More reconciled South Korea and Japan?

Based on this article: http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress....-japan-align-even-though-ir-says-they-should/

As this article states, and from any brief overview of East Asian news, Japan and South Korea, despite both being US-aligned, having common threats to deal with (North Korea, rising China), and significant economic and trade ties, don't have, to say the least, the most cordial of relations. The relations between the two countries, despite the aforementioned factors, are, as the article states, more akin to Greece and Turkey (the archetypal antagonistic states, whom nevertheless are in the same alliance-NATO), rather than the relations between countries like say, France and Germany, or Germany and Poland (in which, according to the book Reconciling Enemy States in Europe and Asia, the degree of reconciliation is higher than with South Korea and Japan).

From this basis, with a POD after WWII, how could South Korea and Japan have a greater degree of reconciliation greater than OTL?

IMO, some possibilities could be
-A less "lenient" US occupation of Japan, in which more awareness of Japanese atrocities is propagated into Japanese society (maybe making the whole "history issue" less of a stumbling block)
-Different US alliance system with South Korea and Japan, which is more akin to NATO, instead of the "hub and spoke" San Francisco Treaty System made up of bilateral US-Japan, and US-South Korean alliances (so encourage more cooperation between Japan and South Korea, like NATO is said to have done between France and West Germany?)
-Possibly earlier South Korean democratization (reconciliatory leaders get more legitimacy?)

Any other suggestions would be welcomed, thanks!:eek:
 
Tough, very tough. Way too much Cold War politicking going on poisoning US_ROK relations in terms of tolerating the most atrocious regimes in the name of "fighting Communism". So too too much willingness to turn a blind eye to Japan's turning a blind eye to its own WWII history in Asia and the Pacific. The USA not wanting to piss off either the Japanese People or the Korean governments from the late 40s until, well, today.:(

I don't really have an answer for this, except that for certain what happened with Greece and Turkey was NOT the solution.:(
 
I was told that one thing South Korea has over Japan, thanks to sharing a border with North Korea, is better disaster preparedness. They are ready for pretty much Armageddon to hit at any moment and as a result they have a large stockpile of humanitarian supplies ready to go out to Seoul or other border towns in the event of a second Korean war. I don’t know how true that is, but it makes sense. So maybe this scenario:

2011 the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami hit Japan with full force (same as OTL).

The Japanese response is actually worse than OTL or the same with OTL.

South Korean President Yi Myung-bak sends the South Korean military along with all of their humanitarian “Kim Jong Il just invaded” supplies to Tohoku after the tsunami hits. The slow Japanese response is in sharp contrast to the quick Korean response, which softens emotions on both sides.

Koreans feel pride at the effective and their military’s rapid response to the crisis, something that earns them international praise. In Japan the image of Korean soldiers handing out water bottles and helping rescue civilians give the Japanese a never before felt sense of appreciation for their neighbor.

After the crisis Japanese Prime Minister Kan visits Korea, and in part due to the recognition that the Japanese public has an unprecedented feeling of goodwill towards their Korean neighbors, he admits Japan’s history in regards to Korea is “atrocious” and admits that Korea has been wronged by Japan in the past or something of that nature. He comes under fire in Japan by hard liners but weathers the storm…and the gesture allows many Koreans to warm somewhat to Japan.

The end result is nothing like Germany-France, but still somewhat closer than what we have OTL.
 
I was told that one thing South Korea has over Japan, thanks to sharing a border with North Korea, is better disaster preparedness. They are ready for pretty much Armageddon to hit at any moment and as a result they have a large stockpile of humanitarian supplies ready to go out to Seoul or other border towns in the event of a second Korean war. I don’t know how true that is, but it makes sense. So maybe this scenario:

2011 the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami hit Japan with full force (same as OTL).

The Japanese response is actually worse than OTL or the same with OTL.

South Korean President Yi Myung-bak sends the South Korean military along with all of their humanitarian “Kim Jong Il just invaded” supplies to Tohoku after the tsunami hits. The slow Japanese response is in sharp contrast to the quick Korean response, which softens emotions on both sides.

Koreans feel pride at the effective and their military’s rapid response to the crisis, something that earns them international praise. In Japan the image of Korean soldiers handing out water bottles and helping rescue civilians give the Japanese a never before felt sense of appreciation for their neighbor.

After the crisis Japanese Prime Minister Kan visits Korea, and in part due to the recognition that the Japanese public has an unprecedented feeling of goodwill towards their Korean neighbors, he admits Japan’s history in regards to Korea is “atrocious” and admits that Korea has been wronged by Japan in the past or something of that nature. He comes under fire in Japan by hard liners but weathers the storm…and the gesture allows many Koreans to warm somewhat to Japan.

