Pretty straightforward. What pre-war PODS would need to happen in order for Germany to be occupied by the combined forces of Britain and France as soon as possible, and how soon would that be? Assume that they decided to attack immediately after the German invasion of Poland and the declaration of war.
How quickly could Britain/France defeat and occupy Nazi Germany?
- Thread starter KN1
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jahenders
Banned
Hard to imagine. It might almost require a POD shortly after WWI where both France and UK agree to enforce (or stand ready to enforce) the treaty and other related treaties.
France would also need a POD that doesn't commit so many resources to the Maginot line and a defensive mindset.
Then, when tensions regarding Germany heat up in the 30s, France moves forces toward the border and UK sends forces to France.
Perhaps they:
- Reject the move to have a plebiscite in the Saar in 1935 and move forces in to prevent German moves.
- Don't reach a Anglo-German Naval Agreement or its much worse for Germany
- Invade Rhineland when Germany re-militarizes or make it clear that they'll do so
- Actively side against the fascists in Spain
- Don't agree to Germany getting Sudatenland
Germany might still decide to move into Poland, but is in a weaker position to do so. Hitler's confidence may still lead them to do so, miscalculating the WAllied resolve.
Then, while Germany is still fighting the Poles, Franco-British forces invade the Rhineland, the British Fleet attacks the German fleet, and the Wallies start building up, perhaps getting Belgian agreement to station forces there. At the same time, the WAllies pressure Russia to join them against Germany, citing the fact that Hitler is openly talking that it'll be Russian land they expand into.
The Germans are forced to fight the Wallies while still finishing in the East and they're doing it farther to the East. The Germans might, or might not, still win, but it'll be much harder, and take much longer, to get to Paris. The Battle of Britain is, instead, the French Air Battle. The Germans have a harder time in the Battle for the North Atlantic because they suffer some early losses and have less bases to use.
Perhaps the French even get their colonies more actively engaged (either in Africa or bringing troops to France).
France would also need a POD that doesn't commit so many resources to the Maginot line and a defensive mindset.
Then, when tensions regarding Germany heat up in the 30s, France moves forces toward the border and UK sends forces to France.
Perhaps they:
- Reject the move to have a plebiscite in the Saar in 1935 and move forces in to prevent German moves.
- Don't reach a Anglo-German Naval Agreement or its much worse for Germany
- Invade Rhineland when Germany re-militarizes or make it clear that they'll do so
- Actively side against the fascists in Spain
- Don't agree to Germany getting Sudatenland
Germany might still decide to move into Poland, but is in a weaker position to do so. Hitler's confidence may still lead them to do so, miscalculating the WAllied resolve.
Then, while Germany is still fighting the Poles, Franco-British forces invade the Rhineland, the British Fleet attacks the German fleet, and the Wallies start building up, perhaps getting Belgian agreement to station forces there. At the same time, the WAllies pressure Russia to join them against Germany, citing the fact that Hitler is openly talking that it'll be Russian land they expand into.
The Germans are forced to fight the Wallies while still finishing in the East and they're doing it farther to the East. The Germans might, or might not, still win, but it'll be much harder, and take much longer, to get to Paris. The Battle of Britain is, instead, the French Air Battle. The Germans have a harder time in the Battle for the North Atlantic because they suffer some early losses and have less bases to use.
Perhaps the French even get their colonies more actively engaged (either in Africa or bringing troops to France).
I'd guess 3 & 5 are the most likely. Tho France was unwilling to act alone & there was very little international support for suffocating German resurgence.
This is similar to the French plan in 1939. They expected to attack into the Rhineland starting late September & building into their main attack in October. The schedule was dependant of mobilization of the reservists, which would not be far enough along until late September when all the first and second echelon unnits were ready. The "Active" and "Series A" units.
Unfortunatly the Poles collapsed in just three weeks. The French leaders had expected them to hold out four to six months. When Warsaw was captured the French offensive plan was shelved.
A dozen divisions and proportionate number of support units were from Africa & other colonies. One of the Morrocan Inf Div actually repulsed a German armored attack near Gembloux Belgium in May. The also had a aircraft assembly plant operating in Morroco along side a service depot, and another ner completion in Algeria. those were for assemblying aircraft parts built in the US. Roughly 300 airframes had been delivered and assembled in Morroco by the time France surrendered. Another 1500 were expected in the next six months.
Getting back to the OP:
Caesar Biden
Banned
Your best PoD would be The Munich Agreement falling apart, and as Germany and France mobilize, a coup is attempted by General Hans Oster and his cohorts as they go through with the coup they planned IOTL. So Civil War in Germany, coupled with war with Czechoslovakia, gives France and Britain enough time to mobilize and invade. It won't be a total WAllied victory, as they'll just end up negotiating with Oster's government to help him win the civil war, but it's possible they can still win this war.
