How Would An 1840s Anglo-American War Go?

[Helios Ra]

Regarding sectarian divisions in the US, at this time the South was extremely interested in a pacific port (and later a southern route transcontinental railroad) to gain access to the Chinese market, which they thought would lead to untold riches and power for them. I think they were being overoptimistic but it was a thing. I’m less familiar with their attitudes towards Pacific islands, but I would think that they’d want to ensure Hawai’i was accessible for the to ensure the route to China was viable. I don’t know that I’d buy them immediately seceding in response to a war. If the war goes poorly, and they seem some advantage to be gained by bowing out, maybe, but not reflexively.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

I don't think those militiamen stuck to their own regions because they were needed for local defence, but because (a) they weren't trained enough to be of much use in field battles, and (b) they were ordinary guys with jobs which they couldn't afford to leave for however many months or years to go and fight on some distant frontier.

Fair enough, as far as that goes, but please see below...

Both these factors would still be applicable in the 1840s. You'll note that when the US had to fight a major war, whether against Mexico or the Confederacy, it raised extra troops for the regular army, rather than steamrollering the enemy with hundreds of thousands of militiamen.

I see now, what you and others are thinking. I'm not thinking that the USA is going to go on the offensive, and just human wave Canada, in the first couple weeks of this war, but rather, after a couple of years, the USA is going to be hitting her stride, and the forces that eventually will be going on the offensive will be regulars by that time.

The Mexican American war didn't see anywhere near the levels of mobilization, as I have been going on about, but then that war didn't see Mexican armies invading the USA, nor a Mexican fleet bombarding/blockading the US coast. This thought experiment of a 1843 Anglo-American war is a completely different beast.

Think about it this way, say Japan attacks PH, but has a several thousand mile land border with the US, and 1/12 the population, what happens?

 

[TRH]

Regarding sectarian divisions in the US, at this time the South was extremely interested in a pacific port (and later a southern route transcontinental railroad) to gain access to the Chinese market, which they thought would lead to untold riches and power for them. I think they were being overoptimistic but it was a thing. I’m less familiar with their attitudes towards Pacific islands, but I would think that they’d want to ensure Hawai’i was accessible for the to ensure the route to China was viable. I don’t know that I’d buy them immediately seceding in response to a war. If the war goes poorly, and they seem some advantage to be gained by bowing out, maybe, but not reflexively.

The China trade was more lucrative than I think people remember, for both China and the West. Before the Opium War, a Hong merchant in Canton was the richest man alive. And quite a few Americans also made fortunes from Chinese trade. Including the Roosevelts as I recall.

 

[Fabius Maximus]

Think about it this way, say Japan attacks PH, but has a several thousand mile land border with the US, and 1/12 the population, what happens?

That's not really a good analogy, since Pearl Harbour was a sneak attack carried out by a nation with whom the US was currently at peace. There's no reason to suppose the US would be similarly outraged over an attack by a country with whom the US was already at war (perhaps even, depending on how the TL goes, a war that the US had started) -- and indeed, I'll note that the burning of Washington DC didn't result in a fanatical determination to fight a l'outrance, although you'd think that burning down the nation's capital would get the country far more riled up than attacking naval base.

 

[Helios Ra]

The China trade was more lucrative than I think people remember, for both China and the West. Before the Opium War, a Hong merchant in Canton was the richest man alive. And quite a few Americans also made fortunes from Chinese trade. Including the Roosevelts as I recall.

Instead of writing a paper I decided to look into a little more about Southern views of China and Hawaii in the 1840s or so. From Kevin Waite's West of Slavery: The Southern Dream of a Transcontinental Empire. University of North Carolina Press (2021):
pp. 14-15

[The author discusses the traditional view of the early 19th century Pacific as being the domain of New Englanders while the South eyed the Caribbean and Central America.]
Yet for many white southerners, the most promising field of opportunity lay in the opposite direction. Asia beckoned. And so they devised a set of commercial initiatives in the belief that hundreds of millions of Chinese consumers would one day clothe themselves in salve-grown cotton products. The fact that few slaveholders understood the dynamics of the Asian markets after which they lusted did little to diminish their zeal for the purported value of the far East. From the policy makers of the early republic to the thinkers and politicians of the antebellum period, slaveholders played a leading role in America's Pacific agenda.
They did so, at first, as nationalists. Long before regional identities hardened into sectional rivalries, southern statesmen, like their northern counterparts, pursued Pacific commerce in an effort to bolster America's position on the global stage. There was no conspiracy among slaveholders to press into the Pacific world for their exclusive benefit. Southern leaders, such as Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, may have coveted Pacific frontage for the United States, but neither did so as part of an expressly proslavery agenda. Such a weighty enterprise required the coordinated efforts of leaders from across the country. In 1844, when President John Tyler of Virginia sought to strengthen America's trading position in the Pacific world, and particularly the flow of cotton into China, he turned to Caleb Cushing, a Massachusetts lawyer and politician, to carry out that mission. As Cushing recognized, increased trade would shower benefits on producers and manufacturers across antebellum America's integrated economy. In other words, the mercantile class of New England stood to gain as much from the transpacific outflow of cotton as the planter class of South Carolina did. Tracking their collective efforts helps reorient the Atlantic-centric narrative of the antebellum United States
Yet, in time, the issue of transpacific trade erupted in sectional controversy. When Congress began debating the first major proposal for a transcontinental railroad in 1845, lawmakers raised a thorny set of questions about the political costs of American development. Most crucially, where would this railroad run: through slave country or across free soil? Partisans understood that whichever section won this national highway would control not only the commerce of the American West but access to the China trade as well. Slaveholding expansionists squabbled among themselves over tactics. But they directed most of their energies against competing plans from the North, in what they viewed as a winner-take-all contest for American and Asian commerce. As a result, the railroad question gave shape to some of the major geopolitical developments of the period, including the US-Mexico War and the rush to California's goldfields. Conflicting visions of Pacific empire were at the heart of an emerging sectional crisis.

