Is it plausible for the Soviets to be defeated - WW2

[brokenman]

The Germans are practically and badly overextended. If they have focused on an objective first, like capturing the oil fields at the Caucasus and getting the badly needed oil, the front would have stabilized well and the Germans could dig in and resupply before rushing north. However it would allow the communists to regroup, rearm and fortify Moscow and Stalingrad.

Another, the great Finnish blunder. Despite repeated pleas by Hitler, Mannerheim (or another, I forgot his name) refused to help the German forces besieging Leningrad. If you could push him to at least complete the encirclement, secure Lake Ladoga and preventing Soviet supplies from coming to the city, Leningrad would have felled easily, allowing the Germans to settle in and possibly aid the exhausted Army Group Center.

However, with the Battle of Britain (rather) and the Afrika Corps draining the German resources further, a Nazi win on the grounds of complete conquest in highly untenable. Eliminate these fronts, kick out Britain out of the war (I don't know how will you do that as Churchill is pretty much determined to continue the war) and you could have the badly needed air support in the Eastern Front.

 

[Julian]

Just to note, Stalin never seriously considered a negotiated peace with Hitler, even in 1941. His offers were solely designed as delaying moves to buy time rather than serious overtures .

 

[Julian]

Possible, yes, plausible, not so much.

It is really difficult to get the conditions to allow the Reich to win. Taking Moscow is slightly easier to achieve, but is still quite difficult.

As a minimum you need the following to allow for Moscow:

• Earlier start to the offensive, no later than mid May 1941
• No diversion of effort into Africa or Yugoslavia
• Better logistical support (this is probably the most important, but it ties closely to the first two requirements)
• Around a third of the forces used OTL to garrison Norway to be used in Barbarossa.

If you get all of the above you have more decent, if not perfect, weather. More of the offensive take place during the longer days of late spring and early summer, allowing for longer combat and air support (in WW II major combat was very much a daytime activity, with the nights being more artillery and resupply/refit) which allows the Heer to press its advantage in the period while the Red Army is at its most disrupted. Lastly the addition of an additional four or five divisions, at least two of them armored, and a couple hundred combat aircraft, along with more trucks, fuel, etc. allows the armored spearheads to make better, more sustained progress.


All of the above assumes that Hitler doesn't interfere with the main goal of obliterating the Red Army any more than IOTL (which is, frankly, a stretch). If you get all of these in place, and they are at the far edge of possible then there is a shot at Moscow. To defeat the USSR, well, that is a different matter.


To have any hope of the Reich winning you have to take Stalin out of the picture before he calms down and starts to listen to the people telling him that it isn't always a mortal sin to withdraw major formations before they are encircled and destroyed but after he has allowed all of the great double envelopments to take place. If you somehow manage have him execute Zhukov, Konev, and and a few more senior Generals before he dies, so much the better.



Stalin is the key, no one else in the Soviet leadership had a strong enough grip, and sufficient personal power (and inspired so much fear) to keep the country fighting. Without him, the in-fighting among the Soviet leadership for the crown might allow the Reich to impose terms. Unlikely, but barely possible.

1. An earlier start to the offensive actually helps the Soviets; Soviet intelligence indicated that Barbarossa would be launched in May and, when it wasn't, Stalin chose to disbelieve any further news of a German attack as warmongering. If a May attack happens the Soviets will be overall better prepared. They'll still get their asses whooped, but not to the OTL degree.

2. Yugoslavia provided vital supplies of raw materials and wasted very little time. Barbarossa was delayed until June due to mud in May preventin troops from getting into position.

3. Good in theory, hard in practice. Russia is large, infrastructure is poor, the weather rapidly wears down vehicles (Dust), etc.

4. Throwing more men into the fray only increases logistic problems.

 

[aktarian]

[*]No diversion of effort into Africa or Yugoslavia

Forces used in Yugoslavia weren't slated for Barbarossa anyway. And Yugoslavia wasn't a problem, Greece was and that was in the works since Italy failed to win.

[*]Better logistical support (this is probably the most important, but it ties closely to the first two requirements)

How? More logistic vehicles means less something else. and those logistic vehicles burn their fuel, need their spares.... more vehicles means more problematic logistics.

[*]Around a third of the forces used OTL to garrison Norway to be used in Barbarossa.

