How Would An 1840s Anglo-American War Go?

[Tibi088]

I doubt the USA will repeat the mistakes of the war of 1812, namely using untrained militias.

Do they have much else in 1840?

I also doubt any attempt to conquer British colonies on the mainland of North America would be half-assed. If the USA chooses to fight, it will be committed to doing so. That doesn't necessarily mean going all in to try to take all of Canada, because it could mean pouring serious resources into Maine or Oregon. It also doesn't mean the attempt would be successful, just that a lack of American commitment to would probably mean no war to begin with.

This war is supposedly about the Oregon territory. I do not doubt there will be an attack on Canada but thats not going to be the goal of the war. Defeating the british/Canadians in a battle, maybe taking a fort would I think be enough for the british to concede to the US's demands regarding Oregon (the reverse is also likely true). That does not require taking all of Canada. If the US meats with way more success from the get go than it expects than taking all of Canada might be put on the table and than it could turn in to an all out war. But as long as its about it Oregon it will be "half-assed" on both part because neither side will be ready to go all out for Oregon.

 

[tallthinkev]

Blockading a country is one thing. Raiding and demolishing port cities is another. Even if you have a powerful navy, your ships are still vulnerable to shore batteries. Sure Britain could capture or sack a city but not the entire east coast, not even close.

Having forts and batteries is all well and good. But only if they are fully manned, the men are trained, have the fire power to reach the target and there are enough supplies. For most, if not all, US forts this was not the case.
One of the biggest sticking points was who was going to pay for these forts, the state or the federal gov. The lack of manufacturing and supply infrastructure in the arms industry. And the size of the US army was less than 10,000 men.

It was the same until the Endicott forts that were built between 1890 and 1910

 

[Belisarius II]

Blockading a country is one thing. Raiding and demolishing port cities is another. Even if you have a powerful navy, your ships are still vulnerable to shore batteries. Sure Britain could capture or sack a city but not the entire east coast, not even close.

Firstly that assumes there would be a Mexican-American War in this scenario. Secondly if the Mexican war had already ended by the time this Anglo-American War breaks out, Mexico wouldn't be in a position to do much of anything. If this Anglo-American war coincides with the Mexican-American war, then I would give the edge to Brits/Mexicans, but an American victory would definitely still be plausible. If its after (or before) the Mexican-American war, or the Mexican-American war is averted, Mexico won't be doing much to help the Brits.

If you want a civil war over slavery and/or secession there has to be a reason for it to break out in the 1840s rather than the 1860s. A British blockade on cotton is would not do it even if there weren't a domestic market for it.

I doubt the USA will repeat the mistakes of the war of 1812, namely using untrained militias. I also doubt any attempt to conquer British colonies on the mainland of North America would be half-assed. If the USA chooses to fight, it will be committed to doing so. That doesn't necessarily mean going all in to try to take all of Canada, because it could mean pouring serious resources into Maine or Oregon. It also doesn't mean the attempt would be successful, just that a lack of American commitment to would probably mean no war to begin with.

Every time this subject of an Anglo/American war set between 1815-1900 comes up the same tropes are laid out as if they were self-evident truths. First that since Britain had the world's greatest fleet every American city within 50 miles of the ocean could be destroyed at will. This is patent nonsense. In any kind of real world taking, or destroying a city is a massive undertaking, that no one enters into lightly. In an age of wooden sailing ships sailing into a port surrounded by headlands, with narrow and shallow entrance channels, and protected by shore batteries is a high-risk operation. You don't want to run aground while under fire from shore batteries.

In 1776 the British had to withdraw from Boston because the Patriots were able to place a battery on Dorchester Heights. Even the light field guns that the Patriots possessed threatened the fleet, and supporting naval forces, and made the city untenable. In 1840 Boston would be defended by a lot more than 6 pounders. There were gun batteries on islands, and onshore positions along the approaches to the city. To overcome them would take a major effort and need a large landing force to secure the batteries and open a path for the fleet.

Quotes are always brought out of American officers reporting how terribly inadequate coastal defenses were, and that is true. They thought they were inadequate, which means if they thought about what a hypothetical attacker could do, they needed a lot more. Robert E Lee was an engineer working on coastal defenses at this time. If you asked him if the British came back to NYC with the same force, they came with in 1776 what he would do he wouldn't tell you surrender was the only option.

In 1840 the British have nothing like the force they sent to NYC in 1776, and the Americans have vastly better defenses, have better trained, and more professional led troops. The NY Militia of 1840, along with reinforcements form other States and Federal Army would form an army at least as large, and far more effective the Continental Army of June 1776. If the British tried to do what they did the first time they'd get a huge shock. But no British commander would even try that in 1840. An invasion of NY would be a slow probing attack to just get ashore, and then a cautious advance on the city. But again, nothing like that would happen in 1840. Most of the British Army in NA would be sent to defend Canada, not attack American population centers.