The end result is nothing like Germany-France, but still somewhat closer than what we have OTL.

Interesting...but what happens if a hardliner (LDP guy) gets elected in Japan again? It would backtrack...:(
The key thing for reconciliation, according to the book, is consistency...It's not enough to start reconciling...there needs to be sustainment.
I mean, OTL South Korea and Japan were able to jointly host the 2002 World Cup, which was a high point in South Korea-Japan relations, but then afterwards things went downhill, what with Yasukuni Shrine visits, textbook controversies, Dokdo/Takeshima...
 
South Korea-Japan relations were actually quite close during the dictatorship years, especially during Park Chung-hee's regime. This cooled during the 70s because of several factors, including:
1. kidnapping and attempted assassination of Kim Dae-jung
2. capture of 2 Japanese passport holders during the enforcing of martial law
3. assassination of Park Chung-hee's wife(partially resultant of Japan's lax security)
4. friendlier relations between Japan and North Korea, due to NK kidnapping several Japanese citizens(coerced friendship, perhaps)

Within South Korea, the '65 basic relations agreement is seen to have led Korea and Japan to start on the wrong foot(which can be seen as wrong, as it is quite an irreconcilable idea for solely South Korea to receive recompensatory payments from Japan for all of the Korean peninsula). In Japan, the payments are often mentioned and are viewed as legitimate rekindling of relations between a "new" Japan and Korea; in Korea, the payments are less noted and are merely seen as a corrupt bargain made between the dictator-friendly South Korea and Japan. In my opinion, it is easiest to extend Park's regime for a longer friendly relationship between Japan and Korea. Stronger economic and social ties, those that were seen during the 70s and those that would probably be extended with the dictatorship, would lead to Japan and South Korea having a relationship similar to that of OTL Japan-Taiwan. After 1979, it was too easy for the less politically legitimate dictators/presidents to use Japan as a political factor that gets them votes.

I do not believe a NATO-type situation to actually help. Even during the 70s South Korea-Japan relations were seen as a "special relationship", one that was beyond the closeness of partners and friendliness of allies. As previously mentioned, Turkey and Greece, despite both being NATO members, constantly fight each other indirectly.

If we are to go further back, it is to stop Kim from invading South Korea. Such an event, instead of fulfilling Kim's goal of a reunified peninsula, resulted in several tragedies:

1. Stopping Rhee's imminent impeachment,
2. Keeping the incompetent Shigeru cabinet as PM,
3. Establishing MacArthur as a "great general"(a reputation soon destroyed later in the war),
4. And making Japan move away from the original plan of a "yeoman's paradise".

Because of the Korean War, Japan's slow dismantling of its pre-war economic, social and political system stopped altogether. This meant that all the same people who have survived the war - leaders who led during the war - also led Japan after the war. This led to a large number of the problems.

This is all I can think of right now, I'll add more if I remember anything else.
 
South Korea-Japan relations were actually quite close during the dictatorship years, especially during Park Chung-hee's regime. This cooled during the 70s because of several factors, including:
1. kidnapping and attempted assassination of Kim Dae-jung
2. capture of 2 Japanese passport holders during the enforcing of martial law
3. assassination of Park Chung-hee's wife(partially resultant of Japan's lax security)
4. friendlier relations between Japan and North Korea, due to NK kidnapping several Japanese citizens(coerced friendship, perhaps)

Within South Korea, the '65 basic relations agreement is seen to have led Korea and Japan to start on the wrong foot(which can be seen as wrong, as it is quite an irreconcilable idea for solely South Korea to receive recompensatory payments from Japan for all of the Korean peninsula). In Japan, the payments are often mentioned and are viewed as legitimate rekindling of relations between a "new" Japan and Korea; in Korea, the payments are less noted and are merely seen as a corrupt bargain made between the dictator-friendly South Korea and Japan. In my opinion, it is easiest to extend Park's regime for a longer friendly relationship between Japan and Korea. Stronger economic and social ties, those that were seen during the 70s and those that would probably be extended with the dictatorship, would lead to Japan and South Korea having a relationship similar to that of OTL Japan-Taiwan. After 1979, it was too easy for the less politically legitimate dictators/presidents to use Japan as a political factor that gets them votes.

I do not believe a NATO-type situation to actually help. Even during the 70s South Korea-Japan relations were seen as a "special relationship", one that was beyond the closeness of partners and friendliness of allies. As previously mentioned, Turkey and Greece, despite both being NATO members, constantly fight each other indirectly.

