Assuming the USSR is defeated by 1943, or at least reduced to a state whereby it no longer is a significant drain on German forces, would the Western Allies be able to destroy Germany's transport system, defeat the Luftwaffe, and cripple/severely damage fuel production solely with air power, allowing for an invasion in 1945 before nuclear weapons became available?
Plausibility Check: Western Allied Victory via Air Power
- Thread starter Julian
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Short answer is yes. The longer answer depends on how large of a invasion, and more important where is this invasion/s. Some chunks of the nazi occupied territories could be easily isolated in 1943-44, others not so much.
There are other variables on the Allied side, like a more efficient concentration of force, with little luxuries like the South Pacific offensive of 1943 & 1944 or the Alteutians campaign not taken on. In order to bring more material to bear on Europe. Japanese offensive power was nuetralized by the end of 1942 & we could have stuck with a earlier plan for not undertaking offensive ops in the Pacific until much later in 1944, and in a more limited manner.
Then there are variables like slowing further the creation of ground forces until needed to boost the air forces. The US reduced the number of ground divisions it was to field from 180 to 150, then 120 & eventually 90 in order to increase the size of the airforce and other factors. Fact is the US got by in the ETO with just a single army of seven divisions until April or May 1944. Keeping a dozen or more divisions and ground support troops in cadre until actually needed in order to increase air forces is possible.
This sort of makes a small scratch in the surface of the answer, have fun.
There are other variables on the Allied side, like a more efficient concentration of force, with little luxuries like the South Pacific offensive of 1943 & 1944 or the Alteutians campaign not taken on. In order to bring more material to bear on Europe. Japanese offensive power was nuetralized by the end of 1942 & we could have stuck with a earlier plan for not undertaking offensive ops in the Pacific until much later in 1944, and in a more limited manner.
Then there are variables like slowing further the creation of ground forces until needed to boost the air forces. The US reduced the number of ground divisions it was to field from 180 to 150, then 120 & eventually 90 in order to increase the size of the airforce and other factors. Fact is the US got by in the ETO with just a single army of seven divisions until April or May 1944. Keeping a dozen or more divisions and ground support troops in cadre until actually needed in order to increase air forces is possible.
This sort of makes a small scratch in the surface of the answer, have fun.
Deleted member 1487
Based on your comments on this thread:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=295389
I assume that you were thinking along the same lines for this one.
I think its pretty hard to say with certainty that the West would be able to achieve air superiority with the USSR defeated by 1943 (which IMHO is impossible with the West in the war). But hypothetically let's say it happens thanks to Stalin evacuating Moscow as supposedly he nearly did IOTL, which results in Moscow falling into chaos as order breaks down with his departure (according to Glantz in a lecture I posted in a previous thread this was probable if Stalin decided to 'bug out' and evacuate). This badly disrupts the Soviet war effort and sometime tries, perhaps succeeds in toppling Stalin, which gives the Germans the ability to fight a badly divided enemy that falls into Civil War.
So by 1943 the Soviets are effectively neutralized and the majority of the LW is brought back West, as they aren't really needed in the East. By 1943 the bulk of the LW as still in the East, but this changed in the build up to Kursk. Still even by June 1943 there was about 40% of the LW in the East still, mostly bombers, but not totally. This extra fighter strength will make a difference in 1943, but not that much because the LW IOTL was able to take on the USAAF by day without issue until early 1944 and Big Week really ground them down. However, without the ground losses of 1942 and 1943 (Stalingrad, Kursk, and all the followup Soviet offensives) then the LW has as much resources as it needs to prosecute the air war. Fuel, lubricants, manpower (the LW here won't create its Field Divisions, which wasted hundreds of thousands of trained ground crews and pilots in ground combat positions without adequate training) and production resources are going to get thrown at the LW. IOTL they were seriously drained by the increase in air combat in the West and the Soviet advances, which pulled them in multiple directions, never letting them catch a breath.
Here though the LW is able to have safe training areas in the East and will not have to spend fuel, lives, and various other resources keeping their eastern contingent going; instead they can focus those resources on building up their fighter strength, especially as bombers become less important. This changes the dynamics in 1944, as the LW will be stronger in 1943 and will spend much more resources building up their fighter strength, rather than being bled to death in the East and West simultaneously. Especially if the Stalingrad bloodletting is butterflied away (it wouldn't hurt if the Demyansk one was too) is going to help save important training resources, as many of the pilots for the airlift were drawn from flight training schools to supply the city and were then lost in the effort. Instead here they survive and with the fuel saved from the fighting in the East they can train the next generation of pilots adequately instead of the 'sink or swim' approach after very basic flight training IOTL.
