridan had more cavalry at that point than remained in Early's infantry. After virtually overrunning two corps I sincerely doubt a fallback to higher ground or behind the safety of a river would have damaged morale.

I can definitely agree with this. Early's manpower was far too small to maintain a defensive line. When he was attacking, his smaller force could gobble smaller chunks of Sheridan's commands and determine the terms of the fight. Here, Early basically exposed himself to a larger opponent and said "this is fine." I think overconfidence was Jubal Early's key flaw as a commander. He seemed too certain that Sheridan would retreat after Gordon's counterattack at Third Winchester and was certain that this time Sheridan would retreat.

 

[TheRockofChickamauga]

D.H. Hill was just bad.

Is this your opinion of D.H. Hill as a general, or just his tenure as a corps commander at Chickamauga, because in my opinion he did some pretty good work during the Maryland Campaign and the Battle of Bentonville, although during both of those battles he was serving as a division commander.

 

[Virginia Liberal]

John C. Breckenridge did extremely well during the New Market Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley

 

[Arnold d.c]

Is this your opinion of D.H. Hill as a general, or just his tenure as a corps commander at Chickamauga, because in my opinion he did some pretty good work during the Maryland Campaign and the Battle of Bentonville, although during both of those battles he was serving as a division commander.

I'm referring to his tenure as corps commander. The blog link I left explains why D.H. Hill's corps commander performance was just terrible in great detail, but I do respect his performance as division commander. His main flaw was just how irritating and irascible he was. I doubt any commander would want him no matter how good he was.

 

[TheRockofChickamauga]

I'm referring to his tenure as corps commander. The blog link I left explains why D.H. Hill's corps commander performance was just terrible in great detail, but I do respect his performance as division commander. His main flaw was just how irritating and irascible he was. I doubt any commander would want him no matter how good he was.

He did seem to work well with J.E. Johnston, Longstreet, and Jackson, but that last one can probably be explained by the fact that they were brother-in-laws

 

[Arnold d.c]

He did seem to work well with J.E. Johnston, Longstreet, and Jackson, but that last one can probably be explained by the fact that they were brother-in-laws

I'm not sure on his relationship with J.E. Johnston, but I think Longstreet liked D.H. Hill's humor IIRC. However, Lee quite disliked his sarcasm and at Chickamauga, his personality problem resulted in a terrible argument between him and W.H.T. Walker.

 

[dmg86]

To fair Walker was known for being temperamental as well.

 

[Lothar]

Interesting. Can I know what your source is?

"Early planned to launch a three-pronged attack against the Federals. Gordon was given command of a column consisting of his own division under General Evans, two other divisions under Brigadier General Pegram and Major General Stephen D. Ramseur, and a cavalry brigade under Colonel William H. Payne."
-Keith S. Bohannon, The Fatal Halt versus Bad Conduct, in: Gary W. Callagher, The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864, p. 60

John C. Breckenridge did extremely well during the New Market Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley

I would not judge his force at New Market to be a corps but a division. Besides commanding the Reserve Corps at Shiloh and another corps at Chattanooga, I believe only his position as Early's second-in-command at Monocacy would fall into that category. However I do not think he was more than mediocre in his actions. There he sent Gordon over the ford, who got decimated attacking Ricketts, while Wharton's men were just sitting idle along the river bank. With Shiloh and Chattanooga I am not so familiar, I fear.

 

[Old1812]

To be fair, none of the Confederate command really distinguished themselves at Shiloh. Much the same at Chattanooga, though Cleburne's stand with his division deserves mention.

 

[Lothar]

Benjamin F. Cheatham was a fairly capable corps commander. His first fight at Bald Hill (July 22) saw him take the initiative and transform his corps' mission of demonstration to full-on attack when the XV Corps' line was at its weakness. His assault ultimately failed due to Hood's failure to coordinate Hardee and Cheatham as well as Logan's ability to rally the XV Corps to counter-charge. However, he did fail in a major way at Spring Hill but I can't really fault him too much for the butchery at Franklin or the rout of his corps at Nashville.

