Look to the West Volume VII: The Eye Against the Prism

xsampa

Banned
From a rationalism/Marxist/neoliberal perspective it seems that since technological and economic conditions underlay and frequently destroy cultural and political conditions, isn’t diversitarianism an artificial waystation to global unity since somebody’s going to invent an internet which will create a sense of global culture and eventually perhaps a world creole will be born that will take the place of English
 

xsampa

Banned
In a sense, self-Westernization was the product of local elites who wanted them and their countries to be taken seriously. Even now, there is a push for Global English (or at least EFL) in places like Algeria and Uzbekistan. Of course, this is a result of US/UK dominance and the various conflicts of the 20th century screwing everyone _but_ the US over. So in a sense, from the rise of the British empire onwards, you get this cumulative trend to cultural convergence
 
In a sense, self-Westernization was the product of local elites who wanted them and their countries to be taken seriously. Even now, there is a push for Global English (or at least EFL) in places like Algeria and Uzbekistan. Of course, this is a result of US/UK dominance and the various conflicts of the 20th century screwing everyone _but_ the US over. So in a sense, from the rise of the British empire onwards, you get this cumulative trend to cultural convergence
I think that in both Algeria and Uzbekistan, the thing about English is not particularly about self-Westernization, and more about it not being French or Russian respectively. That is, having access to a global language which is not the one of the colonizer. English happens to be the most prominent global language, so the obvious way to "decolonize" while keeping access to the global system is promoting it as a foreign language.
Algeria of course has the option of another global language (Arabic) but to be fair, Arabicization programs in post-colonial Algeria had... issues.
 
Reading about the Taiping and Spanish Civil War has me thinking: What exactly is the Feng vision for Chinese civilization? And is it any broader than Guangdong?

Of course society is still going to be influenced by traditional moral codes and religion, that's not just going to be obliterated, but in politics... although the Feng aren't burning down ancestral temples like the Taiping, they have rejected Confucianism as an inspiration for governance. Although the Feng aren't Christian, they probably allow missionaries to mill around Hanjing and Shanghai if not the great inner reaches of China. And although the Feng look to the Ming as a source of legitimacy and an example of "Chinese monarchy done right" their monarchy arose out of a very different social group (urban guildsmen rather than peasants) and seems unlikely to move to Beijing. They really don't resemble the Ming very much besides being a Han group overthrowing the rule of a foreign group. And maybe it's fine to root Chineseness near-exclusively in race during a time when the Feng realm is just southern China, and it still works during the period of northern expansion as the Feng achieve battlefield victories and economic development.

But now the Feng are up for an era of not-very-glamorous work-- they have to integrate the impoverished former Qing lands with the rest of the country, develop a sense of self that can fit within Diversitarianism and resist Societism, and deal with the economic fallout of the Black Twenties. And when people (influenced by Diversitarianism or not) look back at the Unification Wars, they might see it as the Chinese race squaring off against the Chinese civilization. We've heard about the Feng funding this and buying that in India, but have they repaired the imperial temples in Beijing, or Confucius's birthplace in Shandong? Even if they have repaired this or that site, the Yellow River cities and villages around the temples, which were once central to Chinese civilization, are now part of the hinterland*. Meanwhile the Feng keep their capital in Guangzhou, from where they can easily interact with the Chinese diaspora of Southeast Asia and the wider world. But that diaspora, TTL and OTL, is probably majority South Chinese. Of course, this sentiment doesn't have to lead to nostalgia for the Later Qing-- there is nothing to be nostalgic about. But questions about traditionalism may be a way to express concern about whether the Feng really care about all of China, or if certain regions (northerners) or classes (subsistence farmers without much relevance to international trade) are always going to be on the back burner when it comes to policy/ideology. Maybe, some may argue, there's a connection between the abandonment of traditional ideals about service not being about profit and instead about paternalistic care for the downtrodden, and the Feng embrace of an oligarchic progressivism where profit is a totally valid reason to do things, but only family/hometown connections can help you attain it...

The Feng would also have difficulty appealing to non-Chinese minorities. Not that the Tibetans and Mongols can secede exactly-- but a costly insurgency could be possible. Kham raiders in Sichuan and Qinghai, maybe. And the Mongols... the Later Qing put them through hell. If the Feng don't meaningfully demonstrate that their vision of China is different, why would they want any part of it? But unfortunately, the Feng have based their Chineseness in race. Which will also be difficult for the Vietnamese to accept.