pp. 18-19

John C. Calhoun, perhaps the most influential figure in the South at the time, also saw America's future in the ports of the Pacific. [Discussion of his interest in California and San Francisco especially to ensure the route to Asia is free (well, slave).]
. . . In an 1843 debate over American policy in Oregon, which the United States held jointly with Britain, Calhoun again stressed the importance of Pacific harbors. He cited the British victory in the Opium War the year before as evidence that soon Japan's ports would be opened to the West, as had China's per the recently concluded terms of surrender. America and Europe could then bid for the commerce of "the whole of that large portion of Asia, containing nearly half of the population and wealth of the globe," he continued. "No small portion" of this vast Asian commerce "is destined to pass through the ports of the Oregon Territory to the valley of the Mississippi, instead of taking the circuitous and long voyage round Cape Horn." At the same time, Calhoun also clamored for a vast expansion of the nation's naval might.

pp. 20-21

[Discussion of John Tyler's foreign policy in regard to the Oregon Territory, California, and the Pacific.]
. . . In a short but forceful message to Congress in December 1842, the president advocated the extension of American power into the Pacific world. Central to Tyler's commercial ambitions were the Sandwich Islands (known today as Hawaii). The islands served as the way station for most vessels passing between East Asia and the North American mainland, Tyler rightly noted, which made them a geostrategic linchpin in the China trade. Their continued independence and security--meaning independence and security from European imperialism--was a top priority for the Tyler administration. In order to prevent the Sandwich Islands from falling into British hands, Tyler formally recognized the archipelago's independence and warned that any threats to that sovereignty from foreign powers would be met with a "decided remonstrance." The threat was vague, but the underlying message was unmistakable: Tyler had vastly expanded the scope of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, pushing it 2,500 miles into the Pacific Ocean.
Although Tyler himself promised to protect, rather than seize, the Sandwich Islands, his Pacific policies encouraged others to consider the possibility. American southerners, better known for their interest Cuba [sic], were among the earliest advocates of Hawaiian annexation. "There are other islands beside Cuba in which the United States are interested," Mississippi planter-cum-California-senator William Gwin reminded his colleagues. "There are a set of islands called the Sandwich Islands, which we in California look upon as our summer residence. And when the Senator from Virginia talks about ripe fruit [Cuba], it ought to be known that that fruit [the Sandwich Islands] is ripe also, and ready to fall." Similar musings on Hawaii's value and vulnerability ran through the southern press in antebellum years.
The islands' agricultural potential and labor order--vast numbers of Native Hawaiian and Asian contract workers under white management on large sugar plantations--enticed proslavery enthusiasts. Elizabeth Parker, wife of an American official in Hawaii, argued the fertile islands could not afford to maintain free labor. "Whether, eventually, these Islands should be annexed to the United States, or become an independent republic, the introduction of slavery is indispensable to their value," she wrote. Another observer recommended a system of feudalism. In language eerily reminiscent of proslavery polemics, one Dr. Wood suggested that the islanders' "naturally inoffensive natures and child-like docility" and "their disposition to be guided" rendered them fit subjects for a type of ameliorated serfdom. Under such a system, he argued, the rich soils of the islands would finally reach their full potential, yielding stores of coffee, sugar, and cotton. Establishing a slave dream across the entire archipelago was little more than a pipe dream at this point, especially since so few American planters ever settled in Hawaii. But their aspirations underline a central, and often overlooked, point: slaveholders' imagined future embraced both the Atlantic and Pacific worlds. And while America slaveholders never seized Cuba, despite numerous attempts, a southern president paved the way for a US protectorate over Hawaii . . . .
[Discussion of Tyler's China policy.]
Of all the industries that might benefit from the presence of a US consul in China, Tyler highlighted one in particular: slave-grown cotton . . . . Tyler's faith in the power of cotton was not unfounded. Beginning around 1835, manufactured cotton goods, and to a lesser extent raw cotton, made up the majority of American exports to China . . . .