I'm not trying to say that the LW would be on the offensive, they most certainly would be reacting to Allied moves, rather than on the attack. But having the strength of TTL's LW would contest the air in 1944 much more than IOTL, which would prevent the problems to the economy you cited in the other thread I linked above. The oil campaign wouldn't be as successful, nor the infrastructure one. They could certainly go after those targets, but would be facing a far less attritted foe and would suffer accordingly. Of course in time the Allies would win the attrition war, but it wouldn't be in 1944 or perhaps 1945.
As someone else pointed out, without the war in the East on going, then a Cross Channel invasion becomes far less likely and less able to succeed with an unengaged bulk of the Heer waiting in France and the Lowlands (not to mention in Italy). When the V-weapons come online they will be a distraction of allied airpower away from bombing Germany, which they were IOTL, as Allied forces tried to knock them out from the air (they didn't succeed) and diverted their bombing resources to French infrastructure and launch sites before the OTL invasion. Here without the invasion or a less successful one, the Axis is going to be able to keep the Allied air forces tied to trying to knock out the weapon sites, rather than focusing full power on tackling the German economy. Coupled with less damage to the economy overall due to a stronger LW in 1944 the German economy is not going to be the shambles it was IOTL after Big Week. This gives greater breathing room to get the Me262 into service as well as more air defenses, which, thanks to no Eastern Front, means that extra resources can be plowed into Air Defense research and more FLAK weapons.
I think a 1945 invasion is the earliest that is possible ITTL and isn't guaranteed to succeed; in the long run the Allies will win, but its a matter of how long and how well each side plays its cards. It may still be too risky to use the A-bomb over Europe until 1946 to prevent the bomber carrying to from being shot down and having it captured, plus there would be the risk of retaliation from chemical weapons if the LW gets it jet bombers into service by 1945.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=295389
I assume that you were thinking along the same lines for this one.
I think its pretty hard to say with certainty that the West would be able to achieve air superiority with the USSR defeated by 1943 (which IMHO is impossible with the West in the war). But hypothetically let's say it happens thanks to Stalin evacuating Moscow as supposedly he nearly did IOTL, which results in Moscow falling into chaos as order breaks down with his departure (according to Glantz in a lecture I posted in a previous thread this was probable if Stalin decided to 'bug out' and evacuate). This badly disrupts the Soviet war effort and sometime tries, perhaps succeeds in toppling Stalin, which gives the Germans the ability to fight a badly divided enemy that falls into Civil War.
So by 1943 the Soviets are effectively neutralized and the majority of the LW is brought back West, as they aren't really needed in the East. By 1943 the bulk of the LW as still in the East, but this changed in the build up to Kursk. Still even by June 1943 there was about 40% of the LW in the East still, mostly bombers, but not totally. This extra fighter strength will make a difference in 1943, but not that much because the LW IOTL was able to take on the USAAF by day without issue until early 1944 and Big Week really ground them down. However, without the ground losses of 1942 and 1943 (Stalingrad, Kursk, and all the followup Soviet offensives) then the LW has as much resources as it needs to prosecute the air war. Fuel, lubricants, manpower (the LW here won't create its Field Divisions, which wasted hundreds of thousands of trained ground crews and pilots in ground combat positions without adequate training) and production resources are going to get thrown at the LW. IOTL they were seriously drained by the increase in air combat in the West and the Soviet advances, which pulled them in multiple directions, never letting them catch a breath.
Here though the LW is able to have safe training areas in the East and will not have to spend fuel, lives, and various other resources keeping their eastern contingent going; instead they can focus those resources on building up their fighter strength, especially as bombers become less important. This changes the dynamics in 1944, as the LW will be stronger in 1943 and will spend much more resources building up their fighter strength, rather than being bled to death in the East and West simultaneously. Especially if the Stalingrad bloodletting is butterflied away (it wouldn't hurt if the Demyansk one was too) is going to help save important training resources, as many of the pilots for the airlift were drawn from flight training schools to supply the city and were then lost in the effort. Instead here they survive and with the fuel saved from the fighting in the East they can train the next generation of pilots adequately instead of the 'sink or swim' approach after very basic flight training IOTL.
