Make the Confederacy win by changing only British politics

[Fiver]

I'm at a loss as to how a paragraph concerning John Roebuck's self destruction relates to my assertion with regards to Confederate battlefield success or, perhaps more importantly, the Roebuck Motion in 1863 relates at all to the main point at hand of British intervention in the Fall of 1862. As for the situation at hand then:

Two sentences after your screencap of page 290 ends, the source says "British observers were shocked by the South's poor showing, for they had hoped for another military success that would have compelled the North to accept mediation." This source shows that the British considered offering mediation, not armed intervention in support of the Confederacy.

British would-be interventionists should not have been surprised that the Confederacy lost at Antietam. Lee had no chance of winning at Antietam and should never have fought the battle. Any other commander of the Army of the Potomac probably would have crippled the Army of Northern Virginia.

 

[Fiver]

*Prince Albert dies 10 days early
*Seward gets advanced warning of more belligerent Palmerston response
*Lincoln feels he can not offer moderate compromise without appearing weak and stalls for time to defuse the situation
*Meanwhile Winfield Scott arrives in France, Napoleon III gives 'credit blanque' to UK, backing whatever play they make
*Seward sends vague reply and releases captives but no apology, Palmerston feels this is insufficient and replies to this effect
*Tensions flare as Confederates focus on Dranesville, exaggerating casualties and its proximity to Washington
*With Stonewall Jackson shelling (Hancock) Maryland from (West) Virginia before the situation is resolved, UK elects to intervene on 12 January 1862
*By mid-1863 Confederacy gains independence, never having lost New Orleans. Maryland secedes, Vandalia is still a Confederate state, Missouri is split in two, and Confederate territories number three in the West. Kentucky may/not hold and there are minor other changes (Delmarva, etc.) but the bigger changes come as Mexican Republican troops lacking US support are defeated at Guyamas in 1864.

Most of this series of alternate events is probable, though even if the Trent incident ignites a war the UK probably wouldn't chose armed intervention that quickly. At least some of the British Cabinet would feel the release the release of Mason and Slidell and the vague reply would be enough. There would be debate as Palmerston would have to convince these people that there was still grounds for a war. If Britain does intervene militarily, the CSA might gain their independence by 1863, but I see no reason why this would lead to Maryland joining the Confederacy. By Vandalia, I guess you are meaning West Virginia. In OTL, not even Robert E Lee could take it away from the Union, so I don't see why the CSA would be able to gain it.

 

[Fiver]

I'm at a loss because you're making claims in direct contradiction of what you previously said:

At no point have I made claims that directly contradict my previous posts.

IGettysburg is only mentioned once, with nothing being said about them expecting the Confederates to win or that they refused intervention on the basis of that; in fact it notes the motion was tabled before news of Gettysburg even arrived in England. What your citation does say, however, is that Roebuck had a meltdown and this was the cause.

I cited 4 sources, not 1. I did not say that the British expected the Confederates to win at Gettysburg. I did not say that the British refused to intervene because the Confederates lost. I said that the motion was withdrawn "without it being voted on, four days before news of a battle at Gettysburg reached Britain, and six days before the British knew the Confederacy had lost the battle".

 

[Fiver]

You've repeatedly cited a single source while I responded with two. To claim I'm ignoring evidence when I've cited a more varied historiography to support my assertion is utterly baseless, and it's very telling you've continued to extol your single source instead of attempted to respond to the ones I've posted. I also find it telling you've left out portions of your own source such as this one:

Palmerston also urged caution. On September 22 he advised Russell that Britain should await the outcome of the battle looming north of Washington and suggested that it would be premature to hold a Cabinet session on Russell's proposal before news arrived. Palmerston thought that northern determination would not flag until the northern army was "thoroughly beaten" and Baltimore had joined the Confederate cause. Then, he thought, northern leaders "may be brought to a more reasonable State of Mind." The next day Palmerston, after accepting Russell's general plan and suggesting that Russia be invited to enter the scheme, added, "If the Federals sustain a great Defeat they may be at once ready for Mediation and the Iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they should have the best of it we may wait awhile and see what may follow." On September 26 Russell wrote Cowley and Palmerston wrote Charles de Flahaut, French ambassador to the Court of St. James's, advising them of this position

Which rather decisively support my case.

You have assumed I was deliberately avoiding answering you and deliberately omitting parts of my own sources that might disagree with me. I have not responded to your posts before today because I did not read them before today. I my not have fully quoted British Mediation and the American Civil War: A Reconsideration by Kinley J. Brauer , but my summarization was not a deliberate omission.

The section you quote does not support your claim that "You really just need a major victory in battle by Confederate arms; the politics of 1862/1863 were conducive to intervention." It shows that Palmerston was considering offering mediation, not armed intervention.