Unification of the Korea would likely also invigorated support in the States for a rollback policy going forward.
Yes, it will be seen as more achievable.
But let's not overestimate the case of "the stupids" and "the cockies" the US would get from defeating and destroying North Korea with the 8th Army and its air forces. The US will be even more reckless and have more swagger about thinking it can put down Communists in Indochina. Maybe in some other places like Cuba. But the US is *not* going to fool itself into thinking taking down a country the size and population of China is just an easy walk in the park.
The US also likely will not fool itself that risking a tangle with the Soviet Army in the plans of northern and central Europe in the East German or Hungarian uprisings would go well.
Could we see an earlier rapprochement between the US and China without the two engaging in direct conflict, or would a military presence on the Manchurian border make the relationship even worse?
The relationship could go exactly as OTL or diverge to earlier rapprochement or later rapprochement.
I think a lot depends on how various regional crises play out, most of all in Indochina, but also in the Taiwan straits, the Sino-Indian border, etc.
One factor is I think the sooner the US has a Vietnam-like, grinding military setback, the more open the US will become to dealing pragmatically with, and recognizing Communist China.
I do not think it was a mere coincidence that the US public and political class only found it acceptable on a bipartisan basis to normalize with China after the US felt it was losing in Vietnam and trying to get. So in that regard, if the US jumps into Indochina overconfidently in the 1950s and loses in a decade or so, maybe after or during that debacle its willing to finally talk to China, so that early war might support an earlier than OTL normalization.
But if the US doesn't get into Indochina fighting until the 1960s and only has a first massive was with the PLA then, maybe it delays rapprochement to even later than OTL, or even causes a US-Soviet rapprochement and anti-China alignment instead.
Perhaps no Sino-Soviet split because the threat of the USA is closer?
Maybe, but it could go any which way. As it was, the Sino-Soviet split broke out despite China being quite insecure, having inflicted famine on itself, and with the Chinese and Americans pursuing hardline policies against each other. Mao seemed to start it for idiosyncratic and prideful intramural and ideological Communist reasons, and unless what he was telling everyone publicly and privately was all lies, he had deluded himself into thinking that he could take ideological leadership of the Communist world, and use argument and charisma to force the Soviets and other Socialist states to resolve any points of ideological and national dispute between themselves and China by abject 100% surrender to China (read- Mao's) position.
Would the existence of the People's Republic be in danger had it not intervened?
Not really any more than it was *by intervening.* IMO.
Depends on the butterflies.
A lot of things depend on the butterflies.
I'm guessing the only way to avoid Chinese intervention is for the evincing of American restraint…indicating a continued rump DPRK "tripwire" state and a UN restoration of status quo ante (pushed North, somewhat, never mind).
So you don't take the objections voiced to Mao in his senior leadership group by Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai seriously?
Were they just "going through the motions," and hedging their bets for the historical and party record in case it turned out to be a fiasco, so they could profit.
If Mao slipped in the tub before the decision, and one of them took over, would being in his shoes have made them decide to intervene?
So despite my esteem of raharris1973, should we not look to American restraint, rather than Chinese, for this scenario.
And should not unbutchered pork, ham and bacon products take flight from the runway labelled as "date 1[1]: Sam R.?"
So you're saying now that that not only is China backing down impossible, but its the US that needs to restrain itself. But then you basically negate that by saying that could only happen if pigs can fly.
While I agree each side had strong drivers to escalate until locked into a stalemate and shown the futility and diminishing returns of further escalation, I do think non-escalation is possible and even plausible for either side.
It would probably mean the Soviets are harsher towards any uprisings in their satellite states in Eastern Europe seeing the U.S. and their UN allies overthrow a communist government.
I guess. They put these down in OTL, they will put them down in the ATL.
This would mean a different Indochina War
Yes, most definitely, even if the ultimate outcome is a a unified Communist Vietnam by 1975 or 1980, the path to get there will definitely be altered in lots of interesting ways.
possibly a harsher Malayan Emergency.
I really wonder what the harshness would be for, since the Malay commies and their ethnic Chinese host community was so hopelessly overmatched from the beginning.
he Huk Rebellion in the Philippines would still be crushed since the Huks did not have anything to counter anything the Philippine Air Force had.
Yep, no question.
China was definitely under threat. It could not even protect its own shores if the U.S. Navy and allies bombarded it. China in 1950 is just as poor as Sudan is today.
