Minarets of Atlantis

[St. Just]

While popular opinion is that I shall continue, might I ask what might you feel vis-à-vis events ought benefit from change?

I'd have to go back and see, but I think rewrites can be helpful in fleshing out things or reconsidering them (Isaac's Empire, if you're reading the new version, is kind of the classic example).

Anyways, I was outvoted- and the new update was as good as ever! Lovely to have you back on the forums!

 

[Shevek23]

Just to follow up a bit on the whole dubiousness about (Catholic) California missions thing, a few things that bother me:

1) Timing. OTL I suppose the New Spanish Viceroyality procrastinated more than they had to, to start moving up the coast past Baja California. But on the other hand, the longer they waited the more resources Mexico had to back up the project. Here, you're suggesting that the process of establishing missions up the coast started earlier, which explains why there are Californios who have been raised Catholic for some time now, long enough for some syncretized version of the foreign religion imposed with some force to nevertheless be something they don't give up gladly. Bearing in mind that ITTL, Mexico was not initially subdued by Cortez et al in the 1540s but rather was first invaded and reorganized by Muslims who called it "Atlantis," and then had it stolen from them by a Spanish invasion some time later, the time frame for New Spain to develop the infrastructure to support the coastal mission push is eaten away at at both ends--starting later, the Viceroyality will start and support this project earlier?

2) Why up the coast? OTL, it was belatedly started to preempt Russian and perhaps English ambitions on the otherwise "empty" coast. You say, to preempt Bayouk. But Bayouk was overland to the east, across the Great Basin and the Rockies. Logically, shouldn't New Spain have been looking to occupy those zones?

OTL they did missionize in the central desert areas long before San Diego, I believe (off the top of my head--sorry if I might be mistaken). I'm pretty sure Spanish missions in Arizona are older than California's and I know in mid-17th century OTL they had taken control, more or less, of New Mexico. Here of course Bayouk got to the latter first. And without the relatively high density population areas of the Rio Grande river and other Pueblo peoples of the Rockies ridge area, the population westward is really very scanty. There just aren't that many people to missionize, even if one assumes they all come willingly to the new faith and allegiance and don't get killed off with Eurasian plagues the good Fathers bring. As far as I know the OTL Spanish footprint on the territory that is now the State of Nevada was practically nothing, for instance. So it isn't easy to do and doesn't yield much gain.

Actually now that I think about it, in the different context missionizing the California coast and Central Valley (not actually Mission territory OTL) would be different than OTL. The missions being somewhat oppressive and something of deathtraps to the native peoples are both somewhat unavoidable, but they might be far less so ITTL, if the purpose is not merely to occupy and preempt territory a rival might want, but rather to build up the very infrastructure that is lacking in the near-empty desert lands eastward. If the idea is to transform California into a reserve rear area for an anticipated fight wiht Bayouk coming across the Basin, then trying to win over the California natives without killing them off, and win them over in a manner that secures their loyalty, takes priority over grabbing as much land as possible. The thing is, the alternative path to OTL that is gentler and wins over a larger and stable and more loyal population is also slower; it might work to invest more resources than OTL and leapfrog past one site that is a work in progress to start founding others earlier, without the help of the one just before. But New Spain and Old Spain are smaller and weaker than OTL, and even starting a century earlier we don't have very long to get results.

So I'm thinking, they probably didn't get much past Santa Barbara if that far; five or six missions starting with San Diego; vice versa they proceeded more slowly and carefully, and the Californio population did not plummet as much.

But evidently Bayouk's forces broke through anyway.

3) Still, even if this is a plausible ATL Spanish move, the maps we have been shown didn't show it happening. This bothers me; you really have to watch out for the strong tendency this TL has to carry stuff over wholesale from OTL even if the premises are thin.

But to be sure, even if the existence of a California Mission enterprise is a parallel to OTL, the details must be otherwise than OTL to yield the results you mention; it may look superficially like the people and missions of OTL but clearly to get this similar appearance, the backstory had to be substantially different.

 

[Ridwan Asher]

Another thing that occurs to me : Japan. Surely, they have enacted Sakoku as scheduled. That development was definitely induced mostly from within. Yet, Neo-Confucian inspiration from China was also a significant part of Sakoku policy. And in here, we have two Chinas, of which the Southern half is active in global trade while the northern half under Qing rule won't likely be in the position where the thought would even register or come across as sensical. And besides, even IOTL there was an attempt to liberalize and relax Sakoku which was outmaneuvered by the conservatives. I'm just wondering how relations with a different kind of China will affect the internal matters of Tokugawa Japan. An earlier or/and more gradual/partial/piece meal opening of Japan would be interesting to explore.

