Operation Torch - The Eastern option

[ivanotter]

All,

Torch got settled as the 'Western option', meaning: Casablanca, Oran and Algiers.

The 'Eastern option' was Oran, Algiers and Tunis.

A compromise was achieved: Tunis became Bone.

It was perceived that Tunis was much too close to Sicily and the airfields there.

If we try to imagine that the extreme Eastern option was chosen (Brooke was apparently in favour of this one) and we saw the landings in Tunis (Bizerte, Tunis and maybe even around Sfax) would it have been feasible?

Casablanca being scrapped could not have been a major loss (except the movie of course). Did it add anything of strategic value to anything?

Would Rommel still have been strong enough to fight it out in Tunis this early?

Was the concern about the Sicily airfields reality? was LW and Italian air force a factor to be reckoned with?

The advent of serious carriers in the Med could have devastated Sicily I should think and Malta was still there.

The key thing is: Would it have made a big difference after all?

 

[Aber]

The key thing is: Would it have made a big difference after all?

I'm not sure Tunis was ever an option, but even if Bone was chosen it makes a HUGE difference.

OTL the Allies nearly captured Tunis in December. If they land further eastward than OTL, they will capture Tunis and prevent the German build-up in Tunisia and interdict supplies to Tripoli. They will probably capture Tripoli from the west before the end of 1942 - remember Rommel was still in Egypt when Torch landed.

This accelerates the capture of Sardinia and Sicily and the start of the Italian mainland campaign.

What is difficult to predict is the impact on German strategy, especially whether they realise earlier that they are overstretched in Russia.

 

[terv]

Casablanca was taken because the Americans wanted a port that outside of the med just incase torch caused issues with spain. tunis is doable but the britsh fleet carriers lack the fighter strength to cover the landing. plus it also placed them out of position to cover the oran and algiers landing just in case the French or Italian fleet decided to attack the landing forces.

 

[ivanotter]

If North Africa had been cleared any earlier it would also have negated the German build-up in Tunisia. The whole sale capitulation of forces would not have happened and those would then still have been in Europe.

The loss of some 230,000 soldiers in Tunisia and 2,200 aircraft was heavy. If that had not happened, could it have been used in Sicily?

Kasserine would not have happened either.

Of course it would mean less US losses, but also that US forces might still have been a bit 'green' prior to Husky?

On the other side of the globe: Would there have been any need to draw forces away from Kursk? That could have been better or worse, I should think.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Casablanca was taken because the Americans wanted a port that outside of the med just incase torch caused issues with spain. tunis is doable but the britsh fleet carriers lack the fighter strength to cover the landing. plus it also placed them out of position to cover the oran and algiers landing just in case the French or Italian fleet decided to attack the landing forces.

There was a Spanish army of five divisions in Spanish Morocco. Plus airfields. The US leaders got a bit paranoid about that force in what amounted to the Allied rear. The Brits had a robust intelligence service in Iberia & correctly judged the Spanish as uninterested in war. Unfortunately the Brits were not sharing the intel data, just their conclusions & the US leaders had little idea what the British evaluation was based on.

British concerns about air cover were legit. Bone was inside the Axis envelope, but the covering force could be better positioned. Note that a Allied cruiser and several cargo ships were damaged/sunk by a airstrike not long after the Allied fleet did start using
Bones port.

 

[ivanotter]

On air craft carriers: I found the following from https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii: .. the only US carrier involved was USS Ranger.
Oil tankers were converted to makeshift 'carriers': Chenango, Santee, Sangamon and Suwanee.

Could the allocation of a bit more US carriers have neutralized Sicily in this instance? Combining it all with a heavy presence in Malta?

Wiki says that the air strength in Sicily at Husky was 1,400. How much was operational? modern? (Carl to the rescue here, please!).

According to Brooke, he was busy trying to convince Marshall that the Med was not some black void to enter at your own peril. I was not aware that the Brits only shared their conclusions but not the rationale.

 

[ivanotter]

Sorry - hit the button to early

Eisenhover was keen on operating as far East as possible. Did he have additional info different from Marshal?

The British carrier strength seemed to be the escort carriers (Biter, etc) and also Illustrious. Anything more?

The British probably correctly guessed that Spain would not be interested. French navy neither and the Italian navy would not dare to come out in strength.

It did however leave the sub threat to be looked at.

Another point: Would Rommel have been 'compressed' into a bad position? Nothing to fall back on and supplies not forthcoming at all?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

According to Brooke, he was busy trying to convince Marshall that the Med was not some black void to enter at your own peril. I was not aware that the Brits only shared their conclusions but not the rationale.

 

[Aber]

Wiki says that the air strength in Sicily at Husky was 1,400. How much was operational? modern? (Carl to the rescue here, please!).

Air strength at the time of Torch would have been much much lower, as the active air front was in Egypt, with some Allied bombing attacks on Benghazi and Tripoli.

Air strength in Sicily was increased post-Torch by transfers from the Eastern Front, with consequent impacts on the Battle of Stalingrad. The air war in the Mediterranean becomes very different with Allied control of all-weather airfields in Tunisia rather than the muddy fields they used OTL.

 

[merlin]

I find it ironic the Americans i.e. Marshall were 'iffy' about Spain interfering, while being so 'gung-ho' about an early cross-channel invasion.

 

[Winestu]

At the time Torch took place, how many troops did the Germans & Italians have in N. Africa?

 

[Aber]

At the time Torch took place, how many troops did the Germans & Italians have in N. Africa?

Apart from Armistice Commission, none within 600km of Tunis. Most combat units were 2000km away from Tunis in Egypt.

 

[ivanotter]

Aber: interesting comment.

