Japanese invasion of USSR, c. 1936-39

TLDR: Using really whatever POD you like (as long as it's remotely plausible), have a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Far East occur sometime between 1936-39. What's the POD? How does it play out? Who ultimately is likely to prevail and why?

IOTL, various subfactions of interwar Japanese military and political life - namely the "Imperial Way" faction defeated in the 2-26 Incident - believed strongly in the merits of the Hokushin-ron ("Northern Expansion Doctrine" or "Northern Road") strategy for economic/territorial expansion. AKA, an aggressive invasion of the Soviet Union designed to absorb Siberian territory for its land and natural resources.

Of course, "Strike North" never really happened. The defeat of "Imperial Way" after 2-26 stripped the IJA bare of many of the biggest proponents of invading the USSR, and the embarrassment the IJA suffered at the hands of the Soviets during Khalkin Gol solidified the conviction that south, not north, was the direction to go. But what if it hadn't happened that way? Suppose that 2-26 hadn't happened, or that the Kodoha faction had gained the upper hand some other way?

I am not interested in fitting this scenario to a particular outcome - how can Japan win? How can the USSR win? etc. -but more interested in the blow-by-blow of how this might have played out. This map purports to offer a general idea of potential Japanese offensives, which seem aimed at a) consolidating Sakhalin and cutting Vladivostok off from resupply/reinforcement; b) seizing outer Mongolia and (probably) vital chokepoints along the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and; c) driving deeper into Central Siberia, where...I guess they'd seek some kind of political resolution with the USSR to carve out Manchukuo-esque client states in the Far East?

Anyways, such an operation (or anything like it) would be, I'd think, fraught with peril for the IJA of 1936-39 for a variety of reasons...but similarly devastating for the Soviets.

Thoughts? And apologies if this is actually kinda Sealion East, I haven't seen a ton of serious discussion of it in the time I've spent on here but could have missed plenty.
 
Sorry off topic but would be interesting to see if PLA ever had a contingency plan like in case of war with USSR during the 70s and 80s. And maybe how they thought they would fare against the Soviets.
Atleast something to compare it with
 
Sorry off topic but would be interesting to see if PLA ever had a contingency plan like in case of war with USSR during the 70s and 80s. And maybe how they thought they would fare against the Soviets.
Atleast something to compare it with

You mean in case they decided to launch a full-blown offensive? Guessing the broad thrust of the land component would be generally the same - i.e. some sort of attempt to cut off the major supply depots/transit hubs along the Trans-Siberian Railroad (the BAM evidently wasn't finished until 1991, but I'd guess they'd want to go after whatever pieces of that were ready, too) and try to knock Vladivostok out early.

It would be interesting to hear their sort of self-assessment of their prospects of success, though, I agree. My knowledge of the '69 skirmishes is fairly limited but I don't think they portended well for a full-on Chinese invasion.
 
I was a little surprised to seehow close Vladivostok was to the border. It looks very vulnerable on paper.
Incidentally, asahi.com has a phone-friendly article in three chapters on Nomonhan incident. It gives some insight into the mindset and capabilities of the Kwantung army from a Japanese perspective.
I've just finished the second chapter and can't see the Japanese having an easy time of things unless the Red Army makes some major mistakes.
 
I was a little surprised to seehow close Vladivostok was to the border. It looks very vulnerable on paper.
Incidentally, asahi.com has a phone-friendly article in three chapters on Nomonhan incident. It gives some insight into the mindset and capabilities of the Kwantung army from a Japanese perspective.
I've just finished the second chapter and can't see the Japanese having an easy time of things unless the Red Army makes some major mistakes.

Yeah, I agree - I've been doing a bit of reading on Nomonhan/Khalkin Gol and it's interesting. It certainly revealed a number of deficiencies in Japanese armored/mechanized capabilities (both what was available and how it was used) and seemed to demonstrate in small scale how a far larger Soviet defender would cause problems for them. The 23rd Division, which appears to have taken the brunt of the beating, was the greenest Japanese division in Manchuria at the time.
 

