Tyr Anazasi
Banned
6 weeks are way not enough for her. If she did, she might get lost due to a malfunction of crew and/or equipment.
Jutland Redux- A shattering summer solstice
- Thread starter johnboy
- Start date
6 weeks are way not enough for her. If she did, she might get lost due to a malfunction of crew and/or equipment.
Hoods thoughts
0316, North Sea, 22 June 1916
Sleep would not come for Rear Admiral Horace Hood. He had a number of concerns over the practices and composition of Beatty's battlecruiser force, some over the Grand Fleet as a whole. In particular, for the battlecruiser force, a lack of opportunity to practice gunnery, with no ranges available near their main base, Rosyth. For that reason alone, he had taken every opportunity available to avail his own command of such opportunities and his own ships had only returned to Rosyth from Scapa Flow after such practice of the 14th.
His own three ships of the Invincible Class were the weakest in Beatty's force. They mounted the same 8 12inch Mark X guns as their near sisters of the Indefatigable Class, however, the amidships turrets of the Invincible Class ships were positioned too close together in the interests of saving weight and therefore speed and this did not allow them to fire across the deck, reducing the broadside to six guns only. The Invincible Class ships were poorly protected by a waterline belt of only 6 inches, itself only running from the rear X turret to just forward of A turret. Past A turret the belt decreased to only 4 inches. The main battery guns and their supporting barbettes carried only 7 inches and very little of her overall armour was below the waterline. It was quite apparent to Hood that his three ships were delicate beasts.
Nor was that the only concern. RN cordite charges were stored in pairs in metal container in the magazines. The igniters in the charges were protected by a thick paper cover that was removed prior to loading. Hood had seen the crews regularly remove the paper caps in the magazines as opposed to waiting until loading, which was all to often to lead to a trail of propellant all the way from the gun turret to the magazine, a far from ideal practice and he had used his time at Scapa to strictly forbid such a practice one he had become aware of it. It had not, however, spread to the rest of Beatty's command. The Battle of Dogger Bank and it's attendant disappointments had been blamed on the slow rate of fire, yet Hood was more of the opinion that lack of gunnery and signals practice was more to blame. Hood had also made closure of the magazine door except when ammunition was being passed through mandatory. This was not enforced in other ships, again due to a manna for more speed of loading. Ammunition stockpiling outside the magazines was another dangerous practice that had become common, despite the almost loss of the cruiser Kent at Falkland Islands in 1914. It was officially banned by the Admiralty, but widely condoned, especially by Beatty.
Hood was unaware of other lurking problems, firstly, the very nature of the RN propellant charges themselves. They degraded much faster than those of the High Seas Fleet and were therefore much more likely to explode spontaneously. Changes later in the war were to ameliorate these problems, but never completely solve them. Secondly, the quality of heavy shells was not all it should have been. Tests conducted as early as April 1914 showed that there were serious problems with RN armour piercing shells. This showed that the shells could not reliably penetrate heavy armour, even head on at closer ranges. At long ranges where the angle was 30 degrees or more many AP shells disintegrated on even 6 inches of armour. Yet nothing was done with these findings until much later. It was not until later in the war the new "greenboy" shells removed the defective lyddite bursters and shellite was added instead.
No, there were issues to be sure, but one thing the RN had on it's side, Hood was sure, was tradition, training and the will to win. Losing was unthinkable. He had trained his own squadron to what he felt was now it's peak. In any case, weight of metal was always a decisive factor. There was a reason the big battalions always won. Beatty's force would consist of ten ships. If the High Seas Fleet's scouting force was to be encountered, they would have only half that number of ships. This time, unlike Dogger Bank, they would not escape.
Sleep would not come for Rear Admiral Horace Hood. He had a number of concerns over the practices and composition of Beatty's battlecruiser force, some over the Grand Fleet as a whole. In particular, for the battlecruiser force, a lack of opportunity to practice gunnery, with no ranges available near their main base, Rosyth. For that reason alone, he had taken every opportunity available to avail his own command of such opportunities and his own ships had only returned to Rosyth from Scapa Flow after such practice of the 14th.
