Ranking the Confederate Corps Commanders

A couple of months ago, I created a thread titled "Ranking the Union Corps Commanders"in which discussions were held concerning how capable the Union corps commanders in both the Eastern and Western Theater were, and how they stacked up to each in rating. I have now desired to do the same for the Confederate corps commanders. The same rules from the Union thread still apply. Also, I am aware that generally that there are more passionate feelings concerning CSA generals than Union ones, and due to historiography, the rankings of some figures are never going to please everyone (specifically Longstreet). Also, I know that almost everyone here is a mature person and knows not to do this, but please do not make this into a thread that either deifies the Confederacy or turn this into a Confederate bashing thread. This thread's purpose is to rank the men solely on the basis of their military skill, not their personal life. With that said, lets move on to the list.

Distinguished:
1. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson: In a very close race, I ultimately decided to give Jackson the top spot. If consideration was only given to times when Jackson under direct supervision from a superior, he would have been in the capable category. It was his times commanding on his own without direct superior overseeing the action that earned him this top spot, and these where the kind of operations in which he shined. At Second Bull Run, he was able to hold the line under immense pressure, and despite the loss of two of his three division commanders, and many brigade commanders. Then at Harper's Ferry, he forced the surrender of 12,000 Union troops and still arrived in time to participate in Antietam. Finally, there is his finest hour at his final battle: Chancellorsville. He was willing to take on a task many generals on both sides would have refused, and successfully pulled it off with brilliant effect. Ultimately, he would prove to be the most crucial man in Lee's greatest victory of the war. His untimely death certainly played a role in the outcome of the Civil War. His main drawback, however, was his inability to get along with many of his subordinates. Despite this, however, he always managed to deliver at least passable performances.
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2. James Longstreet: Perhaps Lee's greatest subordinate if only times under direct supervision are considered, Longstreet delivered several masterful performances during the war. He became most famous for the devastating, hammering flank attacks he could deliver, as shown off at Second Bull Run, Gettysburg, and the Wilderness. His loss at that third battle might have been Lee's worse loss of the war. Even if it wasn't, it deprived him of his most capable and experienced subordinate in a time when he desperately needed him. Similar to Jackson, he would sometimes face problems dealing with others, such as Jubal Early, A.P. Hill, Evander Law, or Lafayette McLaws later on in the war, but again similar to Jackson, these feuds would never lead to a terrible outcome as petty feuds between miltary men often do. Overall, he well deserves his nickname as Lee's Old Warhorse.
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Capable:
3. Richard S. Ewell: This might be a controversial placing, but I think Ewell deserves to be placed in the capable category. In his first real test as a corps commander, the Second Battle of Winchester, he managed to win a victory worthy of Jackson. It was at Gettysburg that he managed to permanently scar his image in the public eye. This was due to him not attacking the Union's defenses on the hills at the end of the first day. It should be noted that Lee's orders were left much up to Ewell's discretion, and that his men were tired from hard marching and fighting, as well as the fact that the Union had already begun to fortify. In only remembering this, it is forgotten that it was men under his command that initially broke the Union line, and that they would again do well in the second and third day of battle. At the Wilderness, once again, men under Ewell's command would deliver a brilliant flanking assault. Ultimately, his worst moment and his ultimate undoing would be Spotsylvania, where Union forces were able to break through his portion of the defensive perimeter and had the potential to destroy the Confederate Army. The circumstances leading to this were not all his fault, such as Lee moving his artillery to other positions. Ultimately, however, this near catastrophe would cost Ewell his command, and he would be sent off to the defenses of Richmond.
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4. Jubal A. Early: While it might ruffle some feathers that Early is below Ewell, my reasoning behind this is that while Ewell has a great triumph to his name, Second Winchester, Early has no such accolade, although he did manage to win some victories. Coming to corps command following Ewell's reassignment, Early's tenure was defined by one goal: Make sure that the Shenandoah Valley stayed in CSA hands, and to distract as many men from the Siege of Petersburg as possible. At first, Early succeeded at both of these goals: he drove out David Hunter and drew the VI Corps to Washington. After his repulse at the Battle of Fort Stevens, however, things began to go downhill. This was not his fault for the most part, however, as he was outnumbered and faced an aggressive opponent in Phil Sheridan. It is hardly surprising then that he would be battered out of the Shenandoah Valley, although he nearly managed to gain what could have been a decisive victory at Cedar Creek. Ultimately, his failure would lead to a massive public campaign to remove him from command, which Lee ultimately agreed to do.
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Competent:
5: Ambrose P. Hill: Although part of me wants to place Hill in the capable category due to his performance in the Overland and Petersburg Campaigns, I can not overlook how he performed as corps commander in the campaigns prior to those. As a starter, it is important to note that often times, Hill was sick, which hampered his ability to command, and sometimes completely incapacitated him, such as at Spotsylvania where Early had to take command of his corps. In the Gettysburg Campaign, he managed to get his corps engaged in a slogging match with the I Corps that he quite possibly could have lost had Ewell and his men not routed the Union men to the north. The rest of his performance at Gettysburg is hardly worthy of note as he was stricken with illness. Then came Bristoe Station, where his corps faced a bloody repulse from an inexperienced corps commander, Gouverneur Warren. It was during the Overland and Petersburg Campaigns that he began to perform better, perhaps because of the less strenuous nature of defensive warfare. He was able to hold his line well at the Wilderness and Petersburg, and repulse all assaults despite weakening numbers, although his piecemeal attacks at the North Anna cost Lee his final, best chance to strike a critical blow to Grant. Ultimately, he would be killed in what some consider a purposeful charge against Union soldiers in a suicide attempt.
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6: Richard H. Anderson: Ascending to corps command due to Longstreet's injury at the Wilderness, Anderson had a reputation as a solid, but undistinguished, officer. Ultimately, he would be the choice of Lee to take over Longstreet's corps temporarily, chosen over Early and Edward Johnson. His time as commander of the I Corps continued with his reputation. Ultimately, when Longstreet healed and was able to return to command, Anderson was displaced. Lee would then make the IV Corps to give him a command, which essentially were former garrison troops. Due to the high rates of desertion for the CSA Army experienced towards the end of the war, as well as the lack of experience of his men and the overwhelming determination of the Union troops to finally put the war to an end, one can hardly blame Anderson for the destruction of his corps at Sayler's Creek. Ultimately, Anderson was simply a competent general who could be counted on to deliver a solid, if not brilliant, performance as a corps commander.
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Not one from outside the Army of Northern Virginia I note. What of Hardee, Polk, Hood, Cheatham, Stewart, Breckenridge, Kirby Smith, Buckner, S.D. Lee and D.H. Hill? How do you rate them?
 
