How successful could the British have been at the Somme?

[Pericles]

I've been reading Ring of Steel by Alexander Watson, and his take on the Battle of the Somme was quite startling. I'd previously thought of it as a senseless slaughter, but he argued it was more of an Entente opportunity gone wrong. It was only a few pages and I'm not sure how much of an expert on the battle itself he is, but looking at it from the German perspective he raised a few key points:

• "In the context of the concurrent Russian victories over the Habsburg forces in the east, the French army's successful though costly defence of Verdun, and in August the opening of an Italian offensive and the entry of Romania into the war, an Anglo-French victory on the Somme offered a chance to a deal a death blow to the now vastly outnumbered and over-strained Central Powers."
• He blames General Haig for the British failure, in particular arguing that Haig foolishly rejected the advice to use a 'bite and hold strategy' and the initial advances he demanded were too distant. This meant that the target areas were insufficiently 'saturated' with explosives, particularly since the British were using many dud North American shells.
• That the British were not underdogs at all-the BEF were battle hardened by this point, outnumbered the Germans (106 divisions to 57), had control of the air and had "threefold artillery superiority."
• The Battle was a clear defensive victory for the Germans. It failed to pin down German forces, and German casualties were significantly less than Entente ones (623,907 vs 429,209 from the count he quoted), which was not a critical blow to German strength.

If the bombardment had made the positions indefensible or the British had made limited breakthroughs initially, could this have led to a much different outcome? Watson's argument is that even if shallow, a break-in would have been extremely difficult for the Germans to seal, and at least could have forced them to actually devote more troops to the Somme rather than other battles and fronts.

Is this line of argument supported by other historians? Or did the attack at the Somme never have a chance of making much of an impact? If it could have been a British victory, what sort of changes would this cause to the war?

 

[David Flin]

• That the British were not underdogs at all-the BEF were battle hardened by this point, outnumbered the Germans (106 divisions to 57), had control of the air and had "threefold artillery superiority."

If that's the claim, then it's an odd one.

The BEF, at this point, was swelled by the Kitchener Volunteers, who had (for reasons best known to Kitchener) been trained in isolation from the experienced troops, and had to learn the lessons of warfare from scratch.

The Battle was a clear defensive victory for the Germans. It failed to pin down German forces, and German casualties were significantly less than Entente ones (623,907 vs 429,209 from the count he quoted)

And that's the extreme count. There are many estimates of casualties for the battle, and the figures he quotes are the highest I've come across for Entente casualties and the lowest I've come across for the German casualties. More typical figures are 500-550K Entente casualties, and 420-520K for German casualties.

• He blames General Haig for the British failure, in particular arguing that Haig foolishly rejected the advice to use a 'bite and hold strategy' and the initial advances he demanded were too distant. This meant that the target areas were insufficiently 'saturated' with explosives, particularly since the British were using many dud North American shells.

That's just wrong. Haig had argued against the offensive at that time in that place and in that way. He wanted an attack further north, a month or so later (when the new Kitcheners had a bit of experience in the trenches) and with much more limited objectives (the very bite and hold strategy described) with greater availability of tanks. He was specifically over-ruled by DLG, who insisted on the Somme to help take the pressure off of Verdun. Haig said that this would be HCI (Heavy Casualties Inevitable) and that it was sacrificing British soldiers.

DLG insisted. Once Haig was conveniently dead after the War, DLG then undertook a programme of shifting the decision-making blame for the Somme and others onto the now-conveniently dead Haig.

If a finger needs to be pointed at anyone for the fiasco of the Somme, it's at two people. Kitchener and Lloyd George.

Is this line of argument supported by other historians? Or did the attack at the Somme never have a chance of making much of an impact? If it could have been a British victory, what sort of changes would this cause to the war?

The interesting line would be What If Haig had his way, and the attack taken place in August and further north.

 

[Belisarius II]

If that's the claim, then it's an odd one.

The BEF, at this point, was swelled by the Kitchener Volunteers, who had (for reasons best known to Kitchener) been trained in isolation from the experienced troops, and had to learn the lessons of warfare from scratch.



And that's the extreme count. There are many estimates of casualties for the battle, and the figures he quotes are the highest I've come across for Entente casualties and the lowest I've come across for the German casualties. More typical figures are 500-550K Entente casualties, and 420-520K for German casualties.



