TFSmith121
Banned
True, and thanks
Yes, I usually try to carry the title sentence over to the first paragraph in the body of the post, but I missed it. Thanks.
On the like-with-like, however, there are some pretty significant differences between the resources/goals of a ROUNDUP/OVERLORD analog (in '43 or '44) and both SHINGLE and Gallipoli.
SHINGLE was - essentially - designed as a flanking move/amphibious envelopment for 5th Army's overland drive; for a variety of reasons, however, it was too far north of the 15th AG's line to really function as such, and it was too weak to provide a separate line of advance - hence the stalemate until spring (launching SHINGLE in winter didn't help, of course).
Gallipoli is different because the assault force, once it went ashore, was essentially still horse-drawn; the differences in tactical and operational maneuver with a motorized force like the 21st AG was night and day.
In a lot of ways, the situation the Allied commanders at Gallipoli - in terms of technique once the landing force was ashore - had more in common with the Chileans at Quintero Bay in 1891 or the Americans at Santiago in 1898.
Best,
True, though I think to compare like-with-like we have to use other amphibious operations. Anzio took four months, Gallipoli just plain didn't undergo the transition, and it's hard to come up with other examples from pre-Overlord.
Also, just as a friendly note, if you title your posts and they're part of a sentence then please re-state the sentence in the body. It's easier to follow if you don't have a sentence split between title and body
Yes, I usually try to carry the title sentence over to the first paragraph in the body of the post, but I missed it. Thanks.
On the like-with-like, however, there are some pretty significant differences between the resources/goals of a ROUNDUP/OVERLORD analog (in '43 or '44) and both SHINGLE and Gallipoli.
SHINGLE was - essentially - designed as a flanking move/amphibious envelopment for 5th Army's overland drive; for a variety of reasons, however, it was too far north of the 15th AG's line to really function as such, and it was too weak to provide a separate line of advance - hence the stalemate until spring (launching SHINGLE in winter didn't help, of course).
Gallipoli is different because the assault force, once it went ashore, was essentially still horse-drawn; the differences in tactical and operational maneuver with a motorized force like the 21st AG was night and day.
In a lot of ways, the situation the Allied commanders at Gallipoli - in terms of technique once the landing force was ashore - had more in common with the Chileans at Quintero Bay in 1891 or the Americans at Santiago in 1898.
Best,