If Russia and Austria divided Ottoman Empire as per plan?

[TiberiusCaesar]

How history has proceeded? Russia has repetitively dominated and retreated from Balkan. It is almost frustrating to see. I'm convinced in 18th Russia could consign Ottoman to oblivion if unimpeded by other powers.
I've always wondered why Great Powers are so preoccupied to preserve balance of power to the last 19th century. They could simply carve out Ottoman and Persia and share spoils of division. It also seems they weren't interested in territorial claim of Egypt at all after expulsion of Bonaparte. Both Great Britain and France didn't want to occupy Egypt even in 1870s. Consequently, Middle East has been left uncolonized until the end of the First World War, despite of relatively sparse population and immeasurable potential benefits.

I'd like to intervene on this matter. First of all, the 18th century is 100 years. That's a long period. While the Ottoman Empire was hopeless in 1770, they were pretty equal in 1710. So no, Russia could not consign the Ottoman Empire to oblivion in the 18th century. I am giving you the benefit of the doubt and think you mean the late 18th century. Let's focus on that part.

Russia had taken advantage in military terms, with regards to quality by the mid 18th century. In the 1735-39 war this became pretty evident. They could beat Ottoman Armies in field and occupy lands between the Dniepro and Pruth. It became easier in 1768-1774 as the Ottomans were quite powerless to drive the Russians out of the Danubian Principalities and Crimea. The cherry on top was the defeat in Kozluca (Suvorovo, Bulgaria) where the Ottoman Army got annihilated by a Russian Force 5 times smaller.
But there is a problem. Beating the Ottoman Army in field was one thing, consolidating their lands is another thing. Especially in the Balkans, which is pretty large. The only Russian operation prior to 1787 was in Suvorovo and that was to force the Ottoman Sultan to peace rather than conquer new lands. The Austrians got stuck in Serbia after 3 years and the Russians do not have the capacity to conquer and consolidate large swaths of land in the late 18th century, despite Ottoman weakness. This will only increase Ottoman resistance even more when the Austro-Russian Alliance wants nothing less than a full occupation of European Turkey, that includes Constantinople. In other words: a pipe dream.

I am not in favor of comparing something of 2022 with 1787. But in this case look at Ukraine. Russia has used 200.000 troops to invade Ukraine and Russia lacked the logistics to supply and succeed in the first months of war. The logistics lack for using even more troops needed to eliminate the Ukrainian resistance. In the 1780s the logistical train is far more inferior while the Russians (and Austrians) need far more soldiers than they used to accomplish the goal.

That's what makes Catherine's Greek Plan just an ambitious plan, and nothing more.
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But for the sake of giving you an answer to your question:
A). Austria will annex Serbia and Bosnia, forming a principality in the less accesible Albania
B). Russia forms the Neo-Byzantine Empire in Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonia, including Constantinople.

Austria is better off. Despite stiff resistance in Bosnia, they can accomodate the local Ayans to a certain degree. Both Bosnia and Serbia will get Germanized to a certain point in the 19th century. Nothing more than Hungary.

This neo-Byzantine Empire is pretty unstable and will deal with lots of internal rebellions. It will likely follow a Latin Empire analogue except that the Russians will want to hold Constantinople, probay succeed too. The Russians will probably tolerate the formation of a Bulgarian and Greek kingdoms when this neo-Byzantine Empire falls apart. That is, assuming the local Ayans are eliminated to the last men.

 

[lilt]

TiberiusCaesar said:
I'd like to intervene on this matter. First of all, the 18th century is 100 years. That's a long period. While the Ottoman Empire was hopeless in 1770, they were pretty equal in 1710. So no, Russia could not consign the Ottoman Empire to oblivion in the 18th century. I am giving you the benefit of the doubt and think you mean the late 18th century. Let's focus on that part.

