Personal Though Exercise on What If on Korean War

Originally posted on September Issue of http://www.changingthetimes.net/index.html

Addendum: Soviet analysis of the Korean War http://www.korean-war.com/Russia/RussianViewTranslation.html

Premise:

This exercise is inspired by the article which discusses how the Korean War could have been different. (Jerry D. Morelock, "Hard Choices: Truman's Dilemma," Armchair General Volume 5 #2 May 2008) The article discusses three options Truman had after Inchon landing: maintain status quo at 38th Parallel, ordering the advance up to Yalu River, or creating new DMZ north of Pyongyang and Wonsan. This article will explore the possibility of the third option, and
probable impact of the outcome.

Background:

The Korean Peninsula is an orphan of the post WWII policies by the Allies. The issue of Korean independence among Allies nations was first raised during the Cairo Conference by Nationalist China.

Chiang Kai Shek of the Nationalist China advocated immediate independence of Korea after the cessation of hostility. [Whose patronage to Korean Provisional
Government (Korean government in exile) began when Korean terrorist attacked Japanese delegates who were celebrating victory over the Chinese in the
immediate aftermath of the Battle of Shanghai. Chiang Kai Shek praised the action as "more effective than one million soldiers."] When first proposed, Churchill confess he doesn't know where Korea is while Roosevelt recommends trusteeship. Allied leaders never discussed the Korean issue in detail afterward. The Korean issue will be dormant until the aftermath of the Yalta Conference. Eager to involve Soviet Union into the war against Imperial Japan, Roosevelt secured promise from Stalin that the Soviet will declare war against Japan three months after Germany surrendered.

Stalin asked three months since he needs time to redeploy his armies from Europe to East Asia. As a result on August 20, 1945, Soviet launched Operation August Wind
against Imperial Japanese forces in Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin and Kurils.

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source

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39th Parallel across the Korean Peninsula

As Soviet forces pressed southward down the Korean peninsula, American policy planners realized that the entire Korean Peninsula would fall under the red banner. So the American leaders insist on the Soviet leaders to cease the advance at the 38th Parallel. Americans chose the 38th Parallel as simple expedient, it is north of Seoul and Pusan.

At the beginning of the 20th Century, then Imperial Russia suggested to Japan a compromise over the issue of colonial influence on Korea: territory north of 39th Parallel is to be under the Russian, while territory in the south will belong to Japan. Japan turn down the offer and waged the Russo-Japanese War. US planners studied all proposals for demarcation and originally advocated the 39th Parallel. But it was vetoed by General Lincoln, who feared the Soviet would oppose it and instead propose the 38th Parallel.

This is further complicated by American handling of dialogue with Koreans. Many Koreans advocate immediate sovereign government. Americans insist the issue be discussed later. Worse, Americans employed Koreans who collaborated with the Japanese colonial government handling everyday issues. This created anger and hostility that led to the death of about 100,000 Koreans by the time the Korean War began.

This is exacerbated by aggressive posture by Rhee Syngman, president of the newly created Republic of Korea in 1948. Rhee threatened to invade North Korea and encouraged RoK military units near the 38th Parallel to clash with the Korean People's Army (KPA or Inmingun). This led to curtailing the number and types of armament Americans were willing to give to the South Korean army. So when Korean War start, RoK Army is underequipped for war.

Final blunder is a news article that stated that Secretary of State Acheson declares South Korea is outside of American responsibility. The report is in error since Acheson in an interview stated that South Korea is under American sphere of protection. The road to war in Korea was paved with mistakes in fact. In the early morning of June 25, 1950, North Korean military, Korean People's Army, or Inmingun, crossed the 38th Parallel.

Fork on the Road:

After Inchon Landing, President Truman and the American Chief of Staff debated whether to cross the 38th Parallel. By recapturing Seoul, American military and UN forces are nearly fulfilling the UN mission to force North Koreans out of South Korea. But should they cross the border? After much discussion and consultation with MacArthur and unauthorized crossing by South Korean military, police and militia, Truman permitted the UN forces to cross the 38th Parallel under UN Resolution. (Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UN_Offensive,_1950 on July 21/2009).