A good deal of the discussion about expanding slavery to Hawaii came in the late 1840s through late 1850s, but the South was clearly interested in them in the OP's timeframe, as part of their Chinese ambitions. I actually think I'd amend my earlier comment slightly, I think the South would absolutely be willing to go to war with Britain over Hawai'i and the Pacific Northwest in 1843. I think of the internal US factions, the South would certainly be supportive of such a conflict. Given New England mercantile interests in the Pacific and East Asia as well, it seems like there could be the necessary coalition of political interests and willpower to fight this war. Whether such a war would go well I have no idea!

Edit: In fact, I wonder if, in the alternative to fighting the war in 1843, a sufficiently larger scare could result in a real US military buildup in anticipation of war with Britain later in the 1840s--maybe they intervene in an alt-but-still-probable Mexican-American War?

 

[Belisarius II]

I don't think those militiamen stuck to their own regions because they were needed for local defence, but because (a) they weren't trained enough to be of much use in field battles, and (b) they were ordinary guys with jobs which they couldn't afford to leave for however many months or years to go and fight on some distant frontier. Both these factors would still be applicable in the 1840s. You'll note that when the US had to fight a major war, whether against Mexico or the Confederacy, it raised extra troops for the regular army, rather than steamrollering the enemy with hundreds of thousands of militiamen.

I'm sorry that these debates always become ether or's. Sure in 1812 most of the militia stayed near home, but that's complicated. Yes, a lot of them were unfit, or not even needed in the actual theater of war, and others manned coastal defenses. Front line States like New York, and Ohio sent a good part of their militia to active operations, and Kentucky & Tennessee were very active in the West, while others were less so. The New England militias, except those of Vermont in 1814 only fought in Maine, and along their own coasts.

The Mexican/American War was fought in a distant theater far from the centers of American power. There was no coastal threat to worry about so, why mobilize a large militia force for home defense? In a war with Britain in 1840 it's reasonable to assume an upscaled War of 1812 scenario. The issues you talk about that limit the use of American militia also hold for the Canadians. The point that Naval Aviation Fan raises about the difficulty of the British sending a large army over the Atlantic, and what shape it would be in when it arrived in Canada are also valid.

To that I'd add the problem of transporting horses. The British had a very hard time bringing horses to America in the ARW and had a very hard time getting them from local sources. The British suffered similar problems in later wars. An army of that period needs about 1 horse for every 3 men. You need horses to draw guns, wagons, and other vehicles, along with the needs of officers, dispatch riders, and others even before you get to horses for any cavalry units. Any British army in Canada is going to have draw most of its horses from the civilian Canadian economy, and that number would be limited. The Americans have a far greater supply of horses available to them and will have more mounted units then the British.

Also, the idea of blockading the whole U.S. coast is a massive undertaking. In nether the ARW, or the War of 1812 was the RN able to do it. In both wars USN warships and hundreds of privateers raided the Atlantic, and beyond. The Americans were able to receive vital supply shipments from Europe. The American coast was far too long for any navy to keep a close blockade. In the ACW the Union had to capture Confederate ports to make the blockade truly effective. The reason American commerce was mostly stopped in the War of 1812 is because there was a blockade at both ends of transit. The RN was blockading the Carribean, and Napoleonic Europe, and Spain was a British ally.

In 1840 the general strategic situation was very different. The Americans could trade with nearby Spanish Cuba, and other islands, and Spanish, Dutch, French, and German ships could transship American goods, and run inbound shipping the same way. Unless the British want to reimpose Orders in Council, and force confrontations with the shipping of the other European powers the Americans will have a good deal more foreign trade than they did in 1812.

A War in 1840 wouldn't be a walk over for either side. The idea that the British were all powerful at sea, or the Americans would just overwhelm Canada is a bit simplistic. I do think the American would have a Longterm advantage in a land war in Canada, and the idea of a major British attack on the U.S. coast is unrealistic. An Anglo/American war would be a disaster for both countries, which is why it was, and should have been avoided. Wars that are fought to the finish are rare in history but are popular subjects for conjecture. I would think this war would end with the Americans taking parts of Canada, and a settlement with American interests in Hawaii upheld, a 49th parallel border in Oregon, and the American leaving Canada. In short not much would change, so why even fight this war. At least in 1812 it was fought over a principle; this would just be an incident that the national leaders allowed to get out of hand.

 

[tallthinkev]

When does this war start? Not good for the US in the spring, planting time, or the late summer for the harvest. What's that, best part of 2 months when the US is going to be down on men, how many, no idea 50,000, more? With a promise of freedom to any slaves that go over to British that is more out of the fields. These slaves don't need to fight, just down tools and leg it.