I would rank Cheatham certainly lower than capable. According to my subjective assessment, he was only fit for division command but not for leading a corps. In my eyes, he rarely or never actually showed initiative in contrast especially to A.P. Stewart. I can't pin it down exactly but I would rank him lower than S. D. Lee, maybe due to his drinking habit, which was suggested to have certainly impacted his actions at Spring Hill (Although one might assume bias, I find Stephen Hood's book on J. B. Hood very helpful in opening new perspectives regarding the Franklin-Nashville-Campaign).

 

[Old1812]

I would rank Cheatham certainly lower than capable. According to my subjective assessment, he was only fit for division command but not for leading a corps. In my eyes, he rarely or never actually showed initiative in contrast especially to A.P. Stewart. I can't pin it down exactly but I would rank him lower than S. D. Lee, maybe due to his drinking habit, which was suggested to have certainly impacted his actions at Spring Hill (Although one might assume bias, I find Stephen Hood's book on J. B. Hood very helpful in opening new perspectives regarding the Franklin-Nashville-Campaign).

I can understand ranking Cheatham not so highly, but can you expand on why you rate S. D. Lee higher? From what I remember, Hood realized a battle at Ezra Church would not work, but Lee went ahead and attacked anyway. Other that it seems he was fairly average.

 

[Arnold d.c]

I would rank Cheatham certainly lower than capable. According to my subjective assessment, he was only fit for division command but not for leading a corps. In my eyes, he rarely or never actually showed initiative in contrast especially to A.P. Stewart. I can't pin it down exactly but I would rank him lower than S. D. Lee, maybe due to his drinking habit, which was suggested to have certainly impacted his actions at Spring Hill (Although one might assume bias, I find Stephen Hood's book on J. B. Hood very helpful in opening new perspectives regarding the Franklin-Nashville-Campaign).

I'll second @Old1812 on this one. Why is Cheatham ranked lower than S.D. Lee? I do understand that Cheatham deserves censure for cancelling Cleburne's attack before failing to launch his own attack, but there is plenty of blame to go around. S.D. Lee failed to alert Hood that Schofield was retreating from Columbia, N.B. Forrest failed to provide Hood the intelligence for his infantry to make its way to Spring Hill and made only a feeble effort to cut the road north of Spring Hill at Thompson's Station. Furthermore, I don't see any sources to suggest that Cheatham was drunk at Spring Hill. It seems to me that Cheatham was genuinely attempting to launch an attack but just botched it when he lost sight of where the rest of his command was, a sure sign of an inexperienced corps commander more than drunkenness. The only time I've heard that Cheatham was possibly drunk was at Stone's River, where he absolutely botched his attack.

On S.D. Lee, do you know of any action that particularly redeems his reputation as corps commander? I know he was a superb artillery officer and did a superb job as a brigade commander during the Vicksburg Campaign. However, it seems to me that S.D. Lee was promoted far too quickly for his own good. His first major battle at a corps level was at Tupelo. He faced 14,000 veterans under A.J. Smith, who was perhaps one of the best Union corps commanders. While it may the case that Forrest was a poor subordinate at Tupelo, conducting his corps commander duties in a passive manner then suddenly changing the battle plan without informing his superior, it can not be denied that S.D. Lee's planning for the fight was deplorable. While he did attempt to draw A.J. Smith off the high ground, he still ordered a frontal attack, which his subordinate, Abraham Buford, warned that this was just suicide. The initial attack got Abraham Buford's Division butchered while Forrest basically twiddled his thumbs and left Roddey's Division out of the fighting. Nevertheless, in the next few hours, S.D. Lee threw lone brigades into the grinder.