Russia had taken advantage in military terms, with regards to quality by the mid 18th century. In the 1735-39 war this became pretty evident. They could beat Ottoman Armies in field and occupy lands between the Dniepro and Pruth. It became easier in 1768-1774 as the Ottomans were quite powerless to drive the Russians out of the Danubian Principalities and Crimea. The cherry on top was the defeat in Kozluca (Suvorovo, Bulgaria) where the Ottoman Army got annihilated by a Russian Force 5 times smaller.
But there is a problem. Beating the Ottoman Army in field was one thing, consolidating their lands is another thing. Especially in the Balkans, which is pretty large. The only Russian operation prior to 1787 was in Suvorovo and that was to force the Ottoman Sultan to peace rather than conquer new lands. The Austrians got stuck in Serbia after 3 years and the Russians do not have the capacity to conquer and consolidate large swaths of land in the late 18th century, despite Ottoman weakness. This will only increase Ottoman resistance even more when the Austro-Russian Alliance wants nothing less than a full occupation of European Turkey, that includes Constantinople. In other words: a pipe dream.

I am not in favor of comparing something of 2022 with 1787. But in this case look at Ukraine. Russia has used 200.000 troops to invade Ukraine and Russia lacked the logistics to supply and succeed in the first months of war. The logistics lack for using even more troops needed to eliminate the Ukrainian resistance. In the 1780s the logistical train is far more inferior while the Russians (and Austrians) need far more soldiers than they used to accomplish the goal.

That's what makes Catherine's Greek Plan just an ambitious plan, and nothing more.
---------------------------------------------------------------

But for the sake of giving you an answer to your question:
A). Austria will annex Serbia and Bosnia, forming a principality in the less accesible Albania
B). Russia forms the Neo-Byzantine Empire in Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonia, including Constantinople.

Austria is better off. Despite stiff resistance in Bosnia, they can accomodate the local Ayans to a certain degree. Both Bosnia and Serbia will get Germanized to a certain point in the 19th century. Nothing more than Hungary.

This neo-Byzantine Empire is pretty unstable and will deal with lots of internal rebellions. It will likely follow a Latin Empire analogue except that the Russians will want to hold Constantinople, probay succeed too. The Russians will probably tolerate the formation of a Bulgarian and Greek kingdoms when this neo-Byzantine Empire falls apart. That is, assuming the local Ayans are eliminated to the last men.
Click to expand...

To be more precise, yup, I mean post-1735. Though I deem since 1710-20 quality of Russian military machine has already surpassed that of Ottoman. In 1739, Russia retreated from Pruth rather than consoldiating their gains. In 1774, Russia again retreated from Danube in exchange of Poland. They did again in 1792, and again in 1812. Isn't it frustrating to see?

And I think Russia could topple Ottoman, if only they directly assault and storm Constantinople. They almost did it in 1828. They probably achieve the goal in 1774, if only they did try. Alas, even Catherine's advisors was opposed to war against Ottoman, because they were preocuppied with preserving their own power.

 

[TiberiusCaesar]

To be more precise, yup, I mean post-1735. Though I deem 1710-20 quality of Russian military machine surpassed that of Ottoman. In 1739, Russia retreated from Pruth rather than consoldiating their gains. In 1774, Russia again retreated from Danube in exchange of Poland. They did again in 1792, and again in 1812. Isn't it frustrating to see?

And I think Russia could topple Ottoman, if only they directly assault and storm Constantinople. They almost did it in 1828. They probably achieve the goal in 1774, if only they did try. Alas, even Catherine's advisors was opposed to war against Ottoman, because they were preocuppied with preserving their own power.

I introduce you to term called: logistics

Russian logistics aren't good enough to do what you describe. Constantinople in the 1770s was a city with a population of 800.000 approximatly. The Russians had 8.000 soldiers when they operated for the first time South of the Danube. That is good enough to supply, way to small to assault Constantinople. The Russian tactics used in the field battles of Kahul 1770 and Suvorovo 1774 is not going to work against a large city like Constantinople. The Ottoman Armies in the 1770s to 1790s were beyond attrocious in field battles but still could put a decent defense in fortified places.

 

[lilt]

I introduce you to term called: logistics

Russian logistics aren't good enough to do what you describe. Constantinople in the 1770s was a city with a population of 800.000 approximatly. The Russians had 8.000 soldiers when they operated for the first time South of the Danube. That is good enough to supply, way to small to assault Constantinople. The Russian tactics used in the field battles of Kahul 1770 and Suvorovo 1774 is not going to work against a large city like Constantinople. The Ottoman Armies in the 1770s to 1790s were beyond attrocious in field battles but still could put a decent defense in fortified places.