I'm not trying to say that the LW would be on the offensive, they most certainly would be reacting to Allied moves, rather than on the attack. But having the strength of TTL's LW would contest the air in 1944 much more than IOTL, which would prevent the problems to the economy you cited in the other thread I linked above. The oil campaign wouldn't be as successful, nor the infrastructure one. They could certainly go after those targets, but would be facing a far less attritted foe and would suffer accordingly. Of course in time the Allies would win the attrition war, but it wouldn't be in 1944 or perhaps 1945.
As someone else pointed out, without the war in the East on going, then a Cross Channel invasion becomes far less likely and less able to succeed with an unengaged bulk of the Heer waiting in France and the Lowlands (not to mention in Italy). When the V-weapons come online they will be a distraction of allied airpower away from bombing Germany, which they were IOTL, as Allied forces tried to knock them out from the air (they didn't succeed) and diverted their bombing resources to French infrastructure and launch sites before the OTL invasion. Here without the invasion or a less successful one, the Axis is going to be able to keep the Allied air forces tied to trying to knock out the weapon sites, rather than focusing full power on tackling the German economy. Coupled with less damage to the economy overall due to a stronger LW in 1944 the German economy is not going to be the shambles it was IOTL after Big Week. This gives greater breathing room to get the Me262 into service as well as more air defenses, which, thanks to no Eastern Front, means that extra resources can be plowed into Air Defense research and more FLAK weapons.
I think a 1945 invasion is the earliest that is possible ITTL and isn't guaranteed to succeed; in the long run the Allies will win, but its a matter of how long and how well each side plays its cards. It may still be too risky to use the A-bomb over Europe until 1946 to prevent the bomber carrying to from being shot down and having it captured, plus there would be the risk of retaliation from chemical weapons if the LW gets it jet bombers into service by 1945.
I think you make a critical error in ignoring the effect of periphery theaters on the distribution of the Luftwaffe and its strategy in 1943. The major periphery is the Mediterranean, with the three major air battles in Tunisia, Sicily, and Italy. A second periphery often given little attention is the air war being foguth over France and Britain by Allied aircraft seeking to gain air superiority over the former and German revenge attacks against the latter. In a conference about Luftwaffe strategy in January 1943, despite a continued war in the east and growing Allied air attacks over German, the consensus was that the major theater of air war would be in the Mediterranean, with the majority of resources in early 1943 being sent there. Despite rising threats over Germany and demands in the East, the growth of fighter forces continued unabated until July (Well after the Battle of the Ruhr began in May), with 40% of new fighter production committed direct to Italy/Sicily, while units in Germany were stripped of aircraft. Forces only began to decline in September (Bombers strength remained constant), with other fronts demanding greater priority and the Luftwaffe defeated utterly; Luftwaffe 2 was only allowed to retreat to new bases in Italy at the end of July after 2/3 of Sicily had already been captured. This represents how out of touch Hitler, Milch, etc were with the strategic situation, and how focused they remained on periphery operations even while other fronts were in flames, to the point where draw downs were only except after defeat had occurred and other fronts had reached a crisis point.
ITTL Hitler will be even less likely to countenance a realistic strategy in the air war instead favoring, as always, the most aggressive solution possible. This implies not, just the opposite of committing most of the freed up resources to the West, the Mediterranean would see the greater share of interest and investment. Further, recognizing this strategic error will take far longer, both due to the Luftwaffe being able to hold on longer and avert immediate total defeat and the lack of the east to provide impetus to shift resources, and Hitler's own mentality. Bouyed by his victories he will be even more confident in his "genius", and far less willing to adopt an intelligent strategy in the air war. Even if not directly involved those heading the Luftwaffe, working towards what the Fuhrer wants, will search for more aggressive solutions.
This will reflected further in the air war over France/Britain. In the case of Britain Hitler (With whom Milch and Jeschonnek agreed) favored a more aggressive bombing strategy which was to a degree fulfilled; several thousand sorties were flown in late 1943 and early 1944. However, these were inhibited by resource demands in other sectors and Allied air dominance in France. ITTL the Luftwaffe has the means and motives to massively expand revenge attacks against Britain, no matter how poor a decision it may be. It also has the motivation to contest the skies over northern and western France (It had been forced to withdraw to bases in eastern France and the low countries), a costly struggle which the Luftwaffe will gain little from. Again this represents a large dilution of strength from the Defense of the Reich at a critical moment, reducing and even reversing Germany's material gains. Albeit IOTL losses weren't exactly enormous in the bombing of Britain, losses in attempting to retake the initiative over France will be comparable to those of previous operations where the Luftwaffe attempted to challenge the western allies directly.
