How much did IJA vs. IJN rivalry hurt the Japanese war effort?
- Thread starter LestWeForget
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marathag
Banned
bad blood went back to the Warring States period, between Clans that were enemies then, and lasted, despite the Tokugawa Shogunate eliminating the Feudal Navies with tech limited until just before Perry showed up with his demands.
In the end it didn't matter, they couldn't win.
That being said, I think it could be argued that without the rivalry, the Japanese Navy would be much weaker.
That being said, I think it could be argued that without the rivalry, the Japanese Navy would be much weaker.
Did the entire govenment system not rely on the rivalry of IJN and IJA as they both had to summit seperate ministers to the civilian government and could colapse it by simply withdrawing them?
Without the rivalry would they not potentially not get into such an unwinnable war, by making more reasonable compromises at the top levels?
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Considering their limited resources the IJA literally building aircraft carriers and submarines probably didn't help.
Neither did all of those Juniour officers deciding to murder the other sides generals/ admirals they didn't like.
Neither did all of those Juniour officers deciding to murder the other sides generals/ admirals they didn't like.
What really hurt the IJA/IJN war effort was the US getting involved...
Randy
Obviously...the question is whether a more cohesive inter-service relationship could have made the Pacific War more difficult for the Americans and if so how much.
The navy would be weaker. Working with the army requires them to devote more time to logistics, asw, and troop transport, which weakens the Battle fleet, and this there wouldn't be a political will for the Southern Strategy.
That being said cooperation would probably lead to better air force coordination between the two branches when it comes to island defense.
If a WW2 broke out, they'd take less territory, but possibly hold it longer.
My initial response was mostly a joke but in context the relationship between the IJA and IJN was always contentious enough to be more like rival gangs than cohesive military branches. Let's keep in mind that inter-service rivalry always exists and it can in fact get so bad it is a detriment to the ability of a nation to carry out its own defense.
The US for example has been there several times, one good example being the inter-war rivalry where the Navy tended to lose out to Army (Air Corps actually) both in the public as well as political eye which was repeated after WWII to the point where the Air Force was actively pushing that the Navy, (and Army) be dissolved in favor of atomic bombs and air-power. (Truman's greatest failing as a President was he not only supported this idea but facilitated it to the point where both the Army and Navy were initially too weak to effectively prosecute the Korean War. Worse really was he also cut the AF and Atomic weapons budgets which heavily effected the actual ability to credibly defend US interests)
Now in context during the inter-war period services had to fight to gain funding to pursue projects and operations in the national defense, they back-stabbed each other, lied, cheated and stole as well as playing politicians and public opinion against each other. But in the end how much money and support they got was fully dependent on approval by the general public in the form of political support. While junior, (and often very senior
) officers would put out tons of propaganda in the forms of essays and articles in popular media which might aim to damage or reduce the "other" guys credibility and image that conflict was mostly non-lethal. If the US Navy or Army did not like a political decision or outcome they would muster the "troops" and their auxiliaries and go on the offensive in the media to appeal to the public while bombarding elected officials with data, studies and as many meetings as possible to change or modify the outcome.In Japan both the IJA and IJN were an integral part of the government, it could NOT operate without both of their cooperation and any time either did not like a decision or outcome they simply walked out and the government collapsed. Further junior officers routinely, (and quite often with both senior support and approval) would assassinate, attack, or intimidate officers from the other service, political opposition and each other. (And keep in mind this was a lot due to the very harsh discipline and general dehumanizing 'cultures' both branches had that was practiced from top to bottom) The 'conflict' between higher ranking officers while arguably more 'civilized' was none the less just as vicious and lethal.
if you contrast the two you immediately see the main problem in that while the US military was always beholden to political (and by extension public) over-sight whereas the IJA/IJN were able to control the government almost directly. Anytime things did not go their way they could, (and did) walk away and refuse to participate until they got what they wanted. And that inter-service hyper-rivalry carried over even into that realm.
So the general answer to your question is that "yes" a generally more cohesive and unified Japanese military in WWII could have made the Pacific war 'slightly' more difficult for the Allies in WWII, but more specifically had that rivalry and the political power it by necessity attained to further and limit that rivalry not been as much of a factor it's likely the entire history would have been vastly different.
But it was very much a factor for decades prior to this point which in and of itself drove the viciousness of the rivalry so the main question is how you defuse it from the start and what is the end result of all that.