Ottoman army was relatively good at siege and defensive warfare, but I'm still not convinced they could defend capital against a determined incursion of Russia. After all, late 18th and early 19th Russian armies aren't that different. And it still dosen't explain why Russia has so easily relinquished their hard-earn gains. Even Ottoman was perfectly willing to cede Danube to Russia.

 

[TiberiusCaesar]

Ottoman army was relatively good at siege and defensive warfare, but I'm still not convinced they could defend capital against a determined incursion of Russia. After all, late 18th and early 19th Russian armies aren't that different. And it still dosen't explain why Russia has so easily relinquished their hard-earn gains. Even Ottoman was perfectly willing to cede Danube to Russia.

> Good at defensive warfare and sieges
> Cannot defend their capital above all

What now?

Also determined incursion of Russia? There won't be much determination once the logistical train is spread thin, supplies run low and the risk increased Ottoman/Ayan attacks on the Russian Forces.

Again, the Russians can't supply a large force in the Balkans and they need way too much to fight, consolidate and hold. Whatever the Russians can supply is not large enough to take Constantinople in the 1787-92 war.

 

[lilt]

> Good at defensive warfare and sieges
> Cannot defend their capital above all

What now?

Also determined incursion of Russia? There won't be much determination once the logistical train is spread thin, supplies run low and the risk increased Ottoman/Ayan attacks on the Russian Forces.

Again, the Russians can't supply a large force in the Balkans and they need way too much to fight, consolidate and hold. Whatever the Russians can supply is not large enough to take Constantinople in the 1787-92 war.

Don't you see 'relatively'? Russia has always managed to storm cities with inferior number of troops. The only difference is the 'vast'.

If the logistics is that difficult, I wonder, how Peter I could conquer northern Persia in 1723?

Russia can't supply a large force in the Balkan? Don't they routinely field hundreds of thousands soldiers in the mianland Europe since the mid-18th century? And didn't they did the same in 1828? What makes Balkan any different than other areas of Europe?

 

[TiberiusCaesar]

Don't you see 'relatively'? Russia has always managed to storm cities with inferior number of troops. The only difference is the 'vast'.

If the logistics is that difficult, I wonder, how Peter I could conquer northern Persia in 1723?

Russia can't supply a large force in the Balkan? Don't they routinely field hundreds of thousands soldiers in the mianland Europe since the mid-18th century? And didn't they did the same in 1828? What makes Balkan any different than other areas of Europe?

Storming Izmail, Ozi, Chotyn, Sistova etc. ≠ Constantinople

Not comparable

They took coastal cities in Persia because Safavid authorities collapser after the Afghans had defeated them.

Not comparable either

Yes they could not supply large armies in the Balkans. The Balkans were hostile Ottoman lands, mostly hills and mountains. The Coalition battles were in allied lands where they could be easier supplied. This was also 20ish years later. The first battle the Russians had fielded over 100.000 troops was in Leipzig, in 1813 in after marching through allied territory.

1829 is not a valid argument for the division you proposed in the 1780s. That' 40 years laters. Logistics developed better but not enough to annex swaths of Ottoman land as proposed in your OP. The diplomatic situation also changed in 1829 compared to 1787.

 

[WhatSantayanaSaid]

They could simply make those islands into Protectorates and extract valuable resource rather than implementing direct colonialisation, as Britain did in Persian Gulf, a generally poor and sparsely populated region. Also, there are already thousands of uninhabited islands divided and exploited as coaling stations and guano storage.

But how would they turn those islands into protectorates and still have the necessary infrastructure for coaling stations plus other economic ventures (like sugarcane, which I neglected to mention previously)? The Persian Gulf is very different from the middle of the Pacific. Far from any regions that foreign expertise and manpower can naturally migrate to, lacking pre-existing trade routes for said infrastructure to be built with, and in general just lacking manpower in quantities that would suit the imperial powers' needs. The British moved many thousands of Indians to the Pacific islands under their control because they needed more working hands there (particularly for sugarcane plantations). Most people in Fiji have some Indian descent dating back from the era of British rule and most are Hindu, for reference. And you must remember, the Pacific is bloody big and not all islands are big enough for naval infrastructure purposes. They can't use the islands without direct rule, there's not enough resources or manpower for that to work out on its own.

But is direct subjugation truly more expensive than so-called indirect colonialism? As for intervention of other Great Powers, Britain and Russia didn't divide Persia even after advance of rapprochement and conclusion of Anglo-Russian Convention. And Britain so readily renounced Persian Protectorate immediately after the WW1.

