Japanese "Victory" at Guadalcanal?

[Defeatisnotanoption]

October 26th 1942, in the waters off island of Guadalcanal in the Solomons, the US and Japanese fleets met. Over two days the carrier's of both navies, USS Enterprise and Hornet, dueled their Japanese counterparts, among them Zuihō, the leading ship of her class.

The battle saw the Japanese sink Hornet and damage Enterprise at the cost of two of their carriers being knocked out of action, one of the being the Zuihō who's deck was disabled by US dive bombers early in the battle, forcing many of her pilots to ditch in the ocean.

But what if on the 26th she had not been hit? Her normal Combat Air Patrol or CAP was off chasing scout planes, what if they stayed and managed to fight off the American bombers? The Japanese now leave the battle with two working carriers, and not one enemy carrier between them and Guadalcanal...

Could the addition of another carrier alter the Japanese's plans to resupply their forces on the island and make it more successful? Could they retake the island from the 1st Marine Division and halt the US offensive in the Solomons?

(If i have time to do "proper" research, i'll update this into a full fledged post rather then a What If)

 

[Glenn239]

No, the Junyo and Zuikaku were sufficient if unopposed and at full strength, and the addition of Zuiho wouldn't have changed much. Nagumo's problem was aircraft attrition - the Japanese had simply lost too many planes taking out the Hornet.

 

[eltf177]

No, the Junyo and Zuikaku were sufficient if unopposed and at full strength, and the addition of Zuiho wouldn't have changed much. Nagumo's problem was aircraft attrition - the Japanese had simply lost too many planes taking out the Hornet.

Planes AND aircrew, who couldn't be replaced.

At best Japan buys a little time, nothing more. She will lose both Guadalcanal and the war, nothing will change that...

 

[Viper91]

There are ways that the Japanese could perhaps not win during the Guadalcanal campaign, but certainly made the campaign much more costly in terms of losses to men and equipment.

Maybe I-26 has a better firing angle on the Saratoga and manages to put more then one torpedo into her. Going by loss of the USS Wasp, you would be looking at ~200 sailors killed and a number of injuries. While that might not matter in the long run, going into the end of 1942 and the first months of 1943 before the surge of Essex class carriers arrive, it might force the US to be somewhat more conservative if their only remaining carrier is Enterprise.

 

[sdgottsch]

If you are talking about the Battle of Eastern Soloman's, I believe the Japanese carriers were the Shokaku, Zuikaku, and Ryujo (the bait). Had the Japanese been capable of sinking the Enterprise (for real), the Saratoga, and the Wasp (earlier than 19 September), then there would have been serious ramifications but honestly the IJA would still not be powerful enough to cause the USMC to retreat from Guadalcanal...plus, they couldn't leave because the only aircraft carrier available in the Pacific to cover the convoy was the Hornet.

 

[M79]

I think the reference is to Operation FS and the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. If the other American carrier is sunk then the loss of aircraft makes Guadalcanal a killing field as Japanese reinforcements will arrive to try to retake Henderson Field. If the Japanese carriers survive in better shape the USMC might not lose the island but an 'Anzio of the Pacific' or similar title would not be inappropriate. Look for a lot more death and an extra 3-4 months for Japan to survive.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Could the addition of another carrier alter the Japanese's plans to resupply their forces on the island and make it more successful? Could they retake the island from the 1st Marine Division and halt the US offensive in the Solomons? ...

A extra deck load of planes may help, but won't be a panacea. In terms of airpower the USN got stronger over the island as the carriers disappeared from the battle. There was a increasing stream of aircraft fed to airfields there & at some point aircraft/pilot losses could be replaced quickly from a growing pool on the islands further east. Its really difficult for one or two IJN carriers to hang around and interrupt that. When the Saratoga was forced to withdraw it left the bulk of its airing behind to reinforce Guadalcanal. Survivors from the others often found their way their. If the Japanese are strong enough the Enterprise can't support directly its wing would have been sent & the ship withdrawn for repair.

On the ground the Japanese had extreme difficulty getting attacks organized. Most were insufficient in size even if correctly supplied, & the two larger attacks were still questionable in terms of size, and were neutralized by US tactics as much as material problems.

It was a complex campaign & the US strength in the region was growing way out of proportion to Japanese strength. Its not impossible for the Japanese to recapture the airfield but it requires multiple PoD. Perhaps three or more to cascade things in favor of Japan.

 

[sdgottsch]

I think the reference is to Operation FS and the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.

