Returning to the OPs question and topic after all ...
IMHO it seems fully answered in :
AMEN !
No 1918 Armistice, could France keep fighting?
- Thread starter Tanc49
- Start date
The French ?
IIRC it was the AEF covering the front from St.Menehold to Pont-a-Mousson in the 100 days offense, advancing 'only' in its northern part up to Sedan, while the french at the end reached a line from Sedan to Charleroi ... roughly.
(that's about end of 1/3 of November)
The French were nowhere near Metz/Thionville
However, regarding a possible POD at least for the "avoidance" of the armistice as IOTL ... @This Machine already mentioned Ludendorff mental ... 'instability'.
Something he suffered already from 1914 onwards (if not even earlier) as i.e. depicted by then still Colonel Max Hoffmann in the run-up for Tannenberg. Ludenforff almost panicked on some reports of russian troops where he hadn't ... 'forseen'/counted with and was countermanding all/most of orders given so far. Hindenburg had to take him aside into a separate room to 'chill' him down and let the operations unfold without further interventions as they then actually did.
IOTL Ludendorff 'advised' asking for terms at 29th September. But during the preliminary exchange of diplomatical notes he changed his mind and advised at least about 3 weeks later the continuation of fighting. ... Only that by then the goverment had changed and he had almost completly fallen out of favor resulting in his dismission on 26th october.
Now ... why not have Ludendorff in an ATL by ... maybe Max Bauer's ? ... or someone elses influence 'recover' from his defeatism only a day or so at max later ? ... maybe he still advises asking for terms but as a deception while building/preparing another "Siegfried"-Line along Metz/Briey - Longyoun - Noefchateau(Belgium) - Liege, maybe with a 'forestopper'-line along the Meuse up to Namur and preparing something already at the empires borders, which would result into a substantial front-shortening and in that massivly helping the - german - defenders.
That way the german military resources could IMO well last into 1919.
Maybe an addition to avoid the Kiel mutiny :
However, overall the germans will still 'loose' due to the sheer mass of everything the US is able to throw into Europe faster and to a greater amount despite the already improving (though far from being 'brilliant') food situation and raw material situation (to the most likely big suffering of the eastern polulations) for Germany and the (remaining) CP-sphere due to the 'win' in the east.
(THE war winning quality of the US (or 'Yankees') - when they actually won a war - was above everything else : quantity.)
Though it might be possible that after the doughboys running into one 'Siegfried'-line after the other, 'releaving' gradually the already so much beaten Entent-partners and a million or so zink-coffins sent back home ...
Wilson might look for a 'quick end' - aka ASAP maybe already late summer 1919 ? - and smoother the other Entent-'partners' ravaging revenge-wishes to somewhat less harsh terms. ... as said just for ending the piling-up stream of US casualties.
And in what kind of armistice or peace in 1919 to 1921 this might end ...
... could on this board well result in a flame-war of the 'bash-the-german-into-oblivion'-faction and the 'marshal-plan-like-fair-ToV'-faction.
Something he suffered already from 1914 onwards (if not even earlier) as i.e. depicted by then still Colonel Max Hoffmann in the run-up for Tannenberg. Ludenforff almost panicked on some reports of russian troops where he hadn't ... 'forseen'/counted with and was countermanding all/most of orders given so far. Hindenburg had to take him aside into a separate room to 'chill' him down and let the operations unfold without further interventions as they then actually did.
IOTL Ludendorff 'advised' asking for terms at 29th September. But during the preliminary exchange of diplomatical notes he changed his mind and advised at least about 3 weeks later the continuation of fighting. ... Only that by then the goverment had changed and he had almost completly fallen out of favor resulting in his dismission on 26th october.
Now ... why not have Ludendorff in an ATL by ... maybe Max Bauer's ? ... or someone elses influence 'recover' from his defeatism only a day or so at max later ? ... maybe he still advises asking for terms but as a deception while building/preparing another "Siegfried"-Line along Metz/Briey - Longyoun - Noefchateau(Belgium) - Liege, maybe with a 'forestopper'-line along the Meuse up to Namur and preparing something already at the empires borders, which would result into a substantial front-shortening and in that massivly helping the - german - defenders.