I guess what I'm trying to say here is: Hong Rengan dreamed of a China where everything runs like it does in Hong Kong. And maybe we can look at China today and go "well, that's not as crazy as it sounds." But in the 1920s, in a very different China, there should still be something strange about making southern-coast cities into the ideal for an enormous, diverse, and very old country. And that feeling would be strongest in the region of China that has only begun to experience it.

*Was it ever explained what happened to the Grand Canal? Beijing depended on shipments of rice up the canal, but who's exporting rice during the Unification Wars? If the Feng still tried to maintain the Canal, did anyone ever consider choking off this support at a critical time or was this considered immoral/damaging to southern rice exporters? Either way it's inevitable that Beijing experienced one or two big food shortages over the 1800s, which would just add to its underdevelopment and resentment.
 
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xsampa

Banned
Reading about the Taiping and Spanish Civil War has me thinking: What exactly is the Feng vision for Chinese civilization? And is it any broader than Guangdong?

Of course society is still going to be influenced by traditional moral codes and religion, that's not just going to be obliterated, but in politics... although the Feng aren't burning down ancestral temples like the Taiping, they have rejected Confucianism as an inspiration for governance. Although the Feng aren't Christian, they probably allow missionaries to mill around Hanjing and Shanghai if not the great inner reaches of China. And although the Feng look to the Ming as a source of legitimacy and an example of "Chinese monarchy done right" their monarchy arose out of a very different social group (urban guildsmen rather than peasants) and seems unlikely to move to Beijing. They really don't resemble the Ming very much besides being a Han group overthrowing the rule of a foreign group. And maybe it's fine to root Chineseness near-exclusively in race during a time when the Feng realm is just southern China, and it still works during the period of northern expansion as the Feng achieve battlefield victories and economic development.

But now the Feng are up for an era of not-very-glamorous work-- they have to integrate the impoverished former Qing lands with the rest of the country, develop a sense of self that can fit within Diversitarianism and resist Societism, and deal with the economic fallout of the Black Twenties. And when people look back at the Unification Wars, they might see it as the Chinese race squaring off against the Chinese civilization. We've heard about the Feng funding this and buying that in India, but have they repaired the imperial temples in Beijing, or Confucius's birthplace in Shandong? Even if they have repaired this or that site, the Yellow River cities and villages around the temples, which were once central to Chinese civilization, are now part of the hinterland*. Meanwhile the Feng keep their capital in Guangzhou, from where they can easily interact with the Chinese diaspora of Southeast Asia and the wider world. But that diaspora, TTL and OTL, is probably majority South Chinese. Of course, this sentiment doesn't have to lead to nostalgia for the Later Qing-- there is nothing to be nostalgic about. But questions about traditionalism may be a way to express concern about whether the Feng really care about all of China, or if certain regions (northerners) or classes (subsistence farmers without much relevance to international trade) are always going to be on the back burner when it comes to policy/ideology. Maybe, just maybe, there's a connection between the abandonment of traditional ideals about service not being about profit and instead about paternalistic care for the downtrodden, and the Feng embrace of an oligarchic progressivism where profit is a totally valid reason to do things, but only family/hometown connections can help you attain it...

The Feng would also have difficulty appealing to non-Chinese minorities. Not that the Tibetans and Mongols can secede exactly-- but a costly insurgency could be possible. Kham raiders in Sichuan and Qinghai, maybe. And the Mongols... the Later Qing put them through hell. If the Feng don't meaningfully demonstrate that their vision of China is different, why would they want any part of it? But unfortunately, the Feng have based their Chineseness in race.

*Was it ever explained what happened to the Grand Canal? Beijing depended on shipments of rice up the canal, but who's exporting rice during the Unification Wars? If the Feng still tried to maintain the Canal, did anyone ever consider choking off this support at a critical time or was this considered immoral/damaging to southern rice exporters? What I'm saying is that it's inevitable that Beijing experienced one or two big food shortages over the 1800s, which would just add to its underdevelopment and resentment.
This may lead to a movement for Chinese republicanism, particularly in the North
 
And the Mongols... the Later Qing put them through hell. If the Feng don't meaningfully demonstrate that their vision of China is different, why would they want any part of it?

How many Mongolians are in 1922 Feng China? Outer Mongolia was annexed by Russia after the Beiqing's collapse. Does Inner Mongolia have a siginificant Mongolian population?
 