That's just wrong. Haig had argued against the offensive at that time in that place and in that way. He wanted an attack further north, a month or so later (when the new Kitcheners had a bit of experience in the trenches) and with much more limited objectives (the very bite and hold strategy described) with greater availability of tanks. He was specifically over-ruled by DLG, who insisted on the Somme to help take the pressure off of Verdun. Haig said that this would be HCI (Heavy Casualties Inevitable) and that it was sacrificing British soldiers.

DLG insisted. Once Haig was conveniently dead after the War, DLG then undertook a programme of shifting the decision-making blame for the Somme and others onto the now-conveniently dead Haig.

If a finger needs to be pointed at anyone for the fiasco of the Somme, it's at two people. Kitchener and Lloyd George.



The interesting line would be What If Haig had his way, and the attack taken place in August and further north.

Another issue I saw once in a TV documentary is the assault groups advanced with full packs, which slowed them down. They also talked about follow on forces, and resupply units got jammed up in the rear, so the whole advance became bogged down. What would you say about those factors?

 

[Dorknought]

The Somme offensive achieved quite a lot of impact on the Germans:

• By August the German armies were under great strain
• The IX Reserve Corps had been shattered at Pozieres.
• 90% of field guns and 45% of heavy guns were out of action.
• At the end of August the German Chief of Staff was sacked - a regime change.
• Attacks on Verdun were stopped. There were no reserves left
• Proposals to pull back and shorten the line were on the table in early September.
• In September the casualties peaked and morale suffered.
• The new regime instigated the Hindenburg Program and would later initiate USW that contributed greatly to bringing the US in.
• German defenses began to collapse in January 1917
• At the end of Feb the Germans pulled back.

Improving this would be attacking when the British were ready, not when the French were begging for help to divert the Germans from Verdun. However, the British had wanted to attack in Flanders not Picardy. The German forces would need to collapse well before Jan 1917 and before the new prepared line was ready.

 

[David Flin]

Another issue I saw once in a TV documentary is the assault groups advanced with full packs, which slowed them down. They also talked about follow on forces, and resupply units got jammed up in the rear, so the whole advance became bogged down. What would you say about those factors?

For a start, one can't really talk about the Somme as though it were a single discreet event. It breaks down into roughly three sectors (at the east end, with the French; from the Somme to the Serre with the British 4th Army; and north of here with the British 3rd Army.

Each of these sectors had a different experience (the French had complete success in the initial attacks, and the British 3rd army was largely successful initially. Where things fell apart was in the central section with the British 4th Army, which faced the worst terrain with the least experienced troops going up against the strongest defences).

And the Somme could also be divided into roughly three phases: phase one being early July, with the Entente attacks; July-September being phase 2 and consisting of to and fro; phase 3 being Sept-Nov, with both sides running out of steam but neither feeling like giving up. Actually, that's not entirely fair to Phase 3, which saw the Kitchener Armies now experienced enough to carry out bite-and-hold tactics, with a fair amount of attrition taking place and the Entente making modest territorial gains.

The logistical support was, unsurprisingly, a bit of a nightmare. This was, after all, the first time that the British Army had conducted operations on this scale, and was doing so with largely inexperienced and under-trained troops. There had been something of a debate about whether the first assault should carry full-packs (and hence have sufficient ammunition to hold gained ground if counter-attacked) or not (and rely on resupply and reinforcement to enable ground taken to be held, with increased likelihood of taking said ground, but less ability to hold if counter-attacked before resupply arrived). The British Staff decided on full-packs, reckoning that logistical support was almost certainly going to be a nightmare. It also simplified instructions to inexperienced troops unable to follow more complicated instructions. "Take that spot and hold it until relieved is straightforward to understand." "Take that spot, then pull back if counter-attacked in force before being reinforced and resupplied, but hold position if the counter-attack is a weak one, and make sure you let Staff know when you've taken the objectives so you can be resupplied when you are in place, but don't call for help until..."

It was probably the wrong call made, but it wasn't the stupid call often portrayed by those who know little about the battle other than a skim of Wikipedia and a look at Oh What A Lovely War.

John Keegan's The Face of Battle - a seminal work - covers the Somme as one of the three battles considered in the book. The conclusions of the book have been questioned and debated, but mainly because of Keegan's focus on the Sharp End (which, in itself, was in response to the previous styles of analysis which looked at large arrows on a map and the view of the Generals, and the relative neglect of the Sharp End).

 

[marktaha]

We should if we had to fight have instead shelled the Germans and helped defend Verdun. Lloyd George wasn't PM until December.

 

[David Flin]

We should if we had to fight have instead shelled the Germans and helped defend Verdun. Lloyd George wasn't PM until December.