It could be flesh-wounded, but it had "stood up" and would have rallied to a defensive fight. And whatever the US could do to torture China from the air and sea, the US is *not* going to fool itself into thinking taking down a country the size and population of China is just an easy walk in the park.
You can still have the (un army) on the yalu river were cooler head's on all side's lead's to china and the soviet's staying out of the korean war,
You know an additional plausible PoD for the Chinese to stay would be if Stalin, instead of encouraging and pressuring the Chinese to get in, is so worried about escalation and broadening to hit the Soviet Union that he actually *forbids* the PRC to intervene.
In this (atl) were the american's dont get a bloody nose and (black eye) in the korean war will be fare more embolden to take impossibly dangerou's risk's than in (are time line) like nato intervening in the 1953 east german uprising and (plzen uprising) ect with a soviet nuclear response,
As well as a (atl) were (china-soviet's) stay's out of the korean war the american's would think that the red's were coward's and that now is the time to strike,
To remove the likely hood of a 1953 (nato-soviet) nuclear war the west need's to fight hard to stop the spread of mccarthyism,
And to remove the likely hood of other 1950's nuclear war's the west need's to fight hard to stop the spread of undesirable disinformation like the use of negative emotion's useing the (bomber gap) (missile gap) (sputnik crisi's) ect as fearmongering to get the public hysterically terrified to think irrationally,
I think this is an overly alarmist projection of what kind of case of "the stupids" and "the cockies" the US would get from defeating and destroying North Korea with the 8th Army and its air forces. The US will be even more reckless and have more swagger about thinking it can put down Communists in Indochina. Maybe in some other places like Cuba. But the US is *not* going to fool itself into thinking taking down a country the size and population of China is just an easy walk in the park.
The US also likely will not fool itself that risking a tangle with the Soviet Army in the plans of northern and central Europe in the East German or Hungarian uprisings would go well.
As for the 1960's the west need's to fight hard to stop the spread of mcnamaraism's and to rein in the monster that is the military industrial complex,
This is somewhat strange theory because actually while McNamara used quantitative business management methods, methods not exactly applicable to warfighting, especially in a counterinsurgency, reining in the endless service and corporate wishlist of the Eisenhower-era military industrial complex and keeping costs more reasonable compared to the 1950s was *exactly* what McNamara was trying to do in the Department of Defense.
A much shorter Korean War?
'M.A.S.H.' doesn't get made.
Something like it probably does, because an Indochina or Vietnam War is still highly likely, and producers may want to backdate it to Korea for reasons of discretion.
But there is little evidence that if the Allies stopped at the 38th Parallel there wouldn't have been a renewed communist push to the south
Well say the Allies did that, what would Kim Il Sung's move be? Would he be telling the Chinese, "alright, alright, hurry on down and help me finish this in my next offensive?" Or would he insist on trying once more to invade and conquer the south on his own without the Chinese? If the latter, how long would it take him to regroup forces to have a hope of attacking successfully?
I assume the OP is disregarding the question of how and why Beijing makes this choice, so I will do so as well.
First, with no Chinese intervention, U.S. & Allied forces essentially take the entire Korean Peninsula, leading to a general collapse of the Kim regime. Kim Il-sung either dies in the fighting, is captured and taken by Allied forces to stand before a tribunal of some kind, or flees into Chinese or Soviet territory.
Post-war, the decision is taken to unify the Korean Peninsula under a single, unified Republic of Korea with a government based on Western systems. Pyongyang is renamed to one of its historic names, such as Kisong, and maybe replaces Seoul as the RoK's seat of national government. The functions of government are moved there in stages over the next few years.
In the modern era, the northern portion of the peninsula is not beset by disease and malnutrition, which is a good thing.
If either Kim Il-sung or any of his family survived the war, they carry on a "People's Government in Exile" in either Soviet or P.R.C. territory, but as years pass they are taken less and less seriously. If they base it in Soviet territory, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in the 90s likely causes their disollution as well, though they may survive to relocate to China if Beijing sees any propaganda value.
The border between the Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China resembles the 38th Paralel DMZ situation IOTL.
Left-wing parties and movements are restricted at first, but over time as the RoK loosens up, this changes. Even so, left-wing parties are often monitored by intelligence agencies, and some of the more extreme leftist parties and organizations will remain banned for decades.
This is just what comes to mind over a few minutes.
This projection is entirely convincing and plausible.
