Japanese Carriers at Guadalcanal

[Zheng He]

WRT Nagumo's scouting scheme on 4 June, I saw a video awhile back (it's probably on YouTube) where Tony Tully argues that Nagumo's half assed scouting plan on 4 June was the type of scouting plan that they did on days they didn't expect to encounter enemy forces. It was a just in case scouting plan and had Nagumo expected the Pacific Fleet's carriers to be out and about he would have had a more robust plan.

Now this argument still lends itself to a great deal of criticism toward Nagumo and his staff. It shows that nobody questioned the possibility that the US would not follow the script and it shows that despite not have any up to date intelligence on the location of the US carriers (submarines reported nothing, Operation K never happened) it never occurred to anyone that maybe they should put up more scouts to make up for the lack of intelligence from other sources.

Take the argument for what it's worth. It helps explain their decisions although it does not necessarily excuse their decisions.

 

[marathag]

All Japanese aviation development problems stemmed back to powerplants. They couldn't match the 2,000hp engines the Allies were fielding until very late in the game

But could have made a fighter to use the Mitsubishi Kasei, that was in 1500hp trim in 1939, and was lighter and 2" smaller in diameter than the Wright R-2600, much lighter than the BMW, but 1" larger in diameter

 

[Glenn239]

WRT Nagumo's scouting scheme on 4 June, I saw a video awhile back (it's probably on YouTube) where Tony Tully argues that Nagumo's half assed scouting plan on 4 June was the type of scouting plan that they did on days they didn't expect to encounter enemy forces. It was a just in case scouting plan and had Nagumo expected the Pacific Fleet's carriers to be out and about he would have had a more robust plan.

Actually it was Fuchida that argued in 1955 that Nagumo's weak search plan was the type of thing Nagumo's staff did on days where the enemy was not expected, and it was Tully that said Fuchida was a liar in 2005, presenting instead a theory on battlecruiser aerials that had no evidence whatsoever in support. Ten years later, Tully's battlecruiser aerial theory is gone without a trace, and his position on the matter is now the same as Fuchida's.

Now this argument still lends itself to a great deal of criticism toward Nagumo and his staff. It shows that nobody questioned the possibility that the US would not follow the script and it shows that despite not have any up to date intelligence on the location of the US carriers (submarines reported nothing, Operation K never happened) it never occurred to anyone that maybe they should put up more scouts to make up for the lack of intelligence from other sources.

One noticeable difference between Fuchida's old and Tully's new position is that Tully treats Nagumo's staff as inevitably choosing a weak search plan, whereas Fuchida indicates that before the battle the weak search plan had failed a number of times and should be replaced, but wasn't.

 

[Glenn239]

But could have made a fighter to use the Mitsubishi Kasei, that was in 1500hp trim in 1939, and was lighter and 2" smaller in diameter than the Wright R-2600, much lighter than the BMW, but 1" larger in diameter

A 1,500hp engine for a redesigned Zero would have made a difference if available in the 1943-1944 period.

 

[marathag]

A 1,500hp engine for a redesigned Zero would have made a difference if available in the 1943-1944 period.

Or a real monster in 1941-2. The J2M Jack was authorized in 1939 as a bomber interceptor with very low priority. Up the priority a bit and let an IJN observer notice what the Nazis were doing the the FW 190s cooling issues, and wire that back to the Mitsubishi staff sooner than OTL, or just use a standard cowl and take the slight hit in performance. They had the same problems everybody else did with extension shafts and fans with close cowlings- overheating.

J2M1 - Prototype Model Designation; 1,430 horsepower Kasei 13 with three blade prop

Since this was to have been an interceptor, climb was most important, and had less range, just 156 Imp gallons carried, but did have armor from the start
2 x 7.7mm Type 97 machine guns in cowl and 2 x 20mm Type 99 Model II cannons in wings. Cowl guns deleted with more wing 20mm cannons in later marks.
Empty Weight: 4830lb
Maximum take-off Weight: 6307lb
Max Speed: 359 mph at 19,685ft
Service Ceiling: 36,090ft

 

[McPherson]