Basils

Banned
I was a little surprised to seehow close Vladivostok was to the border. It looks very vulnerable on paper.
Incidentally, asahi.com has a phone-friendly article in three chapters on Nomonhan incident. It gives some insight into the mindset and capabilities of the Kwantung army from a Japanese perspective.
I've just finished the second chapter and can't see the Japanese having an easy time of things unless the Red Army makes some major mistakes.
What if they didn’t invade the rest of china after Manchuria? That’s give them the ability to industrialize more and maybe make an armor and artillery addition to their army
 
What if they didn’t invade the rest of china after Manchuria? That’s give them the ability to industrialize more and maybe make an armor and artillery addition to their army

This seems like a precondition for the invasion to have any chance of even modest or temporary success, although it's not clear to me that a '37 invasion of the remainder of China precludes them trying. The "Go North" and "Go South" factions seem less like they were separated by a hard dividing line than general differences in inclination - the "Go South" side of the conversation certainly hated communism and the "Go North" side certainly participated in the war at a fairly high level (Yamashita was initially of the "Go North" perspective and some of Mutaguchi's biggest critics during U-Go were former Kodoha faction) so I guess it's not impossible to conceive of a scenario where they might've hit in both directions. Would've been a disaster, but alas.

To your latter point about industrialization: it's interesting to me that Yamashita evidently did argue for a greater degree of mechanization and investment in armor, as well as not invading China, maintaining decent relations with the UK/USA, unifying the Army and Navy under a sort of Defense Department, and focusing attention on the USSR. All but the last would've unquestionably made Japan's experience in the years 1931-45 far better than OTL. But he was Kodoha and irritated Tojo, so pretty heavily pushed to the side.

Apparently Yamashita was stationed as an attaché to Austria and later Germany, where he would've been exposed to a lot of the latest thinking on armored/mechanized warfare. Had the tables been turned and Kodoha had emerged more prominent from 2-26 or at least not been shoved to the side by the Tojo faction as much, it's possible that Japan might've concentrated more heavily on early mechanization. IOTL, for example, they rolled out halftracks very late and in limited quantities. Perhaps the strategic focus on an invasion of the USSR might've accelerated this development.
 

Basils

Banned
Well said
This seems like a precondition for the invasion to have any chance of even modest or temporary success, although it's not clear to me that a '37 invasion of the remainder of China precludes them trying. The "Go North" and "Go South" factions seem less like they were separated by a hard dividing line than general differences in inclination - the "Go South" side of the conversation certainly hated communism and the "Go North" side certainly participated in the war at a fairly high level (Yamashita was initially of the "Go North" perspective and some of Mutaguchi's biggest critics during U-Go were former Kodoha faction) so I guess it's not impossible to conceive of a scenario where they might've hit in both directions. Would've been a disaster, but alas.

To your latter point about industrialization: it's interesting to me that Yamashita evidently did argue for a greater degree of mechanization and investment in armor, as well as not invading China, maintaining decent relations with the UK/USA, unifying the Army and Navy under a sort of Defense Department, and focusing attention on the USSR. All but the last would've unquestionably made Japan's experience in the years 1931-45 far better than OTL. But he was Kodoha and irritated Tojo, so pretty heavily pushed to the side.