Now that aside we get to the main theater, the air battles over the Reich. Firstly I would note that the infusion of aircraft from the east does little to stem the night bombing efforts over the Ruhr. This alone I believe is crucial, as while American daylight efforts totaled no more than 1-2 hundred aircraft, the RAF's strategic campaign had reached an enormous tempo. The Battle of the Ruhr in early 1943 is particularly important to look at, as its economic effects were enormous, crippling armaments production until 1944. Despite there was little comprehension about the magnitude of the threat posed; Speer's prophesies of economic catastrophe were dismissed, as reports of the scale and damage inflicted by air attacks were downplayed. Indeed, it was only until the shock of Hamburg (Which, given the unique conditions at play, likely doesn't occur ITTL) that led to series considerations about major structural reforms in the Luftwaffe and how it was deployed.
It is unfortunate that IOTL at this moment Harris got cocky. He decided that the RAF could strike a war winning blow against Germany by destroying Berlin just as it did Hamburg. Thus after refitting Bomber Command resumed operations not against the Ruhr, as Speer feared, but Berlin. This strategic error gave the German economy a critical moment of respite to recover in the short term. ITTL I believe this mistake will not occur. The sobering results of the Soviet Union leaving the war, generally higher losses (Not cripplingly, but certainly concerning), increased German air strength, etc will cause even Harris to adopt a more realistic plan in fall/winter of 1943, more than likely a continuation of the Ruhr operations earlier in the year. The effects of this, while not crippling, will spell the beginning of the end for Germany, as even with the winter weather reducing the tempo of operations the RAF will be able to prevent the recouping of losses seen IOTL.
The large scale arrival of American aircraft however really is what will defeat the Luftwaffe. The bombers and fighters of 8th AF alone, tripling in size from October-March, outnumbered the entire Luftwaffe. This massive superiority in size was complemented by an effective strategy; to force the Luftwaffe, by attacking important strategic targets, to fight in broad daylight. This zugzwang saw Luftwaffe losses rise to 50% of aircraft per month, and over 30% of crews. No matter what losses it could inflict on 8th air force, it suffered losses that it simply couldn't bear. This campaign of attrition will continue unhindered through 1944 as, without Overlord, the Combined Bomber Offensive will have nothing to distract its attention.
So I'd argue that the Luftwaffe was, even with the short term advantages gained in 1943, in the long run still doomed. It simply couldn't inflict enough damage, prevent losses, and adopt a coherent strategy. That's not to argue that Allied losses won't be higher; I'd expect to see increases. But it wouldn't be enough to stem the tide.
The reality of the POD is that the Germans are just so waaaay better off that its hard for them to screw up so much to be worse off or even the same as OTL.
They might have periods of time when air losses go high but they always can back off.
OTL, they called of the submarines in May 1943 once losses got high enough, until they could rethink some strategy, they just didn't keep sending them out to get sunk, even though losses continued, U boats levels continued to remain pretty constant with more conservative operational use, I would think they would do the same with airpower too.
Hitlers decision making could go the other way with more success (less desperate and more reasonable). OTL he saw it that he just had to hold on to these various places he demanded held or lose the war eventually, here he just has more forces to do it.
No Stalingrad and Demanysk airfilts with the loss of pilot training (and less direct pilot losses and air frame losses)
In the med in 1942 there is German airpower around that at least Operation Pedastal is not an Allied success (Ohio is sunk) and perhaps Malta falls. Both El Aliamens are better supplied for the Axis.
More JU88Cs are going to be flying uboat top cover over the bay of Biscay and more FW200s and HE177s are going to be over that Atlantic (some got diverted to the Stalingrad airlift). Sure more German air losses but hopefully they are getting something for that in less uboat losses and higher allied shipping losses.
German prestige would be running very high after a Soviet collapse. I would have to believe that this would have some effect on Vichy willingness to resist Allied political and military initiatives in Northwest Africa.
That increase of German prestige and loss of Soviet prestige has to have an infuence in the Partisan war where people have to make their decisions to live with the occupiers or not (more will choose to live with).
Without the 1942-1943 Italian losses in Russia and with the extra German prestige, Mussolinis political position would also be better.
Allocation of resources to home defence flak. While Flak isn't particularly effective you are trying to increase marginally the percentage of Allied losses where they might stop or chosse less valuable targets.
If they have enough ground force in France to resist invasion in 1944, they are better off comparing against OTL just for not losing their air defence/warning network.
The Germans suffered bad air losses over Tunisia in early 43 anyway so it may be hard for them to get much worse than OTL at least here.
They might have periods of time when air losses go high but they always can back off.