One involves directly managing the subject area's bureaucracy and integrating it into the imperial bureaucracy, sending and funding enough troops to patrol the region and put down revolts, and paying for whatever social programs or infrastructure needed for their purposes out of pocket. Not to mention the need to occasionally send troops from the metropole to put down local rebellions and having to explain to grieving mothers and widows why their sons had to die so far from home not in direct defense of their homeland (France during the Algerian and Vietnamese Wars of Independence springs to mind). There's a reason Europe had to withdraw from its colonies after being bankrupted by the World Wars while also maintaining their influence via various methods (including but not limited to bribery, assassinations, economic cooperation, and other tactics used in neocolonialism). Even India, the crown jewel of the British Empire, was too expensive to maintain long term and was cut loose. That should make it clear whether indirect colonialism is more cost-efficient than direct subjugation.

The last of Barbary priates were already crushed in 1815. It turned out that there were very few European slaves in Algeris.

And it dosen't explain why neither France nor Britain interested in Egypt until Suez Crisis.

The Barbary pirates were not completely put down until the French conquest of Algeria in the 1830s. As for other reasons for taking Algeria, France under Napoleon got quite a lot of grain from Algeria and did not pay for it. To simply events, essentially the French after Napoleon did not want to pay the large debt, the Algerians were not powerful enough to force the French to pay but kept insisting on it and refused to reach a peaceful, though humiliating settlement, and personalities flared, resulting in a diplomatic incident that resulted in France invading Algeria and conquering it. It's a combination of factors economic, social, historical, and political that result in that conquest.

As for Egypt, the French and British were definitely involved in Egypt prior to the Suez Crisis. Aside from, well, the British straight up turning Egypt into a protectorate and having their whole Cape-to-Cairo shtick, the actual building of the Suez Canal and the lobbying involved there, the British and French involvements in the Oriental Crisis, Napoleon in Egypt and the British and French fighting each other there, and the British military occupation of Egypt from 1882 until WWI, when Egypt became a former subject of Britain. Plus, the French and British became friendly during the period (particularly during Nappy III's tenure and then the rise of Germany), so that removed the rivalry issue in the region which made annexing Egypt harder previously. Aside from the obvious benefit of the Suez Canal for empire maintenance, Egyptian cotton was a way to prevent complete dependence on American cotton exports (which notably undercut the CSA's importance to the British, who did not intervene in the US Civil War).

 

[lilt]

But how would they turn those islands into protectorates and still have the necessary infrastructure for coaling stations plus other economic ventures (like sugarcane, which I neglected to mention previously)? The Persian Gulf is very different from the middle of the Pacific. Far from any regions that foreign expertise and manpower can naturally migrate to, lacking pre-existing trade routes for said infrastructure to be built with, and in general just lacking manpower in quantities that would suit the imperial powers' needs. The British moved many thousands of Indians to the Pacific islands under their control because they needed more working hands there (particularly for sugarcane plantations). Most people in Fiji have some Indian descent dating back from the era of British rule and most are Hindu, for reference. And you must remember, the Pacific is bloody big and not all islands are big enough for naval infrastructure purposes. They can't use the islands without direct rule, there's not enough resources or manpower for that to work out on its own.

Fair points. Thank you for elucidation!

One involves directly managing the subject area's bureaucracy and integrating it into the imperial bureaucracy, sending and funding enough troops to patrol the region and put down revolts, and paying for whatever social programs or infrastructure needed for their purposes out of pocket. Not to mention the need to occasionally send troops from the metropole to put down local rebellions and having to explain to grieving mothers and widows why their sons had to die so far from home not in direct defense of their homeland (France during the Algerian and Vietnamese Wars of Independence springs to mind). There's a reason Europe had to withdraw from its colonies after being bankrupted by the World Wars while also maintaining their influence via various methods (including but not limited to bribery, assassinations, economic cooperation, and other tactics used in neocolonialism). Even India, the crown jewel of the British Empire, was too expensive to maintain long term and was cut loose. That should make it clear whether indirect colonialism is more cost-efficient than direct subjugation.

I've always wondered whether colonies are economic drain; If colonies aren't profitable, why every historical empire sought to enlarge its territorial extent? Aren't land, labour and market directly correlate with economic power?