His own three ships of the Invincible Class were the weakest in Beatty's force. They mounted the same 8 12inch Mark X guns as their near sisters of the Indefatigable Class, however, the amidships turrets of the Invincible Class ships were positioned too close together in the interests of saving weight and therefore speed and this did not allow them to fire across the deck, reducing the broadside to six guns only. The Invincible Class ships were poorly protected by a waterline belt of only 6 inches, itself only running from the rear X turret to just forward of A turret. Past A turret the belt decreased to only 4 inches. The main battery guns and their supporting barbettes carried only 7 inches and very little of her overall armour was below the waterline. It was quite apparent to Hood that his three ships were delicate beasts.
Nor was that the only concern. RN cordite charges were stored in pairs in metal container in the magazines. The igniters in the charges were protected by a thick paper cover that was removed prior to loading. Hood had seen the crews regularly remove the paper caps in the magazines as opposed to waiting until loading, which was all to often to lead to a trail of propellant all the way from the gun turret to the magazine, a far from ideal practice and he had used his time at Scapa to strictly forbid such a practice one he had become aware of it. It had not, however, spread to the rest of Beatty's command. The Battle of Dogger Bank and it's attendant disappointments had been blamed on the slow rate of fire, yet Hood was more of the opinion that lack of gunnery and signals practice was more to blame. Hood had also made closure of the magazine door except when ammunition was being passed through mandatory. This was not enforced in other ships, again due to a manna for more speed of loading. Ammunition stockpiling outside the magazines was another dangerous practice that had become common, despite the almost loss of the cruiser Kent at Falkland Islands in 1914. It was officially banned by the Admiralty, but widely condoned, especially by Beatty.
Hood was unaware of other lurking problems, firstly, the very nature of the RN propellant charges themselves. They degraded much faster than those of the High Seas Fleet and were therefore much more likely to explode spontaneously. Changes later in the war were to ameliorate these problems, but never completely solve them. Secondly, the quality of heavy shells was not all it should have been. Tests conducted as early as April 1914 showed that there were serious problems with RN armour piercing shells. This showed that the shells could not reliably penetrate heavy armour, even head on at closer ranges. At long ranges where the angle was 30 degrees or more many AP shells disintegrated on even 6 inches of armour. Yet nothing was done with these findings until much later. It was not until later in the war the new "greenboy" shells removed the defective lyddite bursters and shellite was added instead.
No, there were issues to be sure, but one thing the RN had on it's side, Hood was sure, was tradition, training and the will to win. Losing was unthinkable. He had trained his own squadron to what he felt was now it's peak. In any case, weight of metal was always a decisive factor. There was a reason the big battalions always won. Beatty's force would consist of ten ships. If the High Seas Fleet's scouting force was to be encountered, they would have only half that number of ships. This time, unlike Dogger Bank, they would not escape.
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Good summary Johnboy on the poor ammo handling procedures in Beatty command -thank the fates that Admiral Hood is there. Also the issues regarding this BC class - Good as a cruiser killer but a no against BB. UK suffer a lot with Cordite issues. If you are even in the UK check out the Royal Gunpowder Mills museum in Waltham Abbey Essex. (In operation for 300 years) Museum gives a good account on the Cordite process.
Keep up the good work
Keep up the good work
I'm just getting back int it a bit. My last two(huge) completed timelines took such an amount of time I'm more easing into these ones. People rave about 5BS, but having three extra ships right from the start will help Beatty's force, since most of his ships suffered the bulk of their hits in the initial engagement. The most efficient ships in the battlecruiser force were Hood's 3BS plus perhaps HMAS Australia, which had ample opportunity before and in the early stages of the war for gunnery practice as a station flagship. OTL none of those ships were there.
