Plan a Successful Sealion!

[Boom22]

Ice Age keeps Britain attached to mainland.
Or no Hitler maybe Himmler or someone more sinster? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Baron
Now for shameless promotion (He'll be key to a TL I'm makeing.

 

[CalBear]

Please read the opening post! And the thread title, for that matter! This bit has NOT been done again and again and again!

Starting in 1933?

Can't be done, not by 1940, not even by 1945.

The logistical requirements (landing craft, surface combatants, heavy amphibious ships (e.g. LST) supply vessels) alone preclude it The sheer number of ships/boats required to support the landings (the Allies used around 5,000 at Normandy) makes it impossible to conceal the buildup. The RN has a massive advantage in all classes of vessels and is not limited by the Washington or London treaties beginning in 1937 (and could have gotten out of the treaty by 1935 by declaring it's intentions in 1933). Germany lacked the yards, not to mention the resources, to win a naval construction contest with Great Britain, especially one where it was a hundred suface combatants behind at the onset.

The steel needed to build the heavy cruisers alone (forget about BBs, it took 4.5 years to complete Bismarck & Tirpitz) necessary to defend the invasion force would prevent the Reich from fielding three Panzer divisions worth of Pz. MK III (600 tanks) per cruiser, with light cruisers equally a couple divisions, even destroyers are around 150 tanks worth of materials. Figure a minimum of 10 CA (6000 tanks), 10 CL (4000 tanks), 50 DD (7500 tanks) just to keep subs and torpedo boats at arm's length. That's 17,000+ tanks taken out of the Heer OOB, just for minimal escort. A single Bismarck BB will suck up 10 panzer divisions worth of metal. That doesn't even begin to cover the materials and manpower needed to construct and man the massive number of transports and landing vessels.

IOTL the Reich couldn't manage to equip its 1939 Panzer divisions until it captured the Czech armament factories, what is the Heer going to do ITTL?

You also need to look at the number of men it needs to operate major surface combatants. Just the actual crew for the 10 Heavy Cruisers, not counting the logistical tail needed to get & keep them ready for sea, would amount to 16,000 men (each BB crew is at least 2100 men, if you decide build five or six to actually try to defend against major surface combatants). The naval forces, again excluding amphibious and transport crews, will cost you at least five divsions of troops, with the tail costing probably three times that number.

If the Reich is building major surface units and amphibs, it also can't be building subs. That puts the RN into position to concentrate forces in major battle groups rather than scattering ships across the whole Atlantic chasing phantoms.

Many of the same resources being used to construct the warships and support ships needed to attempt the invasion, especially machine tools and skilled machinists, are now denied to the German aircraft industry. Even if the British are facing the same need to build warships, they can buy aircraft and warships from the U.S. (they might be better off buying mainly American BB & CA/CL designs, both of which proved to quite battle worthy in the Pacific War, and concentrating on aircraft since late 1930 british fighter designs are better than the American contemporary designs).

The later the date of the invasion, the worse the problem. British navy construction capacity far exceeds the German & American yards dwarfs the UK's. Even if the U.S. is looking for cash on the barrel, not some version of Lend/Lease, the British have LOTS to trade, they still control India, a good part of Southeast Asia and most of the Middle East, from where they can export massive amount of everything from oil to ore, diamonds, trace metals, rubber, etc. for American currency (or even straight up trade of bulk material for finished product).


Marine Mammal, with a 1933 POD, is effectively impossible without divine intervention.

 

[CalBear]

Rommel, according to a magazine about him, was highly overrated. Tactically,
Patton and Montgomery, were better generals.

What, beside a single magazine article, leads you to state so flatly that Rommel was the inferior of the other two commanders? All were remarkably successful; all also had problems (something all commanders share).

Rommel is somewhat overrated, especially in popular imagination, but he was an excellent field commander. He might not have been the perfect choice for overseeing the Atlantic Wall's construction, but he was tactically brilliant, at least the equal of both Allied officers you mentioned. His efforts with Afrika Corps are, to this day, subjects of study at military academies across the world.

