A while back (maybe late June) there was a discussion here on the possibility of Kido Butai returning to attack Hawaii in early 1942 instead of joining in with the Southern Operation. At the time we decided to conduct a wargame to test the premise. Kevin Faber volunteered to be the IJN, Michael Lyons the USN. I created in July the wargame scenario, the rules, and the excel game files for the players.
This type of game might be useful for the types of AH discussions on the site, since all militaries examine war scenarios using wargames. It may take another month or two to complete this game, and if this game is successful as both entertainment and as a test of an operational premise, I would be interested in a more serious game looking at even more complex issues, maybe even with even more players. The key is to have a bunch of players eager to play, to participate on the thread, and willing to put in the time to learn the game and complete it. Mike has been a real trooper, and has continued the game even through a major move.
In July the game commenced offline. We are five turns in, and the current turn is 12pm-4pm on day two. In a post below are the rules sent to the players, (it’s a rules outline, not the full rule set). The game is a ‘blinged up’ derivative of Avalon Hill’s old game “Midway”, with an all-dice CRT and updated search rules. In addition, each player received a sheet of rules detailing their special national advantages. For example, it’s no secret that the US had radar directed interception and the Japanese didn’t. The US player knows what the rules for these are, and the Japanese player does not.
The game so far, at this preliminary stage, seems to show that the lack of high-level intelligence decrypts on the US side at this time was a serious disadvantage to Nimitz in comparison to Midway. Historically, for the decisive Midway clash it was possible for Nimitz to identify when and where the IJN carriers would be. But here, earlier in the war before this intel became available, it would not have been possible to identify the specific threat axis, the timing of attack, the enemy objectives, from simple traffic analysis. With the vast scale of the fighting area, and outlying islands that the USN did not want to surrender to the Japanese, the US player’s most important objective setting up was to consider potential IJN objectives and directions of movement, because if he guessed wrong his forces are out of position. Did he guess right or wrong? Well, I guess we will find out!
In addition, without certainty on Japanese intentions as at Midway, the US player experiences more difficulty keeping his forces ready in terms of DD fueling at the moment the IJN attacks, (Fletcher experienced this at Eastern Solomons). Mike wants to use his land based air and sea assets in tandem against the IJN carriers, and not allow Kevin’s Kido Butai to tackle either in isolation.
On the Japanese side, there are also some sharable considerations that have come to the top. Kido Butai is a powerful striking force capable of tackling Oahu or the US carriers, but doing both at the same time would be dangerous. One possible catastrophe would be to become embroiled in a full scale air assault on Oahu with US carriers on the flank – just like the historical debacle at Midway. Kevin’s ability to pick the time and place of his choosing, because the map is so huge, is a clear IJN advantage. On the disadvantage front, he loses VP’s for losing air crews, meaning that if he assaults Oahu he needs to do it carefully and with his full air strength,or else losses to heavy fighter defences will be prohibitive. Heck, even doing it carefully might lead to heavy losses.
Game up to current moment. (Information that both players know).
The first three turns were night turns. During the night, a Japanese scout was detected over Oahu having been tracked coming from the northwest beyond Kauai. Visibility conditions prevented this intruder from making a scouting report.
The fourth turn was 8am-12am of DAY 2. Each player’s radio interception units detected some chatter from enemy search aircraft. But there were no sightings made by either player. Another scout intruded at Oahu and this time the aircraft was positively identified by defending CAP as a single-engine seaplane. The scouting report was negative – again, cloud cover prevented any recon of the harbor. Radar tracked the scout back off in a northerly direction.
The current turn is turn 5, Day 2, 12pm-4pm, with one more day turn following after it. Ship movement is complete and we are awaiting USN scouting orders before we proceed to resolving the scouting step. Below are excerpts from the letters each admiral received from high command at the start of the game that give the historical background to this "what if", and a rules brief. Over the next few weeks I’m hoping we can complete the exercise and make some solid observations about the premise of an IJN carrier attack at Hawaii at the end of January, 1942.
This type of game might be useful for the types of AH discussions on the site, since all militaries examine war scenarios using wargames. It may take another month or two to complete this game, and if this game is successful as both entertainment and as a test of an operational premise, I would be interested in a more serious game looking at even more complex issues, maybe even with even more players. The key is to have a bunch of players eager to play, to participate on the thread, and willing to put in the time to learn the game and complete it. Mike has been a real trooper, and has continued the game even through a major move.
In July the game commenced offline. We are five turns in, and the current turn is 12pm-4pm on day two. In a post below are the rules sent to the players, (it’s a rules outline, not the full rule set). The game is a ‘blinged up’ derivative of Avalon Hill’s old game “Midway”, with an all-dice CRT and updated search rules. In addition, each player received a sheet of rules detailing their special national advantages. For example, it’s no secret that the US had radar directed interception and the Japanese didn’t. The US player knows what the rules for these are, and the Japanese player does not.
The game so far, at this preliminary stage, seems to show that the lack of high-level intelligence decrypts on the US side at this time was a serious disadvantage to Nimitz in comparison to Midway. Historically, for the decisive Midway clash it was possible for Nimitz to identify when and where the IJN carriers would be. But here, earlier in the war before this intel became available, it would not have been possible to identify the specific threat axis, the timing of attack, the enemy objectives, from simple traffic analysis. With the vast scale of the fighting area, and outlying islands that the USN did not want to surrender to the Japanese, the US player’s most important objective setting up was to consider potential IJN objectives and directions of movement, because if he guessed wrong his forces are out of position. Did he guess right or wrong? Well, I guess we will find out!
In addition, without certainty on Japanese intentions as at Midway, the US player experiences more difficulty keeping his forces ready in terms of DD fueling at the moment the IJN attacks, (Fletcher experienced this at Eastern Solomons). Mike wants to use his land based air and sea assets in tandem against the IJN carriers, and not allow Kevin’s Kido Butai to tackle either in isolation.
On the Japanese side, there are also some sharable considerations that have come to the top. Kido Butai is a powerful striking force capable of tackling Oahu or the US carriers, but doing both at the same time would be dangerous. One possible catastrophe would be to become embroiled in a full scale air assault on Oahu with US carriers on the flank – just like the historical debacle at Midway. Kevin’s ability to pick the time and place of his choosing, because the map is so huge, is a clear IJN advantage. On the disadvantage front, he loses VP’s for losing air crews, meaning that if he assaults Oahu he needs to do it carefully and with his full air strength,or else losses to heavy fighter defences will be prohibitive. Heck, even doing it carefully might lead to heavy losses.
Game up to current moment. (Information that both players know).
The first three turns were night turns. During the night, a Japanese scout was detected over Oahu having been tracked coming from the northwest beyond Kauai. Visibility conditions prevented this intruder from making a scouting report.
The fourth turn was 8am-12am of DAY 2. Each player’s radio interception units detected some chatter from enemy search aircraft. But there were no sightings made by either player. Another scout intruded at Oahu and this time the aircraft was positively identified by defending CAP as a single-engine seaplane. The scouting report was negative – again, cloud cover prevented any recon of the harbor. Radar tracked the scout back off in a northerly direction.
The current turn is turn 5, Day 2, 12pm-4pm, with one more day turn following after it. Ship movement is complete and we are awaiting USN scouting orders before we proceed to resolving the scouting step. Below are excerpts from the letters each admiral received from high command at the start of the game that give the historical background to this "what if", and a rules brief. Over the next few weeks I’m hoping we can complete the exercise and make some solid observations about the premise of an IJN carrier attack at Hawaii at the end of January, 1942.