So you're spending millions of dollars on developing an obsolescent weapon that's going to get used less than once a decade? Not the most wasteful project I've ever heard of, but hardly chump-change either.
Most wasteful weapons project after 1900
- Thread starter BlairWitch749
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RamscoopRaider
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Everything but Destroyers, Frigates, Corvettes and subs needs ASW escort, and some of them need that too, BBs have never been invulnerable but are nearly so, heck the sub was a major concern even in 1914 and earlier
Post WWI BB's did a lot of shore bombardment, AA escort and tied up money from other powers, as well as until 1939 were the only thing that could sink another BB reliably, carriers could slow one down (and possibly kill one if they got a golden BB) and subs could kill one assuming they could find one and keep up long enough to hit it, but only the BB could kill another in every circumstance
That said when the new generation of Carrier planes rolled in around 1939 BBs could now be sunk by carriers, but they also threw out more AA than anything else and could escort the carriers
If by need you mean 'prevent the ship from being sunk by subs' then in a sense destroyers and frigates would 'need' an escort as well, since operating alone is dangerous and a destroyer would go down faster than a battleship.
Lol, just a random thought with no importance your post prompted in me. I thought it was kind of funny, but yeah its pretty irrelevant to the discussion on hand.
I'll suggest something for the thread so this post has some content. Everything about French Interwar tank procurement. I dont mean it should have been scrapped, but that it was so badly managed and wasteful and could have been so much more.
RamscoopRaider
Donor
What I meant was only these vessels regularly carry ASW weaponry, and not all of them do
The Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program. Ran for fifteen years and about a billion dollars back when that was real money. I'm deluded enough to believe that a nuclear-powered airplane could actually maybe be a good idea, given various assumptions about radiation health effects I won't get into here. But, even if you agree that an atomic-powered plane could be worth having, ANP was too badly mismanaged to produce a viable aircraft. Here's why:
First, while the actual project leaders such as Gen. Keirn seem to have been competent and effective, the higher-ups could never decide if they really wanted the thing. This was the story from the very beginning of the project in the 40s - once NEPA, the ANP's predecessor, finished its feasibility study, the AEC asked the Joint Chiefs if they wanted to set up a joint development program. It took two years for the JCS to respond, and when they did they said they wanted it tomorrow. This pattern continued through the whole history of the program; they alternated between crash projects to build an A-plane yesterday, and leisurely materials development that would consider making something in the 70s. One engineer I spoke to described it as "hire on even years, fire on odd."
Second, the project was jointly funded by the AEC and the USAF - and, instead of setting up a single contracting authority, each agency signed separate contracts with the developers. Which naturally led to the developers playing the USAF and the AEC against each other, to the extent it took two years from the signing of the letter of intent to when Pratt & Whitney actually started working. (This problem was eventually fixed, but not until too late in the day to save things).
Third, development was focused on the direct-cycle turbojet design, in which air would be passed directly through the reactor. This was in contrast to the indirect-cycle, where a coolant such as liquid metals or pressurized helium would run between the reactor and a heat exchanger in the turbojet. The direct cycle had the advantage of simplicity and... Well, that was about it. Indirect cycle engines promised greater safety and much better performance, since the poor thermal properties of air would make your reactor much, much bigger than it could be using a better coolant. An indirect-cycle engine could potentially be worth using; it could maybe even be good enough to power a combat aircraft. A direct-cycle engine would be a technology demonstrator with limited applicability to further development.
Fourth, the Air Force was only interested in nuclear propulsion if it was propelling a supersonic bomber. The technical challenges of nuclear propulsion were prohibitive as it was, demanding supersonic performance using a direct-cycle engine made it almost impossible. ANP tried to get around this by adding chemical-fuel afterburners and only going supersonic over the target, and ended up designing a plane that would weigh more than half a million pounds, cost a fortune, and still be worse than a conventional jet bomber.
Fifth, the whole crashing issue. 'nough said.
By the time Kennedy was inaugurated, even most of the project's adherents thought it was time for it to go. Kennedy and MacNamara finally put it out of its misery in 1961.
First, while the actual project leaders such as Gen. Keirn seem to have been competent and effective, the higher-ups could never decide if they really wanted the thing. This was the story from the very beginning of the project in the 40s - once NEPA, the ANP's predecessor, finished its feasibility study, the AEC asked the Joint Chiefs if they wanted to set up a joint development program. It took two years for the JCS to respond, and when they did they said they wanted it tomorrow. This pattern continued through the whole history of the program; they alternated between crash projects to build an A-plane yesterday, and leisurely materials development that would consider making something in the 70s. One engineer I spoke to described it as "hire on even years, fire on odd."
Second, the project was jointly funded by the AEC and the USAF - and, instead of setting up a single contracting authority, each agency signed separate contracts with the developers. Which naturally led to the developers playing the USAF and the AEC against each other, to the extent it took two years from the signing of the letter of intent to when Pratt & Whitney actually started working. (This problem was eventually fixed, but not until too late in the day to save things).