The Barbary pirates were not completely put down until the French conquest of Algeria in the 1830s. As for other reasons for taking Algeria, France under Napoleon got quite a lot of grain from Algeria and did not pay for it. To simply events, essentially the French after Napoleon did not want to pay the large debt, the Algerians were not powerful enough to force the French to pay but kept insisting on it and refused to reach a peaceful, though humiliating settlement, and personalities flared, resulting in a diplomatic incident that resulted in France invading Algeria and conquering it. It's a combination of factors economic, social, historical, and political that result in that conquest.

I'm aware of it; but it should be noted that France had already planned to conquer North Africa prior to incident. They would've conquered Morroco and Tunisia along with Algeria if Britain didn't keep them in line.

And I think French, who expected rescuing tens of thousands of captive Europeans, only found 100+ prisoners in slave dens of Algeria? They were mostly South Italian.

As for Egypt, the French and British were definitely involved in Egypt prior to the Suez Crisis. Aside from, well, the British straight up turning Egypt into a protectorate and having their whole Cape-to-Cairo shtick, the actual building of the Suez Canal and the lobbying involved there, the British and French involvements in the Oriental Crisis, Napoleon in Egypt and the British and French fighting each other there, and the British military occupation of Egypt from 1882 until WWI, when Egypt became a former subject of Britain. Plus, the French and British became friendly during the period (particularly during Nappy III's tenure and then the rise of Germany), so that removed the rivalry issue in the region which made annexing Egypt harder previously. Aside from the obvious benefit of the Suez Canal for empire maintenance, Egyptian cotton was a way to prevent complete dependence on American cotton exports (which notably undercut the CSA's importance to the British, who did not intervene in the US Civil War).

To be more clear: Neither Britain nor France was interested in colonization of Egypt. Egypt's value as cotton producer is another reason to annex it.

 

[WhatSantayanaSaid]

I've always wondered whether colonies are economic drain; If colonies aren't profitable, why every historical empire sought to enlarge its territorial extent? Aren't land, labour and market directly correlate with economic power?

To be more clear: Neither Britain nor France was interested in colonization of Egypt. Egypt's value as cotton producer is another reason to annex it.

There's a balance there. On one hand, it secures resources, manpower, strategic terrain for further expansion/defense, denies the same to rivals, and so forth. On the other, it requires active policing and dealing with local dissent directly (and also becoming the common enemy that disparate nationalist groups can rally against, thus worsening rebellions), building and maintaining infrastructure and bureaucracy that doesn't benefit the imperial core directly (it might end up getting resources to the imperial core faster, but it's still a sizeable expense and requires quite a bit of linguistic training so both the colonizer's management and the colonized workers can work on the projects), denying the colony certain industries (Alsace-Lorraine produced more textile than the rest of the German Empire upon its annexation in 1871 and saw its textile industry suffer in the coming decades. Bengal, likewise, saw its textile industry diminished during British colonial rule) which in turn makes the colony much less valuable than it was when the colonizer first considered colonizing the colony, and other such economic issues. And yes, Alsace-Lorraine wasn't colonized, per say, but its status in the German Empire was more akin to colonial rule (direct rule from Berlin) than the status of other states in the Empire.

The former factors were pretty reasonable before the advent of nationalism and mass media allowing for much larger and coherent independence movements. Before, divide and conquer or assimilation by force or prestige were pretty effective for quelling local dissent (British India, the Roman Empire, etc.). But once those two factors entered the scene, colonial rule became prohibitively expensive. Add to that the ruinous financial and manpower expenses of WWI and WWII and direct rule was bound to end. Hence why France, which had managed to rule Algeria and Vietnam for decades/centuries despite weathering numerous armed rebellions previously, lost control of both in the 20th century. At the same time, France has clung onto influence in West Africa despite all this with the West African CFA franc, so there's the reasoning that neocolonial rule can get similar benefits at lower costs.

With the Ottomans, a sense of Turkish nationalism was coming into being during the 19th century and an Islamic identity in opposition to Christianity had been around for quite a while. The Russians, meanwhile, didn't had the preexisting infrastructure for overseas rule that the British and French employed, a much more ruthless history of colonizing Muslim territories in the region (resulting the mass slaughter and expulsion of over a million Circassians, which is a bit more destructive and economically ruinous than what other colonial powers did). So even without proper mass media and not quite as clear of a national identity, Turkish resistance would become too expensive for the Russians to suppress in the long term. It's possible that Russian rule would actually act as a catalyst for a Turkish identity to form faster, much like British rule resulted in a pan-Indian identity.