Apparently Yamashita was stationed as an attaché to Austria and later Germany, where he would've been exposed to a lot of the latest thinking on armored/mechanized warfare. Had the tables been turned and Kodoha had emerged more prominent from 2-26 or at least not been shoved to the side by the Tojo faction as much, it's possible that Japan might've concentrated more heavily on early mechanization. IOTL, for example, they rolled out halftracks very late and in limited quantities. Perhaps the strategic focus on an invasion of the USSR might've accelerated this development.
I can’t add much to this. You did a fantastic job. My premise is that going into china proper in 36 cost Japan too much. This hampered its ability to industrialize and modernize its army. All those men in china we’re not contributing to the GDP back home and we’re using up resources that could have been used otherwise. By going south Japan ensured it would not be able to fight the USSR on anything approaching parity
 
Well said

I can’t add much to this. You did a fantastic job. My premise is that going into china proper in 36 cost Japan too much. This hampered its ability to industrialize and modernize its army. All those men in china we’re not contributing to the GDP back home and we’re using up resources that could have been used otherwise. By going south Japan ensured it would not be able to fight the USSR on anything approaching parity

Thanks for this. I'm starting to sketch out a timeline around some of these ideas. It's interesting - if the historical record is to be believed, a lot of senior IJA commanders thought the war in China was a terrible idea and said so - often repeatedly - as it took place. I'm left wondering how much of this was postwar revisionism vs. genuine feeling at the time, but given the existence of Hokushin-ron, it can't all be postwar revisionism.
 
Mongolia and Manchuria need major infrastructure upgrades first. Japan also needs to be ready for winter as have a clear plan for what they want to take.

Cut the Trans-Siberian Railway as thoroughly as possible and keep sabotaging *any* repair efforts. Move into Vladivostok, Kharbarovsk, Kamchatka, Chita, and at least Irkutsk if not Krasnoyarsk and/or Novosibersk.

Set the proposed boundary goal to no further east than Lake Bailal, perhaps the Yenisey River would do. As soon as the goal is reached, begin negotiating for a settlement. Waste no time - supplies will be difficult to move into the area and Russia will grow stronger with each passing day.

Japan risks a lot by doing this but victory will give her potentially abundant resources and a chance to slake her thirst for territory for a while. War with the West is still likely though under different circumstances, especially if Japan completes the conquest of China with a stronger Army and larger/more innovative Navy. I'd be interested to see how this affects the Shinano and certain technological development.
 
Japan risks a lot by doing this but victory will give her potentially abundant resources and a chance to slake her thirst for territory for a while. War with the West is still likely though under different circumstances, especially if Japan completes the conquest of China with a stronger Army and larger/more innovative Navy. I'd be interested to see how this affects the Shinano and certain technological development.

My first inclination is to say that major naval projects like that would be delayed/shelved, but it's hard to say. I'm sort of imagining a long prelude to war where the emphasis is placed on the development of a superior armored/mechanized element vis-à-vis OTL and materiel/labor is directed to that end. Recognizing the difficulty of resupply/reinforcement in Siberia and the need for a quick victory against the USSR, Japan patterns an armored/mechanized element somewhat after Germany's. Of course, materiel shortages and the competing demands from the Navy will still exist, if not so dire as OTL without the invasion of China, so this likely wouldn't be fully finished in time for the invasion. But it gives the Japanese some chance of doing substantial initial damage, especially if it's launched at the peak of Stalin's purges.

Mongolia and Manchuria need major infrastructure upgrades first.

Do they ever. I was able to dig up this railway map of Manchuria circa 1939. Quite a few potential axes of attack that would be very far from a rail depot indeed. I like this map b/c it illustrates by comparison that the Soviets' rail network seems ideally suited to reinforce against a Japanese assault.

4156904688_94406b8e6b_b.jpg
 
My take is that Japan would focus more on its amphibious assault fleet while the IJA would invest on armor and IFVs for the invasion of the Soviet Far East.

Could Japan receive material, designs, and training from Germany or even the West such as the U.S. and the UK (since relations were still somehow good although suspicious) for future tank warfare?

This also needs the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the USS Panay incident not to happen so the West could support Japan's military buildup as a bulwark against Soviet communism.
 
My take is that Japan would focus more on its amphibious assault fleet
That's interesting. Can you elaborate a little more on this point? I know that IOTL Japan's amphibious landing craft weren't anything special, but I'm curious about how they're anticipating the use of amphibious craft in the USSR invasion. Small landings near Vladivostok?