 

[Thoresby]

Also, the idea of blockading the whole U.S. coast is a massive undertaking. In nether the ARW, or the War of 1812 was the RN able to do it. In both wars USN warships and hundreds of privateers raided the Atlantic, and beyond. The Americans were able to receive vital supply shipments from Europe. The American coast was far too long for any navy to keep a close blockade.

The difference here is that in both the ARW and War of 1812 Britain was also at war with major European naval powers enabling only a small fraction of the RN to be even present in the Western Atlantic. Here that won't be the case. That said you are entirely correct that the RN doesn't have the resources to maintain a close blockade over every tiny port along the Eastern seaboard but that just means they'll do what they did thirty years earlier in the face of the Continental System, a tight close blockade on major ports coupled with distant roving blockading squadrons to attrit sailings from smaller ports. Along with an active program of raiding and burning those smaller ports which by their nature are too small to have very many defences. It won't result in a hermetic blockade initially and the US will be able to get commerce raiders out but the RN has form in grinding down an enemy this way and the fundamentals still apply.

 

[Diego]

If the US wants to fight a war against Britain or any other European Power they need to reform their army first. The US Army in 1840 wouldn't be able to grow much bigger than what we saw in the Mexican-American War, really, 100,000 men seems to be the best they could do in the best case scenario. Considering that a lot of those men would be garrisoning coastal defenses there wouldn't be many left to offensive actions, and even if they try to use that mass of mobilized men guarding the coasts to offensive action they are basically militia.

I think that the US is fully capable of fielding an army as big as the European powers with comparable size and quality, but only after a big military reform, something that will take probably a full decade to reach its intended effect. If the Americans are willing to pay the price, because such army is not cheap. Obviously the British and other powers would also start thinking "Why do they need so many soldiers?"

 

[Fabius Maximus]

I'm sorry that these debates always become ether or's. Sure in 1812 most of the militia stayed near home, but that's complicated. Yes, a lot of them were unfit, or not even needed in the actual theater of war, and others manned coastal defenses. Front line States like New York, and Ohio sent a good part of their militia to active operations, and Kentucky & Tennessee were very active in the West, while others were less so. The New England militias, except those of Vermont in 1814 only fought in Maine, and along their own coasts.

Wikipedia says the Americans had over 450,000 militiamen during the war. Since the US didn't have this anywhere this number of men in its armies, either the militia were mostly kept at home, or the number given is wildly exaggerated. Either way, it doesn't really back up the argument that the US will be able to raise hundreds of thousands of militiamen for a war in Canada.

The issues you talk about that limit the use of American militia also hold for the Canadians.

Sure, the British would also have to rely on their regular army to do the actual fighting. But the British army is larger and has more experience of fighting full-scale battles, so the British will have a much easier time ramping up the size of their military than the US.

The point that Naval Aviation Fan raises about the difficulty of the British sending a large army over the Atlantic, and what shape it would be in when it arrived in Canada are also valid.

Britain managed to send 20,000 men to China for the First Opium War, they can send troops to Canada no problem.

 

[Fabius Maximus]

If the US wants to fight a war against Britain or any other European Power they need to reform their army first. The US Army in 1840 wouldn't be able to grow much bigger than what we saw in the Mexican-American War, really, 100,000 men seems to be the best they could do in the best case scenario. Considering that a lot of those men would be garrisoning coastal defenses there wouldn't be many left to offensive actions, and even if they try to use that mass of mobilized men guarding the coasts to offensive action they are basically militia.

The bolded bit is a good point. During the ACW, the Confederacy had some 74,000 troops on coastal defence IIRC, and a united US will need even more.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

In the Mexican-American War United States mobilises 13,000 militia and 61,000 volunteers, and only 30,000 of the volunteers serve in Mexico. If the pro-American side of the thread were arguing that the US would be mobilising 30,000 volunteers for the invasion of Canada instead of closer to twenty times that figure, they'd get a lot less push-back about the likely quality of those troops.

So, 458,463 Militia, in the war of 1812, some 31 years before this threads kick off, and folks want to give me grief over my posited 560,000 potential?

Not as long as you have them perform like the militia in the war of 1812:

The War of 1812 revealed glaring inadequacies in the militia system and raised serious questions regarding the responsibilities the federal government and the States shared for the common defense. From the beginning, relations between Regular Army and militia generals suffered from petty jealousies and an unwillingness to cooperate. Senior officers vied for command positions and authority in the field based on their date of rank rather than experience and demonstrated competence. Regular and militia generals alike refused to relinquish control of their troops for the sake of fostering better unity of effort and simplicity of command. Elderly generals who had gained their experience and formed fixed opinions as young Continental and militia officers in the Revolution harbored hard feelings toward one another throughout the War of 1812... Specific campaigns and battles revealed the weaknesses and strengths of Regulars and militiamen alike. On as many as half a dozen occasions, Ohio and New York militia units refused to cross into Canada to attack British positions. The New York militia’s reputation suffered two black eyes in the summer of 1813 when citizen-soldiers failed to turn out in sufficient numbers to prevent British raiding parties from looting Plattsburgh and Buffalo...