If we are to go further back, it is to stop Kim from invading South Korea. Such an event, instead of fulfilling Kim's goal of a reunified peninsula, resulted in several tragedies:

1. Stopping Rhee's imminent impeachment,
2. Keeping the incompetent Shigeru cabinet as PM,
3. Establishing MacArthur as a "great general"(a reputation soon destroyed later in the war),
4. And making Japan move away from the original plan of a "yeoman's paradise".

Because of the Korean War, Japan's slow dismantling of its pre-war economic, social and political system stopped altogether. This meant that all the same people who have survived the war - leaders who led during the war - also led Japan after the war. This led to a large number of the problems.

This is all I can think of right now, I'll add more if I remember anything else.

That could be the case, but I think it would mean that South Korean-Japanese relations would become less friendly after democratization, whenever it happens...
The thing is, the pro-democratization people in Taiwan are, I think, more pro-Japanese than the KMT dictatorship there, as these people (whom the DPP stems from) were benshengren (descended from people already in Taiwan before 1949, and thus experienced Japanese rule of Taiwan, which was different from Japanese control over mainland China experienced by the waishengren, who were descended from people who fled to Taiwan along with the KMT in 1949). This means when Taiwan became a democracy, being closer to Japan had more legitimacy for the pro-democracy people to leverage their "credentials", so to speak...
IMO I don't think it was the case for the South Korean pro-democratization movement members...:confused:

And additionally, what do you mean by "special relationship"? Because that should imply very friendly relations like with UK and US...:confused:
 
1. Democratisation in South Korea, without proper action by the Japanese, would led to anti-Japanese sentiment. This is the shortest summary possible.
2. The special relationship, I believe, was possibly closer between Japan and Korea than between the US and the UK. Most negotiation and diplomatic processes were not official and up-front, but were rather discreet and informal.
 
1. Democratisation in South Korea, without proper action by the Japanese, would led to anti-Japanese sentiment. This is the shortest summary possible.
2. The special relationship, I believe, was possibly closer between Japan and Korea than between the US and the UK. Most negotiation and diplomatic processes were not official and up-front, but were rather discreet and informal.

OK...I see...did I offend you with these statements? I'm kind of getting nervous right now:(
I think that maybe there should be some way to have more public acceptance of Japan as an ally...IMO it's not enough to have discreet, informal ties, because the wider public doesn't know...:confused:
 
Interesting...but what happens if a hardliner (LDP guy) gets elected in Japan again? It would backtrack...:(
The key thing for reconciliation, according to the book, is consistency...It's not enough to start reconciling...there needs to be sustainment.
I mean, OTL South Korea and Japan were able to jointly host the 2002 World Cup, which was a high point in South Korea-Japan relations, but then afterwards things went downhill, what with Yasukuni Shrine visits, textbook controversies, Dokdo/Takeshima...

Agreed. It could backtrack quickly, but that could help Japan and Korea recognize that it is in their interest NOT to let things move backwards.
 
But if the World Cup didn't work...then what?

The World Cup lacked the emotional impact that the above mentioned Tsunami response would. The World Cup was two countries in the region working together to host a football event. Yes, a lot of pride, but, how do I say this...it was basically two countries with a common goal working together to get it. The average Korean didn't change his outlook on Japan or vice versa as a result of their shared hosting of the World Cup. But the above mentioned scenario could do that...enough to ensure that Japanese politicians avoided shirne visits because they are more worried about offending the Japanese citizens who appreciated what Korea did after the tsunami than offending the hardliners in Japan.
 
The World Cup lacked the emotional impact that the above mentioned Tsunami response would. The World Cup was two countries in the region working together to host a football event. Yes, a lot of pride, but, how do I say this...it was basically two countries with a common goal working together to get it. The average Korean didn't change his outlook on Japan or vice versa as a result of their shared hosting of the World Cup. But the above mentioned scenario could do that...enough to ensure that Japanese politicians avoided shirne visits because they are more worried about offending the Japanese citizens who appreciated what Korea did after the tsunami than offending the hardliners in Japan.

I see...but if the memory of the tsunami fades...then things would get iffy...
 
I think Japan would have to take responsibility for its actions in WWII. Japanese history glosses over their atrocities and Japan has never effectively apologized to Korea or China.

I mean, if Germany totally ignored the Concentration Camps, Israel and Poland would never get along with them.

I'm not sure why the US let Japan (immediately post war) get away with this whitewashing.
 
I think Japan would have to take responsibility for its actions in WWII. Japanese history glosses over their atrocities and Japan has never effectively apologized to Korea or China.

I mean, if Germany totally ignored the Concentration Camps, Israel and Poland would never get along with them.

I'm not sure why the US let Japan (immediately post war) get away with this whitewashing.