Thanks for the clarification, I was mixing up the 24 August 1942 Battle of Eastern Solomon's and the 25-27 October 1942 Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. After reading more on the IJN aircrew losses in those 2 battles (Total Japanese aircraft losses included 33 Zeros, 23 Vals, eight Kates, seven float planes (scouts), one Betty bomber, two Emilys, and one Mavis. Of the 61 aircrew losses, 27 were from Shokaku, 21 from Zuikaku, and 13 from Ryūjō and then 2 months later losing 99 aircraft of the 203 involved in the battle. They lost 148 pilots and aircrew members including two dive bomber group leaders, three torpedo squadron leaders, and eighteen other section or flight leaders. 49% of the Japanese torpedo bomber aircrews involved in the battle were killed along with 39% of the dive bomber crews and 20% of the fighter pilots. That had to be an extreme impact to the Japanese pilot training pipeline.) The Japanese lost more aircrew at Santa Cruz than they had lost in each of the three previous carrier battles at Coral Sea (90), Midway (110), and Eastern Solomons (61). By the end of the Santa Cruz battle, at least 409 of the 765 elite Japanese carrier aviators who had participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor were dead. (this from Wikipedia and an article from https://usnwc.edu/)

Regardless though, I truly don't believe the USMC was going to get pushed into the sea. Plus when the US lost an aircraft they could recover their aircrews whereas the Japanese lost all/most of their aircrews when an aircraft went down. In my humble opinion, the turning point for the Japanese would have had to have happened in August's Battle of Eastern Solomon's since that was when the US ground units were being supplied on 23 August, 29 August, 1 September, and 8 September...without those critical supplies the ground battles would have been much different.

 

[eltf177]

As SHATTERED SWORD said, it was not Midway that gutted IJN aircrews but the meatgrinder around Guadalcanal.

I agree that the IJA is going to have trouble pushing the USMC off the island. Unless IJA reinforcements increase while at the same time keeping the US from reinforcing the Marines the US should be able to hold...

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

A few random thoughts...

1. The Japanese cruiser force attacking the night after the landing does not turn around after defeating the USN screening groups. It continues east & scatters/sinks the transport group lying off the landing beaches. Since the transports still had better than 50% of the material aboard this damages the ability of the landing force to resist in August.

2. LtCol Ikki/Ichiki follows his orders and conducts a reconissance in force in mid August, probing the enemy & determining they are three times as strong as originally thought.

3. Japanese area commanders of both the Army & Navy crack down of their staff and conduct a proper evaluation of the situation and intel analysis. Vs a muddle of assumptions and very uneven operational planning.

4. Appointment of a unified commander for the counter attack in the Solomons & collocating the combined Army/Navy commands on Rabaul. Unequivocal support but Yamamoto for this joint command.

5. Better preparation for the September ground attack, leading to a stronger attack, & possibly a earlier attack by a week or two.

6. Recognition the enemy were not ill led & trained Chinese warlord forces, or Dutch and Commonwealth third stringers. No over focus on only shock and infiltration tactics. A more methodical developing attack that could find and exploit the weaknesses in the defense.

7. Much earlier establishment of a naval gunfire spotting team on Mt Austen & accurate naval fires on the airfield, HQ, artillery, and supply dumps inside the defense perimeter.

8. More aggressive & larger attacks by the IJN surface fleet & carriers in August, & greater focus on the airfield and ground defense then.

All this aims at the idea the Japanese had a limited window for counter attack. To have a chance of breaking the defense they needed to establish a more unified command at the very start and at sea act much more aggressively in the first 2-5 weeks, Ditto for proper staff work and build up. By late September they had repeatedly fumbled the initiative & were losing their advantages in raw strength and ability to decisively exploit their best skill sets.

 

[eltf177]

A few random thoughts...

Excellent ideas but getting into ASB territory. The IJA and IJN working together? HERESY!!!

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

True. Its one of the core problems of separate services. The Japanese had trouble getting a grip on the concept and execution of the 'Joint Command'. A better item 4 on my list affects 3, 5, & possibly 7, and 8.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Trivia Note: During the early autumn phase of the battle the 1st Mar Div Commander Vandigrift had his staff work up a plan for withdrawal into the south uplands of the island. The assumption being the loss of the airfield and the Navy unable to immediately supply or evacuate. There were some plateaus in the uplands on the south half of the island & the hope was they could clear some landing strips there, or at least areas to drop supplies by parachute.

 

[Hammerbolt]

After that battle, HMS Victorious spent severall months "working" for the USN in the Pacific. With such a result, I'm guessing she might spent longer there?...

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

This has the potential to butterfly away the S pacific offensives of 1944. Japan may or may not attempt to move on to the SE in its FS Fiji Samoa operation but either way the US Joint Cheifs are liable to deny MacArthur his plans for a major thrust to the Philippines. Marshal might see the S Pac as a dead end & limit further operations there to a defense in the SE Pacific Command area and limited attacks elsewhere in S Pac for 1943. That releases a fair chance f cargo shipping & some amphi fleet for use elsewhere in latter 1943 & all of 44.

 

[HMS Warspite]

Historically the battle for Guadalcanal was a big gamble by the Allies, especially the USA, using their entire available force in the Pacific at this objective, including the only available Marine Landing troops at the time, who were not yet fully equipped and trained for offensive warfare and would have to make use of what was available. In theory, this landingforce could have been destroyed before disembarking at the shores of Guadalcanal, leaving the USMC with no landforces for a long time, as the new breed of troops had yet to be trained and equipped.