Indeed, they should perform worse given that Following the War of 1812, the enrolled militia entered a period of neglect and decline. The fundamental issue here is that we have three data points :

• War of 1812, large number of hostilities-only units raised which perform incredibly poorly.
• Mexican-American War, small number of hostilities-only units raised which perform adequately
• American Civil War, large number of hostilities-only units raised which perform incredibly poorly for several years until training improves.

But the pro-American side insists on providing a large number of adequate hostilities-only units, and cites the Mexican-American War's small number of hostilities-only units as justification for this.

To Invade the USA, the British/Canadians are going to be facing 100,000's of armed free men, defending their homes against foreign troops

And the enslaved people, all 2,487,355 of them? How many pinprick incursions along that long Southern coast, each with the risk of setting off a slave revolt, does it take before capturing Canada starts to look like it isn't worth it? Or are New England abolitionists going to watch their militia shipped south in order to help the South prop up the slave system?

Wikipedia says the Americans had over 450,000 militiamen during the war. Since the US didn't have this anywhere this number of men in its armies, either the militia were mostly kept at home, or the number given is wildly exaggerated.

I would be surprised if it wasn't the total number of enlistments over the course of the war, which most probably means (like the number of enlistments in the American Civil War), it's counting individuals multiple times as well as failing to reflect the peak concurrent strength of the force. At $8 a month, 450,000 troops serving concurrently would amount to $3,600,000 a month and $43,200,000 a year, which is 20% more than the total Federal budget in 1814.

Yes, it's almost certainly the British who the Americans are thinking of when planning for a hypothetical invasion.

OK, so let's insert 'the British' in the place of the hypothetical opponent and see whether you can understand how your two statements are mutually exclusive.

Every time this subject of an Anglo/American war set between 1815-1900 comes up the same tropes are laid out as if they were self-evident truths. First that since Britain had the world's greatest fleet every American city withing 50 miles of the ocean could be destroyed at will. This is patent nonsense. In any kind of real world taking, or destroying a city is a massive undertaking, that no one enters into lightly.

Quotes are always brought out of American officers reporting how terribly inadequate coastal defenses were, and that is true. They thought they were inadequate, which means if they thought about what the British could do, they needed a lot more.

Why should we take your opinion over how hard it would be for the British to attack American cities over the opinion you admit was held by contemporary American officers?

Yes, your correct Lee wasn't working on coastal defenses until the following year but he's a known example of an American engineering officer of the period working on the problem.

Firstly, he's one of the most documented American engineering officers of the period. However, you didn't know and weren't able to find out that he wasn't working on coastal defences in 1840 (something which took me about five minutes), which speaks to the overall quality of the rest of your research. Secondly, you enlist Lee without the slightest piece of evidence as to whether he thought New York was defensible in 1840 or not.

If the British have 42,651 troops in the UK & Ireland in 1840 it would be impossible for them to send 32,000, or even 20,000 of them to attack New York City, and also send 10-11,000 to Canada.

Britain can threaten a New York level incursion anywhere on the United States coast, including areas equally strategically significant but far less populated and defensible, more or less from day one plus travelling time. That's the value of the naval supremacy which she enjoys; it means the US has to tie up troops in garrisons rather than send them to Canada, find thousands of guns and millions of dollars to complete those coastal fortifications she neglected to finish in peacetime.

The reason so much of the peacetime army was in Ireland was from fear of a revolt

'Internal revolts during wartime usually don't breakout until defeat or serious war weariness sets in, not at the outset' lasted seven posts, until you needed to stop the British using all their troops.

A war that starts over an incident in Hawaii, or Oregon would leave months for training of militia, raising volunteers, and preparations for coastal defenses.

Yes, it would leave the British months for training militia, expanding their regular army, and constructing field fortifications (much less expensive than coastal defences). Command of the ocean means all the British have to do is sit back and hold Canada; they're in the same position as the Union during the Civil War but without the necessity to actually invade and conquer their opponent, which is the bit that took the Union five years to go 120 miles.

Presumably a war in 1840 wouldn't have those internal political problems.

The United States is twenty years away from Civil War over the balance of power between free states and slave states; the Mexican-American War launched a political crisis over whether the territory captured should be free or slave; the United States now proposes to wage war on Canada to potentially add a large number of free states to the Union; and you say 'presumably the war wouldn't have internal political problems.'