That way the german military resources could IMO well last into 1919.
Maybe an addition to avoid the Kiel mutiny :
tell the 'tar-jacket', that the fleet shall sail not for a last fight of honor but ... for escorting a/some food convoy/s ... to feed their starving wifes 'n children at home ...
thereby 'unfortunatly' running into the Home Fleet
and thereby 'butterflying away' the event that caused the November-revolution in Germany. ... and resulting another example/propaganda-myth of 'german heroism' to preserve their country.thereby 'unfortunatly' running into the Home Fleet
However, overall the germans will still 'loose' due to the sheer mass of everything the US is able to throw into Europe faster and to a greater amount despite the already improving (though far from being 'brilliant') food situation and raw material situation (to the most likely big suffering of the eastern polulations) for Germany and the (remaining) CP-sphere due to the 'win' in the east.
(THE war winning quality of the US (or 'Yankees') - when they actually won a war - was above everything else : quantity.)
Though it might be possible that after the doughboys running into one 'Siegfried'-line after the other, 'releaving' gradually the already so much beaten Entent-partners and a million or so zink-coffins sent back home ...
Wilson might look for a 'quick end' - aka ASAP maybe already late summer 1919 ? - and smoother the other Entent-'partners' ravaging revenge-wishes to somewhat less harsh terms. ... as said just for ending the piling-up stream of US casualties.
And in what kind of armistice or peace in 1919 to 1921 this might end ...
... could on this board well result in a flame-war of the 'bash-the-german-into-oblivion'-faction and the 'marshal-plan-like-fair-ToV'-faction.
Garrison
Donor
How does the armistice achieving the Allied goals represent Foch adopting a 'middle ground position'? Be specific, state which war aims Foch abandoned or what concessions were given to the Germans to obtain the Armistice?
Again you quote conditions seven months after the Armistice and nowhere does you quote support the notion of Foch 'freaking out'.
Apart from of course the German allies whose armies had self-demobilised, the German Navy which had surrendered ALL submarines, 6 battlecruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers and 50 destroyers, and the German Army which had surrendered 2500 heavy artillery guns, 2500 field artillery, 25000 machine guns and 1700 aircraft (especially the most modern). They didn't have to surrender tanks because they had so few.
By 1918 rifle-armed infantry was only a minor part of war-fighting capacity, but that was what the Germans were left with.
The Germans who signed the Armistice added:
Given the time and effort that the Germans put into the Hindenburg line, which IIRC was penetrated in its full depth within a week in October 1918, I doubt this is going to help.
At the same time they have to find more troops to deal with the collapse of its Allies in the East and South. Constantinople was occupied on 13 November giving Allies access to the Black Sea, and the Dneipr, and so to Ukraine and Poland.
In addition Allied troops were advancing in the Balkans with Belgrade liberated on 1 November. and of course Romania re-entering the war on 10 November.
TDM
Kicked
OK given that you seem to be arguing their morale was strong, and they were successfully defending, and France was on the brink of collapse, why did they do this?
Does Keegan say the canal wasn't crossed, that the Germans held out and thus stopped the advance? Because to be honest if the canal was crossed that isn't a goal post shift it's kind of directly relevant to whether or not the Germans were able to stop the canal from being crossed and thus stop the advance.
If your point is 'ah but if it was France alone no British no Americans no Italians etc', then "the canal might have been held" (the "canal" being a metaphor for Germany in WW1 '18) than yeah OK, but that's not the case OTL, it's not even the suggestion for discussion in the OP.
The nice thing about allies is that you help each other out, one member's strengths are used to bolster another's weaknesses and vice versa, the whole is greater than the sum of it parts. A Gestalt if you will, (unfortunately for the inventors of the word, they had no one to form a Gestalt with by the 2nd half of '18)
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Of course artillery isn't everything, but it is a mad man to look at WW1 and to declare that "A massive artillery advantage isn't a major combat-multiplier". The Allies had a decisive advantage in artillery, tanks, aircraft, supplies, against an enemy who had itself suffered vast casualties. The Americans can cope and defeat the Germans when they hold every other card other than limited combat experience, which is inherently a negative which fades over time.