Third, development was focused on the direct-cycle turbojet design, in which air would be passed directly through the reactor. This was in contrast to the indirect-cycle, where a coolant such as liquid metals or pressurized helium would run between the reactor and a heat exchanger in the turbojet. The direct cycle had the advantage of simplicity and... Well, that was about it. Indirect cycle engines promised greater safety and much better performance, since the poor thermal properties of air would make your reactor much, much bigger than it could be using a better coolant. An indirect-cycle engine could potentially be worth using; it could maybe even be good enough to power a combat aircraft. A direct-cycle engine would be a technology demonstrator with limited applicability to further development.
Fourth, the Air Force was only interested in nuclear propulsion if it was propelling a supersonic bomber. The technical challenges of nuclear propulsion were prohibitive as it was, demanding supersonic performance using a direct-cycle engine made it almost impossible. ANP tried to get around this by adding chemical-fuel afterburners and only going supersonic over the target, and ended up designing a plane that would weigh more than half a million pounds, cost a fortune, and still be worse than a conventional jet bomber.
Fifth, the whole crashing issue. 'nough said.
By the time Kennedy was inaugurated, even most of the project's adherents thought it was time for it to go. Kennedy and MacNamara finally put it out of its misery in 1961.
I do agree on the B-2 and G-41, the G-41 is basically an updated HK-33/93 and the B-2 seems to be based out of Missouri only, you have to fly insane distances to the mission and insane distances home. I do think Stealth is overrated, the B-52 and B-1 can do the same thing the B-2 can. If I had to add, I would add in the MX Missile since due to a treaty, we had to destroy them, if I were not for the treaty then maybe they would not make my list. Then again, I'd like to see a transfer of land based ICBM's switched over to SLBM's, gravity bombs and air launched missiles since anything to reduce the targets here on U.S. soil would be a "benefit" if we get into an atomic war.
OK, here goes:
Gold: B-2 bomber for the reasons I typed.
Silver: MX Missile, dittoes
Bronze: The XM-29 rifle. Any basic infantry weapon that needs batteries to work and/or fully function is a no-no. IIRC, the .223/5.56mm NATO still works without batteries but I don't think the sights and/or 20mm would work without it. Plus it is heavy in weight and complicated.
Honorable mention: The F-35. That screams junk to me. Trying to make a "Jack of all trades" plane (or whatever) does work, you nd up with a "master of none." I think the F-22 might go here too but the F-35 is ahead of it because despite the problems the F-22 has, at least it works with the huge maintenance issues it has.
Gold: B-2 bomber for the reasons I typed.
Silver: MX Missile, dittoes
Bronze: The XM-29 rifle. Any basic infantry weapon that needs batteries to work and/or fully function is a no-no. IIRC, the .223/5.56mm NATO still works without batteries but I don't think the sights and/or 20mm would work without it. Plus it is heavy in weight and complicated.
Honorable mention: The F-35. That screams junk to me. Trying to make a "Jack of all trades" plane (or whatever) does work, you nd up with a "master of none." I think the F-22 might go here too but the F-35 is ahead of it because despite the problems the F-22 has, at least it works with the huge maintenance issues it has.
You made my points exactly. Plus when you create a "whack a mole" situation, you make more targets. No matter what, if there is a war, we will get creamed with nukes and fallout but it would be a lot worse with you target every square mile. At least with less land bases, you will reduce fallout and blast damage from being really terrible to just being "really bad."
Honestly, I think if a nuclear weapons system was eliminated due to treaty, and in the process eliminated a corresponding weapon system held by the Soviets and reduced the total number of nuclear warheads in the world, then that weapon has served its purpose admirably. I'm not sure if the MX itself is responsible for the treaty in question, but I would regard its elimination as a feature, not a bug, and by far the best use the missile could serve.
I'm not sure. There's the opposing viewpoint that the missile fields serve as a "bomb sponge" so that warheads fall on them instead of, say, New York. (This argument really only applies to today, obviously, when total warhead counts are treaty-limited and heading downward.) I'd still like to get rid of the ICBMs, but for a different reason - they cost money, they're not survivable, and, since they can be reMIRVed, they make "breakout" quicker if the current treaty system ever breaks down.
You can make the same argument for SLBMs: Right now, the Trident-II missiles only carry about 4 warheads/missile (they're designed for up to 10). "Breakout" can happen just as easily for the boomers, should that need ever arise.
Absolutely true. The thing is, though, that since the ICBMs are relatively vulnerable to a first strike, I just don't see them as serving any real purpose except as a breakout hedge and bomb sponge. (Well, that and to keep the USAF in the ballistic missile game.) If we replace the Minutemen with more warheads on the Tridents, then we save money, reduce vulnerability, and reduce overall breakout potential by about 1,350 slots - since we've eliminated both the empty slots on the Minutemen, and filled 450 slots on the Tridents.