The object dearest to their hearts, (perhaps after a restriction of commerce and a corruption bank,) is to prevent the extension of slavery. Although they know that they could not, even if they had a majority in Congress, pass a statute by which the direct abolition of slavery would take place, yet they hope that by obtaining such a majority, they may be enabled to restrict slavery to its present limits, and then pursue such a system of ·legislation as will force emancipation upon the States themselves. Possibly they wish to obtain such a majority as will enable them to go remodel the constitution as to prohibit slavery. Even if this is not the case, they hope to get into the ascendancy so that they may prohibit, or attempt to prohibit, the slave traffic between the States, and pass a law for immediate abolition in the District. These two projects are their darling favorites. If they can succeed in these attempts they will endeavor by protective tariffs, &c., to make valueless the labor of the slave, and compel his master to set him free... Every additional free State, and protective tariff State will add to them several members in Congress ; and for this reason the Northern States whose opposition was thundered against John Tyler and Mr. Polk, for acquiring Texas and the Mexican provinces which would increase, they said, the area of slavery, will now probably be found the warmest advocates for the annexation of Canada.

The inquiry now comes up, what will the South do in regard to annexation ? Her newspapers and her people have not yet spoken out upon the subject. If she sees that the North is bent upon the union of Canada with the States for abolition purposes, and for those alone, she will oppose the project to a man... she will resist by force of arms, if necessary, any encroachment upon her rights and immunities by an abolition majority, yet she will feel bound to do all she can to stave off the acquisition of such a majority by the annexation of free territory, or any other means... the South will remain loyal to the Union until the majority transcends the constitution, either by assuming powers not granted them, or by changing the compact, so as to render it null and void. After this, party lines will be broken down at the South-the voice of dissension will be hushed within her borders, and any encroachment upon her rights will be met by the thunders of war, and thousands of swords will leap from their scabbards, gleaming fiercely upon the field of her honor. (DeBow's Review, 1850)

The fact that in 1846-47 militia forces fought well, and that volunteer regiments with no pre-war experience as units were highly effective is evidence of a strong American military potential. It's hard to say how many men could be mobilized to invade Canada with say 2-3 months prep time but 60,000 doesn't seem unreasonable.

Yes, 60,000 is what's reasonable - which is why the British advocates are so confident. With 2-3 months prep time, the British can have an army of c.20,000 regulars and c.60,000 militia defending fixed positions in Canada, which is the kind of local superiority 60,000 men (c.10,000 regulars, c.50,000 volunteers), with most of the siege artillery diverted to coastal defences, don't have a plausible chance of overcoming, particularly in the short campaigning season you find in Canada. Incidentally, have you realised that United States militia can only be compelled to serve for 90 days, so that 3 month prep time leaves you with 0 days to campaign in Canada?

 

[Belisarius II]

The difference here is that in both the ARW and War of 1812 Britain was also at war with major European naval powers enabling only a small fraction of the RN to be even present in the Western Atlantic. Here that won't be the case. That said you are entirely correct that the RN doesn't have the resources to maintain a close blockade over every tiny port along the Eastern seaboard but that just means they'll do what they did thirty years earlier in the face of the Continental System, a tight close blockade on major ports coupled with distant roving blockading squadrons to attrit sailings from smaller ports. Along with an active program of raiding and burning those smaller ports which by their nature are too small to have very many defences. It won't result in a hermetic blockade initially and the US will be able to get commerce raiders out but the RN has form in grinding down an enemy this way and the fundamentals still apply.

The RN isn't the force it was in the Napoleonic Wars, its strength was greatly reduced. Although there was no major war with a European power, they needed to watch the French, and maintain a superior fleet in the Channel. They needed to provide fleets in the Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean, fight the slave trade, and the first Opium War. They just don't have the ships or men to do what you're talking about. They can't have a close blockade of NYC, Boston, the Delaware, Chesapeake Bay, Wilmington NC, Charlestown SC, Savannah GA, Pensacola FL, Mobile AL, and New Orleans LA, and have roving squadrons to catch any leakers. They were never able to do that in earlier wars and would be unable to ever do that. Yes, they could raid small towns along the coast, but that's not a war winning strategy just an annoyance.

 

[Belisarius II]

Wikipedia says the Americans had over 450,000 militiamen during the war. Since the US didn't have this anywhere this number of men in its armies, either the militia were mostly kept at home, or the number given is wildly exaggerated. Either way, it doesn't really back up the argument that the US will be able to raise hundreds of thousands of militiamen for a war in Canada.

I never argued that hundreds of thousands of militiamen would be invading Canada. I said massing 60,000 troops would be very do able. Hundreds of thousand would be available for other duties such as home defense.

Sure, the British would also have to rely on their regular army to do the actual fighting. But the British army is larger and has more experience of fighting full-scale battles, so the British will have a much easier time ramping up the size of their military than the US.