Plus the west was a chaotic mess from the start, Bragg reorganizing his forces multiple times, Pemberton getting caught in Vicksburg, a lot of the western corps commanders came and went not just due to military need, but friction within the army or political concerns. Though I hoped A.P. Stewart would make the first list, he was always dependable regardless of who commanded him.
 
I find giving Jackson the top spot interesting. His performance tended to really up-and-down, Longstreet was more steady. Hardee and Breckinridge are much better than many give them credit for.

The one example of Cleburne commanding a corps (Jonesborough) is hardly inspiring.
 
A few comments on your list:
  1. I disagree heavily with giving Jackson the top spot. Jackson had undeniable skills in operational warfare, but his tactics were frankly subpar. I have a great deal of respect for Jackson's ability to move troops to the right place at the right time, but his tactical record leaves much to desire. The most notable example was at Brawner's Farm, where with over 6,000 men at his disposal, the element of surprise, and the high ground, against 2,100 unaware green Union soldiers, he was fought to a draw because of piecemeal deployments; he failed to even get more than 3,500 of his men really into the action. Cedar Mountain, where he got surprised and nearly whipped by Nathaniel Banks with inferior forces, is another. He was also lethargic at Second Manassas on the final day of battle, where he did not do anything to support Longstreet's crushing attack on Pope's army, thus enabling Pope to make a relatively clean getaway. At Fredericksburg, he let A.P. Hill create a dangerous gap in the line, which nearly allowed Meade and Gibbons to break his lines. Not to mention the Seven Days...
    At Chancellorsville, while the flank attack was a nice idea, he actually yet against used a poor tactical deployment. He used the same scheme Beauregard tried to at Shiloh with his divisions all lined up with no reserves; the result, as all these troops pressed into a relatively narrow area, was complete disorganization and no reserves to follow up his initial success. His initial wave had enough force to drive off one badly outnumbered and unprepared Union corps; tactically, that's ALL he accomplished. He did not successfully maintain secrecy on the march either; Union forces discovered it, but Hooker deluded himself as to its meaning.
    In contrast, Longstreet, while having failures as an independent commander, has undeniably launched four of the most effective corps-level attacks (Second Manassas, Gettysburg-Day 2, the breakthrough at Chickamauga and the Wilderness).
  2. I do agree that Ewell and Early deserve to go in the Capable category, but I'm not so sure on the placement. I do see your point that Early hasn't a true triumph while Ewell has Second Winchester to boast about. At the same time, I must point out that Early's plan at Cedar Creek was truly brilliant (although I think it was too late by then) and Early has proven himself to be a decent independent commander, a skill which Ewell had not much opportunity to show.
  3. Ok. I will not let A.P. Hill stay in the competent category. If anything, I believe he goes into the subpar or even incompetent category. A.P. Hill's performance as corps commander throughout the war was incredibly lackluster. At Gettysburg, he basically had no control over his corps. On Day 2, he failed to ensure Richard H. Anderson's Division was fully committed to the attack, disrupting Lee's en echelon attack. At Bristoe Station, he was bloodily repulsed by Warren's II Corps, which was notably unsupported by the rest of the Army of the Potomac. At the Wilderness, his corps was the only Confederate force to be routed by the Union attackers (although Lee has some blame here - when A.P. Hill asked for permission to dig in, Lee told him not to, saying that Longstreet was close). At Spotsylvania Court House, he was too sick to take command and so his corps was led by Jubal Early. At North Anna, he failed to eject Warren's bridgehead. I'm hard-pressed to think of anything positive to say about this man aside from his tenure as division commander.
 