So in theory, the IJN could have fought off the USN carrier forces enough to force them out of the region, something they actually nearly did. (USS Enterprise was left in a damaged state, after USS Hornet was lost. USS Saratoga was again damaged and forced back to the USA for repairs, and USS Wasp still was in the transit from Europe to the pacific.) So with USS Enterprise damaged slightly more and incapable of continuing airoperations, the IJN could have won airsuperiority over the region, as they did not solely rely on carrier based aviation, while the Allies did. Large Naval Airgroups were present in Rabaul and on Truk capable of reaching Guadalcanal due to their long range capabilities. These land based aircraft could in theory have massacred the transports carrying the Marines to Guadalcanal, if unopposed by carrier based fighters, as happened in the OTL. Combined to this, Rear Admiral Mikawa's sorty from Rabaul with his cruisers could have added to the damage to the transports, if he had shown a bit more nerves after his succesful demolishing of the Allied Cruiser escorts of that same transports.

So the actual invasion of Guadalcanal already was a close call, as sheer luck favoured the Allies by having USS Enterprise still in the erea for some aircover, besides the Japanese not pressing home their counterattack on the Allied transports. Had the Japanese done this and forced the Allied forces out of Guadalcanal the marines left on the shore, would have had no supplies at all, unlike the OTL where they at least got some, just enough to hold their position. Without the Marines having a foothold on Guadalcanal, the Marines could not have captured and held the vital airfield. This would have forced them into an impossible position and mission killed their land units. The next Marine division was about 6 months away in becoming operational, so no future invasion was possible in 1942.

In the long term, the war of retaking Japanese held positions in the SW Pacific would have been postponed to early 1943 at its best, if not bypassed completely by the Nimitz Doctrine of moving straight through the central Pacific to Japan, putting Mac Arthur on a 2nd plan.

 

[mack8]

Don't have time to write a lot, but apart from Zuiho not being hit which would be helpful, they HAVE to somehow sink the Enterprise in order to have a chance. CV-6 played a big part in destroying the November convoy, sinking it and it's 80 planes or whatever it had on board at Santa Cruz would be of big help to the japanese, the americans will be left with just the Cactus planes to attack the convoy.

 

[hardrada55]

Having Hiyo not suffer it's engineering casualty before Santa Cruz would have provided as many as 18 A6Ms, 17 D3As and 2 B5N2s to the number of aircraft available for the battle. 37 total aircraft. Would another 37 aircraft of the types described made a difference? Enterprise received two 250kg bomb hits and two near misses during the battle. If Hiyo had been with Junyo and launched her aircraft (say 12 A6M 12 D3a and 7 B5N2s) along with Junyo's historical first strike (12 A6M and 17 D3A) at 9:05-9:14, the extra planes (60 total aircraft) might have made a cripple out of Enterprise too. Enterprise's deck is crowded with recovered aircraft when the first Junyo strike arrived.

 

[Johnrankins]

This has the potential to butterfly away the S pacific offensives of 1944. Japan may or may not attempt to move on to the SE in its FS Fiji Samoa operation but either way the US Joint Cheifs are liable to deny MacArthur his plans for a major thrust to the Philippines. Marshal might see the S Pac as a dead end & limit further operations there to a defense in the SE Pacific Command area and limited attacks elsewhere in S Pac for 1943. That releases a fair chance f cargo shipping & some amphi fleet for use elsewhere in latter 1943 & all of 44.

Doubtful, the Philippines were the major US territory in the area. Like it or not MacArthur was right we weren't going to just abandon them. They pretty much had to be taken by invasion for reasons of national prestige which was much more important in the 1940s than the 21st century.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Theres a over focus on aircraft carriers here, particularly after September. The USN was able to bring new aircraft & aircrew to the SE Pac faster than they were lost, & then feed those to Guadalcanal as needed. It was the constant raids on the Japanese supply ships that did so much to cripple the Japanese ground forces. To cut off the islands air and ground defense the Japanese have to be able to interdict the supply ships and this stream of aircraft on a near constant basis from late September. The failure to decisively interdict the US airfield and the supply to the landing force in August/early September lost the Japanese their best and perhaps only real chance. In October or November at the latest the Japanese had 'taken the wrong fork in the road' as one junior admiral put it after the war.

Aside from growing US strength in the SE Pac the Japanese had divided their resources in the ongoing New Guinia campaign. That was being run out of the same Army and navy resource pool as the Guadalcanal battles. Also the US 5th AF had got its feet under itself, resolving the set up and critical supply problems by early summer. The 5th AF raids on Rabaul were a increasing distraction and keeping them below effective levels drew away Japanese resources. AAA & fighter squadrons defending Rabaul drew on the inadequate cargo shipping, and the need to conduct harbor ops around the air raids degraded operations as well. Gudalcanal must be understood in the context of the larger set of campaigns going on in the region.

In the larger picture the US decision of the previous winter to defend Australia/New Zealand and the redirection of combat power to the S Pac was finally paying off for the US in the autumn. Tactically the Japanese were still capable after August, but operationally the US was gaining parity, & in strategic terms Japan had lost the Solomons campaign by November. A few more tactical victories would not change things at that point. In August and September they needed solid success at the operational level, not just isolated tactical victories that were not linked into a cohesive whole.