Japan attacks Dutch and Brits in October 1940

[John Gault]

What if Japan had decided during the Imperial Liaison conference in July 1940 to move into SE Asia as soon as possible in October 1940. In October 1940 the US had no interest in intervening in WWII, so soon after the defeat of France and Roosevelt made promises during the Presidential campaign to keep the US out of the War. The US Congress had authorized Two Ocean navy and Conscription in June 1940. The longer Japan waits to attack the worse position it will be in. If Japan intends to ever seize the Southern Resource area it should do so as soon as possible. Japan relies on 95% percent of oil from the US and will have to bow to US ultimatum if it does not secure an oil supply. The US and Russia will be deterred from intervening by Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy. Attacking Britain will force WII to end more quickly. Similarly cutting off China from western supplies by occupying Burma will speed the end of the China incident. Waiting for Germany to defeat Britain as Japan originally intended would have had have little effect on US posture in Pacific because, Britain's' navy could continue the fight from Canada. Also if Britain obtains a negotiated peace with Germany Japan will be in worse position because Britain will have a free hand in the Pacific. If Britain is removed from Southeast Asia Japan will be in a better strategic position vis-a-vis the United States.

A successful attack on SE Asia in October 1940 would have serious butterflies, such as potentially Spain and the Soviet joining the Axis to attack Britain or even a successful Italian advance on Egypt if forces are diverted by Britain to SE Asia. Britain would likely seek a negotiated peace before the end of 1941.

 

[BlackDragon98]

The only big oil source is the DEI and they will blow every last oil well up rather than hand them to the Japanese.
The Dutch knew they were a prime target and demolitions were already prepped when the Japanese landed OTL.
Only thing the Dutch had to do was hit the switch.

Japan still ends up with no oil and a full US embargo.

 

[pjmidd]

As 1940 means no Zero's , No Val's , fewer carriers , fewer battleships etc, you are doing a massive stretch with biblical levels of wishful thinking. No one even in the IJA/IJN was nuts enough to try and take the DEI but not neutralize the Philippines sitting right on top of the sea lanes they need to control to use the oil. There was good reason they waited till December 1941, it was their best shot, earlier they just bog down quicker. Remember the British forces in the Far East are not the ones used in Europe, they are mainly from the Indian Army ( which contained UK sub units ) so the relative strength is actually better for the UK in 1940.

 

[John Gault]

As 1940 means no Zero's , No Val's , fewer carriers , fewer battleships etc, you are doing a massive stretch with biblical levels of wishful thinking. No one even in the IJA/IJN was nuts enough to try and take the DEI but not neutralize the Philippines sitting right on top of the sea lanes they need to control to use the oil. There was good reason they waited till December 1941, it was their best shot, earlier they just bog down quicker. Remember the British forces in the Far East are not the ones used in Europe, they are mainly from the Indian Army ( which contained UK sub units ) so the relative strength is actually better for the UK in 1940.

The wishful thinking that afflicted Japanese leadership from July 1940 to June 1941 was hoping that Germany would defeat Britain, that the US would withdraw forces from the Pacific as a result and that the Japanese could somehow peacefully negotiate an expansion of their empire into SE Asia.

Osami Nagano, a former Navy Minister and commander of the combined fleet, was willing to take the DEI without attacking the Phillipines. Even without zeroes the Japanese Combined fleet had a better chance of success taking on Britain in October 1940 than the US and Britain in Dec 41. Plus the Brit navy lost every major engagement with the Japanese in 1942.

Because of their 2 year stockpile lack of access to oil only degrades Japanese forces if the war lasts longer than a year or two. Taking on the US is suicide because the Japanese knew that the war would last longer than a year or two.

 

[Deleted member 94680]

A successful attack on SE Asia in October 1940 would have serious butterflies, such as potentially Spain and the Soviet joining the Axis to attack Britain or even a successful Italian advance on Egypt if forces are diverted by Britain to SE Asia. Britain would likely seek a negotiated peace before the end of 1941.

Why would Japanese (projected) success in the Pacific or East Indies affect Spanish diplomatic decisions when everything that happened in the Mediterranean OTL failed to shift them?

Why would a more successful and presumably aggressive Japan make the Soviets join the Axis, as opposed to being seen as more of a threat?

Why would temporarily losing the Far East (as that is how it would be seen by a Churchill government) cause the British to negotiate with the Germans?