Originally, as the UN Forces surged upward past the 38th Parallel, MacArthur planned to stop his forces south of Yalu: initially drawing the line at Chonhju to Jungnam, roughly at 39th Parallel, and later revised to be at Songchon to Songjin, roughly 39th Parallel 50 Minutes. (D. Clayton James, "Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950 - 1953" The Free Press, NY 1993 p193) These lines have the most favorable defensive terrain and frontline length, roughly 100 miles wide. According to the military manual, a division should defend a front six to eight miles wide. (Donald W. Boose Jr. "US Army Forces in the Korean War 1950-53" Osprey Publishing, 2005 p40). This tactical advantage is recognized not only by the American Chief of Staff but also by the British. (Roy Appleman, "Disaster in
Korea: Chinese Confront MacArthur," Texas & M University Press, 1989, p341). British minister Bevin further proposed a demilitarized Korean-Chinese border to assure the Chinese that conflict in Korea will not spread to China. Even the journalists advocate the stop. (Appleman, p345).

Called the "Waist" of Korea by Appleman, that part of the Korean peninsula where MacArthur planned to stop is crossed by the 39th Parallel. (Appleman, p343). From the coast west of Pyongyang to Wonsan, the waist is roughly 100 miles wide as crow’s fly, and by road it is 140 miles long. Further appeal to stop at 39th Parallel is that nearly all the Korean population and infrastructure are concentrated in the south of the 39th and it is a natural choke-point for all communication networks that run up and down the Korean peninsula.

At the time of the UN offensive, six of the eight South Korean divisions were advancing with the UN Forces: I Corps with Capital and 3rd Division, II Corps
with 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions, and 1st Division with the US I Corps. (Nigel Thomas, etc "The Korean War 1950-53" Osprey Publishing, 1986 p11) The III Corps with 5th and 11th Divisions were assigned to security duties south of 38th Parallel. Backing the Republic of Korea Army is the United States military, which
provides nine divisions and three corps. (ibid, p16) Hence total of 15 divisions are at MacArthur's disposal as they were advancing toward Yalu.

Had MacArthur kept to his original plan and halted his units at Songchon to Songjin line, each division would have 6 and 2/3 mile front, reasonably within contemporary military doctrine. Slightly longer than 10 km, some units like the South Koreans may face difficulty defending such frontage. But with adequate fire support and lack of gap between units may have compensated the weaknesses that forced the US led UN forces to retreat in actual event.

Analysis
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40th Parallel across the Korean Peninsula

Could the UN forces, under theater command of MacArthur and tactical command of Walker, hold the line at the 39th Parallel? Walker had prepared a contingency plan to hold the line at 39th Parallel. (Appleman p350). Had the American military known about the logistical weaknesses of the Chinese military, and had the X Corps not mauled by the Chinese offensive as they were advancing north of 39th Parallel in actual event, and the whole UN forces establish line similar to Hindenburg Line north of Pyongyang, the UN force could have hold the line at 39th Parallel. (Appleman, p353). Other problems the UN forces would have if they held the line would have been solved in time.

In order to grasp the difficulty in fighting a mechanized and conventional war across the Korean Peninsula, one has to look at the Italian campaign during World War II. Like the Korean Peninsula, Italy is a mountainous peninsula. During the campaign, Allied forces faced German constructed fortified lines (Gustav and Adolph) to bar them from advancing north. Attempts to breach those lines battered the British Eighth Army, who was victorious over Rommel's Afrika Korp, and the gung ho American forces. The allied forces eventually breached those lines only after expending a considerable amount of men and resources, with Monte Cassino as a good example. The Italian campaign thus clearly shows the advantage of defending a narrowed region of land flanked by a large body of water against overwhelming force. This is further strengthened by favorable terrain the defending force has.

