Minimal goal Barbarossa

[Catspoke]

We have had threads about "What if Hitler knew the Soviets were strong". The consensus was that, sure Nazi dogma pushed them that way, but practically it was about food. Germany was operating occupied Europe on a food deficit and even with Soviet shipments, food stocks were dwindling monthly.

Most of the food was in the Ukraine, west of the Dnieper. What if the Germans limited their objectives to:

1) The food producing regions of the Ukraine, mostly west of the Dnieper.
2) The Magnesium and Ore deposits of Krivy Rog and Nikopol (a little east of the Dnieper).
3) The shale oil of Estonia (valued especially by the Kriegsmarine because it sank when it leaked)
4) The oil of Lemberg area, a declining field but close at hand.
5) The Crimea because of Hitler's concerns about its proximity as an air base against Romanian oil.

All these areas were in hand by September 30th, except for the Crimea, the Perkop isthmus being occupied by the end of September). What if the Germans just shut everything down by September 30th, except for the Crimea and prepared for the defense, and the winter and also abandoned ideas of offensive operations in 1942, just doing a smash and grab what was in easy reach and go on the defense. Transferring some aircraft and armor for the Mediterranean and for home air defense.

Practically speaking the Germans should be able to avoid a lot of the losses of Winter 41 and 42. And the Germans didn't really try to repair the oil of Estonia until 1943, thinking they were going to access the oil of the Caucasus, the oil experts and equipment could have been sent to Estonia earlier, creating better than OTL oil supplies (as well as not burning so much up on the offensive).

What could the Germans accomplish focusing on the med and building up home air defense in 1942, how long could they last vs OTL????

(practically speaking the occupation would be the same, the Germans wouldn't have much use for large population centers like Kiev, or with people like Jews and communist party officials, would need the cooperation of the Ukrainian peasantry still, but the long range plans for the east, starvation plans etc., couldn't be practically implemented even in OTL, so wouldn't be considered here except much further down the road, perhaps there might be more need for cooperation from Baltic peoples, Crimean Tartars, even Ukrainians, basically OTL but maybe earlier, as the Germans might realize the need for their manpower earlier)

 

[Alternator]

The Soviets are far from crippled, and without ongoing pressure they'll just build up an overwhelmingly large military machine and crush the Nazis themselves.

 

[David Floyd]

With less population loss, both civilian and military, the Red Army is larger, sooner, and is attacking an opponent with less territory as defensive depth.

 

[KaiserWilhelm]

Not going to work. The Germans need to knock out the Soviets by mid-1942 at the latest. These policies might extend lines a bit longer into 1944 but they could make things worse by leaving more well-trained Soviet troops in place and allowing the Soviets to use their numbers advantage to grind the Germans to a halt. The Germans don’t have enough bodies to keep troops in France, Southern Europe, Scandinavia, the Balkans while fighting a defensive war in Russia

 

[TDM]

Yep as others have said the German have to knock the Soviets out. Even while OTL the Germans underestimated the size of Red army in place in 1941 and the rate the Soviets could mobilise more forces, they knew that if the Soviets were allowed to get going they will be able to bring overwhelming force to bare.

Also Germany needed to beat the USSR in order to go back and somehow bring the UK to heel and present the world with a fait a-compli of German domination in Europe and European Russia

 

[Garrison]

What could the Germans accomplish focusing on the med and building up home air defense in 1942, how long could they last vs OTL????

Given they struggled to sustain the logisitics of the OTL Afrika Korps I can't see how they can focus there. And however dense the air defences they can only do so much against night bombing. The more resources poured into those areas the weaker the Ostheer will be in the face of the inevitable Soviet winter counteroffensive.