 

[Ian_W]

In October 1940 the US had no interest in intervening in WWII

Evidence for this, thank you. Note the proposed invasion date is after the US gave Britain 50 destroyers ...

Also, what happens if the Japanese do not take the oilfields intact ?

 

[GarethC]

Note that OTL the year after the Japanese move into FIC was used to build up air infrastructure specifically to support the Malaya campaign. A hurry-up offence like this means no Vietnamese airbases or prepositioned supplies for Malaya or Burma, to go with the lack of Shokaku, Zuikaku, Hiyo, and Junyo.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

It takes time to gear up for and plan for a campaign like the one conducted in Dec 1941.

And in July 1940 one could have been forgiven to thinking that the war in Europe might be about to end with Germany having effectively won.

So with peace very likely breaking out in Europe why would Japan want to go to war with the worlds largest Empire who was in the process of massively rearming who is likely to no longer be distracted.

The Japanese do not have any bases near Malaya until 1941 when they occupy the rest of French Indo China and secure its southern ports and airbases.

At the time of the suggested POD the IJA are (in addition to the war in China) heavily involved in the Guangxi campaign (Nov 1939 - Nov 1940) among others and are primarily concerned with cutting off China from the outside world which the Guangxi campaign and the subsequent invasion of Northern FIC (Sept 1940) largely achieved.

These were the Japanese priorities at the time and I cannot see them risking or even being capable of such an op as suggested in Oct 1940.

By the end of 1940 of course Britain is heavily engaged in North Africa against the Italians, is also fighting the Vichy French and has made it very clear to the Germans that 'Wars don't end when you want them too'.

So going into 1941 Britain is distracted, suffers a number of defeats and the war in Europe is very likely to continue for some time.

The SS Automedon papers captured in Nov 1940 presented to the Japanese in Dec 1940 also laid open the fortes and foibles of Imperial defenses and planning in the far East (you couldn't make it up!) and very likely had a large part to play in the subsequent Japanese decision making process in 1941

But the window of opportunity is closing fast with the USA massively expanding and when Japan does capitalise on European colonial weakness and occupies the rest of FIC in July 1941 the USA smacks them hard with sanctions.

After that they either stand down or in the words of the Mighty Jingles 'Go Full Retard' and go all in with the best hand they were ever likely to have.

But I do not see that happening in Oct 1940.

 

[TDM]

I think the US will suddenly become quite interested in Japan if it suddenly start to make moves in the pacific. It not about which year they do it in, it about them doing it.

The wishful thinking that afflicted Japanese leadership from July 1940 to June 1941 was hoping that Germany would defeat Britain, ...

Thing is defeat the British in 1940 in this context means chasing them off the European continent (which TBF they did!)

But the BEF being chased off the mainland in Europe doesn't stop GB & Co from defending itself or reacting to Japanese moves in the Far East. So they's have think Germany defeating the British involves something like invading Britain or somehow forcing Britain to withdraw from it's global empire to defend itself which would be exceptional wishful thinking indeed!

 

[HJ Tulp]

The SS Automedon papers captured in Nov 1940 presented to the Japanese in Dec 1940 also laid open the fortes and foibles of Imperial defenses and planning in the far East (you couldn't make it up!) and very likely had a large part to play in the subsequent Japanese decision making process in 1941

What would change in the Japanese plans if Automedon wasn't captured?

 

[thaddeus]

know the KM (at least Raeder) had great hopes for Japan to seize Singapore, now how they were to do this IDK (meaning in 1940)

IDK also had the KM performed better during Norway and subsequently whether the loss of RN capital ships would have prompted Japan to act? (as Italy did not after their own raid on Alexandria changed the balance of forces in the Med)

 

[HJ Tulp]

The only big oil source is the DEI and they will blow every last oil well up rather than hand them to the Japanese.
The Dutch knew they were a prime target and demolitions were already prepped when the Japanese landed OTL.
Only thing the Dutch had to do was hit the switch.

Japan still ends up with no oil and a full US embargo.

For economical reasons this was not really the case unfortunately. The Dutch forces were ordered to wait until the last moment to blow up the facilities, which they ended up doing with varied succes. Of course in the Dutch war-planning of 1938-1941 the war was never suppposed to reach Java and Sumatra.

