Japanese US battles from 1943 to 1945

[Lord Malikai]

Japan would starve to death long long long before than

I agree 100%. Unfortunately, the data set that @bernardz has assembled for us doesn't have a way to take starvation into account, which is why I did not include it.

The battle itself will go on for
Battle days =0.0773561176022271*(war day number) + 0.00108785694553061*(Japanese military size) - 42.5704311712843 - 0.000548150954708926*(Allied forces)

I'm only using the basic regression package in Excel, but for that regression I'm getting that (war day number) is not at all statically significant and that (Allied forces) is pretty borderline: p-value of .038 which is just less than the .05 cutoff most people use. Comparatively (Japanese military size) has a p-value of .0004. For this reason I prefer the simpler model of Battle Days = 11.12 + 0.000791*(Japanese military size). This is admittedly a matter of personal taste. If you want to talk more about the specifics of the regression modeling, feel free to PM me.

As war day number about 1430, 6 million allied troops and about 4.3 million Japanese takes about four years, again an underestimation as I do not include the militia.

Overall if you follow this discussion, which I have with great interest we are looking at about 4 million military dead, a long war, mass starvation in Japan and it should be added that many were dying every day in the Pacific war outside of Japan too.

I agree with your overall take, and generally on your numbers. As @GDIS Pathe rightly pointed out, it's likely the Japanese run out of food long before the invasion is "over" per the model.

 

[lionhead]

This would lend weight to those that argue that the invasion of Japan was not going to be as quick as some suggest but a bloodbath.

Any comments on this?

I think its generally accepted that Downfall would be a bloodbath. I mean, they were planning to use nukes as tactical weapons for crying out loud.

But no, you can't see that from those figures. A lot more factors apply when calculating how bad it would be.

 

[Dorknought]

What if you added casualties from the Russian attack into Manchuria?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...I agree with your overall take, and generally on your numbers. As @GDIS Pathe rightly pointed out, it's likely the Japanese run out of food long before the invasion is "over" per the model.

The food factor affects the combat power. The outright starvation of the Japanese on Guadalcanal was a significant factor in the ability of the green US Army infantry to break their defense and drive them out of range of the airfield. Fanticism and discipline, or skill at 'jungle warfare' was offset through the inability of individuals to function as soldiers as their caloric intake declined below 1500 & the 1000 per day. This is even more important for militias and other poorly trained and led formations. A close look at the contribution of the militia in the Okinawa battle suggests how useful they would be on other home islands & in what situations. Between lack of food, collapse of basic medical care, collapsing living conditions, ect... the contribution of the citizens would have been less than hoped for. Col Yahara, the senior survivor of the Japanese defense of Okinawa observed the army reserve and militia battalions formed from the Japanese citizens (separate from the native Okinawan militia) were very poor fighters, feel apart in combat, and had a very high desertion or evasion rate. He also noted how regular IJA units were falling apart in the closing weeks of the battle, with previously unseen combat avoidance and outright desertion. I suspect part of this disintegration was due to the officers committing suicide by combat. In the last weeks it appears a high portion of the officers were killed leading attacks. This made the survivors in the regiments effectively leaderless & disorganized.

 

[bernardz]

I think its generally accepted that Downfall would be a bloodbath. I mean, they were planning to use nukes as tactical weapons for crying out loud.

But no, you can't see that from those figures. A lot more factors apply when calculating how bad it would be.

I agree with you on the retrogression models, my main point was that the Japanese forces as a military machine was not as some suggested falling apart, and mine model showed this better while yours simply showed the Japanese at the same level but I agree with you that you are right. What they do show these models is despite the huge knocks the Japanese were suffering it was if anything relatively improving in relative military efficiency. What you are saying that its actually going to be a bigger bloodbath then this and I agree with this too.

What if you added casualties from the Russian attack into Manchuria?

I did say that the war in the Pacific was killing a lot of people every day, actually what is often forgotten is that losses in the Pacific War were here.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_War

Figures here are 33 million from 1937 to 1945, putting in the months that works out to about 11000 every day. At that rate, if you assume that the atomic bombs killed about 180,000 and the bombs shortened the war by 17 days which I am sure it did, the bomb actually saved lives.

The food factor affects the combat power.

