They really don't need to be fast.....simply converted 15-18Kn merchants would work fine to cover the Malayan/Borneo Beaches and the subsequent retreat falling back laying mines to seal up and slow down the flow of the Oil.....
Improve the Singapore Strategy
- Thread starter MatthewB
- Start date
One or 2 of the S class DDs in Hong Kong were converted into minelayer(s)
HMS Thanet (evacuated to Singapore with HMS Scout)
and
HMS Thracian (Run aground and scuttled at Hong Kong - later reused by the Japanese)
I have always advocated the withdrawl of as many forces as possible from Hong Kong including the light naval forces (3 DDs, 2 Gun boats and 6 MTBs) and leave just a 'trip wire' force to oblige the Japanese to use force to capture the City and new Territories.
Base these vessels out of Kota Bharu - using the minelayers to lay fields covering the obvious landing sites.
Minelayers would have helped off Malaya with the shallow seas there, especially if they could have been put to work in late November...
The Solomons are no good for mines. The seas are too deep out in the channels, and the currents are too strong. Hiei for example, is over 2,900 feet down.
Regards,
According to the Dutch sources I read, it was pretty difficult to maintain big minefields in the Malayan archipel as well. Apperently the condition of the mines deteriorated much faster than in European waters. Probably something to do with the temperature and the saltiness of the water.
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MatthewB
Banned
They can’t be any further from the action than Pearl Harbour or San Diego’s drydocks.
And Australia was busy building the battleship sized Captain Cook Graving Dock in Sydney, only that they didn’t complete it until 1945. Perhaps this is where some of our 28 million GBP could have gone, to expedite a graving dock well behind friendly lines, but closer than Esquimalt.
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You could build your base at Darwin instead of Singapore, but there's a large problem. It may provide cover for the Malay Barrier but due to it's isolation it's effectively an island in the middle of nowhere.
Thank for that HJ. Factors I hadn't considered, but do reflect why they weren't used historically...
Regards,
Or build a large floating dock that can be towed where ever it is needed!
There was one at Singapore already in 1941 - not sure how big or good it was though
OTL it was scuttled but later raised and reused by the Japanese.
That's a viable option alright. I personally suggested Ceylon up thread.
Two in Singapore. One floating and one not floating both large and battleship sized. The floating wasn't very functional requiring 8 tugs and with a high speed of 3.3 knots.
MatthewB
Banned
They towed it all the way from England.
http://www.tynebuiltships.co.uk/S-Ships/singaporedock1928.html
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The mobile part is the only important factor here - its not like its taking its place to the left of the line of battle!
It/they would be moved during the 30s
MatthewB
Banned
I think we forget that the Singapore naval base or any naval base with drydocks and port facilities is not supposed to be on the front lines of any war. It's where your ships withdraw to for maintenance and repairs, like how USS Yorktown went to Haiwai (and not Manila) for repairs after Coral Sea. Except for Dec 7th, Haiwai was well away from the Japanese front line, further than Ceylon is from any defence of Singapore.
Why not build the fleet base in Ceylon or Calcutta? You can still defend Singapore with troops and RAF in Malaya, just don't build your only full-service Indian Ocean naval base where it can be cut off. Pacific Ops is not the RN's priority, no, it's the Indian Ocean that matters to keeping the flow of troops and materials to Europe and North Africa.
Again, I'm not saying abandon Malaya or Australia for that matter, but for RN strategy Ceylon makes sense. And that's what happened in the end, with Sommerville building a credible naval presence based on Ceylon. As soon as the shooting started, Philips should have been ordered to move to Ceylon to await reinforcements.
Why not build the fleet base in Ceylon or Calcutta? You can still defend Singapore with troops and RAF in Malaya, just don't build your only full-service Indian Ocean naval base where it can be cut off. Pacific Ops is not the RN's priority, no, it's the Indian Ocean that matters to keeping the flow of troops and materials to Europe and North Africa.
Again, I'm not saying abandon Malaya or Australia for that matter, but for RN strategy Ceylon makes sense. And that's what happened in the end, with Sommerville building a credible naval presence based on Ceylon. As soon as the shooting started, Philips should have been ordered to move to Ceylon to await reinforcements.
Very true. Cunningham was saddled with QEs and Rs because the RN's large floating drydock for the Mediterranean Fleet was sunk at Malta when Italy initiated hostilities. Cunningham couldn't dock anything heavier in Alexandria because of the limitations of the floating drydock there.