 

[TimTurner]

70% of me thinks that the Japanese leadership would consider this too much of a diversion from China and needlessly risky. 30% of me thinks that they will know the risks and pull ahead anyway out of overconfidence, hubris, and sheer desperation.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

What would change in the Japanese plans if Automedon wasn't captured?

All the British weaknesses were laid bare - the report they captured literally told the Japanese how to attack and explained the limitations of the current garrison against a determined land attack from the North and pretty much provided a wealth of detailed information such as the minimum number of aircraft required verse actual aircraft planned, minefield, supplies and a goldmine of data that should never have fallen into the hands of the Axis.

The Japanese were very happy - they presented Captain Rogge of the Raider Atlantis with an Ornate Katana (one of only 3 they presented to their allies - the other 2 to Rommel and Goering) in 1943 as thanks for the document.

Had it not happened and some one on this site suggested it as a POD then everyone would be beating them to death with the ASB stick.

Edit: In answer to the question - I suspect that they would be a lot less confident in striking south in Dec 1941 than was otherwise the case.

 

[thaddeus]

always wondered what would happen if they had established a Dutch puppet state with more authority? the only Japanese targets would be British Borneo, Hong Kong, and Malay States and Singapore?

 

[History Learner]

The only big oil source is the DEI and they will blow every last oil well up rather than hand them to the Japanese.
The Dutch knew they were a prime target and demolitions were already prepped when the Japanese landed OTL.
Only thing the Dutch had to do was hit the switch.

Japan still ends up with no oil and a full US embargo.

Anglo-Dutch did that IOTL and the Japanese rapidly restored production:

In August 1941, with war clouds gathering over the Pacific, the British implemented a scheme which reduced the output of oil by seventy per cent. They also decided that in event of war, no attempt should be made to defend North Borneo, Brunei or Labuan. In December 1941, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the British ordered the total destruction of oil fields and airfields at Miri and Seria. Orders for the demolition of the refinery at Lutong and the oil wells reached Miri on the morning of 8 December 1941 and their destruction was completed that evening.

At 0500, 16 December 1941, MajGen Kawaguchi Kiyotake's 35th Infantry Brigade’s 18th Division and the No. 2 Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) landed on British Borneo and captured the oil fields at Miri and Seria and the refinery at Lutong. The Japanese followed up with landings at Kuching on 24 December, Jesselton on 8 January and Sandakan on 17 January 1942.

On 11 January 1942, MajGen Sakaguchi Shizuo’s 56th Mixed Infantry Group consisting of the 146th Infantry Regiment, units of armored vehicles, field artillery, engineers and medical service and the No. 2 Kure SNLF landed on Tarakan island. Prewar, Tarakan’s Pamoesian and Djoeata oil fields produced 6,000,000 barrels annually. The outnumbered Dutch destroyed the 700 oil wells on Tarakan to prevent Japanese use. The next day, in retaliation for sabotaging Tarakan's wells, Japanese troops executed captured Dutch prisoners-of-war (POWs).

On 18 January 1942, the Dutch began destroying oil facilities at Balikpapan. At 0700, 19 January 1942, the Japanese landed unopposed at Sandakan, British North Borneo. During the night of 23-24 January 1942 MajGen Sakaguchi’s 56th Mixed Infantry Group and the No. 2 Kure SNLF landed in Balikpapan and occupied the town and oil refineries without resistance. The next month, on 20 February 1942, the Japanese massacred 72 Dutch POWs and two Dutch civilians at Balikpapan for destroying the oil facilities there prior to the occupation.

On 10 February 1942, Sakaguchi’s 146th Infantry Regiment's 3rd Battalion also captured Bandjarmasin, the capital of Dutch Borneo, unopposed.

The refineries on Borneo were estimated to supply Japan with up to 35 percent of her refined petroleum products and more than half of that used by Japanese forces in the Philippines.

The Balikpapan refining and oil center was second only to Sumatra's Palembang in production. Allied Intelligence estimated that Balikpapan refineries processed 5,240,000 barrels of crude oil annually and produced aviation gasoline, diesel and motor fuel, kerosene and lubricating oil. Balikpapan’s Pandansari refinery, “the Ploesti of the Pacific”, was a new and modern plant essential to distillation of aviation gasoline and its Edeleanu plants produced sulphuric acid for the solvent treatment of aviation gasoline.

The oil fields on Tarakan island produced 350,000 barrels of crude per month. Borneo crude oil was light enough to be burned directly in ship's boilers, without refining, but when the Imperial Navy turned to this expedient late in the war, they found that the sulfur content was high enough to make boiler steel brittle, eventually ruining the boilers.

