it might well be possible for the Germans to take Moscow and Leningrad in early autumn 1941.They very nearly took Leningrad in OTL had they been willing to make the effort. Regarding Moscow. the distance the Germans moved during the Battle of Smolensk is about the same as from their front line positions at the start of that battle and Moscow.So the Germans could have got to Moscow (they came very close in OTL) with an earlier Operation Typhoon as long as the infantry could keep the southern flank secure and spare enough for urban warfare to take Moscow. The fallof Moscow might not be enough to win the war and the Soviets would still have launched a winter offensive similar to OTL but the Germans would be better placed tomeet that had Moscow and Leningrad fallen. In 1942 the Wehrmacht would have been better placed for new offensive like the OTL Operation Blau. And therefore have a much greater chance of winning the war through a Soviet political collapse.
In 1943 a successful Operation Citadel or Manstein's large scale backhand blow alternative plan might have helped bleed the Soviets to a point where they were willing to discuss a seperate peace but the Wehrmacht could easily have bled to death first as manpower was running short by this stage
The original Barbarossa Plan assumed that the Red Army would be destroyed in the first weeks along the border, and from there the Heer could advance virtually unopposed and engage in mopping up operations at will. The Barbarossa Plan went out the window as soon as it ran into Soviet reserves around Smolensk and in the Ukraine, which revealed that not only was the Red Army able to put up resistance, it was also able to field new formations. As the first phase of the Battle of Smolensk wound down in August the Germans faced the decision to either drive on Moscow or "turn south" and destroy the Soviet southwestern front around Kiev. The Moscow offensive would have been a strategic disaster; not only would it have ran into the vast majority of Soviet reserves east of Smolensk, which had proven capable of slowing the German advance to a noticeable degree, it also would have had an enormous right flank which the Germans simply couldn't cover if they were to seriously attempt a drive on Moscow. A major assumption of the Barbarossa Plan was that the three Army Groups would be able to advance in tandem. But Soviet resistance in the Ukraine prevented Army Group South from rounding the Pripyat marshes at the same time as Center, thus forcing the "turn south" to eliminate the massive Soviet bulge in Center's right flank.
Further, the "turn south" may have actually helped the chances of Typhoon succeeding. Between the turn and Typhoon the Soviets launched multiple offensives which greatly weakened Reserve and Western Fronts, thus making the German offensive much easier. Further it allowed Panzer Group 4 to be transferred from Leningrad to the Smolensk area, concentrating even more armor along the Moscow axis. Finally it gave rail and supply lines more time to catch up with the front, improving the Germans supply situation greatly.
David Glantz quite neatly refutes the idea that the "turn south" was a strategic blunder in his books on Operation Barbarossa and Smolensk.
Well, the germans could have treated the people more deently, but not that much! And even if they manage - somehow - to treat the people better (and they were still nazis, so there is a low chance for the willingness) - how would that be known on the other side of the front? Would be dismissed as enemy propaganda.
The problem is the Hunger Plan. Germans simply did not have the resources to feed (literally) their army in the East and expected them to live off the land. This, by itself, would lead to the massive atrocities on the part of the Wehrmacht, regardless of any other genocidal intent.
As Shaby said, Germany's atrocities were part of it's conquest and occupation of Russia from the start, due to a combination of prioritizing resources for the Heer at the expense of occupied civilians, a belief that the population was fit only for slavery and extermination, and long term plans to carry out extermination in the form of mass starvation and slave labor.
Further, the partisan war was NOT, contrary to popular belief, carried out by mainly civilians. The backbone of the major pro-Soviet partisan movements were Red Army soldiers trapped behind German lines in pockets who were able to escape into the countryside, continuing to put up resistance for months or years. There were numerous civilian partisan units, especially in the Baltic states and Ukraine, but those that had the most impact were composed in large part of soldiers and at least partially organized/supported by the Red Army itself.
The
Soviets can be defeated, but the
Russians cannot.
Not really. I'm of the opinion that the extreme brutality of Stalin's Soviet Union and it's centralized structure allowed it to forcibily mobilize the population to a never before seen degree with a callous disregard for the costs that may be incurred in defeating Nazi Germany. Few states possessed the necessary terror apparatus and government structure to allow such a total commitment to war.