Related to British naval supremacy is the idea that all American trade would be blocked, and the USN destroyed. A tight blockade was impossible because of the length of the coast, and the USN has protected ports. Just as in the ARW, and 1812 USN ships, and Privateers would operate in the Atlantic, and the British couldn't stop them. Loss of trade would hurt both sides and put pressure on both governments to make peace. Loss of Southern cotton, and Northern grain would hurt, and the idea that Britain would be under no economic strain is actually a second trope.

The third trope is that the American militia was nothing but rabble. True in most cases they were not at the standard of the regular army, but since combat operations don't start when a British officer fires a starting pistol. Months would go by before a British army would be attacking home territory. The New England States had the best trained, and equipped militia forces. The problem in the War of 1812 was the political division of the country. The New England militias were ordered not to join the invasion of Canada, and only defended their own territory. Only the Vermont Militia joined the battle to defend NY State in 1814.

In an 1840 war unless something has completely alienated New England, a war being fought in Maine, and on the Canada, line would have the best militia regiments under federal control from the onset. In 1840 U.S. Army higher leadership is far more professional than in 1812, and more of the officer Corps is West Point trained. The Southern States have a tradition of a more rough and ready militia force that battled native Americans sent unofficial support to the Texicans in 1836 and joined in hard fighting in the Mexican/American War. Most of the army that fought in Mexico were militia and they were far from rabble.

I make no prediction of what course this war would take, but the idea that it would a British walk over is the highest presumption of British exceptionalism.

P.S. I addressed the issue of Oregon in an earlier post. A British ship can't just show up on the coast and have the whole territory surrender to it.

 

[TrickyApe]

Every time this subject of an Anglo/American war set between 1815-1900 comes up the same tropes are laid out as if they were self-evident truths. First that since Britain had the world's greatest fleet every American city withing 50 miles of the ocean could be destroyed at will. This is patent nonsense. In any kind of real world taking, or destroying a city is a massive undertaking, that no one enters into lightly. In an age of wooden sailing ships sailing into a port surrounded by headlands, with narrow and shallow entrance channels, and protected by shore batteries is a high-risk operation. You don't want to run aground while under fire from shore batteries.

This is I think particularly true in the 1840's. As I understand things, this was an era where shore defenses had a real advantage due to the development of shell guns. Electric naval mines were also being experimented with successfully, including by Samuel Colt in the United States.

On the offensive side, there wasn't much beyond the traditional wooden sailing fleet. The very first screw driven battleships (wooden and unarmored) were just coming into service in the second half of the decade, although Britain did successfully use smaller ships as tugs to reposition sailing battleships during the operations off Syria in 1840. Steam engines were still too weak to power the armored battery ships that were the only effective tools against Russian forts in Crimean a decade later, and even if these vessels were available it's doubtful they could handle the Atlantic.

It should also be noted that in both Syria and in the prototypical operations against Washington and Copenhagen during the Napoleonic period ground forces were required. Even with undeveloped coast defenses the ability of the United States to muster troops defensively around their cities would give an additional challenge to the invaders.

 

[raharris1973]

If you want a civil war over slavery and/or secession there has to be a reason for it to break out in the 1840s rather than the 1860s. A British blockade on cotton is would not do it even if there weren't a domestic market for it.

How about the southern states simply having no interest in this war, where, even if the USA wins, they lose, in terms of sectional influence, because any territorial gains would be on northern, free state border lands? As a result they could either 'quiet quit' the war and underperform and under contribute to the national effort and trade with the enemy on any terms the enemy will let them. Or outright secede, saying they are a different country and not part of this war.

 

[Belisarius II]

How about the southern states simply having no interest in this war, where, even if the USA wins, they lose, in terms of sectional influence, because any territorial gains would be on northern, free state border lands? As a result they could either 'quiet quit' the war and underperform and under contribute to the national effort and trade with the enemy on any terms the enemy will let them. Or outright secede, saying they are a different country and not part of this war.

Where does this idea come from? The United States wouldn't be adding any territory in the North that they didn't already hold. The Southerners were hoping for Texas admission, and the further spread of slavery was uncertain. The Southerners at this point were putting their faith in pro South Democrats, and President Van Buren still had the support of many Southerners. The country was nowhere near the point of such disunion in 1840. You can't just assume since the ACW happened it could happen 20 years early because it would be great time to stab the rest of the country in the back. It took the violent crisis of the mid to late 1850's to bring on the Civil War.

 

[TRH]

Where does this idea come from? The United States wouldn't be adding any territory in the North that they didn't already hold. The Southerners were hoping for Texas admission, and the further spread of slavery was uncertain. The Southerners at this point were putting their faith in pro South Democrats, and President Van Buren still had the support of many Southerners. The country was nowhere near the point of such disunion in 1840. You can't just assume since the ACW happened it could happen 20 years early because it would be great time to stab the rest of the country in the back. It took the violent crisis of the mid to late 1850's to bring on the Civil War.

In general people don't seem to grasp that war with an external enemy tends to reduce or at least delay internal tensions rather than exacerbating them. Nothing hurts your domestic political position quite like accusations of a lack of patriotism during a national emergency.

 

[Sarthak]

In general people don't seem to grasp that war with an external enemy tends to reduce or at least delay internal tensions rather than exacerbating them. Nothing hurts your domestic political position quite like accusations of a lack of patriotism during a national emergency.