Unless they can be motorised, at which point see previous quote, they'll lag behind. This is what started to happen in August, if not earlier. Tanks could reach behind Soviets and encircle them but there wasn't enough infantry to shut the trap efficiently. Legborne infantry needed to catch up to do it and that took time.

 

[The B]

In any case the Soviets can't lose. Even if everything goes right for the Nazis, there is still a Soviet remnant behind the Urals which will enjoy trolling them for decades. I think Hitler wanted to give that area to the Japanese, which obviously is going to be impossible.

 

[aktarian]

In any case the Soviets can't lose. Even if everything goes right for the Nazis, there is still a Soviet remnant behind the Urals which will enjoy trolling them for decades. I think Hitler wanted to give that area to the Japanese, which obviously is going to be impossible.

However Germans control most productive areas, largest population centres and important chunk of traffic infrstructure.

It's comon meme that if Soviets control area size of a blanket with population of 3 people they will drive to Berlin with human wave attacks.

 

[The B]

However Germans control most productive areas, largest population centres and important chunk of traffic infrstructure.

It's comon meme that if Soviets control area size of a blanket with population of 3 people they will drive to Berlin with human wave attacks.

The Germans will certainly be in the controlling position, but the Soviets still aren't doing bad. The area behind the Urals, although sparsely populated, has still some large cities which will be full of Russians just looking to kill a German. Plus they've got many, many partisans in German territory who would love to help their brothers.

Providing the Nazis aren't stupid rolleyes, they can probably hold the territory but it's going to be virtual anarchy in some areas. In a best case scenario the Soviets will be bled white and whither away, but I can see them surviving to present day.

 

[CalBear]

1. An earlier start to the offensive actually helps the Soviets; Soviet intelligence indicated that Barbarossa would be launched in May and, when it wasn't, Stalin chose to disbelieve any further news of a German attack as warmongering. If a May attack happens the Soviets will be overall better prepared. They'll still get their asses whooped, but not to the OTL degree.

2. Yugoslavia provided vital supplies of raw materials and wasted very little time. Barbarossa was delayed until June due to mud in May preventin troops from getting into position.

3. Good in theory, hard in practice. Russia is large, infrastructure is poor, the weather rapidly wears down vehicles (Dust), etc.

4. Throwing more men into the fray only increases logistic problems.

Forces used in Yugoslavia weren't slated for Barbarossa anyway. And Yugoslavia wasn't a problem, Greece was and that was in the works since Italy failed to win.



How? More logistic vehicles means less something else. and those logistic vehicles burn their fuel, need their spares.... more vehicles means more problematic logistics.



Unless they can be motorised, at which point see previous quote, they'll lag behind. This is what started to happen in August, if not earlier. Tanks could reach behind Soviets and encircle them but there wasn't enough infantry to shut the trap efficiently. Legborne infantry needed to catch up to do it and that took time.

Yugoslavia provided significant material, but not in the summer of 1941, not even into the winter of 1941/42. In the Summer of 1941 it was nothing but a needless diversion of resources, even if most of the diversion was for occupation duties. It certainly didn't supply anything in sufficient quantity to divert even a gallon of fuel before the main engagement. Once the USSR was defeated, the capture of the Balkans would be a simple matter, assuming that the Yugoslavian government even chose to put up a fight with the USSR clearly out of the fight, or at least definitively unavailable as an ally/supplier.

Africa, however, was a far greater drag on resources, with a total what amounted to one & an half Panzer divisions landed there in the late winter, spring of 1941 a force that included a total 300 tanks, half of them actually useful Pz. III (140+) & Pz. IV (40) in addition to the much less combat worthy Pz. I & II. Significant fuel and truck losses were taken, long before the material even reached the Desert, not to mention the losses that followed through the rest of the engagement.

Throwing more troops into the fight will use more logistical supplies, but there will be far more, as well as notably more motorized transport, if the sideshows are avoided. Overall, every gram of material sent to Africa was literally thrown away.

Regarding Norway, it is also important to consider that the Reich had to ship everything to the troops there, using logistical resources in what was, again, more of a distraction than anything else, although much less so than the Western Desert. Control of Southern Norway was critical, especially prior to the fall of France, in allowing the U-Boat offensive to proceed, and a force in Norway was necessary to ensure that the Reich's supply of Swedish ore was not cut off. It is the rather impressive number of troops that were left languishing in Norway, more than the actual occupation that is a problem.