Brings me to a point I've been noodling a bit: I'm assuming this operation optimally needs to begin in late April or early May at the latest to maximize the chances of rapid & deep advance.

Could Japan receive material, designs, and training from Germany or even the West such as the U.S. and the UK (since relations were still somehow good although suspicious) for future tank warfare?

While attempting this in a game of HOI4 might suggest otherwise, I'm severely skeptical that the West's support extends beyond "we won't turn off the tap for oil and steel since you're doing the lord's work going after the Bolsheviks." Manchukuo's already happened at this point and the Japanese aren't super popular. Still, just keeping the flow of material into Japan is a major, major boost over OTL!

Germany is another story. Ishiwara and Yamashita (and probably plenty of others) spent ample time in Germany and Austria in the 20s and 30s OTL, so there was plenty of exposure to the emergent German thinking on mechanized warfare. The problem, AFAIK, is that they'd come back from Germany, urge greater investment in modernization of Japan's armored/mechanized capabilities and promptly get ignored. Politics certainly played a role, as some were on Tojo's bad side.

This also needs the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the USS Panay incident not to happen so the West could support Japan's military buildup as a bulwark against Soviet communism.

Agreed wholeheartedly. I don't think (the exact term isn't coming to mind rn, but there was one) that the cultural notion of a sort of "acceptable insubordination" can be plausibly stamped out pre-WWII, but I do think it could be directed northward instead of southward.
 
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That's interesting. Can you elaborate a little more on this point? I know that IOTL Japan's amphibious landing craft weren't anything special, but I'm curious about how they're anticipating the use of amphibious craft in the USSR invasion. Small landings near Vladivostok?

Brings me to a point I've been noodling a bit: I'm assuming this operation optimally needs to begin in late April or early May at the latest to maximize the chances of rapid & deep advance.
The IJN were focused on battleships and carriers in the 1930s. I think they had more carriers than the USN at this period, hence why a 1937 war over the USS Panay would have been disastrous for the United States.

Japan would need landing ship tanks and troops ships for such an invasion. Yes Vladivostok would have been the target.

Some materials I could find:
The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945 by David S. Nasca (review).

Perhaps had Japan produced more of these earlier:

Along with the equivalent of LCVPs, Higgins Boats, etc:
677aeecb8f057312bb7e13aebd0dacf6--daihatsu-landing-craft.jpg

While attempting this in a game of HOI4 might suggest otherwise, I'm severely skeptical that the West's support extends beyond "we won't turn off the tap for oil and steel since you're doing the lord's work going after the Bolsheviks." Manchukuo's already happened at this point and the Japanese aren't super popular. Still, just keeping the flow of material into Japan is a major, major boost over OTL!

Germany is another story. Ishawara and Yamashita (and probably plenty of others) spent ample time in Germany and Austria in the 20s and 30s OTL, so there was plenty of exposure to the emergent German thinking on mechanized warfare. The problem, AFAIK, is that they'd come back from Germany, urge greater investment in modernization of Japan's armored/mechanized capabilities and promptly get ignored. Politics certainly played a role, as some were on Tojo's bad side.
I think we need a POD that goes way back into the 1920s. Have a more threatening Soviet Union for Japan to invade the USSR in the 1930s. Perhaps if Leon Trotsky took over and World Revolution becomes the fear of the West. Whatever happens would butterfly the tensions between Japan and the West during the Great Depression Era.
 
The IJN were focused on battleships and carriers in the 1930s. I think they had more carriers than the USN at this period, hence why a 1937 war over the USS Panay would have been disastrous for the United States.

Japan would need landing ship tanks and troops ships for such an invasion. Yes Vladivostok would have been the target.

Some materials I could find:
The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945 by David S. Nasca (review).