Would it mean that LW and Italian air forces could have been overwhelmed even with the Eastern option? I could still see a bit more US carriers involved, not only Ranger.

Was US carrier pilots better at land attack compared to British carrier forces? After all Guadalcanal must have been a learning curve in terms of usage of carrier forces.

If Casablanca was not attempted (sorry, Bergman/Bogarth) would any of the French forces at Casablanca even have moved out? Doubtful.

The forces would have been a very good extra at Tunis as that part would then have been the schwerpunkt as the saying goes.

It also raises one strange question:

Was Oran necessary? How much German troops was there to combat? The French forces were even a bit thin on the ground as I understand it.

Could it have been possible to leave the French forces to wither on the vine instead of risking any major combat?

If the sole focus would be on trapping Afrika Corps and related Italian forces, logic says that the further East is a better idea (within reason).

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Apart from Armistice Commission, none within 600km of Tunis. Most combat units were 2000km away from Tunis in Egypt.

In Sicilly/S Italy there was a part of the airborne force for attacking Malta. I cant recall where the balance of it was. Scattered about in France and the Balkans were the other German forces used to intervene in November-December. However the Italians had a large force nearby in Italy. Those included some fairly dependable and trained units, and a decent army commander & staff with Meese. The latter & Kesselring were worth a armored corps. Competent, decisive, focused and optimist that pair is what defeated the Allied rush to Tunis in December, not the size of the tank cannon. When the German army commander on the spot Nehring wavered Kesselring immediately replaced him. When Brit first Army commander Anderson wavered at the same moment Eisenhower failed to dismiss and replace him.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I find it ironic the Americans i.e. Marshall were 'iffy' about Spain interfering, while being so 'gung-ho' about an early cross-channel invasion.

Well, they were confident enough to counter the Spanish with a single green US Corps, and a understrength tactical air wing.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Wiki says that the air strength in Sicily at Husky was 1,400. How much was operational? modern? (Carl to the rescue here, please!). ...

Air strength at the time of Torch would have been much much lower, as the active air front was in Egypt, with some Allied bombing attacks on Benghazi and Tripoli.

Air strength in Sicily was increased post-Torch by transfers from the Eastern Front, with consequent impacts on the Battle of Stalingrad. The air war in the Mediterranean becomes very different with Allied control of all-weather airfields in Tunisia rather than the muddy fields they used OTL.

That 1,400 sounds like Sardinia, Italy, Sicilly together. The Axis were concentrating year again for the current big attack on Malta. Yet another invasion plan was underway at the time. Italy & Germany had between 2200 & 2800 operational aircraft in the Med, depending on the month or week you count. the Balkans and Crete were another sink hole for several hundred.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Was Oran necessary? How much German troops was there to combat? The French forces were even a bit thin on the ground as I understand it.

Could it have been possible to leave the French forces to wither on the vine instead of risking any major combat?

If the sole focus would be on trapping Afrika Corps and related Italian forces, logic says that the further East is a better idea (within reason).

The problem was the French commanders were a unpredictable lot. Darlan at the top was ambigious. He did not like the Germans, but was a supporter of Petains neutrality policy. Many other senior commanders were split between actively pro German, anti German, and pathetically indecisive. Between the start of op TORCH and the cease fire the Allies had 312 soldiers killed by the French. The Germans and Italians lost not a single man in combat in the first week. In Morroco the military commander Nouges procrastinated for hours on executing the cease fire ordered by Darlan. He tried to keep the pro Allied officers in his command imprisoned. Patton had to give him a threat to get them released. At Tunis the French commander ordered his men into the barracks ahdn handed over the keys to his armories and ammo depots to the arriving Axis commanders. Neither Anderson nor Eisenhower wanted a pro Axis enclave splitting the Allied lodgments. Oran itself was a important French naval base as well.

 

[Decatur]

On air craft carriers: I found the following from https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii: .. the only US carrier involved was USS Ranger.
Oil tankers were converted to makeshift 'carriers': Chenango, Santee, Sangamon and Suwanee.

Could the allocation of a bit more US carriers have neutralized Sicily in this instance?

Ranger was the only fleet carrier the U.S. had at Torch because she was the only one not in the Pacific. Enterprise was at New Caledonia, with holes in her flight deck and an inoperable elevator.
Saratoga had just come out the repair yards at Pearl Harbor and was getting ready to head back to the Southwest Pacific.
Remember, November 1942 was an extremely bad month for the U.S Navy. Many admirals thought the ships at Torch would have been far more useful at Guadacanal instead.

 

[Scott Washburn]

The eastern option would have been very risky. The German and Italian air forces seriously pounded British attempts to resupply Malta (in the same region), sinking or damaging a great many ships.

 

[ivanotter]

Probably true that the local French commanders were a bit of a shifty lot.

Could they all have been side-stepped? Not sure I would have left serious French forces in the rear, and that is probably the real case for Oran as well.

It raises the opportunity: could Torch have landed enough forces (Tunis) to squeeze Rommel and at the same time to keep watch on the rear? French forces were not possible to totally ignore perhaps.

Could more air power had been applied with the addition of 1-2 US carriers (wherever they had to come from, thanks Decatur)? If so, would that have been enough to discourage French intervention?

Logistics would have been 'interesting' if Casablanca forces had been divided between Algiers and Tunis.

Malta was OK from November 1942.

Another interesting fact is that IF the main thrust would have been Algiers-Tunis it would have forced re-supplying Rommel far more complex. The vicinity of Malta would have been very hard to overcome. In essence Axis convoys would have to sail right next to Malta, which would not have been a super strategy.

Ports on the other side of Tunis might not be able to handle the pressure.