Overall, the arguments that the changes would probably have made little difference are clearly correct, something that was, I thought, fairly clear in the initial post. However, the OP was asking what, if anything, might allow the Reich to either have a better chance of success, or of at least reaching Moscow. The conditions posited would be an enhancement to what was the case IOTL.

 

[General Mosh]

The main tank the Japanese used at Khalkhin Gol was the Type 95 Ha-Go http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_95_Ha-Go
up against Soviet BT-5s and 7s, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BT-5 which in 1939 were becoming obsolete by European standards, were more than match for the Japanese AFVs. There were even a few 1st generation T-34s employed.

All true. However, as I said, many of the tanks in the Far East would have been (and were) moved to the west. I believe by late 1941 the Far Eastern armies were down to a brigade of T-29s and a couple brigades of some other obsolete tanks. I'm not saying the Japanese would be utterly sucessful against the Soviets in the Far East, I'm just saying they would have been able to break through.

In 1941, the Japanese were too engaged elsewhere to invade Siberia, even if they wanted to. Their best tanks would have been no better than peers to obsolete Soviet designs and would still be hampered by inferior doctrine in their use.

I assume you think the Japanese will still go to war with the allies, which is incorrect. Of course the Japanese wouldn't dare invade the Soviet Union if tied down in the Pacific War. It was either going North or South, the Japanese leadership realized it couldn't have both. You have to remember they're actually only engaged in China and French Indochina, while the Soviets are in the midst of a death struggle with the Nazis, which is drawing all their good equipment and resources. Also, invading Vladivostok and the surrounding area is not invading Siberia. I'm not imagining Japanese and German troops linking up at the Urals. I'm imagining the Japanese taking Vladivostok and a little bit more of the coast. The Japanese had a very detailed war plan for the invasion of the Maritime Province, which called for something like 30 divisions being concentrated on severing the Trans-Siberian railroad, which, again, was so close to the Manchurian border that it was within artillery range of Japanese forts.

 

[MalcontentRex]

Well, Khakov 1943. Soviet extended themselves there same way as Germans did at Moscow or Stalingrad. Soviet division there were according to some sources on 1/3 of their strength. so technically, they were not eaten alive, there were already 2/3 death.
As to other. Without LL and West fighting, Soviets may loose. Without Soviets fighting, West could hardly win. 2/3 of German land forces were inflicted at East. In Sobiet Union Germany lost around 11000 Aircrafts.

Materially speaking the Western Allies absolutely could have beaten the Nazis on their own. There is zero doubt about it. United States military production equaled that of all other combatants combined and the US was producing at nowhere near maximum level. Where we can harbor doubt would be the willingness. Democracies and their populations don't generally have tons of stomach for absolute fight-to-the-death total war, especially if their existence is not directly threatened. This is where I gave the Soviet Union and its citizenry the credit they deserve.

This all being said, if the motivation were there (which may be close to ASB, but not impossible), I see the UK and USA all alone being able to beat the Nazis in no more than another year to year and a half from when they were defeated IOTL, even without the bomb. There is just too much of a superiority in manpower, fuel, supplies of all kinds, transport, material, etc. for them to lose if they really want to fight it out, especially considering that training is equal or better (at least post-1943), armor is adequate, and front-line aircraft (i.e. non-jets or limited-run uberplanes) are significantly superior.

Now look at it from other side.
At West Luftwaffe lost around 35000 (in air and on ground app half/ half). but for that Western Allies paid horrible price. Around 40000 planes and 160000 airmen. What would happen, if Germans didn't loose 11000 planes at East? If they had resources available which went into producing tanks, artillery etc for Eastern front? And what if all this usefull 88 mm wouldn't be needed against Soviet tanks? What if all this resorces for artillery production for Eastern front could go to produce AA artillery for Defense of Fatherland?

Of course it would be very difficult for the W. Allies to beat the Nazis all on their own--nobody disputed that. But it would still be quite doable if the will was there. Picture Brock Lesnar (120kg) fighting a pit bull or wolverine (20kg). Obviously it will be a hell of a fight and Brock will be injured badly but assuming he is willing to stick it out, there's no way he will lose.

