Optimize the RN for WWII

[Riain]

How much of a problem is the fall of France and Singapore for prewar planners? I suspect Singapore was sort of foreseen, iirc the main fleet to Singapore strategy was more or less sound, Somerville had 3 carriers in the Indian Ocean 4 months after Malaya was attacked.

However France fell unexpectedly fast to a new and novel form of offensive , totally transforming Germanys naval geography in a way that prewar planners could not have reasonably expected to foresee. What did naval planners expect when they ordered ahips, that Germany would hold bolougne? Surely they didn't expect them to hold Brest.

 

[Jellico]

On the fall of France, I think the choice not to sent Spitfires to Europe is interesting. Not so much that the fall of France was predicted, but that the UK put the defense of the UK higher than the defense of France so always had a plan to fall back.

Probably more important than holding Brest or Boulogne, the planners expected to have the French fleet. Not only does that suppress the Italians and shorten the transport lanes (and lessen the number of hulls needed) to the East, but it reduces the number of patrolling ships in places like the South Atlantic by half. The Royal Navy has to make up the shortfalls and it is a compounding mess.


Singapore, was a long term mess, though not in the way it is popularly imagined. 15" facing shoreward would not have helped. Singapore was primarily intended as a fleet base. That meant the oil and the repair facilities to support a fleet. I would have to check the dates but neither were fully in place until the mid 30s. As a base it needed to be defended. That did not mean turning the island into a fortress. The land defense was always meant to take place in Malaya, likewise air power was expected to do its part. To do so you need the warm bodies and hardware. The European conflict meant that was never going to happen, and anyone seriously watching things knew what the end result would be.

 

[naraic]

How much of a problem is the fall of France and Singapore for prewar planners? I suspect Singapore was sort of foreseen, iirc the main fleet to Singapore strategy was more or less sound, Somerville had 3 carriers in the Indian Ocean 4 months after Malaya was attacked.

However France fell unexpectedly fast to a new and novel form of offensive , totally transforming Germanys naval geography in a way that prewar planners could not have reasonably expected to foresee. What did naval planners expect when they ordered ahips, that Germany would hold bolougne? Surely they didn't expect them to hold Brest.

The fall of French Indo China rendered the Singapore Strategy as outdated. It was a great strategy if the Japanese were based as far back as China somewhere.

Likewise the fall of France really changed the face of the naval war. The operating threat of submarines would have been reduced significantly without the fall of France in a completely unexpected way. Force H a formation that existed through most of WW2 wasn't planned to exist prewar.

 

[Riain]

On the fall of France, I think the choice not to sent Spitfires to Europe is interesting. Not so much that the fall of France was predicted, but that the UK put the defense of the UK higher than the defense of France so always had a plan to fall back.

Probably more important than holding Brest or Boulogne, the planners expected to have the French fleet. Not only does that suppress the Italians and shorten the transport lanes (and lessen the number of hulls needed) to the East, but it reduces the number of patrolling ships in places like the South Atlantic by half. The Royal Navy has to make up the shortfalls and it is a compounding mess.


Singapore, was a long term mess, though not in the way it is popularly imagined. 15" facing shoreward would not have helped. Singapore was primarily intended as a fleet base. That meant the oil and the repair facilities to support a fleet. I would have to check the dates but neither were fully in place until the mid 30s. As a base it needed to be defended. That did not mean turning the island into a fortress. The land defense was always meant to take place in Malaya, likewise air power was expected to do its part. To do so you need the warm bodies and hardware. The European conflict meant that was never going to happen, and anyone seriously watching things knew what the end result would be.

We're talking about optimizing the RN for WW2, but until1935 the Germans didn't have a single uboat, by 1939 they had a handful with poor basing but by 1940 they were were given the best possible basing.

I'm just pointing out that in this situation hindsight is pretty bloody spectacular, and our optimization decisions would look crazy to brits in 1934.

 

[CB13]

It wouldn't have done them any good unless the Government stopped dithering and mobilised in time.

With the very small invasion force, if the coastal defense forces had just "fired", did Norway really need a full mobilization? Speaking from only superficial knowledge it seems like the nation (or at least those in charge) engineered their inability to fight. My specific recollection was that when the legislature called for a mobilization, the key minister acknowledged the order but shared with no one that the mobilization would take weeks as notices of mobilization were sent out by regular mail...this ensuring an inability to fight any invasion force.

 

[CB13]

We're talking about optimizing the RN for WW2, but until1935 the Germans didn't have a single uboat, by 1939 they had a handful with poor basing but by 1940 they were were given the best possible basing.

I'm just pointing out that in this situation hindsight is pretty bloody spectacular, and our optimization decisions would look crazy to brits in 1934.

If we made the ASW decisions in 1934, I agree it would have seems odd. But following the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June of 1935, it would have been fully reasonable to adjust build programs to adjust to the changing makeup of the German Naval Threat.

Through 1936-1939, British Intelligence (aided by allied nations) would've had some idea of the German build program so numbers might have been estimates, but would not have been a surprise.