Across the 39th Parallel, natural terrain is also favorable to defenders. Described by early Western visitors of the Korean mountain ranges as if they were "a sea in heavy gale," (Source: http://www.tutorgig.com/ed/Geography_of_North_Korea ), nearly 70 percent of the Korean peninsula is mountains (Source: http://atlas.ngii.go.kr/english/explanation/natural_1_1.jsp ). For history as long as remembered, the Korean used the terrain as part of their defense. Often they will build forts or fortified towns atop of large mountains called sanseong. (Note: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_castles_in_Korea) Nearly all the most difficult mountain ranges are at the east coast of the peninsula. Starting just north of Pohang and stopping south of the Wonsan Bay is Taebaek Mountain Range. From north of Taebaek, and running from south to north across the central northern Korean Peninsula is Rangrim Mountain Ranges. (Note: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rangrim_Mountains ) Branching out from Rangrim Mountain, at north of Hamhung is the Hamgyeong Mountain Range which hugs the east coast and ends at the northeastern end of the Korean Peninsula. North of Hamgyeong and sandwiched between Rangrim and Macheollyeoung Mountain Range is Kaema highland, where the Chosin Reservoir is. Please see http://home.kunwi.co.kr/mountain/html/range-k.htm and http://user.chollian.net/~sahar2/lectkor/ko2-4-3.htm for further reference.

As described above, terrain is a worst nightmare not only to mechanized military but to infantry based military as well, as both the Chinese and KPA avoid using eastern part of the Korean peninsula for communication and logistics after the 1950-51 Winter Offensive. This is important since nearly all major Communist communication and logistic networks are located at 39th Parallel: "'majority of [enemy] supply installations...are located contiguous to the major traffic arteries and the bulk of the major enemy's supply installations are encountered in the area adjacent to or just below the 39th Parallel.'" (Appleby, 344) Had the UN forces held at 39th Parallel, not only the Communist force might have difficulty in communication and supply, they would be forced to traverse through easily detectable channels on mountain passes in the east of and on the plains in the west of the Rangrim Ranges. In addition, the Communist forces in the western half of the peninsula had to cross Chongchon River before they could face the UN forces at the 39th Parallel, which is just south of the river. At the same time, the UN forces would have no trouble maintaining lateral communication across the Rangrim Ranges. (Appleby, ibid) UN forces would simply use the same roads the Communist forces actually used during the Korean War but with better engineering and construction and air superiority to improve the transportation. As UN air intervention in actual events had shown, Communist was able to use the roads despite attempts to prevent such movements. (Brian Todd Carey, Striking Within Limits, Aerial Interdiction in the Korean War, Strategy & Tactics Number 236) In fact one could argue that Communist transportation networks in the Korean peninsula during the Korean War can be seen as the prototype for Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The Road Not Taken.

What would have happened to the Korean Peninsula had the UN held the line at 39th Parallel? Result would have been more favorable to South Korea than North. By placing DMZ at 39th Parallel instead of 38th Parallel, China would have accepted the cease fire since they still have a buffer zone between itself and Western forces. More importantly, the Chinese will have a stronger influence on Communist Korea. During the actual Korean War, the pro-Chinese faction of the Korean Communist Party was purged by Kim Il Sung. Had the 39th Parallel as DMZ happened, this faction would have stayed intact or rebuilt. This is so since nearly all the Korean population is located south of the alternate DMZ, so the Inmingun won't have the manpower to guard the DMZ. In actual history, the KPA maintained an army of around 300,000 until the 1970s, compared to RoK military manpower for the army of 650,000 in late fifties and around 500,000 for the past fifty years. This meant that the Chinese had to maintain a permanent garrison north of DMZ as US forces do in South Korea. Thus Communist Korea will suffer the presence of foreign troops as South Korea did: oversexed, overbearing and over here.

Although the timeline of economic miracle the Republic of Korea enjoyed will probably be the same, they might enjoy more resources and manpower than now. Which means RoK could be more economically robust than it is, since it is technically an unified country, population wise, in all but name.

As China goes into economic transformation under Deng Xiaopeng, the Chinese might be able to force Communist Korea to do same. And the Communist Korea, because of presence and need of Chinese military in Korea, might have acquiescence. This means the Korean peninsula has the chance to be united under Taegukki by mid to late 1990s, a possibility, under a condition favorable to China of course.