 

[Dorknought]

From Tooze's, Wages of Destruction:

Everything depended on deciding the battle, as in France, in the first weeks of the campaign. This was the assumption on which Barbarossa was premised. A massive central thrust towards Moscow, accompanied by flanking encirclements of the Soviet forces trapped in the north and south, would allow the Red Army to be broken on the Dnieper–Dvina river line within 500 kilometres of the Polish-German border. The Dnieper–Dvina river line was critical because beyond that point logistical constraints on the German army were binding. These limitations on Germany’s new style of ‘Blitzkrieg’ had not been obvious in 1940, because the depth of operations required by Manstein’s encircling blow (Sichelschnitt) had never exceeded a few hundred kilometres. The entire operation could therefore be supplied by trucks shuttling back and forth from the German border. On the basis of their experience in France, the Wehrmacht’s logistical staff calculated that the efficient total range for trucks was 600 kilometres, giving an operational depth of 300. Beyond that point the trucks themselves used up so much of the fuel they were carrying that they became inefficient as a means of transport.​

Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction (pp. 452-453). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.

The attack on Russia required two things:

1. The Russians must be destroyed within 500km of the Border
2. The Russians cooperate with this plan.

 

[AltoRegnant]

It's also worth pointing out that if Hitler is in position to do this, all evidence he has on hand indicates going deeper into ethnically Russian parts of the USSR is feasible. Add in that no one trusted his word after Munich, and that once he stopped looting he would no longer be able to rip resources into Germany, and things get... funky.

Hell, would he even be able to control his generals at that point? OTL IIRC, they tended to get quite a bit of lionization from the frontliners, and his habit of propping up rivals for them would only disunite the whermacht and make tensions bubble. The first officer with a half decent record and who thought he could pull off gains in russia is going to try something

 

[RedSword12]

Even if Hitler agrees to more realistic objectives in 1941, it will only be so that he's better-prepared to go for Soviet oil in 1942.

 

[McAuslan_in_the_Rough]

1) The food producing regions of the Ukraine, mostly west of the Dnieper.

I believe the German plans for the exploitation of Ukrainian food producing regions also required them to seize the Soviet oil fields of the Caucasus. You mentioned several oil fields, but that might not be enough to fuel the mechanized agriculture they envisioned in the Ukraine.

 

[thaddeus]

We have had threads about "What if Hitler knew the Soviets were strong". The consensus was that, sure Nazi dogma pushed them that way, but practically it was about food. Germany was operating occupied Europe on a food deficit and even with Soviet shipments, food stocks were dwindling monthly.

Most of the food was in the Ukraine, west of the Dnieper. What if the Germans limited their objectives to:

1) The food producing regions of the Ukraine, mostly west of the Dnieper.
2) The Magnesium and Ore deposits of Krivy Rog and Nikopol (a little east of the Dnieper).
3) The shale oil of Estonia (valued especially by the Kriegsmarine because it sank when it leaked)
4) The oil of Lemberg area, a declining field but close at hand.
5) The Crimea because of Hitler's concerns about its proximity as an air base against Romanian oil.

All these areas were in hand by September 30th, except for the Crimea, the Perkop isthmus being occupied by the end of September). What if the Germans just shut everything down by September 30th, except for the Crimea and prepared for the defense, and the winter and also abandoned ideas of offensive operations in 1942, just doing a smash and grab what was in easy reach and go on the defense. Transferring some aircraft and armor for the Mediterranean and for home air defense.

Practically speaking the Germans should be able to avoid a lot of the losses of Winter 41 and 42. And the Germans didn't really try to repair the oil of Estonia until 1943, thinking they were going to access the oil of the Caucasus, the oil experts and equipment could have been sent to Estonia earlier, creating better than OTL oil supplies (as well as not burning so much up on the offensive).

What could the Germans accomplish focusing on the med and building up home air defense in 1942, how long could they last vs OTL????

my (repeated) speculation focuses on Leningrad and Rostov-on-Don, thus as far as they could supply by sea potentially? (guess you could substitute nearby Taganrog for the latter objective?)

the fall of Leningrad might provoke (or would provoke) huge Soviet counterattack(s), this is the timeframe of the historical battles over Moscow? so it sort of scrambles the situation in that the Germans likely hold Leningrad?

can imagine a duality of thinking on this, they have a "victory" if they capture and hold Leningrad, as opposed to a failure to capture Moscow? but still the idea of one final push to total victory?