That is entirely subjective to the context of the nation going to war. There are examples of both sides of the spectrum throughout history.

 

[TRH]

That is entirely subjective to the context of the nation going to war. There are examples of both sides of the spectrum throughout history.

Maybe so, but we only ever seem to talk about the one side of the spectrum, such that separatists and other rebels pop out of the woodwork as soon as a war starts. At least for whoever winds up losing. In a meta sense, I guess Brazil should be happy Nothing Ever Happens in South America. Because if they got into a scrap that went badly in a timeline, the Ragamuffins and Grão-Pará and friends would balkanize the country right quick.

More broadly I think it's more common for your standard real-life war where neither side ends up conquered doesn't foment mass uprisings and separatism, but tallying that up would be a chore.

 

[Sarthak]

Maybe so, but we only ever seem to talk about the one side of the spectrum, such that separatists and other rebels pop out of the woodwork as soon as a war starts. At least for whoever winds up losing. In a meta sense, I guess Brazil should be happy Nothing Ever Happens in South America. Because if they got into a scrap that went badly in a timeline, the Ragamuffins and Grão-Pará and friends would balkanize the country right quick.

More broadly I think it's more common for your standard real-life war where neither side ends up conquered doesn't foment mass uprisings and separatism, but tallying that up would be a chore.

I don't disagree. Just pointing it out

 

[Belisarius II]

That is entirely subjective to the context of the nation going to war. There are examples of both sides of the spectrum throughout history.

Internal revolts during wartime usually don't breakout until defeat or serious war weariness sets in, not at the outset. Throughout this period of American history, a war fever against Britain was always near the surface. It seems to be a popular idea on this board that the USA was just terrified at the thought of war with all powerful England. In every crisis cooler heads always prevailed because it was clear to responsible people that little could be gained by either side, and much could be lost.

The idea of this fear is what keeps bringing up these posts where all Britain had to do was take a firm stand and they could stop American expansion. "No, you can't have California." "No, you can't have Oregon." The British never did that because they had no doubt it would lead to an immediate war. As long as Canada was secure the British let the Americans do what they wanted to do with the rest of NA. Economic interests slowly improved rations over the decades, and war became a receding prospect.

 

[Michael B]

The idea of this fear is what keeps bringing up these posts where all Britain had to do was take a firm stand and they could stop American expansion. "No, you can't have California." "No, you can't have Oregon." The British never did that because they had no doubt it would lead to an immediate war. As long as Canada was secure the British let the Americans do what they wanted to do with the rest of NA. Economic interests slowly improved rations over the decades, and war became a receding prospect.

There is also the fact that the Americans don't just roll in and grab the place in one fell swoop. There is a drip drip of colonists arriving to make a new life. They may even be welcomed as they put money to the local economy. However, as the Mexican discovered with Texas once there are sufficient numbers you can't get them out and sooner or later they will take over the place and make it part of the USA.

 

[tallthinkev]

This is I think particularly true in the 1840's. As I understand things, this was an era where shore defenses had a real advantage due to the development of shell guns. Electric naval mines were also being experimented with successfully, including by Samuel Colt in the United States.

Didn't work for the Russians 10 years later in the Baltic

 

[AltoRegnant]

There is also the fact that the Americans don't just roll in and grab the place in one fell swoop. There is a drip drip of colonists arriving to make a new life. They may even be welcomed as they put money to the local economy.

well, it wasnt entirely a drip, it was closer to pourig cups into bowls of varying sizes. It was pointed out just how many americans colonixed oregon compared to brits.

However, as the Mexican discovered with Texas once there are sufficient numbers you can't get them out and sooner or later they will take over the place and make it part of the USA.

Britain also actually controlled most of their claimed territory, unlike Mexico who could barely get forts up

 

[cerebropetrologist]

Quotes are always brought out of American officers reporting how terribly inadequate coastal defenses were, and that is true. They thought they were inadequate, which means if they thought about what a hypothetical attacker could do, they needed a lot more.

Just to be clear, then, the United States of 1820-1840 is framing its defences not against the British, despite them being the country's major geopolitical foe, but against a hypothetical attacker. And the coastal defences it frames against those hypothetical attackers are stronger than they would need to be to fight against the British, despite Britain having the biggest and strongest navy in the world. And the United States government is generous enough to fund defences that are far stronger than they need to be, while at the same time being too parsimonious to actually pay for those defences to be completed in line with the original schedule. But fortunately, those incomplete defences are still strong enough to protect against Britain. And they're framed against a hypothetical enemy and not Great Britain, despite contemporary documents saying things like "Of the probability of an invasion in that quarter, in case of an unfavorable issue of the depending negotiations between the United States and Great Britain". Makes perfect sense.

Robert E Lee was an engineer working on coastal defenses at this time.

No he wasn't:

1837: Lee is transferred to St. Louis; his assignment is to stabilize the harbor and straighten out a bottleneck in the Mississippi river. Lee’s assistant is Lt. Montgomery C. Meigs.
1838: Lee is promoted to captain.
1841: The entire family moves to Brooklyn, New York, where Lee supervises construction and repairs to Fort Hamilton and the New York harbor defenses.