The shelling before the Somme was the heaviest ever in the history of the British Army up to that point.

There were twice as many guns per yard of frontage than at Loos in 1915, and significantly heavier in terms of shells per square yard than the previous record, that of the French army at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915.

The expenditure of shells was heavy. Very heavy. OK, not heavy enough - but it was by far the heaviest the war had yet witnessed.

British artillery bombardment before the infantry attack on the Somme - The Long, Long Trail

The British C-in-C Sir Douglas Haig and commander of Fourth Army Sir Henry Rawlinson are often criticised for the choice of tactics […]

www.longlongtrail.co.uk

 

[ArtosStark]

We should if we had to fight have instead shelled the Germans and helped defend Verdun

They were shelling the Germans. A lot. More in fact than they ever had to that point.

Lloyd George wasn't PM until December.

In this, I have to agree. We cannot lay this one at LG’s feet, much as I might like to. The choice of the Somme was one made due to the facts on the ground. The original plan for 1916 was for all allied nations to attack the CP at the same time, which would keep the CP from being able to concentrate reserves to stop them, hopefully leading to a breakthrough. The Germans preempted this with the Verdun offensive. The British wanted to attack in Flanders where they felt they had a good chance to get results and, if they did, the possible outcome (the clearing of the Channel Ports) was of benefit to Britain. But with Verdun ongoing, the French needed the pressure taken off. Thus the British had to attack earlier than planned and had to do so close enough that they thought they could force the Germans to divert troops from Verdun itself. The Brusilov offensive on the Eastern Front had similar reasoning but with no chance to directly pull reserves they could go where they wished.

In general, the OP is a bit misleading. The Somme was a success. It reduced the pressure on the French and induced a lot of German casualties. It was not a breakthrough, but that was unlikely at this stage of the war. Haig did keep it going longer than he should have and oriented it to breakthrough rather than more limited objectives. He tended to be optimistic about the chances of breakthrough throughout the war, and Rawlinson was a bit of a yes man for him at this point. However, the strategic objective was attained.

If Bite and Hold tactics had been implemented on the Somme (in the less developed form they existed In at the time) then Rawlinson would have found the same thing that Plumer did in 1917 after Messines, that it has diminishing returns. The first stretch can work great if you pull it off (no guarantee they would have at the Somme) but after that the hellscape that you have reduced the area you now hold to makes moving up artillery and supply lines difficult. This, and the fact that you wear out your guns, makes each subsequent bite less effective. And you need to keep biting to keep forcing the Germans to counterattack to increase their losses against prepared defences.

Had bite and hold been used at the Somme it would have been more effective. But the casualties still would have been enormous and it still would have stalled out as the year went on. So likely no big breakthrough. On the bright side, it would perhaps have highlighted the engineering and logistical shortfalls that would need to be overcome a year earlier. And if the remedy for these is undertaken when manpower is not so strained then the British army may be better set up to fight the Flanders offensive in 1917.

 

[Garrison]

We should if we had to fight have instead shelled the Germans and helped defend Verdun. Lloyd George wasn't PM until December.

So basically you are completely ignorant of the fact that the Battle of the Somme was fought to help defend Verdun and it was the French who insisted the British fight there precisely to achieve that? Also you are oblivious to the fact that the British shelled the German positions on the Somme for a week before the battle? Oh and the notion that the Somme would have gone better with Lloyd George in charge is bizarre, the man constantly drew resources away from the Western Front for pointless operations like Salonika. Lloyd George savaged the British Generals after the war, and encouraged the stabbed in the back myth, because the Generals had the effrontery to prove him wrong by winning the war by defeating the Germans on the Western Front rather than by his hopeless idea of 'knocking away the props'.

 

[marktaha]

So basically you are completely ignorant of the fact that the Battle of the Somme was fought to help defend Verdun and it was the French who insisted the British fight there precisely to achieve that? Also you are oblivious to the fact that the British shelled the German positions on the Somme for a week before the battle? Oh and the notion that the Somme would have gone better with Lloyd George in charge is bizarre, the man constantly drew resources away from the Western Front for pointless operations like Salonika. Lloyd George savaged the British Generals after the war, and encouraged the stabbed in the back myth, because the Generals had the effrontery to prove him wrong by winning the war by defeating the Germans on the Western Front rather than by his hopeless idea of 'knocking away the props'.

Have you looked at the casualty lists caused by men like Haig?

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

The shelling before the Somme was the heaviest ever in the history of the British Army up to that point.