No they are, to quote Pyrrhic Victory concerning the late 1914 and early 1915 operations, which were not marked by major offensives, and the French incorporating tactical lessons during this period without major fighting:
The French also worked hard on achieving better coordination between
the infantry and the artillery. The High Command quickly concluded,
“Every time a strong point is to be taken, the attack must be prepared
by artillery. The infantry should be held back and should deliver
the assault only from a distance where it is certain that the objective can
be reached.”30 In early January 1915 Joffre explained to his subordinate
commanders that as a result of the increased effects of ªrepower and the
strength of organized defenses, operations in the future had to be
“slower” than those envisaged in the prewar doctrine. If an attack were to
succeed, it had to be prepared down to “the smallest detail,” and a large
number of artillery rounds had to be concentrated on the objective to
weaken the enemy and ensure the infantry could advance.31 Joffre’s memorandum
clearly established the framework for ªghting battles with artillery
and infantry working in close coordination. Though rudimentary
techniques for moving artillery and infantry enabled the French to provide
some coordination between the artillery and infantry, ensuring
proper coordination remained one of the most complex challenges of
the war.
The ªrst message,
sent on December 27, 1914, reminded French commanders of the
“necessity” to organize the “ªrst line of trenches in a manner to make
them absolutely inviolable in order to reduce the [number of ] personnel
placed in the trenches” and to “permit the forming in the rear of important
reserves required for future operations.”38 Two subsequent messages
placed increased emphasis on the second line and its role in adding
depth and halting an enemy breakthrough. After requiring detailed reports
from subordinate commanders, the GQG soon received a wealth of
information about the location, organization, and condition of trenches
in each army’s sector.
After the reports arrived, Joffre provided speciªc instructions to each
army commander on what to do about the trenches in his area. In his letter
to the Third Army commander, for example, he criticized a particular
line for being too close to the crest of a hill.39 The letter to the Fourth
Army commander stated, “I draw your attention to the importance of
forming to the rear of your actual second line a series of centers of resistance
supported by natural obstacles.”40
Amidst the search for better methods, Joffre began reconstituting his
reserves. He recognized that reserves were essential for future operations—
whether offensive or defensive—and for providing troops the opportunity
to recover from extended stays in the trenches. Since the
French could not be strong everywhere on the Western Front, they had
to have reserves that could participate in an offensive or rush to a threatened
point. On November 12 Joffre ordered his army commanders to fortify
their fronts and create small reserves. He explained that reserves
could be created “only by reducing numbers in the ªrst line and by decreasing
the density of men on the ªring line.” He added, “An excessive
density in the front line, without any depth, without small reserves in the
regiments, presents the greatest danger from the tactical, as well as the
hygienic, viewpoint.”43 In mid-November Joffre prescribed the size of reserves,
ranging from a brigade to a division, for each of his armies. He ordered
First Army, which covered a huge front on his right, to have larger
reserves: ªve infantry brigades and three cavalry divisions. In only a few
weeks, Joffre built up his own reserves to two infantry and two territorial
divisions. Altogether the French had the equivalent of ªfteen divisions in
reserve by the end of November. To ensure that the reserves could be
transported easily to any point on the front, the High Command placed
them near railway centers
All of these were formulated in a period without major offensives, as the French constantly improved their tactics. It is deeply bizarre to suggest that the Americans, holding increasingly lengthy sections of the front, and engaged in constant combat of at least a low-level nature, will not themselves improve their tactics and operations.
You're furthermore ignoring the cooperation and detachment of American, French, and British officers to and from their different units to each other. The Americans will improve over time, even in the absence of a major offensive, and in combination with a panoply of supporting arms their weaknesses are reduced.