 

[Essam]

The period nearly spanning two centuries, roughly from the death of Suleiman the Magnificent to the outbreak of the War of Ottoman Succession is popularly referred to as the Tulip Sultanate. The name of the period derives from the tulip craze among the Ottoman elites, brought on by early modern consumer culture. Ottoman elites established a craze for the flower, and the tulip came to define nobility and privilege in terms of goods and leisure time, brought on by an empire increasingly centralized on the Sublime Porte (as opposed to conquest and expansion during earlier eras of warrior male sultans influence.)

The period is also marked by the extraordinary political influence over state matters and male Ottoman sultans of the women of the Imperial Harem, namely Halima Sultan the Touareg, Hufsa Hanim Adil Giray the Tatar, and Asmahane née Cornelia Sultan the Fleming. Many of the sultans were minors, or, under pressure from the palatial networks of the Valide Sultans, ruled mentally unfit to rule. It was the women of the Imperial Harem – as mothers, grandmothers or consorts – who effective ruled the empire. The era saw the birth of new policies, such as the establishment of the Ottoman language printing press, and a rise in commerce and industry as well as being an era of relative peace and development, during which the lands ruled from the Sublime Porte can be said to have begun to orient themselves towards Europe and the New World.

By the middle of the 17th century, the death, incompetence or young age of the sultans had seen the rule of Halima Sultan, the wife of Suleiman the Magnificent’s grandson and heir and protégée of Roxelana, unopposed – both during her sons’ and grandsons’ rule, as well as during the interregnums. Societal norms of the era forced the imperial women to rely on popular legitimacy to maintain their influence and power. This was mostly achieved through a massive implementation of public works: ceremonies, charities, and the construction of monuments, public baths, schools, universities and libraries. These works, in turn, resulted in the increased centralization of the empire on the Sublime Porte. The popular legitimacy these imperial women greatly protected them from the criticism of the viziers and pashas who would have rather seen they influencing the weak sultans of the period.

Popular legitimacy, however, was not the only form of the protection the Valide Sultans and Regents enjoyed. The defense and military fortifications of the empire were not ignored, especially under the de facto rule of Hufsa Hanim Adil Giray who introduced Tatars and Circassians to the personal Touareg guards she had inherited from Halima Sultan. Mandated to protect and defend the honor of the womb of the Shadow of God on Earth, the two forces, during the reigns over which Hufsa Hanim Adil Giray was regent, morphed into the “Devetlu Muhafızlar,” or “the Regent’s Guard” and became, effectively, a counterweight to the Janissaries, and a guarantee of the influence of the women of the imperial harem.

The era also saw the imperial government grow increasingly concerned with improving trade relations and enhancing commercial revenues, as well as a gradual acceptance of the role of the Ottoman Empire within the international system by extending legations and embassies in exchange with other European powers. In the embassies representing the imperial women as regents themselves, the Ottoman concepts of the sultan as being caliph and above emperors and kings were preserved in theory. In addition, the arts, culture and architecture were heavily patronized and rose to prominence.

The role of centralization and development are key to understanding the era, as well as the condition of the empire to allow for the women of the imperial harem to rise to such prominence. During the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, the age of expansion gradually came to its end. The conquest of Hungary stretched the empire deep into Europe. The tacit peace with the Habsburgs, effectively ending the empire’s expansion in Europe frustrated the warmongering interests of many military men and viziers. The ascent of the Alaouites in Morocco, who preferred the security of their dynasty by maintaining amicable relations with Catholic Spain over the Saadians and their support in refuge by the Moors of the New World would limit the Ottoman’s ability to expand and influence across the Atlantic.

The ascent of the Barbarossa dynasty of Algiers in Songhai – largely due to the policies of Halima Sultan to defer to her primordial kin in the region – reduced Ottoman influence in northwest Africa as Algiers-Songhai gradually replaced the Ottomans as the primary Muslim power in Africa, and primary patron of the Moors of the New World in the Mediterranean, as the sole Muslim dynasty to control ports on the Atlantic and Mediterranean. This, in turn, inspired Atlantean merchants and early industrialists and their primordial Berber and Touareg trading networks to develop light industrialization in Algerine and Songhai cities under the control of the Barbarossa dynasty, to produce and export to Europe and the Ottoman Empire Moorish goods reliant upon resources from Songhai and the New World.

The centralization achieved under Suleiman dissuaded the continuation of fratricide amongst Ottoman princes, and the adoption of Halima Sultan as an outsider, a Muslim princess in her own right, by Roxelana was continued in turn by Halima Sultan’s hand-selection of the daughter of the Crimean khan, Hufsa bint Adil Khan Giray, as her own protégée. Though controversial even at the time, these acts helped centralize not only the Ottoman dynasty, but also imperial governance in the Balkans, Anatolia, Egypt, the Levant and Arabia. It also brought the women of the harem closer to real power than they had ever been. As the royal princes lost power from the loss of their governance, their wives and mothers gained significantly, using their prince's status and connections in order to influence court and royal decisions.

