Improve the Singapore Strategy

MatthewB

Banned
The subs that would have used it would have been sent to the Med and expended there. And we know this, because that's what happened...

The East may have been above the Med in the pecking order, but in late 1941 only one was an active theatre and so that's where the materiel ended up. The problem is the Med.
Okay, I'm trying my best to feed our contrarian tendencies, but I'm spent reading what can't or won't be done. King Augeas, what do you propose for improving the Singapore strategy?
 

MatthewB

Banned
Do you mean you have 28 million in 1938 to play with or are you going further back?
AIUI, the pace of construction of the Singapore base and fortifications was abysmally slow until Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931. After that, the pursestrings were opened and I imagine the majority of the 28 million was thereafter spent from about 1931 to 1938. So, starting in 1931 you have seven years, each with seven million pounds.
 
what do you propose for improving the Singapore strategy?
the pursestrings were opened and I imagine the majority of the 28 million was thereafter spent from about 1931 to 1938. So, starting in 1931 you have seven years, each with seven million pounds.
Buy an armoured corps and win the BoF in 38-39........

The problem is that the entire Singapore strategy requires GB to be free and willing to look east and with any real large scale war in Europe that's simply not going to happen for obvious reasons, on the other hand if GB/Fr defeat Germany (and or Italy) its very unlikely that Japan will be willing to role the dice against an obviously stronger alliance even if they are on the other side of the world.
 

MatthewB

Banned
The problem is that the entire Singapore strategy requires GB to be free and willing to look east.
Which is why it was ridiculous to build the Singapore naval base. When the majority of the money was being spent on the base from 1933 to 37 Germany had already remilitarized and was gobbling up bits of Europe, and Mussolini was eating up the Horn of Africa. By 1935 it should have been evident that sending a fleet to the Far East is not going to be possible. So, why build a useless base.

As for other boondoggles in the Empire’s Far East thinking, why in the 1920s was the largest drydock east of Simon’s Town built in Esquimalt, British Columbia? https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esquimalt_Royal_Navy_Dockyard Capable of holding the largest warships ever to serve in the RN, if they ever needed a drydock thousands of miles away from everything. Why wasn’t the drydock in Australia prioritized? Yes, the Dominions don’t answer to Britain on their own maritime projects, but couldn’t they be nudged in the right direction?
 
The subs that would have used it would have been sent to the Med and expended there. And we know this, because that's what happened...

The East may have been above the Med in the pecking order, but in late 1941 only one was an active theatre and so that's where the materiel ended up. The problem is the Med.
Reduce the number of Ts built in favor of more smaller classes. If nothing else it will keep more Ts alive for when the balloon goes up in the East.
 
Which is why it was ridiculous to build the Singapore naval base. When the majority of the money was being spent on the base from 1933 to 37 Germany had already remilitarized and was gobbling up bits of Europe, and Mussolini was eating up the Horn of Africa. By 1935 it should have been evident that sending a fleet to the Far East is not going to be possible. So, why build a useless base.

As for other boondoggles in the Empire’s Far East thinking, why in the 1920s was the largest drydock east of Simon’s Town built in Esquimalt, British Columbia? https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esquimalt_Royal_Navy_Dockyard Capable of holding the largest warships ever to serve in the RN, if they ever needed a drydock thousands of miles away from everything. Why wasn’t the drydock in Australia prioritized? Yes, the Dominions don’t answer to Britain on their own maritime projects, but couldn’t they be nudged in the right direction?
Hitler didn't move into the Rhineland until 1936. Anschluss was 1938.

OTOH Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931.

Italy is invading Ethiopia in 1935.

There is a reason why the Empire is building up Singapore in the mid 30s. If they don't build it up they can't play in SEA. If the RN can't play in SEA they have effectively given it up. End of Empire.

Hitler isn't an issue until the late 30s. It is clear to see that the Empire is being pulled in multiple directions as the decade progresses. Carrier construction is a good example of this. Pacific Ark Royal laid down in 1935. Mediterranean Illustrious laid down 1937.


Esquimalt is pretty easy to explain. Have a look at a map. See all the Imperial Red in the eastern Pacific? Where else are they going to put a graving dock? By the 20s it was largely a civilian operation. So the size is intended to take civilian traffic.
 
As for other boondoggles in the Empire’s Far East thinking, why in the 1920s was the largest drydock east of Simon’s Town built in Esquimalt, British Columbia? https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esquimalt_Royal_Navy_Dockyard Capable of holding the largest warships ever to serve in the RN, if they ever needed a drydock thousands of miles away from everything. Why wasn’t the drydock in Australia prioritized? Yes, the Dominions don’t answer to Britain on their own maritime projects, but couldn’t they be nudged in the right direction?
The problem is Canada would probably not pay for something outside Canada so trying to stop them is pointless as it will not give any benefit and its mostly for civilian use anyway...(think how many large merchants Britain had and in even the pacific and they need a dock not in US....

The problem is that none of the sites are ideal for a base,
3%20trade%20route%20chart%20of%20the%20british%20empire.jpg

Ideally they would split it with RAN but none of the Australian cities that world work for are really in the right place they want something in the North West but its empty with the main cities in SW apart from Perth to the SE.....?
1200px-Australia_1942.jpg
 
There is a reason why the Empire is building up Singapore in the mid 30s. If they don't build it up they can't play in SEA. If the RN can't play in SEA they have effectively given it up. End of Empire.
They could probably have defended IO and AUS from behind Malaya/DEI barrier ie Cylon/Perth or Darwin/Nancowry with only lighter forces forward but that means signalling a willingness to abandon the China trade, HK and even Malaya......
 