That was my solution in the thread I mentioned above on the BC board. Leave the main fleet in the Indian and keep it at sea so it cannot be easily located. Put a cruiser/destroyer force in Singapore for offensive sweeps up the east coast of Malaya, with the threat the Indian Ocean fleet could be in the straits at any time....
As I said, Phillips notified the Admiralty in London of his intentions. Why they did not immediately order him not to take his capital ships, the only strategic assets in theatre, in harm's way remains beyond my understanding....
Regards,
I’d use a little of the cash slowly expanding local army units.
Someone must have (or really should have) wondered, “What if the sneaky Japanese attack our shinny new naval base at Singapore by landing some marines inland and taking the base from behind?”.
The obvious way of reducing this risk is to increase army units to protect the island and routs inland. The 2 infantry battalions aren't a big enough force and nobody wants to raise and pay for more in the early 30’s. So why not raise an additional couple of infantry battalions from the locals and some useful auxiliaries like some engineers and logistics units. This has the advantage that their cheap and get payed for from the colony’s budget and not Westminster’s. They also help with labour issues with building the base.
By the mid 30’s things are looking bleaker including the strained relationship with Japan. Some bright spark has realised that the shiny new naval base won’t work at all well when under air attack so any hostile force needs to be kept further away and more AAA units are going to-be needed.The garrison is increased as OTL. However again more local forces are raised using the new units as cadres.
Again once war breaks out more local forces are raised (with the idea of using these to either form a Malaysia Division or to free other units to fight elsewhere. When the Japanese attack 3 - 4 Brigades wortal of troops are available and the campaign becomes closer than OTL.
I feel this has the benefit that these kind of local defence forces are unlikely to be posted abroad and might not be highly thought of by Westminster types so at the same time aren’t used instead of the OTL Indian army units.
Someone must have (or really should have) wondered, “What if the sneaky Japanese attack our shinny new naval base at Singapore by landing some marines inland and taking the base from behind?”.
The obvious way of reducing this risk is to increase army units to protect the island and routs inland. The 2 infantry battalions aren't a big enough force and nobody wants to raise and pay for more in the early 30’s. So why not raise an additional couple of infantry battalions from the locals and some useful auxiliaries like some engineers and logistics units. This has the advantage that their cheap and get payed for from the colony’s budget and not Westminster’s. They also help with labour issues with building the base.
By the mid 30’s things are looking bleaker including the strained relationship with Japan. Some bright spark has realised that the shiny new naval base won’t work at all well when under air attack so any hostile force needs to be kept further away and more AAA units are going to-be needed.The garrison is increased as OTL. However again more local forces are raised using the new units as cadres.
Again once war breaks out more local forces are raised (with the idea of using these to either form a Malaysia Division or to free other units to fight elsewhere. When the Japanese attack 3 - 4 Brigades wortal of troops are available and the campaign becomes closer than OTL.
I feel this has the benefit that these kind of local defence forces are unlikely to be posted abroad and might not be highly thought of by Westminster types so at the same time aren’t used instead of the OTL Indian army units.
Problem is that in the 30s, Singapore wasn't seen as a potential front-line. Let's not forget that the closest Japan base at that moment was Formosa. Even until 1940 the Japanese were only at Hainan and that was not that much closer to Malaya. It wasn't until the conquest of French Indochina that suddenly the Japanese had excellent bases of operation right on the doorstep of Singapore.
Why did the large AFD9 at Singapore not get moved?
Yes I don't think we can blame the local commanders without the details of the messages they almost certainly received from London, both contradictory and impossible to actually carry out....
Or towed out into deep water and sunk when the Japanese reached Johor province?
nbcman
Donor
Per the images linked in post #210, it took 4 tugs to move half of the dock. Was there enough tugs available in or near Singapore in Jan 1942 to be able to move the dock? I only see two listed per this website in Jan 1942:
Assuming they wanted to try, the dock would have had to be broken apart by people who may not be familiar with the assembly / disassembly process. Assuming the dock parts don't sink, the tugs and dock part(s) would be sitting ducks for an air attack as they wouldn't be moving faster than a few knots. It would be far safer to demolish it in place and for the tugs to attempt to get away for future use.
I was suggesting they move it 39-41 to support Med fleet not once war starts to run away.
The dock needs to be regularly broken apart to clear and maintain it (ie remove on section and dock in in the remaining dock) the "crew" dockyard workers would know how to do it.