I, personally, am a huge fan of Patton, he was a man out of his time and somewhat larger than life, but he was also brash, headstrong, and not as good a tactical thinker as he believed himself to be. He also was not strong logistically, something that a 4 star officer needs to be as skilled at as combat.

Montgomery was an excellent planner, and as good a motivator of his men as either of the other officers under consideration. He suffered from the opposite problem that afflicted Patton; where Patton was overly aggressive, Montgomery was overly cautious. Whether that was a result of the understandable British aversion to casualties post WW I or simply a character trait, it reduced his overall effectiveness.

 

[Jukra]

Your challenge, then, should you choose to accept it, is to create a plausible invasion of Great Britain by the Third Reich, with a POD no earlier than 1933.

One has to wait for some ten further years, and there's technological and material reasons for it. The true challenge is to keep Nazi state going for ten years of peace.

First, aircraft technology, even without WW II, would have advanced significantly by 1950 which will have two major impacts. The range of bombers and fighters will be manyfold compared to their 1940 cousings. Thus the RAF will not have the option of just staying out of the range of Luftwaffe during the air superiority fight. The second is the development of better cargo aircraft, which will mean that airborne troops of ca. 1950 vintage will be much more capable than those of 1940. For US development, just compare C-47 to C-119.

Second is the development of better ordnance for anti-shipping duties. By 1950, if effort is made even with peacetime budgets, guided bombs and homing torpedoes will be available. Combined with longer range aircraft with more payload (think about Stuka compared to A-1 Skyraider, for starters) and developed radar technology the surface fleet can be eliminated from the vicinity of the landing operation.

Third reason is the effects of age on Royal Navy. By 1950 the residual WW I battleships and destroyers, even if modernized, are clearly worn out and outdated by advances of technology, not to mention them being completely outdated by developments of aerial ordnance.

As for bonus, by 1950 it might be realistic to expect that some sort of developed V-1 might be available for aerial bombing duties as well, helping to swamp RAF defenses.

For assault landing tasks, if Nazi government would continue for years it would have time to develop special landing unit, ostensibly for Baltic use.

As in 1940, the precursor would be the winning of air superiority. Technological advantages cited would play more for Luftwaffe than for RAF.
The invasion would be still a very difficult task to do, but with longer range aircraft supporting it from France would be possible. Above all, interdicting British reserves while moving would be a lot easier.

As for atomic bombs, I don't think the British, French or the US will have the budget for it with peacetime expenditures. Atomic bomb might be coming, but one has to remember even for the US it took years before the atomic arsenal was significant enough for strategic offensive.

 

[Jukra]

Even if the U.S. is looking for cash on the barrel, not some version of Lend/Lease, the British have LOTS to trade, they still control India, a good part of Southeast Asia and most of the Middle East, from where they can export massive amount of everything from oil to ore, diamonds, trace metals, rubber, etc. for American currency (or even straight up trade of bulk material for finished product).

If one waits for some years, I would think about ten, there's a lot of political reasons for British Empire to evaporate. OTL, India got it's independence, for starters, and Middle East might well blow up.

I also think that yoy're overstating your case with the need of Normandy sized fleet for an invasion. Normandy was an overkill, because Allies had a chance to do an overkill. Even with a situation in which British have somewhat rearmed, and have not sent an BEF to mainland, they will have just maybe some 10 divisions in UK, provided that this fictional Marine Mammal will happen fairly quickly after declaration of hostilities.

 

[Johnrankins]

Congratulations, you are the only poster who actual did what the thread originator wanted to be done.

By ignoring the fact that Germany was incapable of doing all that at once.

 

[Grey Wolf]

Do you know, I think the best way to go about this would be a completely different way ?