In 1840 the British have nothing like the force they sent to NYC in 1776

The force sent to New York in 1776 is 20,000 men. In 1775 the British have 21,000 men in Britain and Ireland; in 1840 they have 42,651. In other words, the British of 1840 have a New York expedition's worth of men over and above what they had in 1776.

and the Americans have vastly better defenses, have better trained, and more professional led troops.

What a shame that, in 1840, the Secretary of War was writing this:

The mass of the militia of the United States, as at present organized... every day that they are mustered for inspection or exercise, abstracts at least one million of dollars from the earnings of labor, without adding any thing whatever to the military efficiency of the country, and too often affecting injuriously the moral condition of those who are assembled for the purpose. Left by the little instruction they receive on such occasions, without discipline. subordination, or knowledge of the use of arms, and totally ignorant of the manner of taking care of themselves or of each other in the field, such a militia, if called out in mass, would rather prove a burden than an assistance to the army employed in the defence of the country, as is shown by the experience of General Washington, repeatedly expressed in his correspondence, as well as by the result of more recent events during the last war... Any attempt to organize, discipline, and render every way fit for service in the field, the unwieldy mass of the militia of this vast country... must fail for want of means, and leave the country exposed to the terrible disasters which will attend the first burst of war upon its frontiers, if they are to be defended by armed but undisciplined multitudes.... At present, the militia cannot be rendered immediately available against a surprise; whereas, under the proposed organization, they would repair to their stations at the first alarm, and would be efficient soldiers when there... All this, it appears to me, will be effected by drilling, during four years, one hundred thousand men, for a period not exceeding thirty nor less than ten days in each and every year

Far from 500,000 men capable of invading Canada to take on British regulars, the United States in 1840 was anxious to pass military reforms to ensure they could muster 100,000 men with the ten days training necessary to let them defend fixed coastal positions.

The NY Militia of 1840, along with reinforcements form other States and Federal Army would form an army at least as large, and far more effective the Continental Army of June 1776. If the British tried to do what they did the first time they'd get a huge shock

So we've got you saying this, without a single citation to back up your claims, and on the other hand we have a report from 1836 from a man who would be appointed Chief of Engineers of the United States Army two years later (and would serve there for a quarter of a century) putting his professional reputation on the line by saying the following:

New York harbor... In the present condition of the defences of this harbor, an enemy would encounter no great opposition, whether his attack was made by land or water... coming into the lower harbor, he might, while the works on Staten Island are in their present condition, risk forcing the passage of the Narrows, as well as the upper works, anchoring in the Hudson or in the East river; or he might land in Gravesend bay, eight miles from the city, and march directly to Brooklyn, where he would find the navy yard lying at his mercy, and whence he might levy a contribution or destroy half the city. The only mode of resistance would be the expensive, harassing and uncertain one of arraying a large body of militia upon Harlem and Brooklyn Heights, and this could be resorted to only in the event, by no means certain, of receiving timely intelligence of his design.

Who on earth do we believe?

In 1840 Boston would be defended by a lot more than 6 pounders. There were gun batteries on islands, and onshore positions along the approaches to the city.

No there aren't. 1836:

The present forts in Boston harbor defend merely the interior basin from attacks by water... as Nantasket roads afford the best possible station for a blockading squadron, it was deemed indispensable to place permanent defences at the mouth of the harbor. The project of the defence regards the existing works, with the necessary repairs and modifications, as constituting a second barrier; contemplates placing a permanent fort on George's island; another at Nantasket Head, having two advanced works on the head and one on Hog island; reducing the latitude of Gallop island, in order to destroy its command over George's island ; and filling up the Broad Sound channel, so as to leave no passage, in that direction, for ships-of-war. These are estimated to cost $2,337,000. Besides the works of a permanent character, it will be necessary, in the beginning of a war, to erect several temporary works in the lower part of the harbor, in order to make that defence more perfect, and also on certain lateral approaches to the navy yard.

1840:
Fort Independence. Owing to the want of funds, no masonry work has been done since the fall of 1838. During the past year, some stone has been obtained and dressed, but nothing further attempted. The plan of operations for the next year contemplates the collection of materials for the entire masonry of the work, and provides the necessary workmanship, except for the arches on one curtain, the parade wall on three fronts, and the breast height wall. It also contemplates covering all the arches, except on one curtain, and forming the terreplein and parapet on the three channel fronts. The department estimate embraces the necessary appropriation.

Fort Warren.-In consequence of the exhaustion of former appropriations, and the last one not being applicable, no masonry has been executed at this work the past year. Operations have been confined almost exclusively to receiving and dressing a portion of the stone required for the different walls, piers, arches, &c. The plan of operations answering to the estimate of the department contemplates the entire completion, with the exception of the parade walls, of the masonry of the three fronts commanding the channel, and, also, the completion of the coverface.