At Ezra Church, he was ordered to refrain from general offensive moves unless control of Lick Skillet Road was directly threatened. When he met Logan's XV Corps north of the Lick Skillet Road, he sent John C. Brown's Division directly to the attack without waiting for Henry Clayton's following division to deploy to its right. Brown's assault, which briefly overlapped and outflanked the Union right, was the best coordinated attack of the day, but the Federals quickly rallied to recover any lost ground. Ignoring his failure to follow orders, I can see why he ordered such a hasty attack; the XV Corps had not yet fully entrenched and his line overlapped the Union right, but it does not excuse what happened next. When Henry Clayton showed up, his lone division was immediately thrown in and was just massacred. When Hood realized from S.D. Lee's reports that Lee probably could not withstand a counterattack by Howard's troops, A.P. Stewart's flanking movement was aborted and A.P. Stewart's Corps became reinforcements. Stewart, listening to the advice of S.D. Lee, sent Edward Walthall's division on its own (again) and got it butchered. Thankfully for the Confederate rank and file, the wounding in rapid succession of Stewart and W.W. Loring (the general commanding the division immediately behind Walthall's) resulted in the battle petering out with no further assaults on that day. To paint S.D. Lee in a more negative light, he blamed the "timidity" of his troops for his failures.

At Franklin, S.D. Lee was surprised to find out there was even a battle and had been marching leisurely. When Cheatham asked him to help out, instead of deploying his corps in line and shielding the remnants of Cheatham's command, he hastily ordered a night time assault and paid the bloody price for it. It's only Nashville where S.D. Lee does not have a bad day. But there are several reasons for this. First, S.D. Lee was not the target of Thomas' attacks. Second, aside from Johnson's division, Lee's men were relatively fresh and strong in numbers. Third, the topography really aided Lee's position. S.D. Lee had success repulsing Thomas' attack on the 15th. On the 16th, S.D. Lee, to his credit, did skillfully pull his troops back to the Overton Hills and held firm until his entire corps could be put in retreat.

In short, with three disastrous days and only one good day, I can't see how S.D. Lee is better than Cheatham.

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

Could Sterling Price be considered a corps commander? If so, how would you rate his performance?

 

[Arnold d.c]

Could Sterling Price be considered a corps commander? If so, how would you rate his performance?

Kinda? The size of his command varied quite a lot; I guess you could label his force at Wilson's Creek to be a corps and he definitely commanded a force the size of a corps during the battles of Pea Ridge, Iuka, Second Corinth and the Missouri Expedition. His first battle shows his positive and negative tactical attributes. He was too lax in enforcing discipline, tended to coddle his troops, had a large ego and argued and undermined his colleagues and superiors. On the other hand, he does have an ability to inspire the men to fight on and was fairly tenacious, which was the key for victory. He followed up with his success to capture the Federal garrison at Lexington, which was perhaps his greatest victory. His move to Lexington demonstrates his independent streak and the victory there inflated his ego, which was detrimental to his cause. His victory at Lexington was ultimately strategically hollow as staying in place would risk being cut off by the Federal troops.

Under van Dorn, he served as a wing/corps commander. At Elkhorn Tavern and Pea Ridge, I was unimpressed with Price's handling of his troops. Although one could point out how poorly organized Price's Wing was, it doesn't really change the fact that Price launched poorly coordinated attacks on Dodge's Iowans that left Clemon's Field littered with dead or dying Rebels. During van Dorn's Corinth Campaign, Sterling Price performed with basic competence. He always followed orders, but never really did anything particularly impressive in terms of tactics.

After returning to the west bank of the Mississippi, he became a division commander and participated in the poorly planned assault at Helena. When Price assumed command of the Confederate forces in Arkansas, he was undeniably outmaneuvered by Frederick Steele's army and forced to abandon Little Rock. After realizing that agitating with his superior officers did him no favors, he shifted his tone a bit to appease his superiors. During the Camden Expedition, Sterling Price did a fairly good job and E. Kirby Smith admitted that he did so. The Missouri Expedition, however, forces me to question Sterling Price's abilities. Thus far, he had shown basic competence and had a large ego to argue with his superiors and colleagues.