The Hundreds Day involved everything you cited above. Leading men in offensive condition, men figuring out what to do, artillery sections properly coordinated, and quartermasters supplying a pitched offensive: well, I guess that now the Hundreds Day Offensive will transform in your arguments from the pitched offensive that you have been advertising to a roll-over of the Germans like reality, so that's one good thing at least leading from this train of thought.
Not enough to restore losses for the former, the latter clearly had problems if they hadn't done it previously.
its the same thing, you are taking a limited French weakness which they as I demonstrated they were countering, be it through increased cooperation with the Americans or through massive recruitment of colonial soldiers, and then entirely dismissing their participation in the war.
After Allied artillery and aircraft is done with Metz, there won't be much left of those fortifications.
Your quote is as follows:
This is saying exactly what I say you are doing: attempting to engage in polemics about the effectiveness of heavy artillery. So once again, you're exaggerating hugely all of the weaknesses of the Allies, pretending that they have no infantry available or what infantry they have is useless, and that their artillery advantage is ineffective. 1918 showed very well indeed the devastating effectiveness of artillery which did effectively smash enemy positions, and the artillery of 1918 is doctrinally and materially far more advanced than that of 1916: it did prove capable of smashing enemy formations to the extent that it was possible for them to be rolled over without excessive difficulty.
See the above. You are inherently claiming that artillery is ineffective and using Verdun as an example of its lack of effectiveness.
This says nothing about the Germans controlling the air. This says that they inflicted a superior kill/loss ratio on the Allies, which is an entirely different thing. It cuts off noticeably at "The Allied air doctrine of relentless offensive" which says something different about the two: the Allies were on the offensive and exercising their air superiority, the Germans trying to defend against it.Granted, the Entente did have a firm and increasing advantage and this allowed them to conduct limited rear area attacks as well as do recon, their control over the air was not absolute:
I do concede, however, that going into 1919 would probably be a different state of affairs.
Air superiority does not mean not taking losses, which are often outsized for an attacking force, even when it enjoys qualitative and quantitative advantages. The Allies resolutely controlled the air and were able to sustain that casualty ratio while controlling reconnaissance, bombardment, and artillery spotting.
During which time the problems you speak of concerning the Americans will abate.
The front is much longer than Metz alone, you are aware? There are certain regions to the north which the British were traversing, and at the time of the Armistice the French were organizing a Lorraine offensive. I must confess if your picture of German geography is that its Western border consists of Metz alone and its Southern border of the Austrian Alps and nothing else, then that is a rather fascinating atlas indeed. Regardless, Metz will be of rather little assistance in the light of the devastating amount of firepower that the Allied armies can lay down by 1918. I also suppose that the estimates concerning German arms production that you have previously noted will have to be revised downwards when the Allies are at the gates of Metz and the Germans have lost their major iron ore supply regions.
Fascinating to hear about the mindless nature of the American Untermensch who make no improvements at all while all German problems are magically fixed.
You claimed the tank advantage was gone by November, ignoring that that was a temporary reduction which would be quickly fixed.
Stop being disingenuous. The Allies had a massive advantage in the number of tanks they can put into the field which in any 1919 battle will be the better part of 10,000. Trying to ignore this by castigating them for not matching some British officer's napkin scribbles is dishonest.
Have you read about the operational nature of fighting in the Middle East and the various disputes occasioned by the conflicts between the involved powers? I would particularly recommend reading up on the background to the Gallipoli campaign and the struggle for influence in Palestine. I believe you would find this quite illustrative for the way coalition fighting forces compromises and alters plans, but in that it generally doesn't cause any power to bow out of the fighting. The Climax of French Imperial Expansion, 1914-1924 is particularly good about the subject.
You claimed that the Western Allies had a unified command structure. They did not until 1918, and yet they somehow miraculously managed to fight beforehand.
Those pesky mountains guarded by such abundant numbers of German soldiers, with such plentiful reserves existing....
Incorrect, since most forces in the Balkans were Greek/Romanian/Italian/Serbian/Montenegro, and the Middle East troops were barely factored into the calculations that showed them to be 10% of Western Front strength.. But regardless, in any case the same numbers hold: those 20 divisions were going up against German allies, and now those allies have collapsed so the Germans have to fight them themselves. I used the example of the Western Front as one point, but regardless they could go elsewhere.