Further, with weaker Communist Korea, nuclear and missile proliferation would be different. Current events have shown that North Korea is duplicitous of nuclear and missile proliferation. With much weaker state in 39th Parallel universe, nuclear and missile proliferation may have been prevented or retarded. Cost of maintaining US forces will be lesser for both the US and Republic of Korea.

For alternate history scenarios on Korean Peninsula, I recommend the following videos:

What If Korea Was Unified
What if South Korea ‘Won’ the Korean War
What if Korea was BIG? And other Irredentist Scenarios
 
There are many ways the Korean War could have gone. It's interesting to see if the MacArthur did not push all the way near the Yalu. Perhaps the Chinese would not have intervened.

China has a lot to say when it comes to reunifying the Korean Peninsula. It does not want a U.S. ally bordering it, nor does it want North Korean refugees flooding the northeast provinces. Beijing would want the reunification to come under their own terms. If the peninsula did reunify during the 1990s under the South Korean flag, so that butterflies the North Korean nuclear weapons program but it would also mean the USFK would withdraw since their presence will no longer be needed.
 
Korean War had far wider ramifications than just the Korean peninsular. In Japan, it led to greater efforts to rearm Japan. In Australia, it led to greater integration with the UN and eventually to the A**US Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the US. In the UK it signaled the end of Empire.

A decision from MacArthur about where to defend against further efforts by the DKPA and perhap the Chinese would have greater ramifications. Further south, makes the Chinese decision to intervene more difficult to justify. Further north benefits the ROK and works against the DKPA. It would also stop "Bug-out fever" amongst US and ROK troops spreading. The problem of course is the mountains down the centre of Korea which the Chinese cleverly exploited. The UN forces had advanced either side of the mountains and had left them largely undefended. What does MacArthur do about them? He lacks specialised mountain troops.
 
Korean War had far wider ramifications than just the Korean peninsular. In Japan, it led to greater efforts to rearm Japan. In Australia, it led to greater integration with the UN and eventually to the A**US Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the US. In the UK it signaled the end of Empire.

A decision from MacArthur about where to defend against further efforts by the DKPA and perhap the Chinese would have greater ramifications. Further south, makes the Chinese decision to intervene more difficult to justify. Further north benefits the ROK and works against the DKPA. It would also stop "Bug-out fever" amongst US and ROK troops spreading. The problem of course is the mountains down the centre of Korea which the Chinese cleverly exploited. The UN forces had advanced either side of the mountains and had left them largely undefended. What does MacArthur do about them? He lacks specialised mountain troops.
It also strengthened the U.S. to commit more defense on the First Island Chain. So the islands from Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaya, SG, etc. were (and still are) essential in keeping the largest communist threats in Asia at that period.

It was a great thing the U.S. and allies controlled the seas at this period.
 
I’ve mentioned this scenario before:

1) Inchon happens as OTL
2) MacArthur’s forces drive east, blocking the NK from escape routes, while the rest of UN forces drive north. The majority of the NK army is trapped and destroyed.
3) At the same time, SK forces are given the honor of recapturing Seoul. This returns “honor” to the SK forces, while freeing UN forces in the strike north.
4) UN forces drive north to, and stopping at, the “waist” of Korea, capturing Pyongyang (perhaps with SK forces being the first in).
5) A “back door” message is delivered to the Chinese, perhaps by the Swiss, from the UN (Truman). The message says that the UN will establish a fortified DMZ at the 39th parallel, and not venture north of that point. The UN will then recognize the territory north of the DMZ as a Chinese “protectorate“. This gives China a buffer zone between it and SK, punishes NK for reckless expansionism (which it did Soviet encouragement), and blocks the Soviets from more influence in the region.

ric350
 
5) A “back door” message is delivered to the Chinese, perhaps by the Swiss, from the UN (Truman). The message says that the UN will establish a fortified DMZ at the 39th parallel, and not venture north of that point. The UN will then recognize the territory north of the DMZ as a Chinese “protectorate“
This makes sense with hindsight, but at the time this will be exceedingly difficult to do. UN (read: American) commanders will be chomping at the bit to press north, just as in OTL, and would likely ignore halt orders. Fortifying on an imaginary line when you have your enemy in a total rout only makes sense if you know that you’re going to get a huge blow to the face if you keep going. But realistic assessments of PRC willingness to intervene and their operational capacities were not forthcoming, and so this requires a lot of hindsight. It also requires the CCP and by extension the KWP to accept a tiny rump state when there’s still the chance of a successful offensive (like the one the PVA delivered IOTL).