1842:
Lovell's Island... its immediate protection is, in the opinion of Colonel Thayer, the officer in charge, “of paramount importance."... West Head Battery and Southeast Battery, Winthrop Island (Governor's Island), Boston harbor. —The repairs of these batteries, for which a small sum was appropriated in September last, commenced in the latter end of that month, together with a survey of the island on which they are placed; of course, but little could be accomplished since that time. The repairs however, it is hoped, may be finished early in the next season...

Fort Independence, Boston harbor.-At the close of operations this autumn, with the exception of one curtain, the entire scarp-wall and all the piers, arches of casemates, and galleries, and the beton roofings in connexion therewith, will have been completed; as, also, the parade walls, asphaltic roofings, foundations of breast-height wall, and embankments of terreplein and parapet, on curtains of fronts Nos. 1 and 2.

Fort Warren, Boston harbor.--A large quantity of masonry has been laid this season, amounting to nearly 17,000 cubic yards. Most of the ma- sonry of fronts Nos. 1, 2, and 3, is now finished, and a part of No. 4 laid. The interior wall of the coverface, with its ramps, is completed; its terre- plein embanked and levelled, and prepared to receive platforms for the guns of the armament. With the amount asked for the next year, it is proposed to place the work in such a condition that, with a few simple arrangements requiring little time or expense, it might, in case of emergency, be prepared to make a respectable defence.

Just as in the ARW, and 1812 USN ships, and Privateers would operate in the Atlantic, and the British couldn't stop them. Loss of trade would hurt both sides and put pressure on both governments to make peace. Loss of Southern cotton, and Northern grain would hurt, and the idea that Britain would be under no economic strain is actually a second trope.

Did it hurt both sides in the War of 1812?

'If, in the early nineteenth-century, defeat in war lay in the inability to continue fighting while an opponent was able to do so, then, despite its victory at New Orleans in January 1815, the United States was defeated in the Anglo-American War of 1812. The Americans had failed to occupy Canada, either as a bargaining-counter or permanently, as Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin had earlier agreed. Even more importantly, the Royal Navy's economic warfare, in the form of its commercial and naval blockades, had deprived the United States of the financial means to continue fighting beyond the first few months of 1815. By depriving the United States of its imports, the British commercial blockade had so reduced American customs duties, the major source of government revenue until the last year of the war, as to create major budget deficits, and cause American dependence on increasingly unreliable public credit.'

'The British commercial blockade had over time so far reduced American agricultural exports that newly-introduced taxes were paid from reduced incomes, only with difficulty and evident reluctance. Overland transport intended to replace increasingly blockaded coastal traffic, had become so expensive as to permit farmers to sell either to local markets at prices depressed by glut, or to distant urban consumers at high prices, which effectively reduced demand. Speculators had made the most of real or contrived shortages. Unemployment, especially in ports and other cities had combined with rising prices to contribute to popular unrest. The proliferation of state and local banks with poorly controlled note issues had contributed to severe inflation, and reduced the overall acceptability of paper money. Banknotes, even those held by the government, had become far from universally acceptable, frequently refused or accepted only at a discount. Banks had eventually been forced to suspend payment in precious metals.'

'The American merchant fleet was never again as relatively important to the American economy as it had been before 1812. The relative diversion of investment funds from merchant shipping became permanent. The American government had declared war after seeking to secure a maritime trading advantage during Britain's prolonged war in Europe. For largely commercial reasons, it had interposed itself between Britain and its French enemy, and the American merchant fleet had paid the price.'

'When the Treaty of Ghent ended the war after thirty-two months of fighting, the Americans had gained none of the aims they had hoped for at the outset, and had bankrupted themselves in the process. Between 1812 and the end of 1814, the American government had collected $35.1m in wartime taxes, at the same time spending $86.7m, creating a $51.6m shortfall. Over the same period, it had sought to borrow $62.5m by selling government stock, of which it appears to have received only $42.6m, probably worth less than half that value in specie. The Treasury's short-term loan notes had changed hands only at discount, and calls for loans had fallen short of their targets, even when the securities were sold far below par. Before the negotiated peace of 1815, the government's credit worthiness had collapsed.'

The third trope is that the American militia was nothing but rabble.

We've known this for over a hundred years:
Mr. Upton, in his Military Policy of the United States, remarks that "up to (the time of the Mexican War) the militia system... had been regarded as the bulwark of national defense." Evidence seems to prove that the bulwark had begun to weaken before the Mexican war... every effort failed to maintain the old standards. It is impossible to set an exact date for the beginning of the decline in interest in the militia, but certain it is that the decline began many years before the Mexican war. The causes for it were many: lack of military necessity ; rareness of drill days ; expense, and commutation and fines. As the memory of the War of 1812 faded gradually from the public mind, the military spirit also declined By 1840 the whole system had fallen into general disrepute. The lack of interest is nowhere more evident than in the incompleteness of the annual returns from the States... The duties of the adjutant-general in most of the States were so slight that the office was not generally attractive to men of energy. In many cases the incumbent knew nothing military... By 1840 the condition of the militia began to alarm some interested people and, as a result, congress appointed a committee to report on the condition of the militia and to make suggestions for its betterment. The report got no decent hearing, ( Paul Tincher Smith, “Militia of the United States from 1846 to 1860” Indiana Magazine of History, vol. 15, no. 1, 1919, pp. 20–47.)