McPherson - I am no fan of Mitscher's performance at Midway but I have gone over in my head the likely multitude of reasons for the dishonesty of his post-battle AAR and while I think career preservation was probably the #1 reason keep in mind that an honest AAR that included honest AARs from his CAG and his squadron commanders means that Hornet's squadron commander are likely facing court martial charges upon returning to Pearl Harbor (including Waldron posthumously). The commanders of VT-8, VF-8, VS-8, and VB-8 all left their commanding officer (Ring) on a combat mission. Ring may have been a tool, a mediocre pilot at best, and ultimately a poor choice for CHAG but he was still in command and his subordinate squadron commanders all bailed on him on a combat mission and it is very possible (yes I agree with John Lundstrom on this one) that Ring's only sin was that he was flying the course his commanding officer (Mitscher) ordered him to fly. How this whole mess would have been handled administratively and legally upon Hornet's return to Pearl is a very interesting question but you can see why Mitscher did what he did and why nobody above him (Spruance or Nimitz) was interested in digging too deeply despite Spruance's comments about his views of Hornet's AAR as well as his comments regarding Hornet's performance in the battle. They had just won a big victory, nobody wanted to ruin things by looking behind Door #3.

1. But Waldron did his job.
2. Ring guessed wrong. It happens. Others who second guessed him (see 1.) disobeyed and if they had been right and successful (*see 1 again) would have DFCs and Congressional's pinned on them.
3. Someone (with respect to MacArthur) wrote the rot starts at the top, and to some extent this is true, but if there was chaos on Enterprise, with the captain and the pilots in agreement as to where and who the fudge upsydaisy was/is, we can trace it to Browning and pin the blame on him. Spruance sided with his pilots and they produced for him. QED, In the case of Hornet, because so many of the principles kept their mouths shut (Ring) or lied (Mitscher) or died (Waldron) Hornet's mess has to be deduced by results and other outside reporting. Best current evidence in the record exonerates even Ring, but not Mitscher. His later [non] performances at the Turkey Shoot and during "Bull's Run" also seem to show a fundamental root problem with him. I will not speculate without evidence why he did what he did. I merely note the results.
4. Agree absolutely.

 

[McPherson]

A 1,500hp engine for a redesigned Zero would have made a difference if available in the 1943-1944 period.

Pipedream.

 

[McPherson]

Or a real monster in 1941-2. The J2M Jack was authorized in 1939 as a bomber interceptor with very low priority. Up the priority a bit and let an IJN observer notice what the Nazis were doing the the FW 190s cooling issues, and wire that back to the Mitsubishi staff sooner than OTL, or just use a standard cowl and take the slight hit in performance. They had the same problems everybody else did with extension shafts and fans with close cowlings- overheating.

J2M1 - Prototype Model Designation; 1,430 horsepower Kasei 13 with three blade prop

Since this was to have been an interceptor, climb was most important, and had less range, just 156 Imp gallons carried, but did have armor from the start
2 x 7.7mm Type 97 machine guns in cowl and 2 x 20mm Type 99 Model II cannons in wings. Cowl guns deleted with more wing 20mm cannons in later marks.
Empty Weight: 4830lb
Maximum take-off Weight: 6307lb
Max Speed: 359 mph at 19,685ft
Service Ceiling: 36,090ft

1. Tooling jigs. This will be a problem.
2. Proper alloys. The Japanese are good metallurgists. They might have solved that problem if the war lasted long enough. It did not.
3. Probably difficult to make carrier fighter capable. The Japanese need one in *43.

 

[McPherson]

McPherson - I am no fan of Mitscher's performance at Midway but I have gone over in my head the likely multitude of reasons for the dishonesty of his post-battle AAR and while I think career preservation was probably the #1 reason keep in mind that an honest AAR that included honest AARs from his CAG and his squadron commanders means that Hornet's squadron commander are likely facing court martial charges upon returning to Pearl Harbor (including Waldron posthumously). The commanders of VT-8, VF-8, VS-8, and VB-8 all left their commanding officer (Ring) on a combat mission. Ring may have been a tool, a mediocre pilot at best, and ultimately a poor choice for CHAG but he was still in command and his subordinate squadron commanders all bailed on him on a combat mission and it is very possible (yes I agree with John Lundstrom on this one) that Ring's only sin was that he was flying the course his commanding officer (Mitscher) ordered him to fly. How this whole mess would have been handled administratively and legally upon Hornet's return to Pearl is a very interesting question but you can see why Mitscher did what he did and why nobody above him (Spruance or Nimitz) was interested in digging too deeply despite Spruance's comments about his views of Hornet's AAR as well as his comments regarding Hornet's performance in the battle. They had just won a big victory, nobody wanted to ruin things by looking behind Door #3.