In that respect, per a cited source on Wikipedia, the Germans had "57" operational U-boats at the outbreak of the war. Although not a fleet of several hundred, "57" by any definition is more than handful and with other boats under construction they were on their way to a fleet of '100"in a hurry which was enough to pose a threat.

I think what may be fair to say is that with limited funds, construction slips and time, the RN felt they had to prioritize the longer lead time Capitol ship program with an acceptance that escort fleets would have to be addressed in an emergency fashion if war broke out. Very similar to how the RAF prioritized bombers, then fighters, and only funded Maritime and Coastal Aircraft as their final spend.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

On the fall of France, I think the choice not to sent Spitfires to Europe is interesting. Not so much that the fall of France was predicted, but that the UK put the defense of the UK higher than the defense of France so always had a plan to fall back.

Probably more important than holding Brest or Boulogne, the planners expected to have the French fleet. Not only does that suppress the Italians and shorten the transport lanes (and lessen the number of hulls needed) to the East, but it reduces the number of patrolling ships in places like the South Atlantic by half. The Royal Navy has to make up the shortfalls and it is a compounding mess.


Singapore, was a long term mess, though not in the way it is popularly imagined. 15" facing shoreward would not have helped. Singapore was primarily intended as a fleet base. That meant the oil and the repair facilities to support a fleet. I would have to check the dates but neither were fully in place until the mid 30s. As a base it needed to be defended. That did not mean turning the island into a fortress. The land defense was always meant to take place in Malaya, likewise air power was expected to do its part. To do so you need the warm bodies and hardware. The European conflict meant that was never going to happen, and anyone seriously watching things knew what the end result would be.

Spitfires were only then recently in mass production were Hurricane production was mature with Hurricane Production well established and Hurricane squadrons had been established since

For example during the week ending 6th April 1940 35 Hurricanes were made while only 14 Spitfires were made

So I think the decision was a practical one more than withholding the 'more valuable' spitfire as those were later used in operations over Netherlands from East Anglia and later on over Calais and Dunkirk.

The Problem with Singapore was that it was not really threatened until French Indo China was invaded and then only really when the entire country was occupied in mid 1941.

It was certainly confounded by:-

• Fall of France plus war with Vichy France
• Entry of Italy into the war closing the Med/Suez and opening 2 fronts in North and East Africa plus the Greek campaign
• Barbarossa and diversion of pretty much every thing that could be spared

All of that was more important in the long term than Malaya.

The 15" guns would certainly not helped the defence of Singapore should have been carried out on the Kra Peninsula and domination of the South China Sea.

Once Japanese army units were in range of 15" gun fire its far far too late

 

[Spencersj345.346]

If we made the ASW decisions in 1934, I agree it would have seems odd. But following the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June of 1935, it would have been fully reasonable to adjust build programs to adjust to the changing makeup of the German Naval Threat.

Through 1936-1939, British Intelligence (aided by allied nations) would've had some idea of the German build program so numbers might have been estimates, but would not have been a surprise.

In that respect, per a cited source on Wikipedia, the Germans had "57" operational U-boats at the outbreak of the war. Although not a fleet of several hundred, "57" by any definition is more than handful and with other boats under construction they were on their way to a fleet of '100"in a hurry which was enough to pose a threat.

I think what may be fair to say is that with limited funds, construction slips and time, the RN felt they had to prioritize the longer lead time Capitol ship program with an acceptance that escort fleets would have to be addressed in an emergency fashion if war broke out. Very similar to how the RAF prioritized bombers, then fighters, and only funded Maritime and Coastal Aircraft as their final spend.

ironically the capital ships then got delayed in large part because of the need to build escorts ASAP. albeit that call was basically solely a Churchill one and very early in the war at that for some reason

 

[CB13]

Spitfires were only then recently in mass production were Hurricane production was mature with Hurricane Production well established and Hurricane squadrons had been established since

For example during the week ending 6th April 1940 35 Hurricanes were made while only 14 Spitfires were made

So I think the decision was a practical one more than withholding the 'more valuable' spitfire as those were later used in operations over Netherlands from East Anglia and later on over Calais and Dunkirk.

It would have been interesting to sit with the leaders of the RAF in a private out of the way hunting lodge or club at that critical time in history to hear what they really thought about the competency of the French Armed Forces. Is it fair to say that based on their decisions (as opposed to their words), it appears that they held a deep scepticism of the French and as such deployed only what they absolutely had to?

 

[CB13]

ironically the capital ships then got delayed in large part because of the need to build escorts ASAP. albeit that call was basically solely a Churchill one and very early in the war at that for some reason

Before Churchill became Prime Minister, I assume the RN likely had much more free reign. I've read observations in passing on the politics of both the Royal Navy and US Navy where peacetime procurement was as much driven by the politics of promotion to ever larger ships (or groups of ships) as it was to the generate the actual force structure required by real-time threat assessment. This was to the point that those in power would skew the threat assessment specifically to ensure their reports generated the force structure they desired. Sadly, this is likely a common theme throughout most military's histories.