With the increase of the prices of tulips in the early 18th century, peaking around 1731, the Sublime Porte intervened, to regulate and artificially increased the price of tulip bulbs. The intervention negatively impacted flower sellers and indeed the mercantile class began assembling, notably in coffee shops, to denounce and draft petitions that would fall on mute ears. Relevant as well in these coffeeshops were the Ottoman Ulema who felt their influence increasingly compromised as the imperial women constructed on a grand scale namesake mosques and hand selected court scholars to preach in them to the Muslim masses. If the Palace the tulip represented the elite and leisurely culture developing amongst the European-oriented Ottoman dynasts and aristocrats, the coffeeshop represented the frustrated mercantile classes and their military and religious allies.

As the empire enjoyed closer economic ties with Europe, so too did the Empire’s Christian populations see an improvement of their situation, often seen as the natural middlemen by European powers into the oriental markets of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire represented a large, wealthy market with little large-scale industry, and European traders were eager to sell their goods. The privileged position of Atlantean traders, however, who maintained light manufacturing and industry in Algiers as an entrepôt between Bayouk and the Ottoman Empire, was decreasing.

As the Ottoman elite continued to exist in unprecedented luxury and commodity which benefitted the emerging Christian mercantile class and their European partners, the traditional guilds, the Ulema and the sidelined networks of Muslim merchants and craftsmen of the Atlantean traders, continued to grow in frustration with the policies of the imperial women. Then, in 1715, the crown prince, Selim, the eldest grandson and heir of the sultan Osman II and Hufsa Hanim Giray, drowned in the Bosphorus. Thus, when the sultsan Osman II passed away in 1718, it was his second-eldest grandson, Mehmet IV who succeeded him. Not a grandson of the powerful daughter of the Crimean khan, the sultan was mysteriously found dead at the age of 26 in his tenth year of reign. The diminished pool of Ottomans from the century and a half of centralized power by the imperial women left the ageing khatun with no choice but to become the regent for the five year-old son of the Mehmet IV by a Flemish concubine, Cornelia Ter Meetelen, known by her Islamic name, Asmahane.

Shortly before her 80th birthday, Hufsa Hanim died, and the Flemish mother of the 12 year-old Sultan Osman III was declared regent. While the orientation towards Europe was a century in the making; the Tulip crisis, the increasing frustration and gradual cooperation of many disgruntled pillars of society, namely: the Muslim merchants, their Atlantean former privileged partners, the Ulema, and the Janissaries, would converge at the same time period as the Flemish concubine Asmahane ascended to the most powerful position in the Muslim empire. The large pubic works projects during the Era, especially the profusion of schools and libraries, had created a new, learned generation from the children of the mercantile elites. Amongst them, there was much interest in the republican project the Atlantean traders espoused and shared, as well as amongst the Ottoman Ulema, tempted by a system with an effectively figurehead sultan where they believed the Ulema could more effectively maintain power. In addition to the military men, these non-dynastic elites lamented the sort of emasculation by the unchecked power the imperial women and sultans exerted over them. The popular legitimacy these Muslim princesses enjoyed amongst the masses, however, seemed impenetrable.

Unprepared and having not been instructed in the feminine statecraft of the imperial harem and the women who proceeded her, Asmahane increasingly relied on the advice of European ambassadors at the expense of her son’s viziers and pashas. Significantly, she sidelined and frustrated the power Giray dynasts who had enjoyed unprecedented power at the Ottoman court, who, importantly, were commanders the Regent’s Guard. With the final conversion of this powerful force to the cause of the Coffeeshop, the course of history would never be the same.

***
ANNEX:
Ottoman Sultans, Consorts and Regents during the Tulip Sultanate

1520 – 1566:
Suleiman the Magnificent (1494-1566)
Consort: Married Roxelena (1500-1572)

1566 – 1569:
Mehmet III (1521-1569), son of Suleiman I
Consort: Married Isabel Sultan (1526-1553)

1569 – 1590:
Moustapha I (1545-1590), son of Mehmet III
Consort: Halima Sultan (1550-1653)

1590 – 1591:
Cihangir I (1569-1591), second son of Moustapha I by Halima
Sultan

1591 – 1600:
Suleiman II (1578-1600), son of Moustapha by concubine
Regency of Halima Sultan 1591-1600

1600 – 1643:
Selim II (1590-1643), third son of Moustapha I by Halima Sultan
De facto Regency of Halima Sultan

1643-1681:
Bayezid III (1625-1681), son of Selim II, grandson of Halima
Regency of Halima Sultan 1643-1653

1681-1708:
Osman II (1638-1708), brother of Bayezid II, son of Selim II
Consort: Hufsa Hanim Adil Giray (1643-1722)

1708-1718:
Mehmet IV (1692-1718), grandson of Osman II & Hufsa Hanim
Consort: Asmahane Sultan “Cornelia ter meetelen the Fleming”

1718- :
Osman III (1713- ), son of Mehmet IV and Asmahne Sultan
Regency of Hufsa Hanim: 1718-1722
Regency of Asmahane Sultan: 1722-1731

 

[Ridwan Asher]

Elegant steps forward toward Giray Rumelian Republic !