So if the French plans were similar what the OP asked, then it would seem the easiest way to fulfill the OP would be to get the Poles to hold out longer. That doesn't seem terribly difficult on the face of it.
First, don't have the Poles agree to cancel their mobilization on August 30th. Going off what Carl and jahenders said, if France at least tried to stop the Germans from re-militarizing or actively fighting the annexation of Sudetenland then I don't see TTL's France putting pressure on Poland to cancel the mobilization. Having more of the army mobilized and in place alone extends the fighting in Poland.
Not sure how likely these other two PoD's are but they'd also help.
Second, if France resists the taking of Sudetenland then the Poles wouldn't need to have their defense plan focused so heavily on protecting the industrialized areas in the west and those areas the Nazis were contesting. Using a defense in depth would extend the campaign further.
Additionally, these two changes to the campaign might just dissuade Stalin from invading due to his usual caution and preference to move against easy targets. A Poland still holding its own would be a tougher nut to crack and definitely draw the attention of the WAllies.
This last change I think is harder to do because it requires going further back but in the 30's if Poland was less concerned with balanced budgets and focused more money on keeping the military equipment up to pace then the butterflies really get flying.
I think for the OP's question at least one of the two ideas mentioned for France's actions and at minimum a mobilized Poland (which is highly likely given a less hesitant France) should be enough to not only have the Poles hold out long enough but maybe also have the French and British be prepared just a little sooner and World War II turns into a separate European amd Pacific Wars.
EDIT: Just noticed Biden&Ceaser's post. Pre-Munich I'd agree that is the easiest way. Post-Munich then I fall back to my post and Carl and jahender's ideas.
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IIRC the Maginot Line on average cost roughly 5% of the annual defence budget during the period it was being built, that figure including both construction of the forts themselves and the guns to arm them with. Now you can perhaps argue that this 5%, and the manpower needed to man them, could have been better utilised elsewhere but you need to find a way to see it used in a new way and not just as they were already done. It's also worth noting that at the end of the day the Maginot Line worked in that it encouraged the Germans to take the invasion path that the French preferred, what came after that however was badly handled.
As Carl mentioned one of the main problems for the French military was the length of time it took to bring up their reserve formations. From memories of when threads like this have come up before I believe a major part of it was that the army was made up of a small core of professional troops with the bulk expected to come from conscripts or former conscripts called back, and that the way things were structured they weren't able to carry out a partial call-up but instead having to go either for a full one, which took a fair while and caused all the attendant disruptions to the economy making the government leery of it, or nothing. You can also throw in a good measure of mutual suspicion with the military having publicly criticised the then government of the day in the past and the politicians in turn not fully trusting the military so preferring conscription and reservists to a large standing army.
See: "A Blunted Sickle".
Steven Eden in "Military Blunders II," estimates that had the French instead spent those resources on tanks or planes they could have bought an additional 24 tank divisions, or 10,000 fighter planes. Obviously the Maginot Line was built over the course of a decade, so that by no means would have allowed France to actually enter WWII with an additional 24 tank divisions or 10,000 modern fighters - but had the French military been spending those resources developing its inter-war maneuver forces it would have had a much stronger foundation beneath it in 1940.
Steven Eden in "Military Blunders II," estimates that had the French instead spent those resources on tanks or planes they could have bought an additional 24 tank divisions, or 10,000 fighter planes. Obviously the Maginot Line was built over the course of a decade, so that by no means would have allowed France to actually enter WWII with an additional 24 tank divisions or 10,000 modern fighters - but had the French military been spending those resources developing its inter-war maneuver forces it would have had a much stronger foundation beneath it in 1940.
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I wonder how he calculates this. Randal Reed in a magazine article from the late 1960s provides this:
Reed goes on to point out French industry did not have the capacity to produce this many trucks, tanks, or aircraft; and it had limits on expansion. This was not simply factory floor space, machine tools, but clear limits on skilled labor. He goes on to refine his numbers to:
Motorized Infantry Divisions............+45...total 60
Armored Divisions.........................+10...total 17
Fighter Planes..........................+1,000...total 1,700 (modern types)
Bombers...................................+500...total 1,225 (modern types)
As part of his refinement he allows for cost of training, and support costs. that is the cost of adding a fighter pane is not just the cost of a air frame and a couple spare engines & other parts, but also the mechanics, riggers, fuel handlers, clerks, ect...
This cost of support crew then touches on limits of people. There only so many able bodied men, or women to allocate & France like most other nations could only increase one group by decreasing another. There was not a huge surplus labor force as there was in North America.
Anyway, that is Reeds estimate. One thing that some folks might catch is only sexy items like tanks or aircraft are calculated. Reed did not do estimates of items like extra corps artillery, AT guns, artillery ammunition.