Evidence for this, thank you. Note the proposed invasion date is after the US gave Britain 50 destroyers ...

Also, what happens if the Japanese do not take the oilfields intact ?

In February of 1941, Gallup conducted a poll in which respondents were asked “Do you think the United States should risk war with Japan, if necessary, in order to keep Japan from taking the Dutch East Indies and Singapore?”. The response was Yes (39%), No (46%) and No opinion (15%).

As for the second part of your question: they repair them as they did IOTL.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

In February of 1941, Gallup conducted a poll in which respondents were asked “Do you think the United States should risk war with Japan, if necessary, in order to keep Japan from taking the Dutch East Indies and Singapore?”. The response was Yes (39%), No (46%) and No opinion (15%).

Here are some other Gallup results from that period!

Note that the above poll was before the total occupation of FIC and the subsequent US Sanctions that resulted.


Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to do–to keep out of war ourselves, or to help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war?

Gallup, Nov. 21-26, 1940

Help 60%
Keep out 40%



Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to try to do–to keep out of war ourselves, or to help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war?

Gallup, March 9-14, 1941 (Lend lease)

Help 67%
Keep out 33%


Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to do–to help Britain, even at the risk of getting into the war, or try to keep out of war ourselves?

Office of Public Opinion Research, July 1941 (Invasion of Russia)

Help 62
Keep out 33
No opinion 5


Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to try to do–to keep out of war ourselves, or to help Britain, even at the risk of getting into the war?

Gallup, Sept. 19-24, 1941 (USN DD attacked by Uboat)

Help 64
Keep out 30
No opinion 6


It is clear from the Polls of the day - as the war got progressively worse US Public opinion went from a very clear 'not our problem' attitude in Sept 1939 - to an almost 2/3rd or better acceptance that the USA must become involved a just a year to 18 months later.

I cannot see a more aggressive (verses OTL) Japan retarding this change only increasing it.

 

[Alanith]

All FDR has to do is have the Asiatic fleet conduct patrols along the IJN supply lines and wait for the inevitable overeager junior officer. Put some dead American boys on the first page and bobs your uncle. Either that, or keep reinforcing the PI and other possessions in the area while daring Japan to do something.

 

[nbcman]

Anglo-Dutch did that IOTL and the Japanese rapidly restored production:




In February of 1941, Gallup conducted a poll in which respondents were asked “Do you think the United States should risk war with Japan, if necessary, in order to keep Japan from taking the Dutch East Indies and Singapore?”. The response was Yes (39%), No (46%) and No opinion (15%).

As for the second part of your question: they repair them as they did IOTL.

Rapidly restore is a relative term. It took the Japanese until 1943 to get to 75% of 1940 production levels. 1942 production was about 40% of 1940 production levels.

It should be pointed out, however, that the initial attempt to deny Japan the oil in East Indies was only an initial setback. Within a short period, Japan was able to restore the Balikpapan oilfields with astonishing results that far exceeded their goals. Oil production in the Southern zone in 1940 was 65.1 million barrels. In 1942, the Japanese managed to restore 25.9 million barrels, and in 1943, 49.6 million barrels (75% of the 1940 level). With the East Indies oil, Japan was able to import enough oil to make up for the oil embargo in July 1941 by the Americans, British, and Dutch. There was no lack of oil, and Japanese fleet could even refuel locally at will. They even struck a giant field in central Sumatra in the Minas structure. All these events helped make Japan feel that the oil problem, which was the driving force for its aggression, had been solved.

However, no USN entry means no USS Grenadier sinking the Taiyo Maru carrying oil field technicians in the summer of 1942 which could mean a quicker repair of the NEI oil facilities.

 

[John Gault]

The Japanese do not have any bases near Malaya until 1941 when they occupy the rest of French Indo China and secure its southern ports and airbases.

The Japanese had occupied North Vietnam in Sept 1940. The Japanese could have decided at the Liaison conference in July 1940 to occupy the entirety of Vietnam in September 1940 in preparation for an attack on DEI in October. The Japanese would have given the Dutch a negotiating deadline to commit to providing required oil supplies. The Dutch wouldn't give in and the Japanese would attack. The US would embargo Japan if they occupied all of Vietnam in Sept 1940 but that would just increase Japanese resolve to attack.