Not really. The British have no great advantage there. They really didn't have a reserve system, so they'd have to raise whole new units, and draft levies of new men to fill up pre-war units. The Americans would need to get the militia in shape, expand the regular army, and raise volunteer regiments. All of these things are big jobs that will take time.

Britain managed to send 20,000 men to China for the First Opium War, they can send troops to Canada no problem.

Why do you think it was no problem? The 20,000 men that fought in the First Opium War mostly came from India, and the British had a very hard time assembling the army. They fought a coastal war closely tethered to the RN. Sure, they could send an army to Canada, but everything happening at the same time would cause a terrible strain on the strategic, and operational levels. The British were not omnipotent.

 

[TrickyApe]

There's an older but still interesting work that might inform on this subject, available to read online at the Internet Archive:

Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the balance of power in North America, 1815-1908 ​

It seems that the British were themselves doubtful of their ability to hold Canada in a long war, perhaps even more doubtful than they should have been given the state of the US military at the time. They were cognizant from the very beginning of the manner in which disparities in population and industry in North America would work against them.

 

[Belisarius II]

Not as long as you have them perform like the militia in the war of 1812:

The War of 1812 revealed glaring inadequacies in the militia system and raised serious questions regarding the responsibilities the federal government and the States shared for the common defense. From the beginning, relations between Regular Army and militia generals suffered from petty jealousies and an unwillingness to cooperate. Senior officers vied for command positions and authority in the field based on their date of rank rather than experience and demonstrated competence. Regular and militia generals alike refused to relinquish control of their troops for the sake of fostering better unity of effort and simplicity of command. Elderly generals who had gained their experience and formed fixed opinions as young Continental and militia officers in the Revolution harbored hard feelings toward one another throughout the War of 1812... Specific campaigns and battles revealed the weaknesses and strengths of Regulars and militiamen alike. On as many as half a dozen occasions, Ohio and New York militia units refused to cross into Canada to attack British positions. The New York militia’s reputation suffered two black eyes in the summer of 1813 when citizen-soldiers failed to turn out in sufficient numbers to prevent British raiding parties from looting Plattsburgh and Buffalo...

Indeed, they should perform worse given that Following the War of 1812, the enrolled militia entered a period of neglect and decline. The fundamental issue here is that we have three data points :

• War of 1812, large number of hostilities-only units raised which perform incredibly poorly.
• Mexican-American War, small number of hostilities-only units raised which perform adequately
• American Civil War, large number of hostilities-only units raised which perform incredibly poorly for several years until training improves.

But the pro-American side insists on providing a large number of adequate hostilities-only units, and cites the Mexican-American War's small number of hostilities-only units as justification for

I've addressed the problems with the militia, and that time can correct these problems, and much of the politics was settled by the time in question. Also, the higher, and middle ranking officers available in 1840 are far better. Using the Mexican War for an example of what the U.S. could do is more relevant to a discussion then endlessly rehashing the defects of 1812. The problems of the Civil War are long and complex. The reconquest of the South was a massive undertaking that under the best of circumstances would take 3 years to achieve. It took 4. The union was winning the war in the West, and on the coasts from the onset, it was only stalled in Virginia.

And the enslaved people, all 2,487,355 of them? How many pinprick incursions along that long Southern coast, each with the risk of setting off a slave revolt, does it take before capturing Canada starts to look like it isn't worth it? Or are New England abolitionists going to watch their militia shipped south in order to help the South prop up the slave system?

That didn't happen in the ARW, 1812, or the ACW.

I would be surprised if it wasn't the total number of enlistments over the course of the war, which most probably means (like the number of enlistments in the American Civil War), it's counting individuals multiple times as well as failing to reflect the peak concurrent strength of the force. At $8 a month, 450,000 troops serving concurrently would amount to $3,600,000 a month and $43,200,000 a year, which is 20% more than the total Federal budget in 1814.

in an earlier debate I came up with same numbers based on State veterans' benefits. Believe it or not American States could keep records, and work out who was eligible for benefits.

OK, so let's insert 'the British' in the place of the hypothetical opponent and see whether you can understand how your two statements are mutually exclusive.

Sorry, but your just being silly. Using the word hypothetical in talking about a possible future situation is a normal way to talk about it. I really don't even understand what the heck you mean by saying my statements are mutually exclusive.

Why should we take your opinion over how hard it would be for the British to attack American cities over the opinion you admit was held by contemporary American officers?

It's not about taking my opinion. It's about what common sense would tell you what ether side would do. The officers who gave those reports were doing their jobs of think out worst case scenarios. If the British attacked, what do you think they would do, give up? No, they'd make do with what they had. Experience in 19th Century warfare showed that earthen emplacements were very difficult for naval forces to overcome. For their part the British were cautious in their campaigns, which for example they didn't try to storm the defenses of Baltimore in 1814, or even bring their fleet into the range of the defending guns in Fort Henry.