How many Mongolians are in 1922 Feng China? Outer Mongolia was annexed by Russia after the Beiqing's collapse. Does Inner Mongolia have a siginificant Mongolian population?
Even today there's over twice as many Mongols in Inner Mongolia as Outer Mongolia. And the border line on the map seems to be much farther north than the OTL China-Mongolia border. Even with all that, they may only number only a few million-- but it's still enough to cause problems with Feng governance
This may lead to a movement for Chinese republicanism, particularly in the North
I don't know if it would be republicanism. There'd definitely be concerns about arbitrary power and inequality. But the cultural side of a northern movement (and it doesn't have to be just the north, there's probably millions of people in the South left out of Feng progress because schools/roads haven't reached them yet, or because they don't benefit much from international trade and even stand to lose from it) may tend toward essentialism. For the Carlists and Falangists, the definition of Spanishness more or less was Catholicism. Spain couldn't not be Catholic, and if liberals or communists seemed to be taking it in that direction then something had to be done and it didn't much matter if it took a monarchy or a republic or a military dictatorship to do it. A vibrant new religious movement may leverage this, and China is no stranger to new religious movements.
Of course this all depends on whether groups aggrieved at the Feng really care much about traditionalism for its own sake in the way northern Spain's smallholders did. The Later Qing was probably a feudal mess that used tradition to cover for its abuses against its population (and the Feng aren't really hostile to tradition, at most they just don't really care for it). Maybe essentialism is popular among the Northern Chinese upper/middle classes but the mass movements turn out more Mentian or even Societist, if inequality is such a pressing concern that it overwhelms culture
 
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xsampa

Banned
I wonder if the Sunrise War and the weakness of the Feng government to keep Japan from becoming Societist may be the last straw.
 

xsampa

Banned
Montenegro is marked as independent in 1922 but it doesn’t appear in the Microstates of Europe chapter. Maybe it was absorbed? It would be ironic if the only Serbian speaking state wasn’t Serbia.

MAYBE the eternal state tolerates Serbian Christians like how Iran sorta semi tolerates Armenian Christians
 

xsampa

Banned
Re: China

Whatever movement takes over will very likely acquiesce to losing Annam and India because they are very much not Chinese, and will not welcome them because of that. We haven’t seen mentions of Indian immigrants to China, unlike for England or France, and Panchala, Berar, Kashmir et. al. seem to be unwilling to let their citizens leave anyways.
 
I wonder if the newly annex Qing states will have the same relationship as otl East Germany after reunification, as in culturally the same but has creat its own permanent quarks and poorer then the west german provinces. I can imagine that but the difference more pronounced since the Qing states have been separated for much longer then otl east Germany.
 
Montenegro is marked as independent in 1922 but it doesn’t appear in the Microstates of Europe chapter. Maybe it was absorbed? It would be ironic if the only Serbian speaking state wasn’t Serbia.

MAYBE the eternal state tolerates Serbian Christians like how Iran sorta semi tolerates Armenian Christians
Montenegro isn't a 'micro-state.'
 

xsampa

Banned
Montenegro is marked as independent in 1922 but it doesn’t appear in the Microstates of Europe chapter. Maybe it was absorbed? It would be ironic if the only Serbian speaking state wasn’t Serbia.

MAYBE the eternal state tolerates Serbian Christians like how Iran sorta semi tolerates Armenian Christians
Checks notes. Ragusa
 
Montenegro is marked as independent in 1922 but it doesn’t appear in the Microstates of Europe chapter.
Checks notes. Ragusa

It is there.

...also known as Dubrovnik. Eighty thousand citizens now dwell in the tiny republic which has survived through an accident of history. Originally founded as a refuge for Roman/Byzantine refugees fleeing the barbarian-destroyed city of Epidaurum (today known as Cavtat, derived from the Latin Civitas Vetus or ‘old city’), Ragusa has defied the odds of history to exist for almost one and a half thousand years. Its survival has been accomplished largely by its rulers, the Rectors (an office also known as Rettore in Italian and Knez in Croatian) successfully playing off the huge surrounding powers against one another. This was sufficiently effective that Ragusa has survived even while those powers have risen, fallen and been replaced. The twentieth century seemed to be a time of particular peril for the republic as most of its neighbours for once became part of the same power bloc, but Ragusa was saved by its unique fusion of Italian and Croatian culture which led to a desire by ideological Diversitarians to defend it. This defence tided the nation over until Vienna and Constantinople (as we may now once again call them) split over the revisionism controversy. Today Ragusa has much less of a feel of an armed camp and is fully open once again to tourism. Though full democracy came to the republic in the late nineteenth century when it joined the League of the Isles, the trappings of the old mediaeval state are retained and the elected ruler is still called the Rector. Besides those who enjoy seeing such a collision of history and present day, the beautiful Dalmatian sea coast is well worth a visit for sun worshippers.
 
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