Actually it was Fuchida that argued in 1955 that Nagumo's weak search plan was the type of thing Nagumo's staff did on days where the enemy was not expected, and it was Tully that said Fuchida was a liar in 2005, presenting instead a theory on battlecruiser aerials that had no evidence whatsoever in support. Ten years later, Tully's battlecruiser aerial theory is gone without a trace, and his position on the matter is now the same as Fuchida's.



One noticeable difference between Fuchida's old and Tully's new position is that Tully treats Nagumo's staff as inevitably choosing a weak search plan, whereas Fuchida indicates that before the battle the weak search plan had failed a number of times and should be replaced, but wasn't.

Fuchida LIED. Kind of shoots holes in everything (^^^^^^^^^^^^) claimed here.

 

[Glenn239]

Fuchida LIED...<snip>...

As previously stated, the Shattered Sword theory on Nagumo's pre-battle intelligence has not withstood the test of time; his battlecruisers did not relay any of the missing signals. Tully subsequently abandoned Shattered Sword's theory and adapted a position that looks much like what Fuchida wrote.

 

[mack8]

A 1,500hp engine for a redesigned Zero would have made a difference if available in the 1943-1944 period.

Or a real monster in 1941-2. The J2M Jack was authorized in 1939 as a bomber interceptor with very low priority. Up the priority a bit and let an IJN observer notice what the Nazis were doing the the FW 190s cooling issues, and wire that back to the Mitsubishi staff sooner than OTL, or just use a standard cowl and take the slight hit in performance. They had the same problems everybody else did with extension shafts and fans with close cowlings- overheating.

J2M1 - Prototype Model Designation; 1,430 horsepower Kasei 13 with three blade prop

Since this was to have been an interceptor, climb was most important, and had less range, just 156 Imp gallons carried, but did have armor from the start
2 x 7.7mm Type 97 machine guns in cowl and 2 x 20mm Type 99 Model II cannons in wings. Cowl guns deleted with more wing 20mm cannons in later marks.
Empty Weight: 4830lb
Maximum take-off Weight: 6307lb
Max Speed: 359 mph at 19,685ft
Service Ceiling: 36,090ft

While i have my own ideas about geting better/earlier engine for japan etc., i do warm up to the idea of Kasei powered fighters for IJN, but in my scenario, the J2M has to go so that Mitsubishi can work on the A7M in 1940-1942, while the Kawanishi N1K is to be developed from the start with a low wing in both land and seaplane fighter varaints. Because the J2M is cancelled the N1K1-J must have prior over the seaplane variant and must be powered by a normal Kasei engine like the G4M, not the contraptions developed for the OTL J2M and N1K (with extended shafts, counter-rotating props etc., these were a can of worms that plagued the respective engine variants through the war).

So you have the N1K1-J with low wing, a 1500HP Kasei-10 series engine and same guns as J2M1, could easily do probably about 360mph, but the engine is reliable and the bird could be available for production in 1942 (if all goes well and no major teething troubles occur)! Later variants could be powered by the 1800HP Kasei-20 series and/or the Homare, have the four gun wing etc.

As to this earlier A7M, the all important engine is the key. So supposing we can't get the MK9A ready that early even in a detuned form, one other option is the 18 cyl MK10/Ha-104 (used in Ki-67 and the Ki-119 project), rated at 1900-2000HP, depends who you ask. Yes it's a big hefty engine, but again what it's got for it is reliability, it's a straight evolution of the 14 cyl Kasei. Again, speed would be a bit less, but if you get a reliable A7M capable of say 370mph available for production in 1943, that's a freaking big improvement.

Finally, yes, just like the americans stuck to the F4F in it's FM2 form because it could operate from the slow and small CVEs, so too the Zeros must be fitted with the 1500HP Kinsei-60 engine in 1943, to be used primarily from the smaller carriers.

Getting a few thousands of each of these 3 fighters in production from mid-war to 1945 will at least make 1943-1944 a lot harder in the air for the americans, even if assuming the hopelessly green pilots IJN had in later years, in what plane would a green pilot have more chance to survive or at least do some damage to the other side, an A6M or a beast like A7M? The answer is of course obvious.