I'm ethnically Chinese (Canadian by nationality), and I have to say that this isn't entirely true...From what my parents (who lived in Japan for 6 years) told me, the people in Japan do have some awareness that they did horrible things in WWII (and before, in the case of Korea). However, it's the government officials who tend to say stuff that whitewashed the past, which gets the rest of East Asia pissed off...
And these government officials aren't just low-ranking ones...they include the prime minister too...So as a result, people in rest of East Asia regard Japanese people as a whole negatively because of "Japan's supposed to be a democracy...why would they elect the equivalent of Holocaust deniers?! This means that the people don't really care about acknowledging the truth...This type of stuff never happens in Germany..."

You are right that the Japanese haven't effectively shown apology...the thing is, as I implied previously, Koreans/Chinese feel that a true apology would be in the lines of what Germany has done in acknowledging...which is not really possible to do...:(

And the reason the US let them get away is because of China going communist...similar to ending denazification in West Germany...As other German posters have said, it was only with the 68ers where they really started to acknowledge...
Also Macarthur was even more lenient on Japan than the US were on West Germany, even taking into account the lackluster nature of denazification...most egregiously he gave Unit 731 immunity...

And with regards to reconciliation...for me it's not enough for the government officials in South Korea and Japan to get along well and have good relations...what I mean is for these countries as a whole to do so...like in the European countries (not everyone in these countries should get along, but as a collective...)
 
Worse Sino-Korean relationship

Posts above has already discussed the "pull" factors to achieve a RoK-Japan reconciliation, like better Japanese attitude or an early (or no) democratization in Korea.

Now the push factors, namely worse relationship with North Korea and China.

The OP has listed North Korea and China as common threats ROK and Japan faced. And thus it seemed logical that ROK and Japan stand closer with each other, to affront this threat.

The thing is, from the perspective of Japan and the US, China and North Korea may be nothing but threats, but the South Koreans tend to see a more complicated picture. We know these complexities from both their media and their behavior.

In a nutshell, after democratization, the South Korean public opinion was torn between a softer and a harder stance toward their northern brethren. Yea, there are fear and contempt, but despite the state of hostility, there is still a lingering sense of national "oneness". This sentiment is expressed in years after years of Sunshine Policy, but also very visibly in their movie industry. Consider the J.S.A.(2000), Heaven's Soldiers(2005), and Hanbando(2006). the last one is especially relevant as it painted Japan as a hindrance to Korean reunion.

The relationship between China and South Korea is more economic-related. China is currently South Korea's largest import and export partner and, atypical in the developed countries, the RoK has a trade surplus vis-a-vis China, making bilateral trade very profitable for Seoul. Furthermore, Korea's chaebol-dominated economy has kept its domestic demands permanently low, making Korea even more dependent on foreign markets.

The strong economic ties, in addition to changing the Korean mindset in thinking of China more as an opportunity and less as a threat, has also made Japan and Korea competitors.

ROK-PRC economic connections started as late as in the early 1980s, but there were signs that ROK government had planned very early on in an eventual political rapprochement with the PRC. I wonder if anyone here still remembers Torpedo Boat 3213 incident, in which two PRC navy mutineers murdered six of their comrades, hijacked a torpedo boat, and defected to the RoK... and were soon arrested and repatriated to mainland China together with the boat and rest of the crew, despite strong protests from Taiwan that they should have been repatriated to Free China (Formosa). The incident showed that Korea placed their own economic interest higher than ideological considerations when dealing with China, even during Cold War days. There was pragmatism in the Chinese leadership as well, considering Korea a viable economic partner and a developmental model worth copying.

It's close to impossible now, but in the early days of Sino-Korean rapprochement, it was highly likely that the leaders on both sides could be less pragmatic and more ideological in this relationship. You don't need all out hostility between the east and the west to force the Koreans closer to the Japanese, a lack of Sino-Korean economic corporation was already sufficient to keep up the atmosphere of ideological confrontation in East Asia, which naturally drives Japan and Korea (both part of the "free world") together.
 
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The relationship between China and South Korea is more economic-related. China is currently South Korea's largest import and export partner and, atypical in the developed countries, the RoK has a trade surplus vis-a-vis China, making bilateral trade very profitable for Seoul. Furthermore, Korea's chaebol-dominated economy has kept its domestic demands permanently low, making Korea even more dependent on foreign markets.