You are the one who made the argument concerning the tanks, not me.
It is you who has been advancing the viewpoint that the Germans will 1)Be able to solve any manpower issues that arise (while apparently the French are completely incapable of doing the same, despite the presence of an economy linked into the global markets and supported by them, a vast colonial empire, and actually having allies....), 2)Effectively deploy enough troops to cover up the opening of another front, and 3)That they were already contesting in an effective fashion the 100 Day Offensive. Exaggerating what you're saying? Sure, I enjoy rhetorical effect, but perhaps it speaks more to the absurdity of your argument that what you dismissively label as a "strawman" is not very dissimilar at all to the case you advance...
You should look at the advance rates of your beloved Germans during the final offensives against Soviet Russia: the rates of advance of Operation Faustschlag show just what happens when there is no real opposition to combat. The only present factor in the region that is hostile to the allies is Hungary, which even the Romanians collapsed in a matter of just a few days of fighting, with rates of advance of in excess of a hundred kilometers in just a few days.
Not again, that it particularly matters, since you've kindly suggested that it will take months for combat on the Western Front to resume anyway. The Yugoslavs and Romanians enjoyed the support of the Western Allies, who as we've previously established concerning their increasing war production, is plentifully sufficient to support them afield.
Which is fine, because 1)I doubt that the Germans would move fast enough to occupy the Italian-Austrian passes before the Italians did, as the Italians were already in momentum and the Germans were not, 2) Even if they did, its yet another front and another drain on German forces and resources when it is already clear that those resources were insufficient, 3) The Danube valley is of sufficient width to make another terrible drain on German resources, 4)The Czech mountains are no real geographic barrier in the context of the limited number of German troops which could be marshaled there, and are certainly far less of a geographic obstacle in any case than the Alps.
Of course, I am sure that you will tell us now that the Germans will pull millions of additional men into the field and single-handedly hold another front where 3 other nations had been unable to do so previously, by strategies which they mysteriously had not previously adopted despite the seeming overwhelming advantages inherent to them....
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Open Green Fields
Banned
If Germany does not surrender in 1918 and everything is the same and this is the one difference from the original timeline
Then what happens is the Germany loses.
Germany was facing internal revolution, many soldiers did not want to fight and there were huge food problems and the civilians wanted the war to end.
The German leaders agreed to surrender and the terms because the answer from the French, British and Americans was; ok fine then the war is on let's go.
Germany could not fight on for any more significant amount of time. Germany was facing collapse in all areas. That is why Germany gave up. It could not fight any more.
Then what happens is the Germany loses.
Germany was facing internal revolution, many soldiers did not want to fight and there were huge food problems and the civilians wanted the war to end.
The German leaders agreed to surrender and the terms because the answer from the French, British and Americans was; ok fine then the war is on let's go.
Germany could not fight on for any more significant amount of time. Germany was facing collapse in all areas. That is why Germany gave up. It could not fight any more.
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Germany did not surrender because it couldn't fight anymore. Germany quit the war because once America joined the entente victory became inevitable. But that doesn't mean the Deutsches Heer can't rack up more Casualties in a defensive war of attrition.
Open Green Fields
Banned
No that is a post war construction.
Germany was collapsing, people did not want to fight, there was not enough food, revolution and starvation was not far away, revolution would happen before starvation.
The German army could wound 1 more person of the allies, yes which shows that your sentence is technically correct. However that does not change what was going on, revolution, lack of morale, lack of food, lack of military and civilian supplies and an economy that is crashing.
You just have to expand your knowledge about ww1 and what specifically was going on in Germany and around Germany.
However, your sentence does show that one important lesson is valid.
One must totally crush ones enemy, completely pulverize them or some guy will always say that things weren't that bad, or even, which you don't, that they could have won.
That nr one lesson is as valid as ever.
Completely crush all your enemies, or someone will always say something.