 

[St. Just]

Very interesting- a Flemish Valide Sultan, and what looks like a situation reminiscent of the forces that overthrew the Empire of Brazil (elites becoming alienated from the prerogatives of the ruling structure, including nobles)

 

[Al-numbers]

A War of Ottoman Succession?

Well then. May the odds be ever in Cornelia's favor.

 

[Deleted member 67076]

A War of Ottoman Succession?

Well then. May the odds be ever in Cornelia's favor.

Thats what I was thinking. Oh boy this is going to be bloody.

 

[Ridwan Asher]

So we now know what this TL will have in the place of French revolution

 

[Badshah]

A War of Ottoman Succession would have considerable consequences around the Muslim world. Especially when one considers that Persia and the Mughal Empire are both Caliph (well, Imam in the former) in their respective realms. One might see a power play in Mecca similar to what Akbar tried to pull in the 1590s- providing extensive funding to gain influence in the holy city at the expense of the Ottomans.

The Girays being sidelined will certainly be an issue, considering they've always been the junior house in the Empire; being removed from power won't sit well with them, but they have a royal pedigree in the Porte that outshines any other contenders within the Empire itself.

 

[Jonathan Edelstein]

It seems like these events are leading o a coup or revolution rather than a succession war. A politically incompetent regent has lost the support of a powerful dynasty and has alienated the religious, commercial and military elites except for her own praetorian guard; the next logical event would be a Janissary coup in favor of the Girays, supported by the ulema and the coffee-house merchants. Tsar Gringo's analogy to Brazil, where a bloodless coup occurred, seems like a valid one.

So I'm wondering what will make this into a civil war. Are Asmahane's forces stronger and more loyal than they appear, will the Girays and the ulema have a falling-out over republicanism, or will the militarily-disorganized commoners suddenly discover that they have a cause? Or will it be something else altogether?

 

[Ridwan Asher]

Ya Essam, if you might be wondering about what to do for the next update, may I submit a request for India ?

Of course, if you already have something else for the next update, that can wait. But surely the effect of Islamic Republicanism in muslim-ruled portion of India would be interesting, successful or not the idea will fare there. My suspicion is that, India will be more resistant.

 

[Essam]

Here, you're suggesting that the process of establishing missions up the coast started earlier, which explains why there are Californios who have been raised Catholic for some time now, long enough for some syncretized version of the foreign religion imposed with some force to nevertheless be something they don't give up gladly.

Bearing in mind that ITTL, Mexico was not initially subdued by Cortez et al in the 1540s but rather was first invaded and reorganized by Muslims who called it "Atlantis," and then had it stolen from them by a Spanish invasion some time later, the time frame for New Spain to develop the infrastructure to support the coastal mission push is eaten away at at both ends--starting later, the Viceroyality will start and support this project earlier?

2) Why up the coast? OTL, it was belatedly started to preempt Russian and perhaps English ambitions on the otherwise "empty" coast. You say, to preempt Bayouk. But Bayouk was overland to the east, across the Great Basin and the Rockies. Logically, shouldn't New Spain have been looking to occupy those zones?

You're right, Spanish missions did not reach much farther than LA County I suppose OTL, but in OTL Baja California had missions from Sonora and Arizona dating to the 17th century (Sonora and Arizona from the 16th.) So, I suppose Spain ITTL would have moved into these even earlier and more so due to Moors due east initially in Louisiana and early enough into Texas and New Mexico. Hence, there should be about 75 years or so of Spanish influence on the native Californians.

Elegant steps forward toward Giray Rumelian Republic !

Close, or maybe not so close. We'll see how the Crisis in the Sublime Porte plays out.

Very interesting- a Flemish Valide Sultan, and what looks like a situation reminiscent of the forces that overthrew the Empire of Brazil (elites becoming alienated from the prerogatives of the ruling structure, including nobles)

Or at least an unprepared outsider failing to manage and balance the various elite groups, neither the established elites nor the emerging ones.

A War of Ottoman Succession?

Well then. May the odds be ever in Cornelia's favor.

Make sure you choose your loyalties wisely my friend!

Thats what I was thinking. Oh boy this is going to be bloody.

It will certainly have repercussions across the globe sooner rather than later. Whether or not it is bloody in the Ottoman domains themselves or elsewhere is another question.

