A long time reader on this site, but this is my first post so please be gentle with the less plausible ideas.
I've noticed that this type of thread seems to generate a lot of discussion.so thought we might try it for the RAF/FAA who in the case of the former, seemed to get the lions share of resources in the late 30's, but perhaps made some of the poorest equipment choices for strong ideological reasons. So lets see if we can fix those without spending much more money.
You are appointed Chief of Air Staff in April 1933 to replace Sir Edward Ellington and stay in post until 1942 at least. Unlikely I know, but Trenchard managed a full ten years in the job.
Unlike most of your colleagues at the Air Ministry you don't drink and have thus avoided the lead infused Kool Aid at parties that leads most of them to believe strategic bombing is the one and only way to win any future war. What decisions would you make about aircraft and strategy that would lead to a more effective RAF in the early years of the war, at least up to the outbreak of fighting with Japan?. As a bonus you get on well with the 3rd Sea Lord, who is another free thinker and co operate with him on improving the FAA's equipment over the same time period.
Here are some initial thoughts.
You recognise well before the war that the Fairy Battle is looking like a very poor strategic bomber option and no better at army support. Some are needed to train crews on modern equipment pre war, but orders after the first 500 are cancelled and these are mainly used for training and as target tugs. The army still needs support, so 500 Hawker Henley's are ordered for number 2 group instead. These prove more both useful in the Battle of France and later in the Middle East. Fairey still needs to build something while they work on more useful designs, so are asked to licence build more Hurricanes or Spitfires instead.
The Admiralty has a bit of a rethink about its aircraft needs and decided the Skua and Roc are both too slow for its fighter requirement and these are cancelled. A navalised Henley looks ok for the dive bomber role, but the requirement is now for a minimum 300 mph fleet fighter and The Fairey Fulmar proposal also looks too slow. Fortunately you have also gone luke warm on turret fighters and the RAF Defiant order is cancelled in 1938. Boulton Paul submit a proposal for a redesigned Defiant without the turret as a folding wing fleet fighter and as this can meet the speed requirement, it is put into production in early 1940 as the Boulton Paul Fulmar, re equipping all FAA fighter squadrons by the end of the year. Over a thousand are produced.
Early war evidence suggests Bomber Command is being wildly optimistic about its effectiveness. Until the cause can be established you conclude bomber production should be reduced, having decided that a much smaller force will still need to be defended against, but will consume far less of UK war production. As a result many German fields are spared destruction, a smaller number of German Civilians are killed and many highly trained air crews saved. Some bomber production is re directed to Coastal Command and the reduced demand from BC for improved Merlin engines means much better Spitfire models are available in 1941.
Rather than largely pointless fighter sweeps over France in 1941 you decide the Luftwaffe can be better fought on more equal terms in the Middle East and 500 extra fighters are directed there instead. This leads to potentially much better outcomes over both Crete and in North Africa in the first half of 1941
I'm expecting to back track to some other better decisions pre war in later posts, but I'd expect other posters might be much more informed on 1930's engine and airframe developments.
I've noticed that this type of thread seems to generate a lot of discussion.so thought we might try it for the RAF/FAA who in the case of the former, seemed to get the lions share of resources in the late 30's, but perhaps made some of the poorest equipment choices for strong ideological reasons. So lets see if we can fix those without spending much more money.
You are appointed Chief of Air Staff in April 1933 to replace Sir Edward Ellington and stay in post until 1942 at least. Unlikely I know, but Trenchard managed a full ten years in the job.
Unlike most of your colleagues at the Air Ministry you don't drink and have thus avoided the lead infused Kool Aid at parties that leads most of them to believe strategic bombing is the one and only way to win any future war. What decisions would you make about aircraft and strategy that would lead to a more effective RAF in the early years of the war, at least up to the outbreak of fighting with Japan?. As a bonus you get on well with the 3rd Sea Lord, who is another free thinker and co operate with him on improving the FAA's equipment over the same time period.
Here are some initial thoughts.
You recognise well before the war that the Fairy Battle is looking like a very poor strategic bomber option and no better at army support. Some are needed to train crews on modern equipment pre war, but orders after the first 500 are cancelled and these are mainly used for training and as target tugs. The army still needs support, so 500 Hawker Henley's are ordered for number 2 group instead. These prove more both useful in the Battle of France and later in the Middle East. Fairey still needs to build something while they work on more useful designs, so are asked to licence build more Hurricanes or Spitfires instead.
The Admiralty has a bit of a rethink about its aircraft needs and decided the Skua and Roc are both too slow for its fighter requirement and these are cancelled. A navalised Henley looks ok for the dive bomber role, but the requirement is now for a minimum 300 mph fleet fighter and The Fairey Fulmar proposal also looks too slow. Fortunately you have also gone luke warm on turret fighters and the RAF Defiant order is cancelled in 1938. Boulton Paul submit a proposal for a redesigned Defiant without the turret as a folding wing fleet fighter and as this can meet the speed requirement, it is put into production in early 1940 as the Boulton Paul Fulmar, re equipping all FAA fighter squadrons by the end of the year. Over a thousand are produced.
Early war evidence suggests Bomber Command is being wildly optimistic about its effectiveness. Until the cause can be established you conclude bomber production should be reduced, having decided that a much smaller force will still need to be defended against, but will consume far less of UK war production. As a result many German fields are spared destruction, a smaller number of German Civilians are killed and many highly trained air crews saved. Some bomber production is re directed to Coastal Command and the reduced demand from BC for improved Merlin engines means much better Spitfire models are available in 1941.
Rather than largely pointless fighter sweeps over France in 1941 you decide the Luftwaffe can be better fought on more equal terms in the Middle East and 500 extra fighters are directed there instead. This leads to potentially much better outcomes over both Crete and in North Africa in the first half of 1941
I'm expecting to back track to some other better decisions pre war in later posts, but I'd expect other posters might be much more informed on 1930's engine and airframe developments.