With a few exceptions, the common militia acquitted itself dishonorably during the War of 1812. Militia serving in a mixed fed-eral/state command under General Dearborn refused to cross the international border at Lake Champlain in preparation for an attack against Montreal, forcing abandonment of the American offensive in the first year of the war.Militia ineptitude was also a key factor in the August 1814 sacking of Washington...

As enthusiasm for militia service continued to decline after the War of 1812, so too did the ability of the average citizen to appear armed in compliance with the Militia Act of 1792 or applicable state regulations. In the early years of the nineteenth century, it was common-place for militia captains to complain that more and more members of their companies appeared with no weapon at all, or with such poor makeshifts for guns as umbrellas, broomsticks, farm tools, and garden implements. And as citizens came to lack the desire and equip-ment needed for militia service, so too they began to ridicule and burlesque the very concept of the citizen army. Two northern cartoons depicting typical musters of the 1820s and 1830s are illustrative... the ‘‘Nation’s Bulwark,’’ writes Marcus Cunliffe of the citizens assembled in the first figure, ‘‘can contrive only a ragged muster. Still, the majority have been able to produce weapons of a sort. A decade or two later, even this much evidence of the martial spirit was lacking.’’ Cunliffe’s point is born out in the second print. By 1835, even in the militia’s New England heartland, cornstalks, sticks, and um-brellas are as common among the soldiers as muskets and bayonets, and fighting and drinking appear to command more attention than the ridiculous captain in his overblown hat...

Further illustrative are Abraham Lincoln’s recollections of his youthful experiences of ‘‘militia trainings’’ in the West, where the militia lacked even that fading status that its deep historical roots and the nostalgic memories of aging Revolutionary-era veterans pre-served to the eastward:
We remember one of these parades ourselves here, at the head of which, on horse-back, figured our old friend Gordon Adams, with a pine wood sword, about nine feet long, and a paste-board cocked hat, from front to rear about the length of an ox yoke, and very much the shape of one turned bottom upwards; and with spur shaving rowels as large as the bottom of a teacup, and shanks a foot and a half long. That was the last militia muster here. Among the rules and regulations, no man is to wear more that five pounds of cod-fish for epaulets, or more than thirty yards of bologna sausages for a sash; and no two men are to dress alike, and if any two should dress alike the one that dresses most alike is to be fined, (I forget how much). Flags they had too, with devices and mottoes, one of which latter is, ‘‘We’ll fight till we run, and we’ll run till we die.’’

( H. Richard Uviller and William G. Merkel, "The Decay of the Old Militia, 1789–1840" The Militia and the Right to Arms, or, How the Second Amendment Fell Silent, eds. Neal Devins and Mark A. Graber (New York, 2002))

Most of the army that fought in Mexico were militia and they were far from rabble.

In the Mexican-American War United States mobilises 13,000 militia and 61,000 volunteers, and only 30,000 of the volunteers serve in Mexico. If the pro-American side of the thread were arguing that the US would be mobilising 30,000 volunteers for the invasion of Canada instead of closer to twenty times that figure, they'd get a lot less push-back about the likely quality of those troops.

 

[Belisarius II]

There is also the fact that the Americans don't just roll in and grab the place in one fell swoop. There is a drip drip of colonists arriving to make a new life. They may even be welcomed as they put money to the local economy. However, as the Mexican discovered with Texas once there are sufficient numbers you can't get them out and sooner or later they will take over the place and make it part of the USA.

It depends on what you mean by one fell swoop. The Louisiana Purchase was in 1803. It took till 1847 to take control over the West Coast. Is 44 years one fell swoop? That's all-in-one human lifetime.

 

[raharris1973]

Where does this idea come from?

The Mexican-American War, fought just a couple years after this hypothetical war, was sectionally divisive, and had notable opposition, much of it with sectional overtones or undertones. It is true it did not stop the fighting and winning of the war, but opposition was present, and accusations attributing sectionalist motives to the pro-war side were present on the anti-war side. Don't see why it couldn't or shouldn't happen in a war with Britain. The question is how marginal this point of view is, or how significant.

 

[Belisarius II]

Just to be clear, then, the United States of 1820-1840 is framing its defences not against the British, despite them being the country's major geopolitical foe, but against a hypothetical attacker. And the coastal defences it frames against those hypothetical attackers are stronger than they would need to be to fight against the British, despite Britain having the biggest and strongest navy in the world. And the United States government is generous enough to fund defences that are far stronger than they need to be, while at the same time being too parsimonious to actually pay for those defences to be completed in line with the original schedule. But fortunately, those incomplete defences are still strong enough to protect against Britain. And they're framed against a hypothetical enemy and not Great Britain, despite contemporary documents saying things like "Of the probability of an invasion in that quarter, in case of an unfavorable issue of the depending negotiations between the United States and Great Britain". Makes perfect sense.