 

[McPherson]

From Tooze's, Wages of Destruction:

Everything depended on deciding the battle, as in France, in the first weeks of the campaign. This was the assumption on which Barbarossa was premised. A massive central thrust towards Moscow, accompanied by flanking encirclements of the Soviet forces trapped in the north and south, would allow the Red Army to be broken on the Dnieper–Dvina river line within 500 kilometres of the Polish-German border. The Dnieper–Dvina river line was critical because beyond that point logistical constraints on the German army were binding. These limitations on Germany’s new style of ‘Blitzkrieg’ had not been obvious in 1940, because the depth of operations required by Manstein’s encircling blow (Sichelschnitt) had never exceeded a few hundred kilometres. The entire operation could therefore be supplied by trucks shuttling back and forth from the German border. On the basis of their experience in France, the Wehrmacht’s logistical staff calculated that the efficient total range for trucks was 600 kilometres, giving an operational depth of 300. Beyond that point the trucks themselves used up so much of the fuel they were carrying that they became inefficient as a means of transport.​

Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction (pp. 452-453). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.

The attack on Russia required two things:

1. The Russians must be destroyed within 500km of the Border
2. The Russians cooperate with this plan.

I love it when I see good numbers for LLOC tactical radii. This is the logistics that amateurs dismiss. Motorized armies like fleets have tactical radii constrained by the range of their cargo lift. Actually for a land army, it is worse, (*even with horses) because the truck or wagon (and the horse) wears out faster, is less mobile and is a less efficient mover of goods than a ship.

Germans were about 450 km during Barbarossa, so it does agree with Tooze.

Later the Russians would (better staff) take their own tactical radius into account, and even with better trucks than anything the Germans could dream about, (Thanks Lend Lease.), would lunge about 500-600 kilometers, move up supplies and repair the lorries, and then hop forward again. This is what I think happened outside Warsaw after Bagration petered out. The Russians were in a supply pause.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The food producing regions of the Ukraine, mostly west of the Dnieper.

“Mostly west of the D’niepr”? Eastern Ukraine is just as, if not more, valuable as agricultural territory goes. Not to mention the huge industrial and mining centers there.

Later the Russians would (better staff) take their own tactical radius into account, and even with better trucks than anything the Germans could dream about, (Thanks Lend Lease.), would lunge about 500-600 kilometers, move up supplies and repair the lorries, and then hop forward again. This is what I think happened outside Warsaw after Bagration petered out. The Russians were in a supply pause.

The WAllies experienced the same thing in 1944 in France: truck resupply starts to break down at about ~500 kilometers from major railheads or port facilities, practically irrespective of how many or how good your trucks are. In the West, the issue had to be resolved by capturing and reopening major ports closer to the front. In the East, it was railway repair that determined how fast the advance could be resumed and how long supply pauses lasted.

The Soviet advance into the Balkans was unusually lucky in this respect: Romania’s clean defection let them integrate that rail net wholly intact with extreme rapidity and hence they were able to sprint on through Bulgaria, southern Yugoslavia, and then around the western side of the Carpathians and on into Eastern Hungary almost non-stop before resupply problems finally set in and forced a slow-down of operations, a roundabout sprint of approximately 1,000 kilometers.

 

[Gudestein]

I dont get the premise of this POD. What is Hitler supposed to be thinking? I am going to lose anyways so I’ll try to last a little longer?

 

[Catspoke]

I dont get the premise of this POD. What is Hitler supposed to be thinking? I am going to lose anyways so I’ll try to last a little longer?

The premise is that what Germany really needs is food from the Ukraine, and in this TL has some awareness of the difficulties of advancing too far and becoming over extended.

Shutting down the offensive in September or October 41 once the resources of the Ukraine are acquired.

Less losses in the Kiln bugle and such places over the Winter 41.
Less disruption to pilot training due to Demaynsk airlift 41-42 (and the later Stalingrad airlift).
And avoiding the huge losses over the Winter of 42-43, including Allied losses, especially the Italian expeditionary force which really hurt Mussolini politically.
The thought being an intact German army, with far less losses, defending a shorter line will be able to defeat the Soviet army indefinitely?????

in late 41, 42 perhaps Malta can be starved out or invaded with the extra airpower available. Perhaps this all leads to a situation where the Germans can defend southern Europe (Sicily) in 1943, keeping Italy nominally in the war, and having better odds facing a cross channel invasion in 1944.