But, let's get to the specifics of your argument. No Soviet presence in WWII and/or no Barbarossa means:

--no, or far fewer, German heavy/heavy-medium uberpanzers that vastly outclassed most WAllied tanks, therefore giving the Allies a much easier armor war
--significantly fewer battle-hardened Luftwaffe airmen fighting over the skies of W. Europe in 1943-5
--no Ukrainian grain to feed the armies of fascism
--hundreds of millions of tons of military, fuel, transport, and food production not going to Lendlease and staying in the hands of the USA/Britain

So, there are definitely ways in which no meaningful USSR participation in the bulk of WWII would have helped the Western Allies.

As somebody said, WWII was team effort.

No disagreement here at all, but the difference is one of one half of the major Allied forces being nearly helpless if left to wither on the vine versus the other half having a lengthy and very difficult/long fight on its hands, but one it will inevitably win with time and most importantly desire.

 

[MalcontentRex]

In any case the Soviets can't lose. Even if everything goes right for the Nazis, there is still a Soviet remnant behind the Urals which will enjoy trolling them for decades. I think Hitler wanted to give that area to the Japanese, which obviously is going to be impossible.

No the Nazis can't physically conquer every square inch of the SU, but without anybody helping them, they don't need to. This SU is essentially no different than Nationalist China--completely helpless.

 

[KACKO]

Well, materially speaking, Vietnam should be won. Afganistan for Soviets ditto. It wasn't.
Why should Germans had less experienced pilots if there was no Eastern Front? No losses at East means more pilots.
No Soviets in war means Germany may still got food and material from Soviet Union as before Barbarossa.

As to Soviets, without LL, they wouldn't lose. Just for them wining would be restoration before Barbarossa border.

 

[Kongzilla]

Could the Holocaust provide enough motivation for the WAllies to keep in the fight especially if they know they are going to win. Even if America was starting to drop out wouldn't Churchill keep going because there isn't anyone else left in Europe and Hitler is licking his lips for the chance to bitchslap england.

 

[MalcontentRex]

Well, materially speaking, Vietnam should be won. Afganistan for Soviets ditto. It wasn't.

Both of those, at least Vietnam, could have been won with different political decisionmaking and military strategy.

Why should Germans had less experienced pilots if there was no Eastern Front? No losses at East means more pilots.

Many of the experten got started on the "easy" eastern front and then, as the tide of the air war turned against the Reich, got transferred west.

No Soviets in war means Germany may still got food and material from Soviet Union as before Barbarossa.

Not on the scale of IOTL when the Reich just plundered it.

As to Soviets, without LL, they wouldn't lose. Just for them wining would be restoration before Barbarossa border.

At very, very best, the Soviets get a bloody stalemate WWI-style somewhat east of Molotov-Ribbentrop.

 

[Herzen's love-child]

I assume you think the Japanese will still go to war with the allies, which is incorrect. Of course the Japanese wouldn't dare invade the Soviet Union if tied down in the Pacific War. It was either going North or South, the Japanese leadership realized it couldn't have both. You have to remember they're actually only engaged in China and French Indochina, while the Soviets are in the midst of a death struggle with the Nazis, which is drawing all their good equipment and resources. Also, invading Vladivostok and the surrounding area is not invading Siberia. I'm not imagining Japanese and German troops linking up at the Urals. I'm imagining the Japanese taking Vladivostok and a little bit more of the coast. The Japanese had a very detailed war plan for the invasion of the Maritime Province, which called for something like 30 divisions being concentrated on severing the Trans-Siberian railroad, which, again, was so close to the Manchurian border that it was within artillery range of Japanese forts.

Why would Japan go North? Vladivostok (and that portion of Siberia, for it is indeed part of Siberia, but if you are more comfortable with the use of "Russian Far East, I can use that) hasn't the oil or strategic materials that the Japanese needed. I wasn't remotely considering Western Siberia. Japan had invasion plans for Russia like the U.S. reputably even has invasion plans for Canada. As a contingency.