OTL, they called of the submarines in May 1943 once losses got high enough, until they could rethink some strategy, they just didn't keep sending them out to get sunk, even though losses continued, U boats levels continued to remain pretty constant with more conservative operational use, I would think they would do the same with airpower too.
Hitlers decision making could go the other way with more success (less desperate and more reasonable). OTL he saw it that he just had to hold on to these various places he demanded held or lose the war eventually, here he just has more forces to do it.
No Stalingrad and Demanysk airfilts with the loss of pilot training (and less direct pilot losses and air frame losses)
In the med in 1942 there is German airpower around that at least Operation Pedastal is not an Allied success (Ohio is sunk) and perhaps Malta falls. Both El Aliamens are better supplied for the Axis.
More JU88Cs are going to be flying uboat top cover over the bay of Biscay and more FW200s and HE177s are going to be over that Atlantic (some got diverted to the Stalingrad airlift). Sure more German air losses but hopefully they are getting something for that in less uboat losses and higher allied shipping losses.
German prestige would be running very high after a Soviet collapse. I would have to believe that this would have some effect on Vichy willingness to resist Allied political and military initiatives in Northwest Africa.
That increase of German prestige and loss of Soviet prestige has to have an infuence in the Partisan war where people have to make their decisions to live with the occupiers or not (more will choose to live with).
Without the 1942-1943 Italian losses in Russia and with the extra German prestige, Mussolinis political position would also be better.
Allocation of resources to home defence flak. While Flak isn't particularly effective you are trying to increase marginally the percentage of Allied losses where they might stop or chosse less valuable targets.
If they have enough ground force in France to resist invasion in 1944, they are better off comparing against OTL just for not losing their air defence/warning network.
The Germans suffered bad air losses over Tunisia in early 43 anyway so it may be hard for them to get much worse than OTL at least here.
Regarding the peripheral theaters, I would say it's not a given that the allies take Sicily in 1943 ITTL. By 1943, the Germans would be in a position to flood the beaches of the Mediterranean with at least an extra million men. This will mean Op. Husky isn't even attempted. This will keep Benny in power, the Med shut, the Italians still garrisoning the Balkans and Italian factories still working. The LW won't have to take part in a bloody battle because said battle is possible to not take place.
Also, with no losses on the eastern front, demand for steel would be much smaller, and consumption of fuel will be greatly diminished by not having tens upon tens of thousand of trucks and AFVs going around back and forth through Russia. With the Wehrmacht having nowhere to fight, the Kriegsmarine largely useless and with submarine production unable to be rapidly increased in the short term, the LW is going to get the lions share of (new) resources, along with a huge increase in AAA and associated ammunition consumption.
Also, with no losses on the eastern front, demand for steel would be much smaller, and consumption of fuel will be greatly diminished by not having tens upon tens of thousand of trucks and AFVs going around back and forth through Russia. With the Wehrmacht having nowhere to fight, the Kriegsmarine largely useless and with submarine production unable to be rapidly increased in the short term, the LW is going to get the lions share of (new) resources, along with a huge increase in AAA and associated ammunition consumption.
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I wonder how difficult it will be to exploit the Caspian region oil fields what with Allied bombers based in Persia/Iraq attacking them & the railroads westwards?
Would that goad the Germans into attempting a campaign into Persia/Iraqi?
Would that goad the Germans into attempting a campaign into Persia/Iraqi?
Depends on which numbers you add up, but the Germans suffered between 60 & 70 % of the aircraft losses of 1943 in the Mediterranean & Western Europe. 68% seems to be a accepted number. Toss in the Italians and it creeps up towards 75% of all Axis aircraft losses that year. The air battle over the Med. seems to have been the bulk of those losses. Three times, over Tunisia, Sicily, and then Italy the German AF was shot out of the air, the survivors withdrawn. It is true they got in some notable tactical victories, but operationaly & strategically 1943 in the west was a running loss for the Luftwaffe.
Exploitation of eastern resources would require a large amount of material. I've been following some investigations of German transportation development in the east through 1943 & it looks lame so far. The railroads they did restore were barely able to supply the understrength field armies. Even absent those armies in combat & only occupation forces things like shipping tens of thousands of tons of crude or refined oil west is going to be problematic without massive reconstruction or the transportation & its suppport.
AussieHawker
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With The Eastern Front mostly just skirmishes the Germans don't have to worry about if they should give the Resources to the Heer or to the LW or KM, Instead of the Vast Majority going to the Heer the other branches will be given a lot more labor and resources.