As for Britain and France, Britain did in fact occupy and turn Egypt into a protectorate, so I'm still not sure about the 'until the Sue Crisis' bit. Also, France during the Revolution invaded Egypt with the clear intent to conquer it in order to secure a forward position towards India. So it's not like Egypt was not on their radar. They had significant investments in the region and intervened in the region militarily multiple times in the 19th century. It's only after the Egyptians tried to expel foreign influence during the ʻUrabi revolt that Britain occupied the country to protect their investments, which was essential the start of colonial rule. And even that became untenable after some decades.

 

[lilt]

There's a balance there. On one hand, it secures resources, manpower, strategic terrain for further expansion/defense, denies the same to rivals, and so forth. On the other, it requires active policing and dealing with local dissent directly (and also becoming the common enemy that disparate nationalist groups can rally against, thus worsening rebellions), building and maintaining infrastructure and bureaucracy that doesn't benefit the imperial core directly (it might end up getting resources to the imperial core faster, but it's still a sizeable expense and requires quite a bit of linguistic training so both the colonizer's management and the colonized workers can work on the projects), denying the colony certain industries (Alsace-Lorraine produced more textile than the rest of the German Empire upon its annexation in 1871 and saw its textile industry suffer in the coming decades. Bengal, likewise, saw its textile industry diminished during British colonial rule) which in turn makes the colony much less valuable than it was when the colonizer first considered colonizing the colony, and other such economic issues. And yes, Alsace-Lorraine wasn't colonized, per say, but its status in the German Empire was more akin to colonial rule (direct rule from Berlin) than the status of other states in the Empire.

The former factors were pretty reasonable before the advent of nationalism and mass media allowing for much larger and coherent independence movements. Before, divide and conquer or assimilation by force or prestige were pretty effective for quelling local dissent (British India, the Roman Empire, etc.). But once those two factors entered the scene, colonial rule became prohibitively expensive. Add to that the ruinous financial and manpower expenses of WWI and WWII and direct rule was bound to end. Hence why France, which had managed to rule Algeria and Vietnam for decades/centuries despite weathering numerous armed rebellions previously, lost control of both in the 20th century. At the same time, France has clung onto influence in West Africa despite all this with the West African CFA franc, so there's the reasoning that neocolonial rule can get similar benefits at lower costs.

With the Ottomans, a sense of Turkish nationalism was coming into being during the 19th century and an Islamic identity in opposition to Christianity had been around for quite a while. The Russians, meanwhile, didn't had the preexisting infrastructure for overseas rule that the British and French employed, a much more ruthless history of colonizing Muslim territories in the region (resulting the mass slaughter and expulsion of over a million Circassians, which is a bit more destructive and economically ruinous than what other colonial powers did). So even without proper mass media and not quite as clear of a national identity, Turkish resistance would become too expensive for the Russians to suppress in the long term. It's possible that Russian rule would actually act as a catalyst for a Turkish identity to form faster, much like British rule resulted in a pan-Indian identity.

As for Britain and France, Britain did in fact occupy and turn Egypt into a protectorate, so I'm still not sure about the 'until the Sue Crisis' bit. Also, France during the Revolution invaded Egypt with the clear intent to conquer it in order to secure a forward position towards India. So it's not like Egypt was not on their radar. They had significant investments in the region and intervened in the region militarily multiple times in the 19th century. It's only after the Egyptians tried to expel foreign influence during the ʻUrabi revolt that Britain occupied the country to protect their investments, which was essential the start of colonial rule. And even that became untenable after some decades.

Weren't powers aware of the fact they should reach out and grab territories as fast as they can ahead of spread of nationalism? I'm genuinely curious.

What I mean is neither Britain nor France possessed any intention of occupation of Egypt, at least untill late 1870s. Also, while initially Britain propped up Ottoman and France Egypt, both powers weren't interested in carving out former Ottoman territories. So I wonder whether they determined so-called indirect colonialism will be more cost-effective than direct subjugation.