It does but if the Japanese military followed what other armies do, they take the food first and since the military is only a small percentage of the population, I would expect that they would have enough food for a while.

 

[James Ricker]

Yes but I really don't think a mechanical failure that causes the plane to crash is going to be the biggest worry in this case.

If the aircraft can't make it to the allied fleet it becomes a problem for the remaining Japanese aircraft, giving the Americans fewer targets to shoot at.
Given the maintenance and quality control issues arising from the economic and logistical collapse Japan was suffering from, a significant percentage of Kamakazi aircraft would be lost to mechanical failures before reaching the allied armada.

 

[James Ricker]

True but what the Japanese lack in quality they will attempt to make up in quantity, which is to say tossing over 7,000 aircraft at the Allied invasion fleet. So even if the mechanical failure rate is higher than normal that's still a lot of planes being turned into guided missiles. The mere thought of this scared the crap out of the Navy after their experience at Okinawa.

The Allies knew where the airfields were. Before the invasion those airfields would have been attacked heavily. On the day of the invasion those airfields would have been surrounded by fighters.
Pilot skill also becomes a factor if the weather isn't perfect. Dedicated Kamakazi pilots received little training and little or no actual air time ,major problems could arise.

 

[Lord Malikai]

I agree with you on the retrogression models, my main point was that the Japanese forces as a military machine was not as some suggested falling apart, and mine model showed this better while yours simply showed the Japanese at the same level but I agree with you that you are right. What they do show these models is despite the huge knocks the Japanese were suffering it was if anything relatively improving in relative military efficiency. What you are saying that its actually going to be a bigger bloodbath then this and I agree with this too.

I would disagree with your assertion that the Japanese military was relatively improving. I do not know what values your regression model is spitting out, but in my model the correlation between (battle days) and (war day number) is statistically insignificant; we have to assume no correlation. That said, the Japanese military was also not getting worse.

What if you added casualties from the Russian attack into Manchuria?

Adding in the Soviet Offensive in Manchuria has some interesting effects. Both (battle days) and (Japanese dead) now statistically correlate with both (Allied forces) and (Japanese forces). Allied deaths is functionally random with this data set. The projection for Downfall is 2 million Japanese military dead, unknown Allied deaths, 5 year duration (once again the food situation is a serious concern here).

It's seriously worth pointing out that statistically the island campaigns revolve around only how many Japanese defenders there are. This gives the impression of a military situation dependent on how long it took the Allies to dig the entrenched Japanese defenders out of the caves and jungles.

By contrast Manchuria was a more traditional military campaign and statistically the outcome is dependent on both Allied and Japanese forces committed. This again passes the "gut check" - in an open campaign where each side can maneuver, you would expect the outcome to depend first and foremost on how many men each side brought to bear. I suspect including variables for qualitative differences like battlefield terrain or dummy variables for "did the Japanese run out of food" would probably help create a better picture statistically, but that requires hunting down more data than I have time for presently.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Carl Schwamberger said: ↑
The food factor affects the combat power.

...
It does but if the Japanese military followed what other armies do, they take the food first and since the military is only a small percentage of the population, I would expect that they would have enough food for a while.

Thats a nice theory but it does not fit the reality on the ground. The fact is food shortages were already in place and affecting performance. Malnutrition related diseases like Beri Beri had appeared & the incidence was growing. Industrial managers all the way to the top were complaining the low rations were hindering production, in 1943. Historians like Christopher Clary have tried to present a argument famine was not incipient. Clarys own essay on this 'Starvation Myth: The US Blockade of Japan in WWII" rather weakens it self with statements like "Although there was a increase in the production of Soybeans, Sweet Potatos, Potatos, and other vegetables in 1945, the caloric content of those crops underwent a substantial decrease compared to the year before." Or citations that the Japanese intake was averaging "1793" calories a day (TRH Haven), & 1680 calories a day (Wainstock), in 1945.

Several I have read raise the question of stockpiled food. However none I've read are able to provide anything beyond anecdotal evidence, & the main argument being 'They did not starve in 1945, so there must have been sufficient food reserves.' This ignores the insistence of the occupation government during 1945-1947 that substantial famine relief supplies be sent from North America.