 

[Spencersj345.346]

Before Churchill became Prime Minister, I assume the RN likely had much more free reign. I've read observations in passing on the politics of both the Royal Navy and US Navy where peacetime procurement was as much driven by the politics of promotion to ever larger ships (or groups of ships) as it was to the generate the actual force structure required by real-time threat assessment. This was to the point that those in power would skew the threat assessment specifically to ensure their reports generated the force structure they desired. Sadly, this is likely a common theme throughout most military's histories.

this was a when he was 1st lord of the admiralty decision

 

[CB13]

this was a when he was 1st lord of the admiralty decision

I didn't realize he had the leverage to make that decision that early.....good on him.

 

[Riain]

If we made the ASW decisions in 1934, I agree it would have seems odd. But following the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June of 1935, it would have been fully reasonable to adjust build programs to adjust to the changing makeup of the German Naval Threat.

Through 1936-1939, British Intelligence (aided by allied nations) would've had some idea of the German build program so numbers might have been estimates, but would not have been a surprise.

In that respect, per a cited source on Wikipedia, the Germans had "57" operational U-boats at the outbreak of the war. Although not a fleet of several hundred, "57" by any definition is more than handful and with other boats under construction they were on their way to a fleet of '100"in a hurry which was enough to pose a threat.

I think what may be fair to say is that with limited funds, construction slips and time, the RN felt they had to prioritize the longer lead time Capitol ship program with an acceptance that escort fleets would have to be addressed in an emergency fashion if war broke out. Very similar to how the RAF prioritized bombers, then fighters, and only funded Maritime and Coastal Aircraft as their final spend.

57 uboats based in Germany, or even based in Flanders, is no big deal. It was when Germany surprised everyone and captured the Atlantic Coast that everything changed. All of a sudden the stupid looking plan to build a handful of capital ships looked at be a mortal threat to Britain.

I can't decide what to use my hindsight for. Carriers and strike forces to totally crush the heavy German ships at Norway so when they capture France the S&G and co aren't a threat? They'd be useful in the Med and IO in 41-42 as well, but what about the cursed uboats?

 

[Spencersj345.346]

I didn't realize he had the leverage to make that decision that early.....good on him.

given it delayed the carriers and KGVs a lot not really

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

It would help to have something like the Flower Class Corvette design ready to go (just in case) and place the first orders during the Munich Crisis. You could justify the initial work and a few ships earlier as patrol craft for the colonies. Something to replace the aging WWI vintage Flower Class Sloops still in service.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

given it delayed the carriers and KGVs a lot not really

I dunno if thats fair

Delayed carriers and BBs are not going to lose the Allies the war

The actual shortage of escorts very nearly did

Churchill knew this from WW1 when it was not the German surface fleet that came the closest to defeating the the British but the U-boat fleet.

 

[Spencersj345.346]

albeit in our scenario the KGVs and the illustrious's their equivalent are likely getting done faster and we build at least a few more sloops prewar

 

[CaptainCalvert]

I dunno if thats fair

Delayed carriers and BBs are not going to lose the Allies the war

The actual shortage of escorts very nearly did

Churchill knew this from WW1 when it was not the German surface fleet that came the closest to defeating the the British but the U-boat fleet.

I agree. WW1 showed the importance of ASW and convoys, so escort ships with ASW capability (or at least the threat of having it) matter.
I can understand maintaining only a token escort fleet for exercises and to keep your hand in, especially when money is tight, but not having a few designs ready to go, and maybe a couple of prototypes to test seaworthiness - and a plan to build them that's triggered by something like Germany starting to build UBoats - is pretty rubbish really.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I agree. WW1 showed the importance of ASW and convoys, so escort ships with ASW capability (or at least the threat of having it) matter.
I can understand maintaining only a token escort fleet for exercises and to keep your hand in, especially when money is tight, but not having a few designs ready to go, and maybe a couple of prototypes to test seaworthiness - and a plan to build them that's triggered by something like Germany starting to build UBoats - is pretty rubbish really.

I agree but in Winston's defence he had been in the wilderness for a long time with no influence on things and only made First Lord of the Admiralty in Sept 1939.

The Germans only pulled out of AGNA in April 1939 and only began to build more u-boats beyond the 50 odd they were allowed under that agreement

The first Flower class corvette (of an eventual 145 of this class) was ordered in July (26 vessels) and then more in August (30 vessels) initially to allow coverage of the East coast of the UK and more ordered once the war had started.

Again the idea that Germany would be basing u-boats out of Western French ports was not planned for by anyone (not even the Germans)

 

[Riain]

It would help to have something like the Flower Class Corvette design ready to go (just in case) and place the first orders during the Munich Crisis. You could justify the initial work and a few ships earlier as patrol craft for the colonies. Something to replace the aging WWI vintage Flower Class Sloops still in service.

Presumably something better than the Flower class itself, which had a lot of problems and shortcomings.