Perhaps had Japan produced more of these earlier:

Along with the equivalent of LCVPs, Higgins Boats, etc:
677aeecb8f057312bb7e13aebd0dacf6--daihatsu-landing-craft.jpg


I think we need a POD that goes way back into the 1920s. Have a more threatening Soviet Union for Japan to invade the USSR in the 1930s. Perhaps if Leon Trotsky took over and World Revolution becomes the fear of the West. Whatever happens would butterfly the tensions between Japan and the West during the Great Depression Era.

I gave that article on fast tankers a read - interesting stuff.

I kind of went back-and-forth on the idea of an amphibious operation. Presumably you'd have some sort of operation launching from Hokkaido with the aim of either hitting Vladivostok directly or attempting a landing to the north, hoping for a rapid encirclement. I struggled with that one, because it seems impractical and unnecessary - the main overland thrust from Manchuria would probably achieve that goal without the complexities and risks involved with an amphibious landing.

But there's one sort of argument in favor of it - in this scenario, the IJA's won out in a big way over the years preceding the invasion. They're getting the new toys (earlier halftracks, more and better armored cars, perhaps earlier deployment of the ShinHoTo Chi-Ha) and more investment. Even if we've somehow resolved the issue of Japan's disjointed national defense hierarchy, which hasn't been touched on here yet, there's still going to be interservice politicking that needs to be resolved. It's possible that an amphibious operation gives the IJN a relatively low-risk opportunity for prestige and a chance to feel involved in a campaign where they frankly won't matter that much.

I agree that the POD is quite early - you need a series of events that marginalizes Tojo and the Toseiha faction to the benefit of Kodoha rather than the other way around, and a more robust/terrifying USSR hell-bent on exporting communism ASAP might just do that.
 
I gave that article on fast tankers a read - interesting stuff.

I kind of went back-and-forth on the idea of an amphibious operation. Presumably you'd have some sort of operation launching from Hokkaido with the aim of either hitting Vladivostok directly or attempting a landing to the north, hoping for a rapid encirclement. I struggled with that one, because it seems impractical and unnecessary - the main overland thrust from Manchuria would probably achieve that goal without the complexities and risks involved with an amphibious landing.

But there's one sort of argument in favor of it - in this scenario, the IJA's won out in a big way over the years preceding the invasion. They're getting the new toys (earlier halftracks, more and better armored cars, perhaps earlier deployment of the ShinHoTo Chi-Ha) and more investment. Even if we've somehow resolved the issue of Japan's disjointed national defense hierarchy, which hasn't been touched on here yet, there's still going to be interservice politicking that needs to be resolved. It's possible that an amphibious operation gives the IJN a relatively low-risk opportunity for prestige and a chance to feel involved in a campaign where they frankly won't matter that much.

I agree that the POD is quite early - you need a series of events that marginalizes Tojo and the Toseiha faction to the benefit of Kodoha rather than the other way around, and a more robust/terrifying USSR hell-bent on exporting communism ASAP might just do that.
At this point the Kurils and the southern part of Sakhalin Island was still held by the Japanese. They can launch amphibious invasions into the "arm" of the Soviet Union but I'm not sure if there were any beaches suitable for this.

A thrust from Manchuria would be the most practical thing. I'd imagine if the Japanese had better tanks as you mentioned the ShinHotos and Type 4 Chi-Nu tanks get rolled out earlier. Maybe throw in some German designs such as the Tiger or the Panther (this of course, assuming that Nazi Germany here also sees the bigger threat the USSR posses so it invests on heavy tanks earlier). This would also mean Japan needs a source of oil to let their war machines keep going.

Lastly, another important POD we need is to stop the IJA and IJN butting heads. Perhaps in that case, Japan has a better advantage. It does not need to take the whole of the USSR (that task is impossible), just the key portions. I do recall the Soviet Far East is lightly defended and supplies could take a week or two all the way from the European side.
 