The overall body of evidence looks like there was not enough food to sustain the army raised for home defense at any reasonable caloric level. While the soldiers would not have been as bad off as on Guadalcanal Their ability to compete at parity with the invading overfed Allied soldiers is highly questionable. That better than half the front line infantry regiments were reservists, militia, and conscripts mobilized in 1945 meant they were badly led, trained, and discipline 'brittle'. J R Skates 'The Invasion of Japan' reviews the condition of these formations, along the way noting their lack of any useful transport and dependance on supply stocks directly at hand. He makes the point that after mobilization for home defense the Army was unable to provide a effective supply transport for other than the previously existing units. Even after stripping the civilian sector transport, mostly railway transport and horses to the point of collapse the Army was still far short of adequate supply transport for the new formations. While this indicates to me the formations would have become marginally effective from poor ammunition supply the low individual efficiency from declining caloric intake and vitamins/minerals would have been a severe problem as well. Between Allied interdiction, a already damaged road and railway system, and and loss in administrative efficiency the ability of the Japanese Army to sustain consistent or steady food supply of over 2000 calories a day is questionable. Assuming the difference is made up by diverting civilian rations to soldiers it means accelerating the creation of famine areas, with the attendant effect on the soldiers morale. If the redirection of food is thru ad hoc and spontaneous action (looting) it means military disciple has broken in those units & their combat value has further declined.

 

[lionhead]

I agree with you on the retrogression models, my main point was that the Japanese forces as a military machine was not as some suggested falling apart, and mine model showed this better while yours simply showed the Japanese at the same level but I agree with you that you are right. What they do show these models is despite the huge knocks the Japanese were suffering it was if anything relatively improving in relative military efficiency. What you are saying that its actually going to be a bigger bloodbath then this and I agree with this too.

Again, a lot more factors are weighing in to see in what state the Japanese army was at that stage. Comparing it to the island hopping campaign even all the way to Okinawa doesn't tell you anything about the situation in Japan itself.

People have mentioned food shortages for example, a very important part. The problem was that it was gone, they didn't have any food left. This affects fighting ability significantly. Can't add that to the calculations unless you have the figures.

Yes, the Japanese army, and Japan in general was falling apart. The military efficiency wasn't higher. It was more desperate and determined, but add to that the food shortage and ammo shortage, i'd say there is a bigger chance than you think that the Japanese army will fall apart if operation downfall will happen. It will be a bloodbath, but not because of the military capacity of the Japanese army but because the Japanese population was going to be used, thousands of kamikaze aircraft and the use of tactical nukes. If we compare with Okinawa you might see mass suicides and confusion killings. On the american side there iwll be siginifacnt losses of course because of pockets of resistance that will fight for the last blade of grass and grain of sand, and again the tactical nukes. But the losses for the Japanese is going to be insane. It woul change the face of the war, even though it was basically already over.

 

[eltf177]

J R Skates 'The Invasion of Japan' reviews the condition of these formations, along the way noting their lack of any useful transport and dependence on supply stocks directly at hand. He makes the point that after mobilization for home defense the Army was unable to provide a effective supply transport for other than the previously existing units. Even after stripping the civilian sector transport, mostly railway transport and horses to the point of collapse the Army was still far short of adequate supply transport for the new formations. While this indicates to me the formations would have become marginally effective from poor ammunition supply the low individual efficiency from declining caloric intake and vitamins/minerals would have been a severe problem as well. Between Allied interdiction, a already damaged road and railway system, and and loss in administrative efficiency the ability of the Japanese Army to sustain consistent or steady food supply of over 2000 calories a day is questionable. Assuming the difference is made up by diverting civilian rations to soldiers it means accelerating the creation of famine areas, with the attendant effect on the soldiers morale. If the redirection of food is thru ad hoc and spontaneous action (looting) it means military disciple has broken in those units & their combat value has further declined.

I must agree with this, the lack of food coupled with a lack of transportation means that IJA formations are going to become unable to function rather quickly. The USAAF was bombing railways and roads. Mines were taking out ships left and right. Subs were torpedoing any remaining large vessels while using deck guns to sink smaller craft. Basically little of anything - food, raw materials, oil - was getting through. The longer Olympic and Coronet were put off the worse the Japanese situation would become...

 

[bernardz]

I would disagree with your assertion that the Japanese military was relatively improving. I do not know what values your regression model is spitting out, but in my model the correlation between (battle days) and (war day number) is statistically insignificant; we have to assume no correlation. That said, the Japanese military was also not getting worse.

