How much better could the Soviets have done in January 1942?

[Pericles]

This is a point I've seen in a few sources about Barbarossa, but I like the summary in Wages of Destruction-

In the first days of January 1942, in the judgement of the most competent military analysts, the position of Army Group Centre was untenable. German 4th Army, whose Panzers had spearheaded the thrust towards Moscow, was threatened with encirclement on both its southern and northern flanks. If Army Group Centre had been broken, the entire Ostheer would have been forced, at the very least, into a far-reaching withdrawal. Moscow 1941 might well have become a disaster for the Wehrmacht even greater than it was to suffer at Stalingrad twelve months later. Tragically, however, it was precisely this sense of impending victory that led Stalin to overreach. Believing that he was in a position to win the war, on 7 January 1942 he ordered the Red Army onto the offensive along the entire 1,500 kilometere front line.

But, in retrospect, Stalin's failure to concentrate all his forces against the weakest point in the German line was a terrible mistake, enabling the Army Group Centre to stabilize its position at a distance of 100-150 kilometres from Moscow.

Is Tooze right? How well could the Soviets have done in early 1942 with a concentrated offensive? If an early Stalingrad or a proper 1812 repeat had occurred (depending on the specifics), how would the rest of the war have gone and how much sooner could the Allies have won? I wonder if this has been discussed here before, I haven't seen anything on it, but it sounds like an interesting PoD.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

It’s generally been acknowledged that the Soviet high command failed to concentrate its resources against Army Group Center and attempted to do too much too fast from January onward, although this was not so much all Stalin’s doing as some post-Stalin memoirs portrayed. It DOES remain uncertain whether the additional resources dispersed to other parts of the front would have been enough to inflict a Stalingrad-or-greater-style reverse on AGC, although one can definitely say the possibility is there.

 

[Pericles]

It’s generally been acknowledged that the Soviet high command failed to concentrate its resources against Army Group Center and attempted to do too much too fast from January onward, although this was not so much all Stalin’s doing as some post-Stalin memoirs portrayed. It DOES remain uncertain whether the additional resources dispersed to other parts of the front would have been enough to inflict a Stalingrad-or-greater-style reverse on AGC, although one can definitely say the possibility is there.

What sort of scenarios are we looking at with how the front could have developed differently?