The problem is what resources are we really discussing? Aircraft production requires aluminum, not steel, so transfers of that won't help. Manpower is very helpful, and large portions of the army will be sent to work in armaments. But there are only so many factories (And under constant Allied air attack), and the law of diminishing marginal returns eventually comes into play. Fuel is I think the most important, but it offers only a temporary reprieve; loss rats in pilots and aircraft will exceed what training can produce no matter how much fuel is availiable for practice. Further, once the Allies begin their sustained fuel campaign Germany will be running on whatever it has in stock; certainly not enough to last it into 1945. Further, demobilizing the army, shifting resources elsewhere, and the effects of Allied bombing means that by summer 1945 the Heer will be a far weaker beast than it was in OTL, especially as the Germsn economy and transportation network begins to break down. Thus an Allied landing is likely to achieve great success in summer 1945.
The lack of tractors and animals also made it next to impossible to harvest more than a fraction of what the Ukraine could offer.
Seriously ? Seriously ?! The Germans were bleeding entire army groups left right and center in Russia in 1944/1945 before the onset of summer !
Also, right now the Germans don't have to use their Ju-52 fleet to supply key aspects of the eastern front, hence the training programs should be much, much more productive.
Fuel also won't really be a problem by the time the A-bomb arrives, as, as I've said before, one of the biggest drains on fuel consumption is gone, not to mention the fact that the Romanian refineries will be much better defended and will only be taken out by allied bombing many months later than OTL.
I expect the front in August/September 1945 to be somewhere between Caen and Paris when the A-Bombs start dropping.
As I said above, large portions of the army would be demobilized, lowering irks strength. Allied air attacks would also cripple transportation and armaments production, denying it vehicles, fuel, ammunition, etc. Germany won't be able to support its army in the field by virtue of its economy being in ruins, regardless of what manpower it has.
In the case of the fuel situation, note that after just a couple months of sustained operations production had been reduced to 30% of potential, and attacks in trasportation future crippled fuel distribution. This was before Ploesti was captured.
Even during its worst lost rates between May and July 1943 the RAF increased its on hand strength by over 200 crews. As Allied force size and sophistication increased loss rates decreased, while German losses grew to over 50% of aircraft per month. Attrition was very much in Allied favor.
But it does disrupt manpower by placing large sections of the army into armaments production. It will also see trucks, animals, etc shifted into the civilian/military production sector, not stored for future use. Harvesting grain in the Ukraine, for instance, would use a massive amount of tractors, trucks, and animals.
What air power can do is destroy the basis which supports what Germany already has. New vehicles, new tanks, replacement parts, ammunition, explosives, fuel, etc will all be crippled by air power. The rail and canal networks used to move and produce these materials will also be crippled. Thus under extended combat the German army cannot be supported on the field.
The losses were unsustainable for much of the war. The Allied air commanders took note and sought new methods. The most effective was providing fighter escorts. That had much to do with the severe German AF losses in the Med in 1943. The Germans repeatedly tried to fight forward in range of the Allied fighter support and paid dearly for it. As long as Spitfires & P40s were the primary Allied interceptor it was possible for the Germans to step back and fight out of interceptor range, but that left the ground combat units unsupported and the forward communications as well. As the longer ranged fighter planes came in large number falling back no longer worked. The vulnerability of the supply transport became one of the top German problems.
The Allies had a number of technology 'wunderwaffe' in preparation but unused. ie: approx 5,000 JB-2 Loon were scheduled to be fielded in 1945. This knock off of the V1 was rigged for launch from four engine bombers as well as surface launch ramps.
No argument there.
I rather agree with your longer answers, but I think the short answer would best be no. In 1943-44 the Allies were still attempting to perfect their strategies and tactics for the combined bombing offensive. With more aircraft, AA, and manpower available in the west by early 1944, the Luftwaffe might exact such astronomically losses on the USAAF and the RAF that the allies might suspend, at least temporarily, the strategic bombing campaign. Also, one of the political reasons the allies spend so much effort on the bombing campaign was to show Stalin they were at least doing something, to assist the Soviets. No USSR left, and the allied high commands might decide not to continue with a strategy that was, initially, both costly and unproductive.
An allied bombing campaign might eventually cripple German the German transport, energy, and food sectors so much that German military potential was seriosuly threatened, and deplete the Lufwaffe's trained crews to the point that they enjoy general air superiority over all of Europe. But I seriosuly doubt that would have happened before a (later than OTL) channel crossing or the availability of Nuclear Weapons.