 

[Glenn239]

3. Someone (with respect to MacArthur) wrote the rot starts at the top, and to some extent this is true, but if there was chaos on Enterprise, with the captain and the pilots in agreement as to where and who the fudge upsydaisy was/is, we can trace it to Browning and pin the blame on him.

Browning bears responsibility for TF-16's performance but the fundamental issue was a lack of training in TF-16 for the ambush mission assigned, and the responsibility for that came from further up the chain - with King and Nimitz. It was they that had these carriers sailing from one end of the Pacific to the other, getting in no training time.

 

[Glenn239]

While i have my own ideas about geting better/earlier engine for japan etc., i do warm up to the idea of Kasei powered fighters for IJN, but in my scenario, the J2M has to go so that Mitsubishi can work on the A7M in 1940-1942, while the Kawanishi N1K is to be developed from the start with a low wing in both land and seaplane fighter varaints.

I'm glad you posted that information, that the Kasei 1,500hp engine was available but being used on bombers.

 

[mack8]

Yes, the 1500 HP Kasei was used on the G4M1 (among other aircraft, H8K also used it f.e.) which flew in 1939 and was available in significant numbers by December 1941 (almost 200 iirc). Have to check some details about the 1900-2000HP Ha-104/MK10, but it was definitely flying in December 1942 on the Ki-67 prototype.

 

[Zheng He]

Browning bears responsibility for TF-16's performance but the fundamental issue was a lack of training in TF-16 for the ambush mission assigned, and the responsibility for that came from further up the chain - with King and Nimitz. It was they that had these carriers sailing from one end of the Pacific to the other, getting in no training time.

There is also the fact that the US Navy did not train to conduct multi-carrier operations at that time. It was not even agreed upon in terms of official doctrine whether or not carriers best utilized in single task forces or in multi-carrier task forces and from what I understand, the guy at the top (Ernie King) was one of the proponents of single carrier task forces. The result was that even when we employed more than one carrier in an operational sense, in a tactical sense they each more or less fought their own battles and you can see the results in all four of the carrier battles that took place in 1942 where the USN had trouble coordinating the operations of multiple carriers and their air groups. I am not going to blame Browning or any other individual for that problem, that was an institutional failure.

 

[marathag]

1. Tooling jigs. This will be a problem.
2. Proper alloys. The Japanese are good metallurgists. They might have solved that problem if the war lasted long enough. It did not.
3. Probably difficult to make carrier fighter capable. The Japanese need one in *43.

Using a standard cowl like the Bettys used, would have cost some speed, but no extension shaft or cooling issues to deal with.
For carrier use, would have needed better gear, as the OTL gear was barely adequate for island use

 

[tomo pauk]

Models without extensions shaft were also lighter by 200-300 lbs, plus the difference in weight of cowling. That kind of weight save can be used for improvement of protection of fue or pilot, for example.

 

[marathag]

Models without extensions shaft were also lighter by 200-300 lbs, plus the difference in weight of cowling. That kind of weight save can be used for improvement of protection of fue or pilot, for example.

Or leave the cowl guns in, and you would have a near Fw-190 with similar maneuverability of the F6F

 

[McPherson]

As previously stated, the Shattered Sword theory on Nagumo's pre-battle intelligence has not withstood the test of time; his battlecruisers did not relay any of the missing signals. Tully subsequently abandoned Shattered Sword's theory and adapted a position that looks much like what Fuchida wrote.

Parshall and Tully (peer reviewed by the Japanese and American navies who fought the battle (their historians) ) versus your assertions? I pick Parshall and Tully .

Especially since I know now how flawed your knowledge of what actually happened (especially WHY it sort of happened the way it did^1.) is.

^1 DOCTRINE.

 

[Farmer12]

I read Shattered Sword now this is from memory. I do not think the Japanese had a hope in hell of taking either island. The number of troops in the garrison out numbered the attackers. Not to mention having to wade in from the edge of the Coral reef with large numbers of machine and marine riflemen cutting loose on the Japanese troops wading ashore. Add on the charges of explosives planted on the beach so that if anyone managed to make it to the shore there was a network of explosive charges to blow those lucky few to bits. I really don't see any attack succeeding