Incidentally, unless you have sources that say otherwise, the Soviet's in July,1941, had a full Armored Division with 375 tanks, a Mechanized Division with 275 tanks, plus whatever armor was attached to the 20 or so Rifle and miss. other divisions deployed in the "Far Eastern Front".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2nd_Red_Banner_Army
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far_Eastern_Front_(Soviet_Union)
http://www.niehorster.orbat.com/012_ussr/41_organ/41_afv_mech_forces.html
This source claims a total of 2969 tanks on the Far Eastern Front in June 1941: http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/formation/mechcorps/mk41.htm
I have no info of the specific tank types that were deployed in 1941. It would seem strange that they were all T-26s.
I don't have a source of number of Japanese armored forces deployed in the region in 1941. But, again, they apparently consisted almost solely of the Type 95s.

 

[KACKO]

Both of those, at least Vietnam, could have been won with different political decisionmaking and military strategy.


Many of the experten got started on the "easy" eastern front and then, as the tide of the air war turned against the Reich, got transferred west.


Not on the scale of IOTL when the Reich just plundered it.


At very, very best, the Soviets get a bloody stalemate WWI-style somewhat east of Molotov-Ribbentrop.

Germans could change their policy towards peoples of USSR and do much better. they didn't.
Well, a lot of these experten were shot down couple of times at East. They were lucky to escape, evade, return to own lines. A lot of them died in that easy start.

Well sure, Germans just plundered occupied territories of USSR. But how much resources that plunder cost them?
As said before, AA guns and crews from East could be used for deffense.

Stalemate east of RM line as Soviet best would be possible only with no west at war at all. With West at war even without LL Soviets are going to advance sooner or later. Without west at war, Soviets would more likely loose.
But British didn't leave the war even after French capitulation, why they should leave when Hitler was so foolish and committed himself in USSR.

Without Soviets at war, D-Day would be really interesting. Almost impossible. A bombs in huge quantities would be necessary just to significantly demage German production. Hitler is not going to capitulate after few German cities will be evaporated.

 

[General Mosh]

Why would Japan go North? Vladivostok (and that portion of Siberia, for it is indeed part of Siberia, but if you are more comfortable with the use of "Russian Far East, I can use that) hasn't the oil or strategic materials that the Japanese needed. I wasn't remotely considering Western Siberia. Japan had invasion plans for Russia like the U.S. reputably even has invasion plans for Canada. As a contingency.

No, they didn't. I'm trying to tell you that there was a massive movement within the Japanese leadership circles to invade Russia. The Navy wanted to go South and the Army wanted to go North.

Up to the mid-1930s the Japanese policy was that of the Army: Northern advance, southern defense. This was a long-standing strategy dating back to incursions in Korea in the 19th century. In the mid-1930s the Navy advanced a competing "southern advance, northern defense" policy for two reasons: it wanted to justify obtaining a larger share of the defense budget and it recognized the importance of the strategic materials, particularly oil, in that region. It called for a peaceful expansion, however. In 1936 this policy was put on an equal footing with the Army policy, but this equilibrium was upset in 1937 when the Sino-Japanese War broke out and shifted the balance of power back to the Army. With the outbreak of the European war, Japanese policy (supported by both the Army and the Navy) was one of non-involvement because of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939 and their rough handling by the Soviets in the Nomonhan incident of the same year. The middle rank officers, however, campaigned for using this distraction of European powers as an opportunity for expansion.

Incidentally, unless you have sources that say otherwise, the Soviet's in July,1941, had a full Armored Division with 375 tanks, a Mechanized Division with 275 tanks, plus whatever armor was attached to the 20 or so Rifle and miss. other divisions deployed in the "Far Eastern Front".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2nd_Red_Banner_Army
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far_Eastern_Front_(Soviet_Union)
http://www.niehorster.orbat.com/012_ussr/41_organ/41_afv_mech_forces.html
This source claims a total of 2969 tanks on the Far Eastern Front in June 1941: http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/formation/mechcorps/mk41.htm
I have no info of the specific tank types that were deployed in 1941. It would seem strange that they were all T-26s.
I don't have a source of number of Japanese armored forces deployed in the region in 1941. But, again, they apparently consisted almost solely of the Type 95s.