Basils

Banned
Thanks for this. I'm starting to sketch out a timeline around some of these ideas. It's interesting - if the historical record is to be believed, a lot of senior IJA commanders thought the war in China was a terrible idea and said so - often repeatedly - as it took place. I'm left wondering how much of this was postwar revisionism vs. genuine feeling at the time, but given the existence of Hokushin-ron, it can't all be postwar revisionism.
It’s hard to tell what is revisionist history and what was real. I agree.
Even among mid level officers there was a bit of shock. At least with USA vs USSR goes. Remember reading about an Air Force fighter pilot in Manchuria who was shocked that Japan attacked the USA and not the USSR.
As for China I think as it showed there was no end in sight and it was a massive resource sink, many probably had their reservations. But how Japan was there was little recourse for what they could do
 
They can launch amphibious invasions into the "arm" of the Soviet Union but I'm not sure if there were any beaches suitable for this.

From what I've researched, it would appear that they're closer in to Vladivostok. It's a pretty heavily forested area - today a lot of sort of national parks with what look like some pretty gorgeous landscapes - but rather difficult territory to be moving men, guns, and supplies.

A thrust from Manchuria would be the most practical thing. I'd imagine if the Japanese had better tanks as you mentioned the ShinHotos and Type 4 Chi-Nu tanks get rolled out earlier. Maybe throw in some German designs such as the Tiger or the Panther (this of course, assuming that Nazi Germany here also sees the bigger threat the USSR posses so it invests on heavy tanks earlier). This would also mean Japan needs a source of oil to let their war machines keep going.

Even the Panzer III or the Czech tanks (later the Panzer 35(t) and 38(t)) would be a fair step up. The 38 in particular was exported in some quantity before the annexation of Czechoslovakia. It sort of wore out its reliability on the Eastern Front, but it saw plenty of action during the '39-'40 campaigns. Maybe a more realistic early option.

As for the oil, going to say that comes from the good-ol' U S of A. Anyone who considers that ASB ought to look up the history of Texaco supporting Franco in the SCW. Anti-Bolshevist Japan may not get outright support from the U.S., but it's hard not to see Roosevelt greenlighting material exports.

Another option is Venezuela, and there are some interesting possibilities to contemplate there as well. Lopez-Contreras was one of those South American authoritarians who would (and did) see plenty to like in the Axis powers and continued to trade with them until it wasn't viable. Maybe TTL's Japan deepens relations with a handful of South American countries...something I'd certainly like to explore.

It’s hard to tell what is revisionist history and what was real. I agree.
Even among mid level officers there was a bit of shock. At least with USA vs USSR goes. Remember reading about an Air Force fighter pilot in Manchuria who was shocked that Japan attacked the USA and not the USSR.

Yep. There's no doubt in my mind that enough, and senior enough, people thought that the USSR was the better route that it's plausible with the right POD.
 
The Japanese were what, <300 m from tapping the Daqing oil fields of Manchuria in 1936? Have then get luckier a few years earlier and maybe Japan suddenly has a much better reason to pursue tank development. Or have Christie sell Japan a prototype in the late 20s/early 30s...
 
Or have Christie sell Japan a prototype in the late 20s/early 30s...
Wow - I did a quick comparison, and the Christie M.1928 could allegedly hit a top speed of 42mph on tracks, nearly double what the Type 97 Chi-Ha could hit and still substantially faster than the Type 95 Ha-Go, which could reach 28mph on tracks while traveling on road. The old Type 89, which was getting phased out as of the onset of war with the wallies, could only hit a top speed of 16mph on tracks/road.

No idea what sorts of armor and armament the Christie prototypes carried during tests; it's clear from the photos I've seen that they were tested while carrying some sort of light/medium machine gun and it's quite likely that they'd lose speed when up-gunned or up-armored. Still, pretty clear that they could've designed a much faster tank, which would've been an asset in a hypothetical invasion.
 
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