Respectfully that' a strange comment. Yes, it's almost certainly the British who the Americans are thinking of when planning for a hypothetical invasion. I don't understand why the use of the word hypothetical in talking about a future event is inappropriate, or confusing. I was specifically talking about the British, but all contingence planning is hypothetical.

No he wasn't:

1837: Lee is transferred to St. Louis; his assignment is to stabilize the harbor and straighten out a bottleneck in the Mississippi river. Lee’s assistant is Lt. Montgomery C. Meigs.
1838: Lee is promoted to captain.
1841: The entire family moves to Brooklyn, New York, where Lee supervises construction and repairs to Fort Hamilton and the New York harbor defenses.

Yes, your correct Lee wasn't working on coastal defenses until the following year but he's a known example of an American engineering officer of the period working on the problem.

The force sent to New York in 1776 is 20,000 men. In 1775 the British have 21,000 men in Britain and Ireland; in 1840 they have 42,651. In other words, the British of 1840 have a New York expedition's worth of men over and above what they had in 1776.

General Howe brought 32,000 ground troops to New York in 1776 carried in 130 transports. That included the troops General Gage took out of Boston, and Clinton's force that was repelled from the attack on Charleston South Carolina. It took the British a full year to raise that army. To round that force out they had to pay for 14,000 German mercenaries. I think the 20,000 men figure your using comes from the number of men ready for action that Howe took to Brooklyn for the Battle of Long Island. The rest of his army which included a high number of men on the sick list stayed in the camps on Staten Island. Howe also had the support of around 4,000 Royal Marines.

In 1776 the British also sent 11,000 troops to Canada. From the source I found on Wiki the British raised about 50,000 men in 1776. It wasn't a matter of just using the 21,000 men they had in Britain & Ireland in 1775. The British needed enough troops to meet possible worldwide contingencies, they can't just strip the UK & Ireland of what's stationed there. The reason so much of the peacetime army was in Ireland was from fear of a revolt. If the British have 42,651 troops in the UK & Ireland in 1840 it would be impossible for them to send 32,000, or even 20,000 of them to attack New York City, and also send 10-11,000 to Canada.

If a major war broke out against the Americans in 1840 the British would likely send about 10-11,000 troops out of the readiest forces at home to reinforce Canada and take about a year to raise a new army for more extensive operations. The British have other irons in the fire in 1840 with demands on the army for possible action.

What a shame that, in 1840, the Secretary of War was writing this:

The mass of the militia of the United States, as at present organized... every day that they are mustered for inspection or exercise, abstracts at least one million of dollars from the earnings of labor, without adding any thing whatever to the military efficiency of the country, and too often affecting injuriously the moral condition of those who are assembled for the purpose. Left by the little instruction they receive on such occasions, without discipline. subordination, or knowledge of the use of arms, and totally ignorant of the manner of taking care of themselves or of each other in the field, such a militia, if called out in mass, would rather prove a burden than an assistance to the army employed in the defence of the country, as is shown by the experience of General Washington, repeatedly expressed in his correspondence, as well as by the result of more recent events during the last war... Any attempt to organize, discipline, and render every way fit for service in the field, the unwieldy mass of the militia of this vast country... must fail for want of means, and leave the country exposed to the terrible disasters which will attend the first burst of war upon its frontiers, if they are to be defended by armed but undisciplined multitudes.... At present, the militia cannot be rendered immediately available against a surprise; whereas, under the proposed organization, they would repair to their stations at the first alarm, and would be efficient soldiers when there... All this, it appears to me, will be effected by drilling, during four years, one hundred thousand men, for a period not exceeding thirty nor less than ten days in each and every year

Again, I agree with all of this. What I'm saying is the war won't be fought with day 1, or day 10 forces. The crisis would build over months, if for no other reason than global communications, and movements were so slow. A war that starts over an incident in Hawaii, or Oregon would leave months for training of militia, raising volunteers, and preparations for coastal defenses.

With a few exceptions, the common militia acquitted itself dishonorably during the War of 1812. Militia serving in a mixed fed-eral/state command under General Dearborn refused to cross the international border at Lake Champlain in preparation for an attack against Montreal, forcing abandonment of the American offensive in the first year of the war.Militia ineptitude was also a key factor in the August 1814 sacking of Washington...

Again, in the War of 1812 the biggest problem with militia was political. The best militia units were from New England and were ordered not join in the invasion of Canada or serve under Federal control. Other States put limits on their militias joining in the defense of other States, or of going into Canada. The Southern States had no such confusion about war aims. The loss of Washington was a national disgrace, showing incompetence, but the defense of Baltimore immediately afterward showed what could be done even on short notice. Presumably a war in 1840 wouldn't have those internal political problems.

In the Mexican-American War United States mobilises 13,000 militia and 61,000 volunteers, and only 30,000 of the volunteers serve in Mexico. If the pro-American side of the thread were arguing that the US would be mobilising 30,000 volunteers for the invasion of Canada instead of closer to twenty times that figure, they'd get a lot less push-back about the likely quality of those troops.