I can accept that although I will say if there is a statistical result which is vague and statistically weak then it shows that the Japanese were improving in military effectiveness not declining.

Adding in the Soviet Offensive in Manchuria has some interesting effects.

The Japanese in China were basically isolated, their fate will add to the overall Japanese losses but not to Downfall itself.

Carl Schwamberger said: ↑
The food factor affects the combat power.
.

I agree but the food situation by itself will not stop the Japanese military which will be more then they had in many of the island campaigns which I took into account, see (a) below and there should be enough available to fight. It will as you say degrade its performance but the lack of food situation occurred often in the Eastern Front during ww2 see (b) below

Yes, the Japanese army, and Japan in general was falling apart. The military efficiency wasn't higher. It was more desperate and determined,

And most importantly from this analysis, the Japanese military is getting bigger. The closer the Allies were getting to Japan, the bigger the armies the Japanese were able to field.

but add to that the food shortage and ammo shortage,


i'd say there is a bigger chance than you think that the Japanese army will fall apart if operation downfall will happen.

(b)
In Leningrad, there were bigger food shortages, not sure about ammo but the Russian army did not fall apart. I doubt the Japanese will either. A similar argument could be made of the German army in Stalingrad, they were cut off, had huge food and ammo problems and yet they were able to mount an effective defence and at no stage did their military machine fall apart.

It will be a bloodbath, but not because of the military capacity of the Japanese army but because the Japanese population was going to be used, thousands of kamikaze aircraft and the use of tactical nukes. If we compare with Okinawa you might see mass suicides and confusion killings. On the american side there iwll be siginifacnt losses of course because of pockets of resistance that will fight for the last blade of grass and grain of sand, and again the tactical nukes. But the losses for the Japanese is going to be insane. It woul change the face of the war, even though it was basically already over.

What you are arguing here is the size of the bloodbath will be much bigger than just the effect of conventual warfare and I agree.

I must agree with this, the lack of food coupled with a lack of transportation means that IJA formations are going to become unable to function rather quickly. The USAAF was bombing railways and roads. Mines were taking out ships left and right. Subs were torpedoing any remaining large vessels while using deck guns to sink smaller craft. Basically little of anything - food, raw materials, oil - was getting through. The longer Olympic and Coronet were put off the worse the Japanese situation would become...

(a)
This will all affect the Japanese military effectiveness but let me point out in most of the Pacific campaigns from day one, the islands were isolated, nothing got in or out, the US had air superiority and little could be transported in the island and yet the Japanese did mount an effective defence. All the figures here I presented are based on battles where this all happened so it is taken into account in these figures.

 

[Fred the Great]

The idea the figures in the OP tells us much - other than that the Japanese didn't really believe in surrender - is nonsensical. The very basic data does not include all the many variables that affect campaign length. The terrain, the firepower both sides can bring to the battle, logistics, prepared defences, aversion to casualties (obviously more on the US side), strategy and tactics, and so on and so forth.

 

[Lord Malikai]

I can accept that although I will say if there is a statistical result which is vague and statistically weak then it shows that the Japanese were improving in military effectiveness not declining.

I think you're conflating statistically insignificant (mathematically a low F or t-stat) with weak correlation (mathematically a low R square). The data shows a reasonably strong correlation (R squared = .33), but one that is statistically insignificant (t-stat = 1.97). Unless we're being loose to the point of sloppy with what we consider statistically significant, we have to accept the null hypothesis in this case: time did not have a significant impact on Japanese military effectiveness. As @lionhead said, it's reasonable to assume that increased Japanese desperation and determination were cancelled out by material shortages, leaving overall effectiveness unchanged.

The Japanese in China were basically isolated, their fate will add to the overall Japanese losses but not to Downfall itself.

My apologies for being unclear. I meant that I added the Soviet Manchurian Offensive as an additional data point in the data set, not that I added its parameters to the hypothetical Downfall projection.

The idea the figures in the OP tells us much - other than that the Japanese didn't really believe in surrender - is nonsensical. The very basic data does not include all the many variables that affect campaign length. The terrain, the firepower both sides can bring to the battle, logistics, prepared defences, aversion to casualties (obviously more on the US side), strategy and tactics, and so on and so forth.