The same could be said to Persia, between Britain and Russia... Persia is barren and bleak, a poor country for sure, Russia even colonialized relatively even more inhospitable Caucasus and Central Asia, so cost would be no problem to them, but they didn't directly occupy their sphere of influence even after rappoachment with Britain. As for Britain and France, when they began to colonialize Africa, the cost of colonization would be out of question, because Africa is the most poor, barren and unprofitable region on the habitable surface. There also had been the trouble of frequent rebellions and tribal insurgencies, in deserts and jungles.

 

[WhatSantayanaSaid]

Weren't powers aware of the fact they should reach out and grab territories as fast as they can ahead of spread of nationalism? I'm genuinely curious.

What I mean is neither Britain nor France possessed any intention of occupation of Egypt, at least untill late 1870s. Also, while initially Britain propped up Ottoman and France Egypt, both powers weren't interested in carving out former Ottoman territories. So I wonder whether they determined so-called indirect colonialism will be more cost-effective than direct subjugation.

The same could be said to Persia, between Britain and Russia... Persia is barren and bleak, a poor country for sure, Russia even colonialized relatively even more inhospitable Caucasus and Central Asia, so cost would be no problem to them, but they didn't directly occupy their sphere of influence even after rappoachment with Britain. As for Britain and France, when they began to colonialize Africa, the cost of colonization would be out of question, because Africa is the most poor, barren and unprofitable region on the habitable surface. There also had been the trouble of frequent rebellions and tribal insurgencies, in deserts and jungles.

Well, pre-rise of nationalism, logistics, manpower, and finances created soft caps on the amount of land an empire could hold. The Spanish Empire is a good example of that. And by the time technological advances afforded those empires the ability to carve up the world, national revivals and the creation of new national identities were on the rise worldwide. And there were active and passive efforts to assimilate/genocide various peoples even before the modern form of nationalism came about, like how the Czech elite were mostly German-speaking until the 1800s and how Russia tried wiping out Muslim peoples in the Caucasus region. But pre-modern technology and media makes it hard to maintain those efforts while also expanding rapidly. It's either expensive, hard to gauge if it's complete, and doesn't prevent revivals. But I don't think nationalism was a consideration for empire building until, well, nationalism existed. It's hard to predict such a fundamental and defining shift in ideology and sociology. We went from lands of different peoples and cultures bound to a specific ruler or family as the norm to lands ruled by peoples of the same culture and language as the norm and that was certainly not something that could have been anticipated on a wide scale before such a shift happened.

A good example is with the Japanese invasion of Korea in the 1590s. When the Japanese conquered lands, they expected the peasantry to simply continue working under their new overlords, just as Japanese peasantry had done in the Warring States period in Japan. They expected feudalism, more or less. Instead, the Korean peasantry fled into the mountains and forests and a good number of those coalesced into militia groups, loyal to the Joseon Kingdom despite the seeming collapse of the kingdom (which could be seen as a sign of a proto-nationalistic identity).

As for Egypt, France tried to conquer Egypt during the Revolution. They were discussing it in the 1770s and Napoleon was rampaging over there at the turn of the century for a reason. So it's not like France and the UK just suddenly got interested in Egypt in the 1870s. It's just that leadership in both didn't see direct rule as worthwhile until the Egyptians started threatening British and French investments in the 1880s.

As for Russia, just because they could afford one lengthy, expensive colonial affair doesn't mean they had the bandwidth for another (basically, just because you bought a Ferrari doesn't mean you can afford a Mercedes-Benz and, even if you could, would it be a wise financial decision?). Especially with the terrain as rugged as it is in Iran and the long and difficult routes to get from Russia's heartland to Iran.

As for Africa, besides how pejorative your description of the continent is, that was largely a prestige project for empires who wanted to one-up each other cost be damned. There were also other considerations like trans-continental transportation routes (Cape to Cairo, the Pink Map, France's attempt to occupy the whole Sahel). And, of course, parts of Africa were well known to be rich in gold, diamonds, ivory, rubber, and other such resources that are scarce in other regions (and then you need rivers and favourable terrain to be able to ship those resources back to the metropole, so that requires more land). Local rulers were either unable to exploit their natural resources to the extent that European demand demanded due to lacking infrastructure/technology, too unstable to reliably supply European interests, or too weak to resist incursions (or some combination of the above), which made direct rule more economical in the short term (rather than wait for technology to spread/infrastructure to be built and risk rivals gaining more influence). And the whole Great Power competition aspect got thrown to the wayside because there was so much land up for grabs all at once and negotiated between all the Great Powers, even those without interest in the region who then could act as third-parties (previously, European competition over influence and diseases made expansion in Africa difficult). The best comparison is probably with Poland; prior to the partition, Austria and Russia were chipped away at Poland but mostly limited to trying to puppet Poland rather than direct rule. Then Prussia came in with a compromise deal and Poland was erased from the map. There was a reason they didn't just split Poland up earlier, they needed to have a balance of power and neither Austria nor Russia trusted the other to be impartial on that matter.