History Learner
Banned
I never claimed that, so that's a strawman. If you follow the quote chain, you would see the idea that I was responding to the idea presented that the French were eager for revenge and wanted to carry the war to a decisive defeat of the Germans.
It would come as a hell of a shock to all of Human civilization that November-January is seven months after November. Regardless of that, the underlying reasons for why Foch and the French didn't want to are still going to be there, Armistice or no; I find it amusing your argument here is basically "one day they were fine, the next day as worse as the Germans".
We're not talking about the Germans, we were talking about the Entente. By the time the Treaty was signed they had significantly demobilized forces but this was not the case in the immediate aftermath of the Treaty; this was my point as to why would Foch be freaking out.
I've argued they were still more than capable of fighting and would've been in a better shape had the opening of peace talks in October not occurred. I have further argued that I believe the French were approaching the end of their ability to continue effectively fighting, with the British likewise approaching that point. With an operational pause at the end of 1919 stretching into the late Spring the Germans could solidify a strong defense alone the Pre-War border where they could effectively hold or at least sufficiently bloody the Americans to get a better peace deal.
The Canal was crossed, but the metrics Ian established was that the Germans had to offer an effective defense; this occurred.
TDM
Kicked
OK
1). you haven't demonstrated your claim about French and British individual capability
2). when you do mention them you seem to determined to talk about each just in their own context rather than as members of alliance (which involved more than them). I.e I agree believe Franc by itself in 1918 would struggle to march into Germany and win, same with Britain. Both together, with everyone else who was there, different story.
On you point about new defensive line Why would we give the germans an operational pause to build a new line of defence? More relevantly how would the German get one since they can't hold 60ft canals against the Entente advance for more than a day?
Ah OK I see what your saying. To be frank not being able to hold a 60ft canal and attached flooded ground for a single day at any point along a 24 mile section against a WW1 army is pretty indicative of not being able to offer an effective defense. i.e effective doesn't mean any defence. This also has a impact on your claims of Germany being able to create new defensive front.
History Learner
Banned
I've never not claimed artillery isn't a force multiplier and the fact you've said that illustrates what I've been saying; artillery alone can not win the war, you need infantry taking ground in conjunction with it to do so. I'd also point that the Americans of 1944 had everything you outlined and then some, and were still stopped cold by German defenses in the same region from roughly September to October until March of 1945 despite years of experience at that point. Given the AEF did not enjoy anywhere near the advantages of the U.S. Army in late 1944, I think it should be telling what will happen.
No they are not and the exact specifications of your citation will reveal this as by late 1914 the French had gotten quite a bit of experience in August and September to say the least.
Because no Army has ever gotten better by sitting around nor does fighting trench raids make you a master of the offense.
The Hundred Days certainly featured that as a whole, but not for the Americans largely. Their first large scale offensive wasn't achieved until September with St. Mihel, which is why Pershing fought so hard with Foch to get the operation as the Americans needed a baptism of fire to learn lessons. If you read the literature on it you realize they found there was many problems with their performance, in particular their logistics systems.
New recruits combined with medical discharges were enough to sustain at least of the armies on the Western Front. The reason the other men had yet to be called up was that it would require replacing them with women in the factories, which was a rather touchy issue for the Prussian elite.
My argument has been that their direct participation will fade going into 1919 as they simply cannot afford to keep it up; the question of what the AEF can do is rather different from can the French continue to keep fighting. I also find the colonial issue interesting and propose the same question you outlined above; why weren't the French already doing that? The answer is quite obviously that recruiting and training hundreds of thousands of people you plan to continue to keep down after the war isn't the smartest of ideas.
Just like Patton managed to do with overwhelming artillery, massive armored units and overwhelming air superiority in late 1944? How about Devers?
Except I've never claimed any of that and further have repeatedly stated that in other posts.
Which is good, because I've never said that either. I did say they were able to effectively continue resistance over their own lines, which was the point; the Allied air advantage in 1918 was not the same as it was in 1945.