So we now know what this TL will have in the place of French revolution

Now you're getting there

A War of Ottoman Succession would have considerable consequences around the Muslim world.
...
The Girays being sidelined will certainly be an issue, considering they've always been the junior house in the Empire; being removed from power won't sit well with them, but they have a royal pedigree in the Porte that outshines any other contenders within the Empire itself.

This will indeed be the straw the breaks the camels back. The young Ottoman sultan of a son of Asmahane-Cornelia is one of the last remaining Ottomans, and his mother, unprepared for managing an empire that had come to de facto be run by the offices of the Valide Sultan and its Guard, has no sidelined its only source of enforcement and/or protection.

Her ascent to the office, and her Netherlandish origins will be very unfortunately coincided with the tulip crisis, and while policies of the century and a half have led to the current status quo, history will surely view her predecessors in a much better light. The tulip crisis will play a role in ending the last support the Valide Sultan-regime had, that of popular legitimacy.

It seems like these events are leading o a coup or revolution rather than a succession war. A politically incompetent regent has lost the support of a powerful dynasty and has alienated the religious, commercial and military elites except for her own praetorian guard; the next logical event would be a Janissary coup in favor of the Girays, supported by the ulema and the coffee-house merchants. Tsar Gringo's analogy to Brazil, where a bloodless coup occurred, seems like a valid one.

So I'm wondering what will make this into a civil war. Are Asmahane's forces stronger and more loyal than they appear, will the Girays and the ulema have a falling-out over republicanism, or will the militarily-disorganized commoners suddenly discover that they have a cause? Or will it be something else altogether?

Yes. And her own praetorian guard is commanded by a powerful dynasty who's support she has lost.

It will not be a question of her strength or loyalty, it clearly will be little-to-non-existant. But who will succeed the power vacuum?

Ya Essam, if you might be wondering about what to do for the next update, may I submit a request for India ?

Of course, if you already have something else for the next update, that can wait. But surely the effect of Islamic Republicanism in muslim-ruled portion of India would be interesting, successful or not the idea will fare there. My suspicion is that, India will be more resistant.

There may be a Europe update first, but the Safavid, Romanov and Mughal empires are due for some focus very soon. And as in every universe, governance ideologies (such as republicanism) will not be specific or monolithic to any religion. The oriental Muslim empires may very well prove to be hostile to such innovative, Berber republicanism. The Ottomans represent the farthest East that the Moors have a continuous socio/geopolitical connection in the Islamic world.

 

[Ridwan Asher]

Glad I hit two boards

To the east, Ottoman Empire maybe the farthest. But after expanding towards California, I have no doubt that Bayouk will see their future in the west. Meaning the Far East. Actual trade relations with China is already there, and with that alone they're already seeing Indonesians coming. I said it myself that we'll see more Chinese migration then Indonesian muslims, but I also noted that the later's number will be significant as well. And the connection surely will go beyond that. Who knows if the Moors will deem a physical political presence to fit their interest in the region ? For that, Philippines is an obvious stop.(Though perhaps China will also want that as well, and they're closer). Should that be the case, they're going to get involved into East Indian affairs, like it or not. And in that context, their interaction with the Anglo-Dutch presence in the archipelago will be obvious enough. What does it mean for Indonesians however, of course will depend on themselves too. I think by now the first Java War (that is, the Chinese War. The Diponegoro one was the second) has already passed. And anyway, Javanese will face the english as well as the Dutch here, so unless the Sultan would have more resolve, he'll have even less chance to win. If he does win though, that means a Java free of colonial yoke. Meaning a potential ally for Bayouk. But either way, Bayouk will be a factor in Islamic South East Asia.

In the case without a regional base for Bayouk in Asia, it will still mean communication trade activity that goes both ways, but with the english in the middle, putting the Indonesians under their discretion with Bayouk having little to do over it. While politically and economically it means less drastic change form OTL(though it's still big), it might still be of indirect cultural and social consequences for the other side of Pacific. Might we shall see Javanese fleeing to Bayouk from colonial rule. Or perhaps, once Slavery of the Africans becomes no longer possible the english will turn to Javanese for sources of legal labor replenishment in their new world possessions.

Oh and one more thing : since both VOC and HEIC are now living under the same roof, how are they interacting with each other ?

 

[Ridwan Asher]

There may be a Europe update first, but the Safavid, Romanov and Mughal empires are due for some focus very soon. And as in every universe, governance ideologies (such as republicanism) will not be specific or monolithic to any religion. The oriental Muslim empires may very well prove to be hostile to such innovative, Berber republicanism.