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Yes, the Germans had learned their lesson from the near loss of the Seydlitz at Dogger Bank. German charges were, in any case, kept in seal-able brass containers, making them much less susceptible to ignition, however, after Dogger Bank. Ammunition hoists were equipped with automatically closing doors and directives issued that propellant not be stockpiled in the turrets.
The High Seas fleet developed a new propellant in 1905 that was much less liable to ignition than the RN by introducing a stabliser that retarded decomposition. Ships spontaneously blowing up in harbour cause these things to be looked into and prior to that time German propellant was even more unstable that RN. It is interesting that post Jutland both Beatty and Jellicoe whitewashed an Admiralty finding that improper storage was to blame for the loss of the three battlecruisers. None the less, in 1917 a new version of cordite with a chalk based stabliser was developed. It was a long way from "all that", however and it is far from impossible that the loss of HMS Hood many years later could also have been caused by fires causing propellant ignition. As late as 1945, tests conducted to simulate an ammunition "flash" showed RN double base cordite would ignite at 530mm and in some cases even greater distances whilst standard USN single base cordite would only do so from 120mm or less. The (at the time) new USN SPGC flashless propellant would only ignite when the trigger was within 25mm. It's a damning indictment on a navy so well prepared for war in most other areas.
Someone told me many years ago that Tiger's crew was very bad - "jailsweepings" the term used, and that Pelly enforced ammunition handling and storage procedures to a far greater extent than other BCF drivers, whose ships had far more than the authorised numbers of charges, stored dangerously. He just didn't trust his crew. This may have saved the ship IOTL.
Cool trivia and anything that proves to save your ship is a good thing for a RN captain.
Interesting and indicative of a lack of clear thought early in the war by the Admiralty. Giving your newest and most powerful BC a poor crew just negated her good qualities. IIRC her gunnery was appalling even by the standards of the other BCs that didn't get to the gunnery ranges under Hood.
I agree Pelly did the right thing on ammo storage at least. I've always had a fondness for Tiger and wish she had been kept on and updated in the 1930s like the Japanese Kongo class on which she was based.
Archibald
Banned
LMFAO and seconded. Well, what's the problem ? he lived his life like a damn crazy kamikaze and died in a nutty banzai-charge against much superior ships. I can only suppose he wanted to die in a blaze of glory rather than decaying in an hospital bed. There are people like this everywhere, although they are a minority (fortunately !)
Now I want to see a TL where he lived past 1945 and how would he reacts to the Japanese suicidal ground, air and naval attacks.
Hipper's thoughts
0320, 22 June 1916, North Sea
On board Lutzow, Hipper was also contemplating the potentiate weaknesses of his command. There was no question of fighting all of Beatty's battlecruiser force, if, indeed, they were encountered. His own force, consisting as it did of only five ships, was far to outnumbered for that. No, his own task was to draw Beatty's ships back towards Scheer, where they could be engaged, slowed and destroyed under the guns of the High Seas Fleet Main body. The inclusion of Mauve's 2nd Battle squadron, with it's seven slow pre dreadnoughts was, in his mind, scarcely an advantage. They would restrict the fleet to something between 16-17 knot at maximum, however, the decision as to their inclusion had not been his.
He would back his own ships against those of the British any day of the week, however, that was in a one on one fight. It was likely that they would not be fighting one on one and that some of his opponents would likely be shooting at him unmolested by return fire, a sure incentive for good gunnery. His own ships were well armoured, the result of a different design philosophy than that of the RN. In the High Seas Fleet the Scouting group was designed to return to the main body and then fight with it, against enemy dreadnought as normal capital ships. Hence, their armour structure.