The strong economic ties, in addition to changing the Korean mindset in thinking of China more as an opportunity and less as a threat, has also made Japan and Korea competitors.
Not to mention, that in the case of ROK-PRC relations it's easy to justify economic pragmatism as being also the morally right thing to do: The closer ROK-PRC relations are the more likely the PRC is to cut North Korea loose and accept reunification on Southern terms. Not that either thing is actually likely to happen, but it sounds good. So in other words seeking friendly relations with the PRC is an area where the economic interests of right-wing money grabbers and the political fantasys of left-wing peacenicks are aligned. Kinda like when in Germany Green Fundies and Coal Lobbyists were working together against nuclear energy.
You could even point to the historical precedent of Shilla aligning with the Tang to overcome Goguryeo and unifying the peninsula (while glossing over that Shilla took only about the southern 1/3rd of it).
 

Realpolitik

Banned
This is not going to be easy, to say the least. Remember, the South Korean government's legitimacy back in the days before the economic boom was in part due to copious doses of nationalism, and there was a very natural target for that. There was no official criticism of Japan during the Park/Chun days-Park was too good of a politician to let anti-Japanese feelings get in the way of the economy-thus the natural feelings were stifled. I think that's part of the intensity of it all today. Anti-Japanese nationalism is a necessary thing to display in ROK politics.

There was also a lack of incentive for Japan to do think that would appease the ROK until it was too late. Remember, West Germany didn't do Ostpolitik until 1969.
 
Not to mention, that in the case of ROK-PRC relations it's easy to justify economic pragmatism as being also the morally right thing to do: The closer ROK-PRC relations are the more likely the PRC is to cut North Korea loose and accept reunification on Southern terms. Not that either thing is actually likely to happen, but it sounds good. So in other words seeking friendly relations with the PRC is an area where the economic interests of right-wing money grabbers and the political fantasys of left-wing peacenicks are aligned. Kinda like when in Germany Green Fundies and Coal Lobbyists were working together against nuclear energy.
You could even point to the historical precedent of Shilla aligning with the Tang to overcome Goguryeo and unifying the peninsula (while glossing over that Shilla took only about the southern 1/3rd of it).

Actually, this may be a bit more likely than one would think OTL...China doesn't actually like North Korea...the populace think they're crazy nuts...and Wikileaks cables apparently say that the Chinese are willing to let South Korea unify with North Korea, as long as there's no US bases...
Also, the hostile feelings that South Korea and China both share towards Japan encourages closer alignment of the two countries, as shown in this article:
http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/japan-uniting-china-and-the-koreas-since-1909/

In there, it describes about how China, upon South Korean request, has set up a memorial hall and statue for this guy, which pissed off Japan, as the guy was the assassin of Japan's first PM...

This is not going to be easy, to say the least. Remember, the South Korean government's legitimacy back in the days before the economic boom was in part due to copious doses of nationalism, and there was a very natural target for that. There was no official criticism of Japan during the Park/Chun days-Park was too good of a politician to let anti-Japanese feelings get in the way of the economy-thus the natural feelings were stifled. I think that's part of the intensity of it all today. Anti-Japanese nationalism is a necessary thing to display in ROK politics.

There was also a lack of incentive for Japan to do think that would appease the ROK until it was too late. Remember, West Germany didn't do Ostpolitik until 1969.

Indeed...this is evident with the "Rhee/Peace Line" in 1953, demarcating Dokdo/Takeshima as Korean territory...Additionally, the 1965 treaty wasn't really approved of by the South Korean populace...As another commenter said, it was seen as a "corrupt bargain"...
Thing is, Park Chung-Hee didn't have as much "leverage" for being reconciliatory...He didn't have as much legitimacy from the populace, or the background (served in the Kwantung military, which meant he could work with Japanese better, but in the context of reconciliation would be more of a "sellout/traitor") necessary for this Korean equivalent of "Nixon to China" (contrast with say, de Gaulle, or Brandt)...

The thing is, Ostpolitik had some precedent in the Franco-German reconciliation...According to the aforemetioned book in the OP, Willy Brandt, when he signed the Treaty of Warsaw in 1970, considered it to be, I quote, "an historic act, parallel to the Franco-German reconciliation a decade earlier [referring to the Elysee Treaty of 1963]).
This precedent is extremely important, because it served as a "template" for other nations to conduct reconciliatory measures, including in East Asia OTL.
An example is the joint history textbook idea...South Koreans, Japanese, and Chinese raised great interest in the Franco-German joint textbook Histoire/Geschichte...This was actually translated into Korean and Japanese, and the East Asian countries collaborated on their own joint textbook...However, as the fact that their joint textbook had different titles depending on language shows...it wasn't of the same "nature"...
Anyhow...there wasn't such a East Asian precedent for reconciliation...we're relying on European ones, which aren't really working...as the OP article said...the "Track II" diplomatic measures aren't really helping...
 
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