Sow dissent and internal division amongst your enemy

Now, this requires different policies on behalf of the Germans, but if we can hand-wave battleships and landing craft, we ought to be able to hand-wave away the Nuremburg Laws

Anti-Semitism wasn't a key ingredient of ALL Nazi officials' way of looking at the world. Additionally, some of those whom we associate most clearly with the Holocaust were in a strange way pragmatists who tied their flag to Anti-Semitism because it was being trumpeted at the highest levels

Thus, demise Hitler seems almost imperative here. Perhaps have the Gelli suicide blow up in his face, then perhaps a Goering-Strasser alliance get into power and get rid of Roehm

Perhaps we could look at suborning a son of the Kaiser to act as a generally powerless 'Regent' for his father (instead of the combination of President and Chancellor as Fuhrer after Hindenburg's death)

Many more ideas spring forth

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

 

[Redbeard]

Crossing the channel is not a problem, people do it each day by the tens of thousands, some even swim across.

Beating the 19 early 40s British Army is no problem either - they could hardly fight coherrently at Divisional level and would be lucky to assemble two Divisions for a battle by 1940.

But crossing any strip of water with the RN nearby is a very serious problem, and here lies the problem of Sealion or any similar operation.

By OTL 1940 the Germans were far from having the naval strength to keep control over the Channel for long enough to cross and subdue GB.

The losses taken at Norway in spring 1940 did not make it better, but even escaping Norway without losses would not be enough.

Starting a comprehensive naval build-up right after Hitler'sd take over in 1933 will most certainly alert the British from the start, and Hitler will not survive the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936.

The Luftwaffe being as focussed on co-operation (and subordination) with the Navy as with the Army could however be carried out relatively inconspicuously and could leave the Luftwaffe with a significant anti-ship capacity by 1940.

Next we let butterflies take a toll on the RN in 1939 and early 1940 - IIRC there are plenty of OTL nearby incidents we just need to push into "full-contact" epsiodes, and the RN is short of a handful of capital ships or more. The big clue would be the British Mediterranean fleet sortieing shortly after the Italian entry into the war, meeting the Italians - and being defeated (and/or being sunk by frogmen like at Alexandria in OTL late 1941). That would leave the Italian fleet idle but available for an invasion of GB. In combination with a Luftwaffe (and Italian Airforce?) with a significant anti-ship capacity it begins to look like a very difficult job for the RN, even if all available forces are withdrawn to the Homefleet.

Airsuperiority of course still needs to be won (BoB), but IMO sticking to the airfields and aircraft factories would secure that. I guess the RAF would not let itself be 100% eradicated, but withdraw the remnants to bases outside striking range from the French bases. That will only provide a very short comfort however, as the Army and RN now will have to operate without aircover at where the decisive battles are going to take place. And if/when they try to intervene with German operations on land or sea they will show a very limited capacity to do so.

Judging by Allanbrooke's uncensored memoirs (published a few years ago) the British judged their 1940 army home defence to be of very low combat value (Allanbrooke was in command) and I'm sure the RN would enter into an all-or-nothing battle in the Channel.

Such a battle could go terribly wrong for the RN, and if so GB is lost.

One should however never underestimate the RN, and even against this beefed up Axis sea-air power, they certainly could win a victory big enough to make a crossing impossible in near future. But losses are likely to be so big, that GB is forced to accept a peace, where sovereignty over the British Isles is pretty much what is left. In this context loosing the Axis navies is not really a problem for Hitler's future plans.

For the crossing itself it appears to me like the Kriegsmarine intentionally exagerated the problems, in order to avoid an operation the likely failure of which they were most certainly to be blamed for, and the remote chance succes of which they were unlikely to be honoured for.

But if we again go back to a "Butterflies mit uns" ATL, incl. a pre-war greater Luftwaffe focus on naval co-operation, I think we only need a little creativity to have significant Axis army forces operate successfully on the British Isles. In early April 1940 the Germans got their hands on a substantial fleet of fast motor ferries in Denmark. IIRC from my earlier surveys the ferries had a combined lift capacity of at least a motorised Division incl. vehichles.