Certainly of concern to Hipper was the relative lack of offensive power of his ships. The three old ships all used the 11 inch gun. These, both the L45 in the Von der Tann and the L50 in the later two ships, all fired the 304kg AP shell. It was a reliable enough weapon, but far lighter than the 385kg projectile of the RN 12 inch gunned ships and far less than the 635kg shells of two latest British ships, Tiger and Queen Mary. Only the Derfflinger and Lutzow used the 12inch gun firing 404kg projectile. The 13.5 inch guns of the latest British ships gave them greater range and would likely give them the advantage of firing first. On the flip side, as the range decreased, his own ships 11inch guns would need to close to 13,000 yards or less to penetrate the best armoured RN ships such as Tiger.
Although Hipper's ships were better armoured, they were not immune to damage and one concern was that, in order to save weight and therefore generate speed, the torpedo bulkheads in all ships did not run the entire length of the hull. This left them with almost no armour at both the furthest forward and furthest astern compartments, a feature that may yet prove of concern.
His final concern was for his own light forces. His light cruisers were smaller than their RN contemporaries and armed with 4.1 inch, rather than the 6 inch guns of their opponents. His torpedo boats were similar, smaller and less well armed than their RN contemporaries. Even their torpedoes were inferior. The 50cm G7 torpedo that was standard mounted a 195kg warhead and had a maximum range at "slow" speed(27kts) of 9300m. It was less than the RN 21inch MK IV, which had a larger 235kg warhead and was capable of a range of 13,500 yards at 25 knots.
On board Lutzow, Hipper was also contemplating the potentiate weaknesses of his command. There was no question of fighting all of Beatty's battlecruiser force, if, indeed, they were encountered. His own force, consisting as it did of only five ships, was far to outnumbered for that. No, his own task was to draw Beatty's ships back towards Scheer, where they could be engaged, slowed and destroyed under the guns of the High Seas Fleet Main body. The inclusion of Mauve's 2nd Battle squadron, with it's seven slow pre dreadnoughts was, in his mind, scarcely an advantage. They would restrict the fleet to something between 16-17 knot at maximum, however, the decision as to their inclusion had not been his.
He would back his own ships against those of the British any day of the week, however, that was in a one on one fight. It was likely that they would not be fighting one on one and that some of his opponents would likely be shooting at him unmolested by return fire, a sure incentive for good gunnery. His own ships were well armoured, the result of a different design philosophy than that of the RN. In the High Seas Fleet the Scouting group was designed to return to the main body and then fight with it, against enemy dreadnought as normal capital ships. Hence, their armour structure.
Certainly of concern to Hipper was the relative lack of offensive power of his ships. The three old ships all used the 11 inch gun. These, both the L45 in the Von der Tann and the L50 in the later two ships, all fired the 304kg AP shell. It was a reliable enough weapon, but far lighter than the 385kg projectile of the RN 12 inch gunned ships and far less than the 635kg shells of two latest British ships, Tiger and Queen Mary. Only the Derfflinger and Lutzow used the 12inch gun firing 404kg projectile. The 13.5 inch guns of the latest British ships gave them greater range and would likely give them the advantage of firing first. On the flip side, as the range decreased, his own ships 11inch guns would need to close to 13,000 yards or less to penetrate the best armoured RN ships such as Tiger.
Although Hipper's ships were better armoured, they were not immune to damage and one concern was that, in order to save weight and therefore generate speed, the torpedo bulkheads in all ships did not run the entire length of the hull. This left them with almost no armour at both the furthest forward and furthest astern compartments, a feature that may yet prove of concern.
His final concern was for his own light forces. His light cruisers were smaller than their RN contemporaries and armed with 4.1 inch, rather than the 6 inch guns of their opponents. His torpedo boats were similar, smaller and less well armed than their RN contemporaries. Even their torpedoes were inferior. The 50cm G7 torpedo that was standard mounted a 195kg warhead and had a maximum range at "slow" speed(27kts) of 9300m. It was less than the RN 21inch MK IV, which had a larger 235kg warhead and was capable of a range of 13,500 yards at 25 knots.
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Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
At the same time sending trained reservists to fight as infantry at Antwerp! Not Winston's finest hour.