While I must acknowledge that Price operated under many physical and material constraints (horses were never in top condition for example and basically creating an army from veterans and newbies), it does not change the fact that Price was an indifferent planner and disciplinarian. His movements tended to be uncoordinated and his men committed depredations on both Unionists and Southern sympathisers, driving both to Union arms. Price intended to wrest control of his home state from federal forces, establish a Confederate government, recruit an army and influence the 1864 U.S. elections. Price's army prepared and marched too slowly; his entire army was a mounted force, yet Price ordered them to move at the speed of infantry which allowed Rosecrans to assemble a capable force to defend Missouri. Sterling Price's assault on Fort Davidson in Missouri's Arcadia Valley was an incredibly foolish decision as he failed to even gather personal knowledge to properly assess the situation. Adding insult to injury, the enemy garrison escaped during the night. Price's failure here allowed Rosecrans to establish coherent defenses and caused Missourians who may have been swayed to Price's cause to reconsider.

After the stinging embarrassment at Fort Davidson, Price changed his target from St. Louis to Jefferson City. Once again, moving at an infantryman's pace, Price's mounted troops moved too slowly to capture Jefferson City before Rosecrans could get there and dig in. By this point in time, Price attempted to coordinate his operations with guerilla activities. However, Price's inattention to operational details meant that guerillas just struck what they thought were the best targets, which did not always benefit Price's army. Declining to test the state capital defenses, Price's invasion was then converted into a raid, albeit still a slow one and one additionally burdened by a growing baggage train. With his poor health and confinement to an ambulance, Price could never make use of his one great battlefield skill, his personal magnetism.

Price's now raid moved towards Kansas and did have several opportunities to destroy significant supply points for the Union armies west of the Mississippi. Sterling Price failed to issue clear orders or maintain discipline. The army moved at a slow pace, capturing important towns like Boonville, Glasgow, and Lexington along the way, but it still moved slowly, especially with Price's reluctance to release any part of the wagon train of loot, while Union forces were converging on him. He got engaged in largely pointless battles along the way, costing him precious time. Sterling Price did very little to manage the fights, especially at Independence, where he could have sent reinforcements but contented himself with just watching the battle with a friend. This eventually culminates in the Battle of Westport, the Gettysburg of the Trans-Mississippi Theater. Price's slowness and inattention to operational details almost got his army encircled, instead it was just shattered and lost all its artillery.

Retreating to Arkansas, Price suffered another defeat at Mine Creek, where his army was run down by Pleasonton's cavalry division. Price suffered about 1,200 Confederate casualties, and the Union suffered about 100. Only the early abandonment of the pursuit by Rosecrans and Pleasonton rendered Price's complete destruction out of the question. The final stand up fight of the campaign was a tactical draw at Newtonia on October 28. But Price was still forced into another rapid retreat, this time a tortuous journey through northwest Arkansas, the Indian Territory, and back to southwest Arkansas at Laynesport on December 2. After casualties, desertions, and wholesale furloughs, only 3,500 of the original 10-12,000 Confederates were left in the ranks.

In short, Price's tactical skills were barely adequate at best and his operational skills meant that he had no business as an independent commander.

 

[Lothar]

Getting back to Cheatham vs. S. D. Lee later, hopefully, I have to deliver my opinion on Sterling Price's performance during his 1864 raid. For my TL on that campaign I did a lot of reading and I dug deep into several works on the matter. Kyle Sinisi's "The Last Hurrah!" is as far as I know the latest work on the matter and it corrects several criticisms of Price concerning key decisions. Bear in mind that I by no means idolize Price or believe him to be a genius only because I explore how his invasion could have succeeded, I believe him to be a mediocre commander more or less, but I have to jump in on several things.