With far too many dud rounds. I think they estimated later that something like 1 in three shells failed to detonate. That is a problem that can be laid squarely at the feet of the Government for not properly regulating the arms factories.

 

[David Flin]

With far too many dud rounds. I think they estimated later that something like 1 in three shells failed to detonate. That is a problem that can be laid squarely at the feet of the Government for not properly regulating the arms factories.

Sure, but we can't say they didn't think of shelling.

 

[The Gunslinger]

Have you looked at the casualty lists caused by men like Haig?

See post #2

That's just wrong. Haig had argued against the offensive at that time in that place and in that way. He wanted an attack further north, a month or so later (when the new Kitcheners had a bit of experience in the trenches) and with much more limited objectives (the very bite and hold strategy described) with greater availability of tanks. He was specifically over-ruled by DLG, who insisted on the Somme to help take the pressure off of Verdun. Haig said that this would be HCI (Heavy Casualties Inevitable) and that it was sacrificing British soldiers.

DLG insisted. Once Haig was conveniently dead after the War, DLG then undertook a programme of shifting the decision-making blame for the Somme and others onto the now-conveniently dead Haig.

If a finger needs to be pointed at anyone for the fiasco of the Somme, it's at two people. Kitchener and Lloyd George.



The interesting line would be What If Haig had his way, and the attack taken place in August and further north.

 

[David Flin]

See post #2

I assume @marktaha has me on ignore.

To judge by the number of times they seem oblivious of anything I have said.

I respond for others reading the relevant threads.

 

[Elfwine]

I respond for others reading the relevant threads.

As one such, is this:

The BEF, at this point, was swelled by the Kitchener Volunteers, who had (for reasons best known to Kitchener) been trained in isolation from the experienced troops, and had to learn the lessons of warfare from scratch.

"Really, we don't know, Kitchener never explained his reasoning." or "Kitchener had really transparently awful reasons, too stupid to need to tear apart here."?

Interested in any book suggestions you might have on the volunteers there in general as far as how ready to field and use continental scale armies Britain was, honestly, but that specifically struck me as "There has to be something going on here, even if its just Kitchener being incredibly stubborn about a really bad idea." in reading this thread.

 

[David Flin]

"Really, we don't know, Kitchener never explained his reasoning." or "Kitchener had really transparently awful reasons, too stupid to need to tear apart here."?

Never explained his reasoning.

Will hunt out references when I'm on a computer rather than a crappy phone.

 

[Elfwine]

Never explained his reasoning.

Will hunt out references when I'm on a computer rather than a crappy phone.

Interesting. That feels like something that would be interesting to see going differently as far as WWI alternate history, not just as far as the Somme specifically.

And no rush.

 

[David Flin]

Where he was right was in his prediction that WWI would be a long war and would need a stonking big British Army.

Where he was wrong was in his wanting to retain control of "his" army.

 

[Mike D]

Have you looked at the casualty lists caused by men like Haig?

Given that Haig had no choice about launching the attacks or where they would be launched, how do you think he could have done better with the technology available to him in 1916?

 

[Dorknought]

Given that Haig had no choice about launching the attacks or where they would be launched, how do you think he could have done better with the technology available to him in 1916?

Observers from the Russo-Japanese War noted that in the Attacks around Port Arthur, the IJA had success in having the leading lines close behind the barrage.

In a briefing before the Somme, Brigadier James Jardine, commanding the 97th Brigade, 32nd Division, said:

It came to my turn and Rawlinson asked me had I anything to say, and I replied: ‘The leading lines did not advance close enough to the barrage.’ ‘Oh,’ he said, ‘How close do you think they should be?’ and I replied, ‘Thirty to forty yards, Sir, and they must expect some casualties.’ I could see that he did not like what I said for he replied, ‘Oh, thirty to forty yards!!’ ‘Well Sir,’ I said, ‘That’s what the Japanese did,’ and his reply was, ‘Oh the Japanese,’ in a rather sneering way.

His recommendation summarily dismissed, Jardine decided nonetheless to employ the Japanese doctrine within 97th Brigade as best he could. One of his battalions, the 17th Highland Light Infantry, was able to leave its trenches in advance of the remainder of the division, following the artillery inexorably towards the German positions. Sebastian Dobson wrote: While many battalions along the front line climbed out of their trenches only to be mown down by German machine-gun fire, the 17th overran the enemy trenches in the Leipzig Salient before the opposing German infantry could emerge from their shelters, and made one of the few small gains of that terrible day.

From: Rising Sun And Tumbling Bear: Russia's War with Japan. Connaughton, Richard.