 

[Evil Crusader]

I've always wondered whether colonies are economic drain; If colonies aren't profitable, why every historical empire sought to enlarge its territorial extent? Aren't land, labour and market directly correlate with economic power?

Wealth and people absorbed at the border of your main imperial core can more quickly be redirected towards better performing, while colony stuff was further literal months away. Colonies played a different role in the pre-industrial and industrial world!
In the former system, colonies were all about controlling the flow of certain resources (be they traded, or extracted) and the lucrative gain they can net whoever grabs them; with the obvious exception of Latin America that offered advantageous conditions for settling with a combo of low and yet subjected populace, abundant metals, and relatively large economically integrated areas, most other places limited themselves to a string of coastal dens from where to raid and acquire said valuables at a profit; the concerns of European politics simply prevented anybody from easily exporting a surplus of populace.
In the latter system, colonies have a different role, that of providing raw materials for the budding industrial revolutions; but those gains are still to be contrasted with the cost of getting there, setting up the proper infastructure, get the ruling classes to work with you, and of course, defend them from others' claims. In there actual settler policies would be attempted, partially because of demographic pressure, and partially in order to have a loyal and already formed bureaucratic apparel to facilitate said exploitation. It still was a costly endeavor, one that tended to offer diminishing returns for late comers...

Weren't powers aware of the fact they should reach out and grab territories as fast as they can ahead of spread of nationalism? I'm genuinely curious.

What I mean is neither Britain nor France possessed any intention of occupation of Egypt, at least untill late 1870s. Also, while initially Britain propped up Ottoman and France Egypt, both powers weren't interested in carving out former Ottoman territories. So I wonder whether they determined so-called indirect colonialism will be more cost-effective than direct subjugation.

The same could be said to Persia, between Britain and Russia... Persia is barren and bleak, a poor country for sure, Russia even colonialized relatively even more inhospitable Caucasus and Central Asia, so cost would be no problem to them, but they didn't directly occupy their sphere of influence even after rappoachment with Britain. As for Britain and France, when they began to colonialize Africa, the cost of colonization would be out of question, because Africa is the most poor, barren and unprofitable region on the habitable surface. There also had been the trouble of frequent rebellions and tribal insurgencies, in deserts and jungles.

Agree with @WhatSantayanaSaid's post.
I'll just add that capacity to resist is part of the equation most of the time, and polities like Egypt, Persia, or Korea (to keep to discussed examples) actually had the capability to resist for a good while, making the cost of invasion and garrison simply not worth much like how the Europeans could walk over China in the 19th Century, but did not overly partition it, considering it better to leave it somewhat dysfunctionally running while they extracted as much wealth as possible.
There's also the matter of circumstances, for example, the CSA's attempted cotton blackmail and Egypt's sudden mismanagement under Ismail provided a route towards the eventual subjugation that would have easily been avoided otherwise. Generally people don't refrain from conquering out of the goodness of their heart; therefore they all had reasons not to go that deep (until it was a free for all, like in Africa, and even there, it merely was a rush to get claims recognized, to be then slowly digested amd exploited over time).
Nations like Russia, Austria-Hungary and to a degree Imperial Germany still had plenty to digest at home and a relative abundance of resources, which effectively made a prosecution of the old imperial tactics a better return on investment.

 

[TickTock The Witch's Dead]

Far more likely that Russia and Austria divide the Ottoman Balkans between themselves and Russia go for western Anatolia and the Caucasus instead. Way cheaper and with the extra benefit of ruling over theoretically more loyal Christian subjects. Russia could go for western Armenia and the Pontus too though I would say that's the furthest Russia can go into before running into serious problems.