The point of a statistical regression is that not all variables contribute equally to the end result. If you can boil down a series of military operations to the 3 or 4 most important variables then you have a useful tool for predicting outcomes of future or counterfactual operations. The problem with the OP is that the mathematical model used was overly fit to the data and logically unsound. A proper model should (perhaps paradoxically) only give a ballpark outcome not a precise one. The book Moneyball (about the rise of sabermetrics in baseball) presents a good argument for how you can still derive useful statistical models from an environment with many variables.

 

[lionhead]

And most importantly from this analysis, the Japanese military is getting bigger. The closer the Allies were getting to Japan, the bigger the armies the Japanese were able to field.

Dude, you need to listen. The Japanese army was reinforced by new men who didn't even get the proper training. The numbers increased, the quality greatly declined. This is more important than just the fact the army got bigger.

(b)
In Leningrad, there were bigger food shortages, not sure about ammo but the Russian army did not fall apart. I doubt the Japanese will either.

Leningrad, was being supplied over the lake. Next to that we are talking about a siege of a city for 2 years, thats uncomparable to the siege of an island group, that was also a food source contrary to Leningrad, by the world's largest strategic bombing campaign for over a year that destroyed their food supply. Thirdly, and more importantly, The USSR was not the aggressor, they had a reason to keep on defending. Also because they were actually fighting with boots on the ground and not just terrorized from above their morale was kept at a better level, their struggle seemed to work.

A similar argument could be made of the German army in Stalingrad, they were cut off, had huge food and ammo problems and yet they were able to mount an effective defence and at no stage did their military machine fall apart.

Uhm, excuse me but the German 6th army at Stalingrad was surrounded by end november 1942. By February 1943, thats 2 months, the 6th army had collapsed from being overrun and cut off from food and ammo supplies. Imagine then being cut off from food for a whole year, and then get invaded. You really need to start making better arguments.

 

[eltf177]

This will all affect the Japanese military effectiveness but let me point out in most of the Pacific campaigns from day one, the islands were isolated, nothing got in or out, the US had air superiority and little could be transported in the island and yet the Japanese did mount an effective defence. All the figures here I presented are based on battles where this all happened so it is taken into account in these figures.

True, but supplies and ammo had been delivered. Food might have been rationed but they had enough firepower to be effective. The IJA in Japan was going to have to rely on whatever was delivered before fighting because getting anything after that was going to be difficult. And the food situation was critical, islands didn't have a massive civilian population to feed...

 

[ExScientiaTridens]

The US Military (and others I am quite certain) extensively study casualties, including those in WWII. Military planners have long used the number of troops engaged and duration of combat as the primary predictors of casualties. In these circumstances, the number of troops involved derives from the planned correlation of forces (i.e., enemy strength, terrain, etc. leading to a determination of required friendly forces) and expected duration of combat (i.e., planned time to complete the mission). As a result, casualty rates are generally presented/analyzed as casualties/1,000 combatants/day.

I think there are simply too many factors involved to simply predict the duration of fighting in the home islands from casualties, number of opposing personnel, days of battle in the island-hopping campaign and time since Pearl Harbor. It considers nothing of the land area and type of terrain in the battle ground. A lot of the Pacific battles were fought in small areas with high troop densities in bunkers. Once a beach head is established the battle takes on a different character.

The following table comes from a US Navy publication concerning casualty rates in the Pacific:

The Navy's general conclusion is that ground casualty rates were higher during the short duration operations early in the war. Tarawa being a prime example. For these amphibious actions, casualty rates are highest on the first day and fall rapidly thereafter. The Navy conclusion was that the Marianas campaign represented the type of battle that would be fought in the home islands. However, once the landing succeeds, the casualty rate dropped significantly

The only exception to this was Okinawa where the Japanese chose not to oppose the landing. I would also point out that casualties quoted in Wikipedia must include sea, air and ground casualties since the computed rate (0.83) is lower that the USMC ground combat loss rate (which was lower than the US Army loss rate - which I do not have at my finger tips).

But these are only planning numbers for staff use, to help determine logistics, medical and replacement requirements. Manpower requirements for the next year... It certainly gets factored up by the size of the enemy force (I don't have that equation, and don't believe there is a single accepted model).

Duration isn't always a clear factor - the Red Army suffered over 350,000 casualties in the last 23 days of the war and their assault on Berlin and central Europe.