(Its hard to argue any Word War 2 POD means little more than the Axis last a little longer though).

 

[Catspoke]

my (repeated) speculation focuses on Leningrad and Rostov-on-Don, thus as far as they could supply by sea potentially? (guess you could substitute nearby Taganrog for the latter objective?)

the fall of Leningrad might provoke (or would provoke) huge Soviet counterattack(s), this is the timeframe of the historical battles over Moscow? so it sort of scrambles the situation in that the Germans likely hold Leningrad?

can imagine a duality of thinking on this, they have a "victory" if they capture and hold Leningrad, as opposed to a failure to capture Moscow? but still the idea of one final push to total victory?

You certainly could draw a line wherever you want, Volkov to Lake Ladoga to Taganrog, instead of the A-A line would make some sense. Capturing Leningrad frees up several German and Finnish divisions, as well as a sea supply point, and easier shipment of Estonian shale oil.

(With this in mind after October 10th or so the Germans could start shifting forces back from Moscow to Leningrad, avoiding Phase 2 of Typhoon, and trying to secure Volkov and Tihkvin to hold over the Winter to take Leningrad by a Winter siege)(and avoiding the last lunge to Rostov),

 

[thaddeus]

my (repeated) speculation focuses on Leningrad and Rostov-on-Don, thus as far as they could supply by sea potentially? (guess you could substitute nearby Taganrog for the latter objective?)

the fall of Leningrad might provoke (or would provoke) huge Soviet counterattack(s), this is the timeframe of the historical battles over Moscow? so it sort of scrambles the situation in that the Germans likely hold Leningrad?

You certainly could draw a line wherever you want, Volkov to Lake Ladoga to Taganrog, instead of the A-A line would make some sense. Capturing Leningrad frees up several German and Finnish divisions, as well as a sea supply point, and easier shipment of Estonian shale oil.

(With this in mind after October 10th or so the Germans could start shifting forces back from Moscow to Leningrad, avoiding Phase 2 of Typhoon, and trying to secure Volkov and Tihkvin to hold over the Winter to take Leningrad by a Winter siege)(and avoiding the last lunge to Rostov),

if Leningrad falls it would be a "BFD" politically and likely Murmansk lost also? would the Allies even try Arctic Convoys to Arkhangelsk?

IDK that the Nazi regime would even shift from offensive action against the Soviets, there is the intervening event of DOW on the US? maybe they could decide on a shift of focus towards the Med, try to bolster Italy as you pointed out, prior to the arrival of US forces?

 

[LeX]

I think invading Russia is an all-or-nothing plan. The only somewhat sane course of action Germany could have taken if in 1941 it figured out it couldn't swallow the USSR whole would have been to attempt a serious alliance with the Soviets.

 

[Garrison]

I think invading Russia is an all-or-nothing plan. The only somewhat sane course of action Germany could have taken if in 1941 it figured out it couldn't swallow the USSR whole would have been to attempt a serious alliance with the Soviets.

It was considered and rejected in OTL for a very simple reason, Germany would inevitably end up as the junior partner given the far greater resources of the USSR and Germany's dependence on imports. At best they end up in the kind of relationship the UK had with the USA during the latter stages of the war. At worst they end up like post war East Germany. Also fear and hatred of the Communists extended far beyond Hitler and his inner circle and that's even allowing for Hitler's obsession with Lebensraum.

 

[RedSword12]

if Leningrad falls it would be a "BFD" politically and likely Murmansk lost also? would the Allies even try Arctic Convoys to Arkhangelsk?

But how would this POD make Leningrad fall? Seems to me like cutting the Murmansk Railway was a bit more feasible, and the German-Finnish forces still failed at that IOTL. Making that attack succeed would need a POD of its own.