Firstly, he's one of the most documented American engineering officers of the period. However, you didn't know and weren't able to find out that he wasn't working on coastal defences in 1840 (something which took me about five minutes), which speaks to the overall quality of the rest of your research. Secondly, you enlist Lee without the slightest piece of evidence as to whether he thought New York was defensible in 1840 or not.

Respectfully you're nitpicking and missing the point.

Britain can threaten a New York level incursion anywhere on the United States coast, including areas equally strategically significant but far less populated and defensible, more or less from day one plus travelling time. That's the value of the naval supremacy which she enjoys; it means the US has to tie up troops in garrisons rather than send them to Canada, find thousands of guns and millions of dollars to complete those coastal fortifications she neglected to finish in peacetime.

Sure, they could land a few thousand men in some remote area and keep themselves tied up defending it. It's not like landing in Normandy in 1944 and building up for a breakout. As the Civil War showed taking a major port by direct action from the sea was a very difficult thing to do.

'Internal revolts during wartime usually don't breakout until defeat or serious war weariness sets in, not at the outset' lasted seven posts, until you needed to stop the British using all their troops.

Ireland is a special case. The Irish Catholics were an occupied people always looking for a chance to be free. The English understood that and always feared a new revolt in Ireland. I think you're not understanding the situation in Ireland, or the English sensitivity to it.

Yes, it would leave the British months for training militia, expanding their regular army, and constructing field fortifications (much less expensive than coastal defences). Command of the ocean means all the British have to do is sit back and hold Canada; they're in the same position as the Union during the Civil War but without the necessity to actually invade and conquer their opponent, which is the bit that took the Union five years to go 120 miles.

The British were able to fortify several places in Canada, but most of the country was open to invasion. For the British Quebec City was the center of gravity, and last redout. The Americans had several possible lines of advance, and Canada would be strained to cover them all.

The United States is twenty years away from Civil War over the balance of power between free states and slave states; the Mexican-American War launched a political crisis over whether the territory captured should be free or slave; the United States now proposes to wage war on Canada to potentially add a large number of free states to the Union; and you say 'presumably the war wouldn't have internal political problems.'

The circumstance of this hypothetical war, and how it would affect the balance between free & slave States is unclear. But 1840 is not likely a ripe time for Southern secession.

Yes, 60,000 is what's reasonable - which is why the British advocates are so confident. With 2-3 months prep time, the British can have an army of c.20,000 regulars and c.60,000 militia defending fixed positions in Canada, which is the kind of local superiority 60,000 men (c.10,000 regulars, c.50,000 volunteers), with most of the siege artillery diverted to coastal defences, don't have a plausible chance of overcoming, particularly in the short campaigning season you find in Canada. Incidentally, have you realised that United States militia can only be compelled to serve for 90 days, so that 3 month prep time leaves you with 0 days to campaign in Canada?

There are a lot of variables in what you're talking about. Obviously, the war is not going to be fought by 90-day militia, but you seem to be assuming that all the Americans have. You're also making an illogical assumption that the defense can concentrate, but the attacker can't. That makes no sense.

 

[James Ricker]

The big problem for the British would be force projection. There would also be the potential for other European powers taking advantage of the situation.

 

[Neal Caffrey]

I've addressed the problems with the militia, and that time can correct these problems, and much of the politics was settled by the time in question. Also, the higher, and middle ranking officers available in 1840 are far better. Using the Mexican War for an example of what the U.S. could do is more relevant to a discussion then endlessly rehashing the defects of 1812. The problems of the Civil War are long and complex. The reconquest of the South was a massive undertaking that under the best of circumstances would take 3 years to achieve. It took 4. The union was winning the war in the West, and on the coasts from the onset, it was only stalled in Virginia.

That's just not true, the vast majority of officers by 1840 in the army were at best mediocre and deeply ill suited for a fast decisive campaign due to West Point being a very defense and engineering oriented academy that neglected both Cavalry and Infantry, many of the better officers got better due to how formative of an experience the Mexican American War was for all of them, without that prior experience most middle officers in the army would be at best medicre and at best deeply incompetent.

 

[The Gunslinger]

So, 458,463 Militia, in the war of 1812,

The vast majority of which never saw battle, were incredibly poorly equipped and generally ill trained. The militia were also notoriously unreliable and often didn't cooperate with the regular army. New York had one of the better militia systems in place thanks to Tompkins, and even they suffered massively on the offensive.

The regular army, by the end of the war had difficulty recruiting and was actually shrinking (largely due to desertion and disease) by the war's end despite being allocated expansion by Congress and having upped the land bounty significantly.

 

[tallthinkev]

The big problem for the British would be force projection. There would also be the potential for other European powers taking advantage of the situation.

Europe were a lot more worried about each other than the UK, plus the small matter of the home fleet. Of the four main players, Prussia can't do anything as it would have to worry about Russia and France. France can't do anything because of Prussia, Austria can't get anywhere