Okay, I'm trying my best to feed our contrarian tendencies, but I'm spent reading what can't or won't be done. King Augeas, what do you propose for improving the Singapore strategy?

Sir, I have a number of ideas for you that I think can be done. Let me noodle on them and I will post something for you tomorrow.
 
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He was going to be the man that lost Malaya and Singapore![/QUOTE]
Okay folks........... I'd say we've covered why sending a fleet is not feasible or likely. So, what do you recommend for the Far East? Singapore base cost £28 million (1938 GBP). So you've got plenty of government cash to play with.

Given how the Japanese valued British possessions in the Pacific, including the Solomon Islands, PNG, https://www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/pacific.htm I've always thought better use could have been made by the British pre-war. A secret submarine base, for example.

Good old fashioned mine fields, and 2 more Abidel class Fast Minelayers, and perhaps some older DD's converted to fast minelayers. Lay the fields around choke points and harbors in the Solomons. When war comes and the Japanese advances are defined lay more fields directly in their path... If a base is abandoned, mine the harbor on the way out. Defenses both AAA and Costal Artillery as well as a brigade of infantry at Rabul. Use Tulagi Harbor as a forward base for the minelayers and the aforementioned Secret Submarine base.
 
The other consideration is that in any 'Equation' regarding the forces that could be sent East, I don't think anyone had imagined that by 1941 Germany would be dominant in Europe, France and its Navy effectively knocked out and at worst an additional threat with Italy also weighing in.

All prewar plans would have turned to shit!

Any prewar planner who actually planned such scenario would probably be regarded as mad.
 
Vickers MkIII tanks and all the other gear for an armoured division or 3 in the 30s? Rebuilding all the Queen BBs and 3 BCs to modern standards and building a much better FAA?

There are holes all through the British defence establishment between the wars, but these don't negate the need for the Singapore strategy.

What's the point of spending money to get better equipment if the logistics infrastructure is not in place to support the combat force?
 
They could probably have defended IO and AUS from behind Malaya/DEI barrier ie Cylon/Perth or Darwin/Nancowry with only lighter forces forward but that means signalling a willingness to abandon the China trade, HK and even Malaya......

And that strategy need the cooperation of the DEI authorities, which may not available.
 
Okay, I'm trying my best to feed our contrarian tendencies, but I'm spent reading what can't or won't be done. King Augeas, what do you propose for improving the Singapore strategy?

AIUI, the pace of construction of the Singapore base and fortifications was abysmally slow until Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931. After that, the pursestrings were opened and I imagine the majority of the 28 million was thereafter spent from about 1931 to 1938. So, starting in 1931 you have seven years, each with seven million pounds.

There is also the issue that an Australian drydock is not going to be useful in war against Japan. Too far away.

Submarine force is not sufficient to stop the Japanese invasion of SEA. One would need post-war submarine to do that.

One need both a fleet and a secure base in SEA in order to wage a long term war against Japan.

Because, at the end of the day, grand strategy is NOT a solely military issue.

Do not forget the effect of ‘Ten Year Rule’ to UK war planning. This was the underlying theory behind the planning of all of the Armed Services as set out by the government in 1919. Basically, it stated that Britain would not be involved in any large-scale war for at least ten years.
 
There is also the issue that an Australian drydock is not going to be useful in war against Japan. Too far away.

Submarine force is not sufficient to stop the Japanese invasion of SEA. One would need post-war submarine to do that.

One need both a fleet and a secure base in SEA in order to wage a long term war against Japan.

Because, at the end of the day, grand strategy is NOT a solely military issue.

Do not forget the effect of ‘Ten Year Rule’ to UK war planning. This was the underlying theory behind the planning of all of the Armed Services as set out by the government in 1919. Basically, it stated that Britain would not be involved in any large-scale war for at least ten years.
They really should have changed that to the four or five year rule by 1934/35 as tensions were clearly rising in the world. Hmmm I wonder what the result of such a policy change would be on history. As for Drydocks and a major fleetyard/base just build one in Ceylon to take advantage of its excellent anchorages and the simple fact that it would be far less exposed and thus not need nearly as many troops or fortifications to be secure and just build a floating drydock or two to service ships at Singapore if needed and it the base seems too exposed just tow them to Ceylon, and build some fuel tanks a Singapore but most of the otl fuel storage capacity should go to Ceylon.
 
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In the late 20’s the RN was planning against a Japanese threat and when challenged by WSC the RN couldn’t justify it so they turned to planning against ‘Locarno Wars’ and they were told to stop that but by then Japan was being aggressive against China so switched back to Japan focus. This at least put the oil bunkerage storage for the strategic move across the route to Singapore in place.
 

Riain

Banned
What's the point of spending money to get better equipment if the logistics infrastructure is not in place to support the combat force?

About as good as it is to a fancypants base that gets overrun due to a lack of modern forces in sufficient numbers commanded by competent leaders.
 
About as good as it is to a fancypants base that gets overrun due to a lack of modern forces in sufficient numbers commanded by competent leaders.
No its far better its available to fight in northern Europe and that just happens to be where its mostly made and paid for.....
 
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