I said I was "mostly" joking about the "war" actually being between the IJA and IJN in which the allies later 'disrupted' due to interference and I said "mostly" because in a very general sense that's the actual situation. As an island nation Japan initially sought and became a Naval power early in the 20th century. As part of the 'fallout' from that they gained large holdings (Korea) on the main-land and therefore needed an expanded Army to hold and occupy that area. That doing so brought in badly needed resources was lost on no one and so both to combat the resurgent Soviet (Russian) threat and to secure more resources, (and to very much accrue more power in political and financial terms) the IJA kept expanding. Several times specifically against orders from Tokyo. The IJN which was already in conflict with the expanding IJA took notice and redoubled its efforts but it's very hard to argue with what is seen as a 'winning' strategy so the IJA was in ascendance. Then things started to go wrong
The Soviets turned out NOT to be the Imperial Russian's and gave the Japanese some bloody noses which the IJN used where they could. Further world wide opposition in the form of aid and weapons were ensuring the "prize' that this had all been about, (China) was not falling and was in fact becoming a drain rather than a gain on resources.
Again somewhat to the delight of the IJN who could now point out that while they were not directly supporting continental operations, (they actually were in deploying aircraft and Naval battalions into ground combat where the IJA was short) they would need more resources and money so as to ensure Japan's interest against an increasing hostile world. As time went on and the IJA continued to struggle it became clear that certain powers (US/UK/Dutch and French) were adamant enough about Japanese expansion that they were going beyond just 'aiding' the enemy but actually restricting Japan's activities by apply hurtful resource and financial restrictions which were interfering with Japanese (at this point mostly IJA really) ambitions.
So in effect as the IJA saw it they were being forced by by outside factors to curtail activities that had been 'winning' the 'conflict' with the IJN by outside factors begin forced upon them by nations they saw as having little or no legitimate 'influence' over Asia. Worse from their perspective was that this was leading to a resurgence in power for the IJN. Something had to be done.
Now in none of this 'thinking' was it even considered that the 'rivalry' between the IJA and IJN should be set aside or toned down. THAT after all was the core and main conflict from the very start
This assumption of this all being only a 'temporary' truce in the on-going REAL "war" is probably best exemplified by the fact that as a routine measure both the IJA and IJN spied and ran information operations against each other for most of the war to try and find 'bad' news they could then use to embarrass and use to nibble away at the power of the other side. (And for a large part of the Pacific War of WWII it was the IJN that was 'carrying' the burden so very much yes every time the ILN had issues it was reported to the government by the IJA and not the IJN. IIRC Midway was the only time the IJA agreed to hold the information and that likely because they were having problems the IJN was holding over them at the time. Anyway you see the general problem I hope. it is very hard to get cohesive cooperation between two rival factions that are only "temporarily" aligned and fully expect to resume the 'main' conflict the moment the current 'distraction' is behind them. Hence they didn't even really start to coordinate till far to late in the war and only stopped actively working against each other when it was clear the survival of the Japanese nation was at stake. (And keep very much in mind there was no disagreement between the IJA and IJN that 'survival' meant a continued Japanese Empire in which they, and their rivalry, were still in power and that death as a people and nation was the only other possible outcome*)
As noted this all starts around the first part of the 20th Century and finding a way to NOT go down that toxic and self-destructive path is not easy.
Randy
*= As a key aside but rather off-topic to this conversation one needs to keep in mind that there was also a major gulf between the military, political and civilian populations with most civilians believing whole heartedly that the Emperor was not only the head of government but the head of state as well and that ALL aspects of society were beholden to and under his direct command. Hence Japan surrendering after hearing the Emperor state it whereas the military had no intentions of giving up. The general population was indoctrinated to think of the Emperors word as law and the military had used this belief even though they themselves have isolated and distanced him from the actual power base. (Not going to get into his 'guilt' or 'not-guilt' but we do know he made his feeling clear on certain subjects that the military in Japan may have agreed with or at least acted like they did but then "frontier" forces would go ahead and do whatever anyway with retroactive 'blessings' if it worked and condemning the guy on the spot if it didn't)
The main point being that the military despite having so much power had also invested so much "soft" power over the civilian population that into the image of the Emperor that once they failed to 'secure' (silence) him all their plans for resistance and ruin were useless as none of the public would support them.