On top of that, stopping on an imaginary line will be seen as capitulation for no good reason at all and will expose Truman to withering critique. The ROK leadership in Seoul also has absolutely no reason to accept this. To them, the war is finished. Why allow the KWP to get back up and stand on its feet when the ROK directly views them as a bandit/criminal entity. As hard as it might be to remember today, this was not one sovereign nation attacking another. This was a civil war between two self appointed authorities claiming the other to be illegal. Ratifying the 39th parallel as a border to an entity they saw as illegitimate for what would seem to be no good reason makes no sense for them.

punishes NK for reckless expansionism (which it did Soviet encouragement)
As a minor point, I’m not sure I would call it reckless expansionism. Expansionism would require one to believe these were two sovereign nation states rather than one nation with two competing self-appointed entities. Neither side recognized one another and border fighting was common. Both sides intended to gather an army to subdue the other as a continuation of the civil war. The OP discussed the situation quite well and mention Rhee’s public call to gather an army for an invasion of the DPRK. It also implies the war was primarily fought from a KWP desire for territorial expansion which was not the case. While the general offensive line won out in the KWP and they launched the first offensive of the war, I am of the opinion that one side or the other was bound to trigger a general war. Reckless also implies it was senseless when it was an astute move. Of course, the gambit failed but the KPA offensive was still wildly successful and by no means a total failure.
 
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I do have provincial map experience for alternate Korean War.
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POD: In early November 1950, U.S Commander Douglas MacArthur was sacked by President Truman for the disastrous reckless moves of not heeding the warning of the Chinese PVA troops advancing at the mountainous areas. On November 3, President Truman handpicked Matthew Ridgway to lead for the entire duration of the Korean War (1950-53) to speed up the implementation of the gradual withdrawal of the majority of U.N forces and U.S Forces from the nearby Yalu River and the endangered mountainous ridge zones about 30-40 miles near Yalu River. Even if 80% of U.S and U.N forces, including some ROK forces, withdrew from danger zones, Mao Zedong rebuffed the reduction threats near the Yalu River border. Mao contacted Chinese Army commander Peng Duhuai and other military officials by telegrams to screw up the U.N armed forces' retreat and annihilate them. In a 1954 interview with British officials, Chinese FM Zhou Enlai replied, "Even if the threats mitigated from the U.N imperialists, the (Chinese) forces dared to relentlessly chase down the enemy, or I refer to U.N forces, to show an example of heinous behaviors at buffer areas."

Despite minor quarreling about postponement, the Chinese PVA forces launched a major vibrant offensive assault in northern North Korea starting in mid-November 1950. General Matthew Ridgway strategized the U.S and Allied forces' defense position to maintain the city of Pyongyang as long as possible to inflict heavy casualties from Chinese PVA forces and regrouped NK forces. On December 10, the ROK forces abandoned the defense at Pyongyang finding itself unsuitable against the massive and accurate Chinese artillery bombing range of Pyongyang. The Allied successfully reserved about 60-70% of U.N forces and regroup at Seoul. The North Korean forces recaptured Haeju and Gaeseong separately on December 23 and December 26. The die-hard Chinese forces tried to liberate Seoul, but it was unsuccessful since the Chinese forces only captured Paju and Uijeongbu thanks to heavily U.S 8th Army division withstanding in Seoul. With the Chinese military supplies dwindling, the R.O.K and U.S forces initiated a final blow of counterattacks to drive away the frightening Chinese PVA forces. Imjin River was fully back on defensible functional by March 1950.

What do you think?
 
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