The only downside is that we lose the "bomb sponge" effect, but I generally think the tradeoff is worth it.
The AF getting out of the ICBM business is not very likely.
As for the battleships, they were also developing extended-range HE rounds, submunition rounds, even rounds for ASW-instead of an HE shell, it's a depth charge. A rain of HE or submunition rounds clearly lives up to the name of "Grid Square Removal Service" that the Army's MLRS crews have.
As for the battleships, they were also developing extended-range HE rounds, submunition rounds, even rounds for ASW-instead of an HE shell, it's a depth charge. A rain of HE or submunition rounds clearly lives up to the name of "Grid Square Removal Service" that the Army's MLRS crews have.
I don't disagree that battleships are fantastic at providing that sort of fire anywhere within their range. It's a very expensive way of delivering those munitions, though - the ship itself, the crew, the associated escort group, specialist facilities for maintenance, and so on. And all the platforms that currently deliver them (ASW escorts, MLRS, carriers, etc) will still be needed, so there's no economies to be made there.
It might make people wonder "would the Marines be able to make do with fire support from 8" or even 6" guns, given how often since WW2 those scenarios have come up?". Or, if it is decided that nothing but a 16" gun will do, would it be possible to mount them on some sort of cheaper hull? Something like an up-to-date monitor, perhaps.
True, sadly. Although, if I recall correctly, Panetta actually suggested the Minuteman force might be eliminated if the automatic budget cuts go through. But that may have just been a "cut the fire department" deal - you know, indicate we'll cut something Mr. Important Senator wants to keep, to give him more incentive to actually reach a deal.
Not to derail but what kind of warheads to ASMs have? Straight up HE or HEAT? Also if battleships came back in style, how hard would it be to fit a HEAT warhead onto an ASM?
Also it's already been mentioned, but as with a tank you don't have to completely destroy a battleship to neutralize the threat, a mission kill is sufficient. Except that it takes a lot more time and money to fix a battleship than a tank.
Also it's already been mentioned, but as with a tank you don't have to completely destroy a battleship to neutralize the threat, a mission kill is sufficient. Except that it takes a lot more time and money to fix a battleship than a tank.
Other thing, you can have a 2 stage ASM with the second stage consisting of a torpedo. I believe the French had something like that in the 60s.
Torpedoes nowadays are fused to explode under the ship. This creates a gigantic gas bubble, and since for a split second there's no ocean under it the keel literally breaks in half under it's own weight. Don't see how all the armor in the world is gonna help against that, if anything it would make matters worse due to the added mass.
This type of missile would be more likely to hit the target too, since during the final approach the warhead would be underwater and thus invulnerable to CIWS. You could even program the missile to keep flying at the target after the torpedo is released to confuse the enemy about the nature of the attack.
Torpedoes nowadays are fused to explode under the ship. This creates a gigantic gas bubble, and since for a split second there's no ocean under it the keel literally breaks in half under it's own weight. Don't see how all the armor in the world is gonna help against that, if anything it would make matters worse due to the added mass.
This type of missile would be more likely to hit the target too, since during the final approach the warhead would be underwater and thus invulnerable to CIWS. You could even program the missile to keep flying at the target after the torpedo is released to confuse the enemy about the nature of the attack.
Only to a degree. The PT-76, Scorpion and Sheridan may be undergunned but they would at least have a small chance against a MBT. One or two MG's against a real tank won't. If you're going to build tankettes put in a 20mm or 25mm cannon, something to give you a fighting chance.
This leads me to designs that would be decent or even great if built in the early to mid 1930's but were a complete waste by appearing as late as they did. Examples include:
- Romanian Toldi I with a 20mm cannon (one source says the 20mm was actually an anti-tank rifle). I pity the crews that had to take these up against T-34's or KV-1's. The Toldi II had a 40mm cannon but this was practically useless by the time it appeared.
- Hungarian Turan I with a 40mm cannon. Against, useless against Soviet heavies.
- Italian M14/41 with a 47mm cannon. A slightly improved M13/40 but not enough to do the job.
I disagree, unless by "small chance" you mean "effectively none at all". Those guns might be ok for fire support or perhaps against other light armour such as IFVs (don't start any long books beforehand, though), but they've got no business at all going up against MBTs. Against anything more recent than a T-34 they're nothing more than a crew's worth of "sad duty to inform you" letters waiting to happen, which leads me to the conclusion that they're not actually intended to fight tanks. If that's the case but they still have a place on a modern battlefield, then tankettes seem to fit into the same category - thin armour and a gun that's useless against tanks, but that's not their job. Recce, infantry support - in those roles they could still perform a useful function, presumably.