I'm fully aware and I'm also fully aware that the British offensive was at it's end by the time of the Armistice. That just leaves the French and Americans to bash their heads against German border defenses, and I doubt the French could sustain that for long.
When all you can do is strawman, it's a pretty clear sign you're unable to counter the points of the other person.
It would take months to fix and the tanks being produced were not conducive for the mobile warfare advocated by Fueller. Given the experience of Patton in 1944 and other American commanders in the region, I'm also doubtful of their usefulness to offensive actions in the region.
You mean his detailed plan that became the basis for armored warfare used by the major armies of the next war and into the current day? The same plan the Entente was trying to enact at the time? Do tell me. See above for the rest.
You're being deliberately obtuse here as the Anglo-French squabbles in the Middle East have absolutely nothing to do with the Americans nor present an issue in the European theater because there is nothing to dispute there.
Yes they did but the entire reason they developed a unified command structure is because they realized how ineffective the previous state of affairs was and realized that to carry out the major offensives later in the year they needed a central authority to help direct and manage them.
You act as if existing divisions can not be detailed to do so or fresh units raised.
Again, you're being obtuse; if they Anglo-French pull out their divisions, they cannot occupy any of the territory they want as they will not have forces on the ground. They have to keep those forces there, otherwise their entire Post-War plans are upended and I'd bet the Ottomans and Bulgarians would re-enter the conflict if suddenly they found themselves with no enemies to face. Since we're assuming a PoD at the end of September, the Serbians, Montenegrins and Romanians are largely a non-factor.
And you're the one who continues to make strawmen.
That's certainly my argument more or less but that is nowhere near what you were claiming and we both know it. You stated I claimed they had been winning the 100 Days, which I never have.
You should also note that Faustschlag was on the Northern European Plain, meaning all those pesky mountains they had to face were non-existent. Further, we're somehow expecting the Serbs and Romanians, with no real industrial base because they had just been occupied for years, to somehow sustain a massive offensive across the Pannonia Basin and thence into Germany through multiple mountain rangers with no Anglo-French support. Romania could collapse Hungary because Hungary was effectively having a civil war within it that the Romanians could get the support from one faction and, further, Hungary is right next to Romanian and in the middle of the relatively flat and open Pannonia Basin.
So in other words, you've conceded it wouldn't be until sometime in 1919 that the Yugoslavs and Romanians could take the offensive? I'm also not sure what support you're referring to since apparently the Anglo-French are withdrawing all troops from the theater and I'm curious as to how they will be able to keep them supplied given that fact as well as how they will go about doing both that and supplying the Americans.
"The Allied Superman no no wrongs, the puny Germans will be crushed"
History Learner
Banned
To which do you speak?
The British offensive had reached it's culmination point and the general expectation was that their increasingly overstretched logistics combined with the worsening weather as Winter came would bring the offensive to a halt. Spanish flu would then likely extend this halt probably into May, when it would finally abate. The Germans also already had an existing line in the form of border fortifications that existed since the war, in particular those of the Metz region; these same defenses stopped Patton in 1944 and were, according to Paddy Griffith, the strongest any army had yet faced in the war.
The British took the objective, certainly, but that doesn't mean that the Germans did not offer effective resistance in fighting such. It's like saying that because the Germans took Kiev in 1941, the Soviets were completely incapable of effective fighting.
TDM
Kicked
either really
OK and the flu not to mention the Blockade are going to effect Germany right?
if they took a 60ft canal in less than day it does
only kiev at lest held for 6 weeks, but yeah OK you want to equate the German army's capacity to withstand invasion in 1918 to the Soviet ability to hold ground in 1941? Cool, although that doesn't really strengthen your point
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nbcman
Donor
You mean the lack of supplies that caused the 3rd Army to not attempt to advance against Metz for over a month and the continued shortage of artillery ammunition that slowed the advance. However, Metz fell and the 3rd Army ended up in Austria and Bohemia.
Regardless, why would the Entente forces try to go through the border fortifications when they could advance through Belgium and Luxembourg not to mention via the south using A-H's rail system? The Germans were doomed.