The fact that in 1846-47 militia forces fought well, and that volunteer regiments with no pre-war experience as units were highly effective is evidence of a strong American military potential. It's hard to say how many men could be mobilized to invade Canada with say 2-3 months prep time but 60,000 doesn't seem unreasonable. In the 1839 Crisis over the Maine border Congress authorized funds for the raising of 50,000 volunteers, so such things were well within the realm of possibility.

 

[Naval Aviation Fan]

In the Mexican-American War United States mobilises 13,000 militia and 61,000 volunteers, and only 30,000 of the volunteers serve in Mexico. If the pro-American side of the thread were arguing that the US would be mobilising 30,000 volunteers for the invasion of Canada instead of closer to twenty times that figure, they'd get a lot less push-back about the likely quality of those troops.

Ah hem!

I know wiki isn't ideal, but lets look at the numbers for the war of 1812, and see if my numbers actually have merit.

Just to be clear, this is from the Wiki on the war of 1812:

Strength
United States United States Army: 7,000 (at war's start) 35,800 (at war's end) United States Rangers: 3,049 Militia: 458,463* United States Marines United States Navy and United States Revenue Cutter Service(at war's start) Ships of the line: none Frigates: 12 Other vessels: 14 Privateers: 515 ships[1] Allies 125 Choctaw Unknown number of other tribes and nations[2]	United Kingdom British Army: 5,200 (at war's start) 48,160 (at war's end) Militia: 4,000 Royal Marines Royal Navy Ships of the line: 11 Frigates: 34 Other vessels: 52 Provincial Marine ‡ (at war's start): Ships: 9 Allies Native American allies: 10,000–15,000[3][1]

So, 458,463 Militia, in the war of 1812, some 31 years before this threads kick off, and folks want to give me grief over my posited 560,000 potential? If anything, I think that these figures are very close to what we would likely see the USA eventually raising, in such a war in this time period.

Please note, the vast majority of the Militia in 1812 stuck to their own regions, as the USA was still a young nation, but 31 years of expansion since then would mean that a far larger fraction of these forces are going to be available for more than just local defense efforts. Upthread, someone said that Canada would start the war with 30,000 formal Militia, and I think that they could probably raise an additional 15,000-20,000 more. That being said, the USA has 12 times as many folks, so if Canada can start off with 30,000, and bring this figure up to 50,000, then the USA can be expected to be able to hit some 600,000 by the end of the war, which is why all this talk of the USA losing territory is just the stuff of pipe dreams.

In this hypothetical war of 1843, the entry level commitment on Britains part is going to be north of 100,000 troops just to be able to buy into the game, and that level of force is also going to take time to muster, train, and transport across the sea. What portion of these notional 100,000 troops are going to be in fighting shape will not be anything like 100%, as eating shipboard rations, and food spoiled along the way, is not something to be dismissed out of hand in this time frame, and this is just malnutrition, when you add in disease, I don't know what we would be looking at in terms of effectives, but it will be far less than the 100,000 sent, and keep in mind, the USA is going to have many more than this.

How many more, to ensure 100,000 effective troops, are the British going to have to raise, train, and ship all the way across the Atlantic (let alone supply there) are needed, and how many years will this take?

To Invade the USA, the British/Canadians are going to be facing 100,000's of armed free men, defending their homes against foreign troops, so other than quick raids followed by a hasty retreat, anything bigger and more long term is going to be a good way of losing Canada's initial Militia forces, and really annoying the USA.

The only way this war ends well for Canada/Britain, is if it never escalates, and the USA isn't forced to mobilize many 100,000's of men, and the only way to have that happen, is to keep foreign troops off US soil.

Britain has other military commitments, so what happens if the RN is trying to bombard/take/blockade the entire coast of the then USA? What happens when others realize that Britain is wide open, what with her fleet on the other side of the Atlantic, in a multi-year fiasco? Never mind the material costs of trying to supply a force greater than 100,000 men on the other side of the ocean, what happens if an alliance of European nations decides to invade the UK while this is going on? Heck, they might not need to even invade, just all of them start raiding British shipping while blockading/bombarding British coastal cities.

No, the RN cannot be committed in whole, for multiple years, to the blockading effort of the entire US coast, and no, the British cannot bring and support enough troops to fight a protracted ground war in North America, on the scale outlined, as if she tried this, then kiss goodby to her Empire. The USA is isolated from any large, industrialized European nations by the vast distances of the Atlantic Ocean, and Britain just by the English channel.

 

[Fabius Maximus]

Please note, the vast majority of the Militia in 1812 stuck to their own regions, as the USA was still a young nation, but 31 years of expansion since then would mean that a far larger fraction of these forces are going to be available for more than just local defense efforts.

I don't think those militiamen stuck to their own regions because they were needed for local defence, but because (a) they weren't trained enough to be of much use in field battles, and (b) they were ordinary guys with jobs which they couldn't afford to leave for however many months or years to go and fight on some distant frontier. Both these factors would still be applicable in the 1840s. You'll note that when the US had to fight a major war, whether against Mexico or the Confederacy, it raised extra troops for the regular army, rather than steamrollering the enemy with hundreds of thousands of militiamen.