On this subject, I might note that rather then minority-rule-over-majority lay-base on which the Mughal empire is built on, Moorish Republicanism might potentially slips better into Maratha's Astha Pradhan

On the other hand, while Persia itself adheres to Persian-style Autocracy, she is different in quite many ways from the Mughals in India. The OTL case of Islamic Republic has a lot to do with the country's interaction with the west, western influence and ideas, but the role of local Shiite ulema is also as essential, if not more so. I remember that OTL Ulema-Baazar axis was only crystallized in 19th century, but I can see how it can form earlier with incitement by the right inspiration. Other factors to consider are that Shiite Ulema has been more priestly and politically stronger then their Sunni counterpart, Persian population is majority muslim, and that Ottoman and Persian Empires forms something of an intellectual bund between them. Iran went with Kemalist experimentation soon after Kemal in Turkey started his. While I don't think Persia falling into republicanism is inevitable, but once the Ottomans go down, it'll be very vulnerable and tense.

 

[Zireael]

A War of Ottoman Succession?

...

This is getting better and better!

 

[Ridwan Asher]

Another thing I'm looking forward to discover is the ultimate political and administrative transformation within the post-Ottoman empire. It will be nothing like Tanzimat, which was a wholesale importation of French centralization model to consolidate and rebuild the almost-collapsing empire along the European lines. Also, it can be said to be happening at an territorial, economical and military peak of the empire, so the empire will be both less vulnerable to outside incursion and internal devolution, though obviously both of this will still be a serious problem. Prior to Tanzimat, even before the Byzantine devolution of military command to local janissary "thematas", Ottomans were pretty pragmatic on territorial expansion, preferring to settle with vassalage when possible or even peaceful acquisition, when possible. Without a situation as dire as OTL transition from 18th to 19th century and the coincidental rise of the west that runs on the side, I think whatever new regime will arise from the civil war won't as likely have as much disdain for autonomous provinces and vassals in the peripheries, or at least will not be for the same reasons. It's assuming that outlying provinces and vassals such as Barbary States, Egypt, etc. will simply stay within the empire instead of leaving it, but I don't see why not, even if it's not a given. Basically, I'd like to see how these vassals will perceive the civil war and their place in it. I'm not asking for spoilers now, but I just think this part is worth mentioning, since one of the points of this TL is evolutionary progress of governmental philosophy and ideology development that originates and runs through a cultural tradition besides the west. And in which the Islamic polities will receive the first hand experience of.

 

[Essam]

Glad I hit two boards

To the east, Ottoman Empire maybe the farthest. But after expanding towards California, I have no doubt that Bayouk will see their future in the west. Meaning the Far East.
...
But either way, Bayouk will be a factor in Islamic South East Asia.

I think the "orientation" of a Bayouk - a country so firmly rooted in North America with primordial ties to North Africa and Europe; as well as extensive trade ties (already centuries-old by the mid-18th century) with the East Indies as well - will come to be what forms "tendency" politics (in whatever form that may be), as we have already scene in the Scene of the Three Pashas:

1. There is a historical current, popular with the masses and perhaps less popular with certain Atlantean elites, who view Bayouk and Moorish North America as perpetually an extension of the Maghreb: fervently loyal to the Saadian Sultan, now resident in Mahdia, viewing him as rightful king of the other four Morocco kingdoms, now ever-more centralized into a single polity under the Alaouites, but nevertheless still there.

2. There is a historical Berber current, represented mainly by the Atlanteans who are now the political elite, with a disdain for the sultanic nizam, and who view Bayouk as THE future power of the New World, with extensive trade ties to Songhai and the East Indies as well as Protestant Europe and the New World (we will see, in time, the realization of the potential of the Spanish colonies as well, especially as the Bourbon Reforms take place, some normalization takes place between Spain and Bayouk, and taking into account the linguistic ties many Baywani elites have with the Spaniards yet.)

3. There is also, naturally, an unexplored, popular with the masses, nativist tendency, which I assume would be equally influenced by the prior tendencies from the first being the the collective memory of expulsion twice, and from the second, being a New World society; as well as influenced by the still-present indigenous memory and maintained tribal identity amongst the Adite tribes. I could see this emerging amongst the upper-strata of the Muladid, popular classes as they emerge with industrialization.

In the case without a regional base for Bayouk in Asia, it will still mean communication trade activity that goes both ways, but with the english in the middle, putting the Indonesians under their discretion with Bayouk having little to do over it. While politically and economically it means less drastic change form OTL(though it's still big), it might still be of indirect cultural and social consequences for the other side of Pacific. Might we shall see Javanese fleeing to Bayouk from colonial rule. Or perhaps, once Slavery of the Africans becomes no longer possible the english will turn to Javanese for sources of legal labor replenishment in their new world possessions.

Due to the unique, and initially laissez-faire policies of the Moroccan governors in Bayouk, the Atlantean trade network in Songhai and SE Asia is rather independent of policy, and much like the early European Indies companies I assume. (We will explore the role of maona in Atlantean/Baywani trade overseas.) So amongst these historically independent traders there is much less need for a base, and the unofficial primordial networks in Songhai (with the Touareg and Berber middlemen becoming more and more influential in that empire, partially due to their extensive slave trade with Atlantis, and due to their connections in the light industry being established in Algiers) as well as Muslim primordial networks in SE Asia playing the major role in cooperating trade and relations.