Ok so here comes my list:

Distinguished:
Nathan B. Forrest (In my eyes a must, because he simply was excellent and inspiring in his handling of troops, especially when being outnumbered)
John B. Gordon (Basically leading Early's II Corps in the Valley and later during the Siege of Petersburg. Hard hitting and inspiring, quickly adapting to the modern character of the war. He held against four times his numbers at Third Winchester and was responsible for planning and executing the flank attack at Cedar Creek. Innovative planning at Fort Stedman, the failure of the attack was not his fault, though).

Capable:
James Longstreet (Especially reliable in defence, no major flaws besides hesitating when he did not like orders, therefore only capable.)
Stonewall Jackson (Moments of utter genius and madness as already mentioned, brilliant in the Shenandoah Valley)
Jubal Early (Good independent commander in the Valley under much worse circumstances than Jackson but sometimes foul-mouthed and argumentative)
William Hardee (always reliable, very good tactician as shown for example at Averasboro)
Richard Taylor (Army of Western Louisiana was basically a corps, so he belongs here. Getting his due for the flawless performance in the Red River Campaign)

Competent:
A. P. Stewart, Richard Anderson (reliable but not outstanding)
Jeb Stuart (sometimes brilliant but also self-centered and egoistic)
 
  1. Ok. I will not let A.P. Hill stay in the competent category. If anything, I believe he goes into the subpar or even incompetent category. A.P. Hill's performance as corps commander throughout the war was incredibly lackluster. At Gettysburg, he basically had no control over his corps. On Day 2, he failed to ensure Richard H. Anderson's Division was fully committed to the attack, disrupting Lee's en echelon attack. At Bristoe Station, he was bloodily repulsed by Warren's II Corps, which was notably unsupported by the rest of the Army of the Potomac. At the Wilderness, his corps was the only Confederate force to be routed by the Union attackers (although Lee has some blame here - when A.P. Hill asked for permission to dig in, Lee told him not to, saying that Longstreet was close). At Spotsylvania Court House, he was too sick to take command and so his corps was led by Jubal Early. At North Anna, he failed to eject Warren's bridgehead. I'm hard-pressed to think of anything positive to say about this man aside from his tenure as division commander.
I put Hill into the competent category because I think he preformed well in the Petersburg Campaign, considering his constant sickness, continually weakening numbers, and the seemingly relentless Union attacks and probes, although I can see your reasoning for wanting to place him in a lower category.
 
I put Hill into the competent category because I think he preformed well in the Petersburg Campaign, considering his constant sickness, continually weakening numbers, and the seemingly relentless Union attacks and probes, although I can see your reasoning for wanting to place him in a lower category.
Fair enough. I'll acknowledge that A.P. Hill did win a sharp victory over Hancock at Ream's Station and that his corps did a fine job fighting off Grant's advances. However, my main issue is how much credit A.P. Hill deserved for his Corps' success. Ream's Station is undoubtedly A.P. Hill's finest day as corps commander; he was as active in giving orders to his subordinates just as he was as the commander of the Light Division. However, his corps' success at Jerusalem Plank Road and the Crater can be attributed to Mahone's initiative and competence while Henry Heth deserves the majority of the credit for the successful fight against Grant's Sixth Offensive because he, and not A.P. Hill, had field command. A.P. Hill's role in the Sixth Offensive was just giving Heth the troops to mass for an attack.
 