While I must acknowledge that Price operated under many physical and material constraints (horses were never in top condition for example and basically creating an army from veterans and newbies), it does not change the fact that Price was an indifferent planner and disciplinarian. His movements tended to be uncoordinated and his men committed depredations on both Unionists and Southern sympathisers, driving both to Union arms. Price intended to wrest control of his home state from federal forces, establish a Confederate government, recruit an army and influence the 1864 U.S. elections. Price's army prepared and marched too slowly; his entire army was a mounted force, yet Price ordered them to move at the speed of infantry which allowed Rosecrans to assemble a capable force to defend Missouri. Sterling Price's assault on Fort Davidson in Missouri's Arcadia Valley was an incredibly foolish decision as he failed to even gather personal knowledge to properly assess the situation. Adding insult to injury, the enemy garrison escaped during the night. Price's failure here allowed Rosecrans to establish coherent defenses and caused Missourians who may have been swayed to Price's cause to reconsider.

The mounts were one of the problems, but the quality of the troops and their equipment were even worse and totally beyond Price's control. Up to one third of his 12,000 men were unarmed in the beginning of his campaign and thousands of the Arkansans in his ranks were pressed into service on gunpoint by Joseph Shelby and his men in advance of the invasion. Price actually established harsh regulations concerning looters and stragglers, but soon had to realize, those were not able to be enforced without a large chunk of his force simply deserting. This of course raises the accusation why he did not cancel his raid, but such a decision was in the context of the moment just not realistic. Price's initial goals of establishing a government, recruiting significantly and influencing the elections were established when he still was under Kirby Smith's assurance of a large infantry force, which was later being denied to him. However, the lack of speed can correctly be critized. In my eyes, Price was simply no ideal cavalry leader and he actually never wanted to be one in the first place. At Pilot Knob/Fort Davidson, according to Sinisi, Price was the only one in the high command to OPPOSE the assault, but was retuned/overruled by his two division commanders who were present on the field. The successfull defence and escape was less a consequence of Price's failure but more thanks to the tactical genius and determination of Thomas Ewing in that instance.

After the stinging embarrassment at Fort Davidson, Price changed his target from St. Louis to Jefferson City. Once again, moving at an infantryman's pace, Price's mounted troops moved too slowly to capture Jefferson City before Rosecrans could get there and dig in. By this point in time, Price attempted to coordinate his operations with guerilla activities. However, Price's inattention to operational details meant that guerillas just struck what they thought were the best targets, which did not always benefit Price's army. Declining to test the state capital defenses, Price's invasion was then converted into a raid, albeit still a slow one and one additionally burdened by a growing baggage train. With his poor health and confinement to an ambulance, Price could never make use of his one great battlefield skill, his personal magnetism.

Rosecrans outnumbered Price from the beginning and the latter's light batteries would at no point have been able to crack the defences of St. Louis. Additionally, cavalry would not have been able to successfully assault the city in the first place. The movement towards Jefferson City was logical, but even there the quality of the Federal troops matched his own and the population was largely neutral up until he reached the Boonville area, where he got major support and many new recruits. In that town he briefly met Bill Anderson and the encounter showed, that Price, also being somewhat revered by the irregulars, did in fact not exert enough influence over the different guerilla bands. Many of them, as Anderson's, were led by psychopaths more interested in senseless killing and looting than in actually advancing military goals. So those bands roamed in the vicinity of Price's columns, burned, looted and killed, but shyed away from any major commitments that would have put them against seasoned Union troops. Concerning the baggage train, Sinisi estimated the size to be adequate and not really overblown, but many footsore and not so voluntary members of Price's force gathered around the wagons and slowed them down additionally. Price being overweight and a heavy drinker was not particularly helpful indeed.

In relation to the final part of the raid you are relatively on point, but it should be mentioned that the move to the west greatly demoralized the Missourians in his command while the Arkansans were striving to get home again.