If any "base" or plantation or proto-colony situation emerges, I assume it will be in North Africa. Though, like British India, this is emerging because Atlantean traders, with primordial connections to Berber populations in Algiers and Oran and Constantine and Kabyle, will see it more efficient to establish factories and produce lightly goods there with material from Songhai specifically for sale in Europe and the Ottoman East (seen as Songhai controls the trans-Saharan trade between Algiers and Qao, and Morocco is an unfriendly power to Bayouk.) This is still independent, though, of any "policies" being made in Mahdia (indeed it might in the future be realized by the political power in Bayouk that industrialization in North Africa takes away from factories in Bayouk.) But that is still a while away, Bayouk still needs to figure out what she is, exactly, and what her role is, and who will lead her.

Oh and one more thing : since both VOC and HEIC are now living under the same roof, how are they interacting with each other ?

I suppose I should put this question to the experts. It is no surprise that I intend to permanently unite the kingdoms. Is it plausible, after, say, a century, to see an Act of Union? And of the VOC and HEIC, would they likely merge, cooperation, split areas of influence?

On this subject, I might note that rather then minority-rule-over-majority lay-base on which the Mughal empire is built on, Moorish Republicanism might potentially slips better into Maratha's Astha Pradhan.

This has come to my attention. To what extent the Marathas could be familiar with Moorish republicanism (which is still an incomplete idea, but likely to be seen by the East, as in the Ottoman Empire, as a form of government where a clerical-mercantile-military alliance could render the monarchy/makhzen of a Muslim empire to a figurehead status and take de facto control) I am not sure. I believe, for now, the values of a republican system as an ideology will be worked out in Bayouk, but I see the model being more just merely instrumentalised elsewhere, at least for now.

On the other hand, while Persia itself adheres to Persian-style Autocracy, she is different in quite many ways from the Mughals in India. The OTL case of Islamic Republic has a lot to do with the country's interaction with the west, western influence and ideas, but the role of local Shiite ulema is also as essential, if not more so. I remember that OTL Ulema-Baazar axis was only crystallized in 19th century, but I can see how it can form earlier with incitement by the right inspiration. Other factors to consider are that Shiite Ulema has been more priestly and politically stronger then their Sunni counterpart, Persian population is majority muslim, and that Ottoman and Persian Empires forms something of an intellectual bund between them. Iran went with Kemalist experimentation soon after Kemal in Turkey started his. While I don't think Persia falling into republicanism is inevitable, but once the Ottomans go down, it'll be very vulnerable and tense.

I agree that Persia is in a continuum with the Ottomans, but also with the Mughals. I think ITTL we will see the Ottomans become more firmly involved in the Western Muslim sphere due to its extensive European holdings, the necessity of maintaining a permanent detente with the Habsburgs, and a reliance on maintained Anglo-Ottoman relations to check Spain and France and maintain contact with Bayouk further West.

Don't forget, Nader Shah era saw the demand for Jaafarism to be recognized by Constantinople as a Fifth Madhab of Islam, so the Sunni/Shiite split is not, as of yet, so pronounced, and both may influence each other, and therefore produce a more varied, yet more unified, concept of Islam.

While I will address the Ottoman situation briefly in the update, the update concerning Persia will also be tied with the Mughals, Maratha, Khiva and Bukhara, which I hope will emphasisze this area of the world becoming rather independent, in that we will see, for a few centuries, an "East/West" line (regardless of religion) at the Ottoman/Safavid border (where-ever that ends up.)

A War of Ottoman Succession?

...

This is getting better and better!

The name "War of Ottoman Succession" is too good to pass, and I think I'll use it, but whether or not it is actually a full-on war is yet to be seen.

Another thing I'm looking forward to discover is the ultimate political and administrative transformation within the post-Ottoman empire. It will be nothing like Tanzimat, which was a wholesale importation of French centralization model to consolidate and rebuild the almost-collapsing empire along the European lines....

Yes. The "War of Ottoman Succession" (however it ends up playing out) will see a massive reformation within a still-strong empire. While the social situation has been highlighted as seemingly frayed, we must understand these are the issues of a new wealthy class versus an established one. The Janissaries are still powerful, and perhaps even better equipped than OTL as we could probably see them maintaing technological developments due to ties with Britain, Bayouk and Holland; the government itself will be much more centralized than OTL Ottomans were in 1750 as the previous update describes; we are seeing a partial earlier incorporation of "Ottoman Christians" as a source of influence without being converted slaves, and we will see a new dynasty and new political ideas developed within an Islamic narrative introduced. I think the mercantile nature of the crisis about to come will guarantee a larger role for the guilds, as well as the military. We will see how the Ulema will play their cards, and whoever is the next sultan will certainly leave a lasting impact.