Plus the west was a chaotic mess from the start, Bragg reorganizing his forces multiple times, Pemberton getting caught in Vicksburg, a lot of the western corps commanders came and went not just due to military need, but friction within the army or political concerns. Though I hoped A.P. Stewart would make the first list, he was always dependable regardless of who commanded him.

I know that this is an unpopular opinion, but I do think the death of Albert Sidney Johnston was a pretty big blow to the Confederate cause in the West. Even though he feuded with Beauregard and made a few early mistakes, he was one of the only commanders of the war to pull one off on Grant and his movements in early 1862 were what caused Sherman's nervous breakdown. He did command the respect of his commanders, and his troops, while not being convinced there were conspiracies all around him.

Bragg at the top ended up being one series of disasters after another which culminated on Missionary Ridge.
 
I know that this is an unpopular opinion, but I do think the death of Albert Sidney Johnston was a pretty big blow to the Confederate cause in the West. Even though he feuded with Beauregard and made a few early mistakes, he was one of the only commanders of the war to pull one off on Grant and his movements in early 1862 were what caused Sherman's nervous breakdown. He did command the respect of his commanders, and his troops, while not being convinced there were conspiracies all around him.

Bragg at the top ended up being one series of disasters after another which culminated on Missionary Ridge.
I have to give you that one, A. S. Johnston was the one individual the western generals and Jeff Davis could agree on to some extent, but his obsession with the Hornet's Nest cost him his life when the Confederate AoT needed Army level guidance during Shiloh. If Johnston survived Shiloh, I don't know if he could have done any better than Bragg or Pemberton militarily, but he was the best option given the need for cooperation among the Confederate generals in the west.
 
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I have to give you that one, A. S. Johnston was the one individual the western generals and Jeff Davis could agree on to some extent, but his obsession with the Hornet's Nest cost him his life when the Confederate AoT needed Army level guidance during Shiloh. If Johnston survived Shiloh, I don't know if he could have done any better than Bragg or Pemberton militarily, but he was the best option given the need for cooperation among the Confederate generals in the west.

Some of the problems in the West for the Confederates were political as much as military. Bragg feuded with men incessantly to the point they wouldn't listen to him, and dismissed or shuffled men off on a whim. Johnston, who had Davis's ear from the start, probably could have avoided some of that and might even have been able to prise men from the grasp of the armies in Virginia. But the better communication and coordination with his commanders could have made all the difference at places like Perryville or Stones River. Hell, even his commanders just respecting him on a basic level might have improved things.
 
Sidney Johnston's obsession with micromanaging his troops sort of reminds me of John F. Reynolds, which is not a bad thing at all. However I do not believe one can effectively analyze Johnston's performance due to only fighting half a battle. I do not want to appear pushy, but is there any input on John Gordon?
 
I do not want to appear pushy, but is there any input on John Gordon?
In my opinion, John Gordon really was a brilliant brigade and division commander. As a corps commander, I think Gordon had potential but his tenure is a bit too short to tell how good he was. At Fort Stedman, Gordon did a good job of creating a detailed assault plan. However, Gordon's analysis of his opponent's defensive line was faulty. The "three forts" in the Union second line required for breaking the Union line were actually non-existent according to Andrew A. Humphreys, II Corps commander and Meade's former Chief of Staff. Furthermore, Gordon's assault was too narrow. By failing to seize Fort Haskell and Battery No. 9 on their flanks, Gordon's troops and any reinforcements to the captured Fort Stedman were raked by heavy artillery fire.

During the retreat to Appomattox, Gordon's Corps acted as the rearguard. The biggest fight of the Appomattox Campaign was Sailor's Creek, which was very nearly the fatal blow for Lee's army. Gordon's Corps succeeded in repulsing two attacks by Humphrey's II Corps before it collapsed from pressure from three sides. The majority of the losses, however, were due to Ewell's and Anderson's failure to notify either Longstreet or Gordon that they had stopped to let the wagon train go pass ahead them. In short, I think Gordon showed some promise with his handling of his corps, but I also think that it isn't enough to determine whether he would have been a top tier corps commander or not. Gordon's attack at Fort Stedman, while brilliantly planned, had the advantage of knowing the ground before them for 9 months. Would Gordon have planned an attack as well as Fort Stedman with less intelligence on enemy dispositions?
 
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