Overall (factoring in his other war conducts), Price was a flamboyant, self-centered commander, who was caring mainly about Missouri and its inhabitants. The volunteers from that state paid him back with overflowing loyality and love and followed him wherever he ordered them, what won him successes as long as he commanded significant numbers of his compatriots. He had no talent commanding cavalry offensively, while his defensive conduct against Steele during the Camden Expedition until the infantry arrived from Louisiana was skillfull. As a corps commander I would rank him competent at best, but as an independent commander he was certainly below average.

 

[Arnold d.c]

Kyle Sinisi's "The Last Hurrah!" is as far as I know the latest work on the matter and it corrects several criticisms of Price concerning key decisions.

Since I don't own the book and have heard good things about it, I'll take your word for it.

The mounts were one of the problems, but the quality of the troops and their equipment were even worse and totally beyond Price's control. Up to one third of his 12,000 men were unarmed in the beginning of his campaign and thousands of the Arkansans in his ranks were pressed into service on gunpoint by Joseph Shelby and his men in advance of the invasion. Price actually established harsh regulations concerning looters and stragglers, but soon had to realize, those were not able to be enforced without a large chunk of his force simply deserting. This of course raises the accusation why he did not cancel his raid, but such a decision was in the context of the moment just not realistic. Price's initial goals of establishing a government, recruiting significantly and influencing the elections were established when he still was under Kirby Smith's assurance of a large infantry force, which was later being denied to him.

I was aware of the former, but I wasn't aware of E.K. Smith's decision to withhold the infantry.

At Pilot Knob/Fort Davidson, according to Sinisi, Price was the only one in the high command to OPPOSE the assault, but was retuned/overruled by his two division commanders who were present on the field. The successfull defence and escape was less a consequence of Price's failure but more thanks to the tactical genius and determination of Thomas Ewing in that instance.

Looking at the available preview of Sinisi's book, Price had completely reversed his original decision, perhaps from the news that there were Southern civilians in the fort. The planning by Price is incredibly questionable. If Price was too unwell to personally scale the mountain and observe the defenses, he should have passed field command to one of his division commanders for this battle. Instead, Price planned an attack with no personal knowledge of the terrain ahead.

In that town he briefly met Bill Anderson and the encounter showed, that Price, also being somewhat revered by the irregulars, did in fact not exert enough influence over the different guerilla bands. Many of them, as Anderson's, were led by psychopaths more interested in senseless killing and looting than in actually advancing military goals. So those bands roamed in the vicinity of Price's columns, burned, looted and killed, but shyed away from any major commitments that would have put them against seasoned Union troops. Concerning the baggage train, Sinisi estimated the size to be adequate and not really overblown, but many footsore and not so voluntary members of Price's force gathered around the wagons and slowed them down additionally. Price being overweight and a heavy drinker was not particularly helpful indeed.

Fair enough on the point of guerillas and the wagon train. Michael J. Forsyth suggested that Price should have sent a list of targets for guerillas to strike, but given how uncontrollable the guerillas were as you mentioned, you're probably right that it wouldn't have mattered whether or not Price actually ordered them to attack specific targets.

Overall (factoring in his other war conducts), Price was a flamboyant, self-centered commander, who was caring mainly about Missouri and its inhabitants. The volunteers from that state paid him back with overflowing loyality and love and followed him wherever he ordered them, what won him successes as long as he commanded significant numbers of his compatriots. He had no talent commanding cavalry offensively, while his defensive conduct against Steele during the Camden Expedition until the infantry arrived from Louisiana was skillfull. As a corps commander I would rank him competent at best, but as an independent commander he was certainly below average.

On the whole, I completely agree with you. It seems to me that Price was perfectly capable of following orders (which can't be said for Leonidas Polk) and although he did commit piecemeal attacks at Elkhorn Tavern and Second Corinth, he was just adequate for a corps commander. However, it does seem to me that Price was lacking in his ability to plan a battle/campaign and carry it out. This made him unsuitable for independent command and probably meant that any army commander had to give him detailed orders. Furthermore, when his health started to fail him, it seems that his personal charisma was not an option and reduced his effectiveness.