It's assuming that outlying provinces and vassals such as Barbary States, Egypt, etc. will simply stay within the empire instead of leaving it, but I don't see why not, even if it's not a given. Basically, I'd like to see how these vassals will perceive the civil war and their place in it. I'm not asking for spoilers now, but I just think this part is worth mentioning, since one of the points of this TL is evolutionary progress of governmental philosophy and ideology development that originates and runs through a cultural tradition besides the west. And in which the Islamic polities will receive the first hand experience of.

We have already seen Algiers go the way of OTL Algiers Regency in guaranteeing its own autonomy, plus a little bit like OTL Mohammed Ali Egypt, establishing itself as a dynasty (as it has assumed the throne of Songhai.) While there is no conflicts as of now about how this situation works (Algiers being of little importance to the Ottomans, but a key port of the Songhai) at the time being, the Sultan of Songhai rules Songhai by divine right, but rules Algiers yet at the pleasure of the Ottoman sultan.

As Bayouk centralizes and imposes itself on the world stage, and as Songhai industrializes, and as the Ottomans are relegated to a more Central/Eastern European power than an Atlantic or western-european one, we will see the Muslim imperial patronage of Bayouk in the Med. switch to Algiers-Songhai, which will have serious reprecussions for the rest of Ottoman Barbary, which will surely want to cast their lot with the Algiers-Songhai/Bayouk axis due to existent trade patterns and primordial ties. Where we may see conflict between Bayouk and their Algerine-Songhai patrons and Barbary allies against the post-Ottomans would be, in the heart of the "Mother of the World" herself: Egypt.

 

[Ridwan Asher]

I wasn't suggesting about Bayouk shifting to identify itself with Asia. United States of our world has always been a western nation part of European continuum, yet it saw and still sees opportunity for rewarding intervention in western Pacific. But I see now that there isn't much overlap between the traders and the state, but this certainly can't go on forever. I think I'm at fault for clinging into European conventional notion of merchantile imperialism, but if not the European form we all know, Moorish traders, and perhaps in extension the muslim traders, will find a way to latch into the state and have it support their enterprises overseas. In one way or another, Bayouk is going to be a player in Eastern Asia.

Your design for North Africa is crazy! There's no way it won't become a precedent. However my Ottomanophile heart is saddened to see Ottomans must be sacrificed for all this.

On Anglo-Dutch Union, I'm one of the skeptics. Both England and Netherlands were exactly those nations where the government is the vehicle for merchantile interests. Perhaps a permanent alliance could be reached, and merchantile class of both nations will reach a compromise(or one party subduing another) in some way. But I see a lot of obstructions going against that eventuality. For one thing, Netherlands will become a strategic geopolitical burden for England, like Hannover, perhaps more so. And in European westphalian and capitalist context, businesses of the major magnates have shaped the national economy so much in the way they have become the raison d'etre of their government. Clash between an english company and a dutch company for profit literally means collision between England and Netherlands. If the business dictates the states to be enemies, they will become enemies. Containing this will be take lot of work and time that won't necessarily outlast the frictions, and will likely involve coercion and most certainly sacrifice. This is an obvious fact of life in our world, but in the light of Bayouk's situation, I think a comparison would be appropriate. I'm not the one to be asked about how to straighten English and Dutch interests in line with each other. The only suggestion I can give you is to chop as much overlap zone of activity as possible. Britain can't thrive where the Dutch do, and vice versa. I don't know if this would be enough.

Indeed it's hard to imagine the Marathas will even care about Bayouk's ideology of governance before it will acquire a measure of prestige and fame. But Mughal's dislike of the idea should be able to play into that.

Frankly you last update didn't illustrate so much on the process of centralization. Have I missed it in the previous Ottoman updates ?

 

[Ridwan Asher]

As Bayouk centralizes and imposes itself on the world stage, and as Songhai industrializes, and as the Ottomans are relegated to a more Central/Eastern European power than an Atlantic or western-european one, we will see the Muslim imperial patronage of Bayouk in the Med. switch to Algiers-Songhai, which will have serious reprecussions for the rest of Ottoman Barbary, which will surely want to cast their lot with the Algiers-Songhai/Bayouk axis due to existent trade patterns and primordial ties. Where we may see conflict between Bayouk and their Algerine-Songhai patrons and Barbary allies against the post-Ottomans would be, in the heart of the "Mother of the World" herself: Egypt.

Will the Barbary States really like to see Bayouk growing more imposing on their backyard ? Well, by this point it shouldn't be obvious. But if they will break the post-Ottomans too hard, I wonder who else they will go to for counterweight against Bayouk later on.