That's June 1941. Before Barbarossa. After Barbarossa some were no doubt transferred to the West. If you can find a source that shows Soviet tanks in the Far East in like August 1941, I'd be grateful. Also, the Japanese have an advantage in both quality and quantity of aircraft. They had plenty of bombers, dive bombers, fighters, a large Navy to shell Vladivostok into the ground, etc. I really don't think its too much of a stretch to imagine the Japanese could beat the Soviets, sever the Trans-Siberian Railway, take Vladivostok, and then get Stalin to sign a peace over it.

 

[KACKO]

If you can find a source that shows Soviet tanks in the Far East in like August 1941, I'd be grateful. Also, the Japanese have an advantage in both quality and quantity of aircraft.

Tanks ans SPG at Far East:
6/22/1941: 3188
12/1/1941: 2124
7/1/1942: 2589
11/19/1942: 2526

Combat airplanes:
6/22/1941: 4124
12/1/1941: 3193
7/1/1942: 3178
11/19/1942: 3357

Guns and Mortars:
6/22/1941: 10080
12/1/1941: 8777
7/1/1942: 11759
11/19/1942: 12728

Men:
6/22/1941: 703 714
12/1/1941: 1 343 307
7/1/1942: 1 440 012
11/19/1942: 1 296 882

So for sure Japanese have no superiority in tanks, definitely not in artillery.
As to airplanes, quantitatively, I am not sure, if Japanese had more then 4000 plane in the region. In quality. Well. Quality could be better, pilots training could be much better. But still, I am not sure what they had in area. Maybe squadrons equipped with Ki-27s? Well, I-16s and I-153 could more or less deal with that. Losses on Soviet side would be huge, but s would be on Japanese.

 

[Herzen's love-child]

Tanks ans SPG at Far East:
6/22/1941: 3188
12/1/1941: 2124
7/1/1942: 2589
11/19/1942: 2526

Combat airplanes:
6/22/1941: 4124
12/1/1941: 3193
7/1/1942: 3178
11/19/1942: 3357

Guns and Mortars:
6/22/1941: 10080
12/1/1941: 8777
7/1/1942: 11759
11/19/1942: 12728

Men:
6/22/1941: 703 714
12/1/1941: 1 343 307
7/1/1942: 1 440 012
11/19/1942: 1 296 882

So for sure Japanese have no superiority in tanks, definitely not in artillery.
As to airplanes, quantitatively, I am not sure, if Japanese had more then 4000 plane in the region. In quality. Well. Quality could be better, pilots training could be much better. But still, I am not sure what they had in area. Maybe squadrons equipped with Ki-27s? Well, I-16s and I-153 could more or less deal with that. Losses on Soviet side would be huge, but s would be on Japanese.

Thanks, KACKO.
Also, most key, the only armor units that were removed from the Far East had been removed Before July 1941
The 59th Tank Division and the 69th Mechanized Division and some smaller armor units were in the Far East military district the whole time.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

I thought you were referring to the December battles; we pretty much agree on the above, but the limits in January, by which time the lines were pretty much stabilized, on Soviet success still prevented a serious victory. They could have inflicted more casualties, but were not going to do much better territory-wise. Its just going to be more like the Rzhev meatgrinder:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Rzhev

Your quote there actually supports my continued arguement look:

Soviet forces along the Kalinin Front and Western Front broke through the German lines west of Rzhev in January, but because of a difficult supply route the troops of the Soviet 22nd Army, 29th Army and 39th Armies became encircled.

The forces involved had insufficient logistic assets available to appropriately exploit their breakthrough, but the Soviets did have additional assets that had been diverted elsewhere because of Stalin's decision to launch a front-wide offensive.

I suppose the real question becomes: would those additional logistics have been enough? As we both have already acknowledged, Soviet assets had been weakened by the war so far. I think that had those assets been concentrated, the Red Army could have achieved a greater victory against the Germans. A completely war-winning one like ITOL Stalingrad was? Very unlikely, if you ask me. But one which puts the Soviets on a much better footing by spring then they were IOTL? Well within the possibility.

And yes the Rostov counter offensive started in November, but was necessary for economic reasons over focusing around Moscow, which was already heavily defended.

And had Stalin kept it a secondary offensive and focused on Army Group Center*, the Soviets would have been in a better position for subsequent offensives anyways.

*Assuming such a decision does produce better results for the USSR than IOTL.