Some kind of unloading facility would of cource be needed. Option 1 would be securing existing ports in S. England, and here OTL operations at Eben-Emael and Meuse showed impressive German skills at surprise operations vs. difficult targets. But the biggest sport would IMHO be in prefabricating ramps that could be towed to the beaches, sunk to the seabottom and combined with matts/wirenet for roadconnection between ramp and established roads. Several ramps could be placed in accordance with the tide. Each ramp ought to be possible to make within a few hundred tons and with relatively simple technology (if you can build a floating dock, you can build this too). Scuttled old ships would provide breakwaters around the ramps.

For the initial assault waves suitable wessels would be available in Denmark too. By 1940 most of the fishing from the West coast of Jutland was done from small motorised cutters beaching their catch on a heavy surf coast. I haven't been able to find numbers, but my best estimate would be that they could be counted in hundreds and each carrying about ten men.

For the inland fighting the ferries would be even more valuable, as each ferry typically would carry 100 loaded 3 ton trucks. Each ferry so is capable in one single run to unload the daily supply need of a German Division in combat. The peacetime performance of unloading and loading in less than 30 minutes would hardly be possible in wartime over intermistic ramps and roads, but it is obvious that a force far larger than the British could resist by 1940 could be landed and supplied over the beach through a few ramps.

Having the Germans, under Hitler, prepare this in detail pre-war is IMHO unrealistic, but if the RN start the war with much heavier losses than in OTL, I guess staff studies over how to perform the ultimate utilisation of a seriously weakened RN would also be much more tempting. Imagine a RN for which just about everything went wrong at Norway in April 1940 and next a spirited German naval staff officer (or whatever you call someone working smartly for the dark side) arriving in Denmark in April 1940...

The basic ideas and concepts, perhaps even designs, could be ready by the time the conquest of France is assured, and by some focussed effort it would not be impossible to have working ramps etc. ready by say September 1940.

Just as important is however that we have a Luftwaffe with much better skills at naval operations. In OTL they only got that well into WWII (1942 - X Luftflotte in the Med.?), but IMHO strangely late. The Luftwaffe never really questioned its supportive (and subordinate) role to the Army, and Göring being allowed to try to do the job by himself at Dunkirk was only allowed because they didn't want to expose the army unneccessarily (at least that is my theory). Anyway, the Luftwaffe, despite Göring's self-inflated ego, never seem to have suffered from the same self-inflated strategic role that the RAF and USAF suffered from. If so, it would only require minor PoDs to give the Luftwaffe a significant anti-ship capacity by 1940. Perhaps the PoD could be the Luftwaffe being more involved in attacks vs. the Republican Navy in the Spanish Civil War.

Regards

Steffen "save the Sealion" Redbeard

 

[Ynnead]

Yeah, Rommel's Parents Move to The US Shortly before his Birth, Because of which he becomes a Protogé of George S. Patton, During The Great War ...

I smell a really good timeline

 

[Nick Sumner]

You would need a POD much earlier then 1933 to pull it off, you may be able to do so with a POD in 1890 or something.

Yes!

The HSF would need to survive World War I and Versailles, German naval law would need to continue to keep a steady supply of new ships arriving in the fleet, Germany would perhaps have parity with Japan in any Washington Treaty or Washington like treaty so then they can build the Navy up from 1932 while they are learning the skills required to perform landings against defended beaches and more importantly to continue resupplying the troops they get ashore.

No attack on Russia is a pre-requisite of success against the British and a wait until 1942 to build up their airborne forces and their ability to resupply an air landing on the same kind of scale as Market Garden would also help. They will also need to achieve the kind of air dominance that the Allies had for Market Garden.

Even then I see no certainty of success, the South of England is highly defensible.