In any event, do the casualty rates indicate that the IJA is "performing better" than earlier in the war? No.

Are they worse? Impossible to conclude, but most believe that the early action reflects US inexperience more than Japanese skill; and that the general trend of decreasing US casualty rates in the Pacific was probably do to US experience and fire power increasing rather than any change in IJA combat capability.

In early 1945, the Army Strategic Planning Staff in Washington operated from what they called the "Saipan Ratio" (have not seen the equation/model). This led to a lot of argument with MacArthur and casualty estimates so high as to defy imagination. In fact, based on the opinion of "senior officers" the "Saipan ratio" was rejected for planning purposes because casualties could not be so "huge as to make the task insurmountable".

When you examine the amphibious operations involving the US Army in the PTO, the average casualty rate is reported to be 7.45. This is a different dataset than either the table above or the Wikipedia-derived numbers. The comparable number from the ETO was 2.16.

Obviously MacArthur's staff argued for something closer to the ETO casualty rates (because he wanted to invade), while the Navy argued for something like the Saipan casualty rates, which they believed were more realistic (which in turn means that an invasion will be terribly costly, ergo blockade).

I have seen references to "current computer models" that project casualty rates to estimate medical sustainment requirements. The factors included in the model include:

Number and type of troops (CS and CSS troops have lower casualty rates)
Projected duration of the conflict
Opponent quality/capability
Intensity of combat
Terrain
Climate
Morale/cohesion factor estimate​

My understanding of the program (FORECAS) is that it uses simulation techniques to create a range of predictions. None are estimated using simple linear correlations.

Good discussion, but I believe the approach is too simplistic.

Best regards,

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

But these are only planning numbers for staff use, to help determine logistics, medical and replacement requirements. Manpower requirements for the next year... It certainly gets factored up by the size of the enemy force (I don't have that equation, and don't believe there is a single accepted model).

The Army Service Force used 720,000 as the estimated number of replacements needed for "dead and evacuated wounded" through 31 December 1946. As this was exclusive of Navy and Marine demands the combined number of anticipated replacements needed in this category can be eye-balled at about 1 million. [Giangreco, "Hell to Pay" p. 53]

The expected monthly rates of reinforcement during Operation Downfall were as follows:

Army: 100,000 men
Navy and Marines: 40,000 men
Total: 140,000/month

In early 1945, the Army Strategic Planning Staff in Washington operated from what they called the "Saipan Ratio" (have not seen the equation/model). This led to a lot of argument with MacArthur and casualty estimates so high as to defy imagination. In fact, based on the opinion of "senior officers" the "Saipan ratio" was rejected for planning purposes because casualties could not be so "huge as to make the task insurmountable".

The Saipan Ratio, extrapolated from the damage inflicted on both sides in that battle, stated that 1 American would die and nearly 4 would be wounded for every 7 Japanese casualties. During the Battle of Saipan 3,426 Americans were killed and 13,099 wounded while the Japanese lost 23,811, almost all of them dead.

 

[Matt]

. A similar argument could be made of the German army in Stalingrad, they were cut off, had huge food and ammo problems and yet they were able to mount an effective defence and at no stage did their military machine fall apart.

The 6th Army was surrounded, deprived of supplies, took horrendous losses, and surrendered. That's the very definition of their military machine falling apart.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The Army Service Force used 720,000 as the estimated number of replacements needed for "dead and evacuated wounded" through 31 December 1946. As this was exclusive of Navy and Marine demands the combined number of anticipated replacements needed in this category can be eye-balled at about 1 million. [Giangreco, "Hell to Pay" p. 53]

The expected monthly rates of reinforcement during Operation Downfall were as follows:

Army: 100,000 men
Navy and Marines: 40,000 men
Total: 140,000/month



The Saipan Ratio, extrapolated from the damage inflicted on both sides in that battle, stated that 1 American would die and nearly 4 would be wounded for every 7 Japanese casualties. During the Battle of Saipan 3,426 Americans were killed and 13,099 wounded while the Japanese lost 23,811, almost all of them dead.

I'd use the Okinawa ratio. That was not available when the planning for DOWNFALL started. Loss ratios on Luzon were not either & they may not be a good comparison. A look at those on Leyte might be better.